Release of Seized Jewellery: 120-Day Limit Under Section 132B(1)(i) Held ‘Directory’; No Automatic Release if Explanation Verification is Pending

11. An examination of the terms of Article 320 shows that the word “shall” appears in almost every paragraph and every clause or sub-clause of that article. If it were held that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c) are mandatory in terms, the other clauses or subclauses of that article, will have to be equally held to be mandatory. If they are so held, any appointments made to the public services of the Union or a State, without observing strictly, the terms of these sub-clauses in clause (3) of Article 320, would adversely affect the person so appointed to a public service, without any fault on his part and without his having any say in the matter. This result could not have been contemplated by the makers of the Constitution. Hence, the use of the word “shall” in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word “may” has been used, the statute is only permissive or directory in the sense that noncompliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid. In that connection, the following quotation from Crawford on Statutory Construction— Article 261 atp. 516, is pertinent: “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other. ”

6. It was not disputed before us that when the Regulations were framed, no Board as required under Section 12 had been constituted, and so, necessarily there had been no reference to any Board as required under Section 59. The question raised is whether the omission to make such a reference makes the rules invalid. As has been recognised again and again by the courts, no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that non-observance thereof involves the consequence of invalidity or only directory, i.e., a direction the nonobservance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provisions that nonobservance of this would entail invalidity or did it not? To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same. In the present case we have to determine therefore on a consideration of all these matters whether the legislature intended that the provisions as regards the reference to the Mines Board could be contravened only on pain of invalidity of the regulation.”

8. A well-settled rule of interpretation of the statutes is that the use of the word “shall” in a statute, does not necessarily mean that in every case it is mandatory that unless the words of the statute are literally followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. It is not always correct to say that if the word “may” has been used, the statute is only permissive or directory in the sense that noncompliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid and that when a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. The principle of literal construction of the statute alone in all circumstances without examining the context and scheme of the statute may not serve the purpose of the statute.

9. The question as to whether, a time-limit fixed for a public officer to perform a public duty is directory or mandatory has been examined earlier by the courts as well. A question arose before the Privy Council in respect of irregularities in the preliminary proceedings for constituting a jury panel. The Municipality was expected to revise the list of qualified persons but the jury was drawn from the old list as the Sheriff neglected to revise the same. It was in these circumstances, the decision of the jury drawn from the old list became the subject-matter of consideration by the Privy Council. It was thus held that it would cause greater public inconvenience if it were held that neglecting to observe the provisions of the statute made the verdicts of all juries taken from the list ipso facto null and void so that no jury trials could be held until a duly revised list had been prepared.

10. The Constitution Bench of this Court held that when the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold acts done in neglect of this duty as null and void, would cause serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, the practice of the courts should be to hold such provisions as directory. In a seven-Bench judgment, this Court was considering as to whether the power of the Returning Officer to reject ballot papers is mandatory or directory. The Court examined well-recognised rules of construction to observe that a statute should be construed as directory if it relates to the performance of public duties, or if the conditions prescribed therein have to be performed by persons other than those on whom the right is conferred.

11. In a judgment reported as Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration. The argument raised was that the time limit of 30 days of publication of award by the Labour Court is mandatory. This Court held that though Section 17 is mandatory, the timelimit to publish the award within 30 days is directory inter alia for the reason that the nonpublication of the award within the period of thirty days does not entail any penalty.

12. In T.V. Usman v. Food Inspector, Tellicherry Municipality, the time period during which report of the analysis of a sample under Rule 7(3) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 was to be given, was held to be directory as there was no time-limit prescribed within which the prosecution had to be instituted. When there was no such limit prescribed then there was no valid reason for holding the period of 45 days as mandatory. Of course, that does not mean that the Public Analyst can ignore the time-limit prescribed under the Rules. He must in all cases try to comply with the time-limit. But if there is some delay, in a given case, there is no reason to hold that the very report is void and, on that basis, to hold that even prosecution cannot be launched.

13. This Court distinguished between failure of an individual to act in a given time-frame and the time-frame provided to a public authority, for the purposes of determining whether a provision was mandatory or directory, when this Court held that it is a well settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would ordinarily be mandatory but when a public functionary is required to perform a public function within a time-frame, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specified.

14. In P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, this Court examined the effect of non-publication of final electoral rolls before the time of acceptance of nomination papers. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 516, para 48)

“48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory.”

“15. A recent Constitution Bench held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act granting 30 days’ time to file response by the opposite party or such extended period not exceeding 15 days is mandatory as the object of the statute is for the benefit and protection of the consumer. It observed that such Act had been enacted to provide expeditious disposal of consumer disputes. In this case, an individual was called upon to file his written statement in contradiction for a pubic authority to decide the issue before it”

“21. The Act was enacted to provide a machinery for empowering banks and financial institutions, so that they may have the power to take possession of secured assets and to sell them. The DRT Act was first enacted to streamline the recovery of public dues but the proceedings under the said Act have not given desirous results. Therefore, the Act in question was enacted. This Court in Mardia Chemicals, Transcore and Hindon Forge (P) Ltd. has held that the purpose of the Act pertains to the speedy recovery of dues, by banks and financial institutions. The true intention of the legislature is a determining factor herein. Keeping the objective of the Act in mind, the time-limit to take action by the District Magistrate has been fixed to impress upon the authority to take possession of the secured assets. However, inability to take possession within timelimit does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. The secured creditor has no control over the District Magistrate who is exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act for public good to facilitate recovery of public dues. Therefore, Section 14 of the Act is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act. If any other interpretation is placed upon the language of Section 14, it would be contrary to the purpose of the Act. The time-limit is to instil a confidence in creditors that the District Magistrate will make an attempt to deliver possession as well as to impose a duty on the District Magistrate to make an earnest effort to comply with the mandate of the statute to deliver the possession within 30 days and for reasons to be recorded within 60 days. In this light, the remedy under Section 14 of the Act is not rendered redundant if the District Magistrate is unable to handover the possession. The District Magistrate will still be enjoined upon, the duty to facilitate delivery of possession at the earliest.” (emphasis supplied)

“4 (a) The Central Government shall pay simple interest at the rate of [one-half per cent. for every month or part of a month] on the amount by which the aggregate amount of money seized under section 132 or requisitioned under section 132A, as reduced by the amount of money, if any, released under the first proviso to clause (I) of sub-section (1), and of the proceeds, if any, of the assets sold towards the discharge of the existing liability referred to in clause (I) of sub-section (1), exceeds the aggregate of the amount required to meet the liabilities referred to in clause (I) of subsection (1) of this section.

(b) Such interest shall run from the date immediately following the expiry of the period of one hundred and twenty days from the date on which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A was executed to the date of completion of the assessment [or reassessment or recomputation]”

“132. (8) The books of account or other documents seized under sub-section (1) or subsection (1-A) shall not be retained by the authorised officer for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of seizure unless the reasons for retaining the same are recorded by him in writing and the approval of the Commissioner for such retention is obtained.”

“40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority’.”

“73. Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court’s ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.

74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself.

78. What is this charming principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness? Is it a magical formula? In R. v. Askew [(1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139], Lord Mansfield considered the question whether mandamus should be granted against the College of Physicians. He expressed the relevant principles in two eloquent sentences. They gained greater value two centuries later: “It is true, that the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning and sufficiency to exercise and practice this profession is trusted to the College of Physicians and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus committed to them ought to be fair, candid and unprejudiced; not arbitrary, capricious, or biased; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike.”

80. At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted:

“4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680], per Lord Greene, M.R.)”

82. Bernard Schwartz in Administrative Law, 2^nd Edn., p. 584 has this to say:

“If the scope of review is too broad, agencies are turned into little more than media for the transmission of cases to the courts. That would destroy the values of agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields. At the same time, the scope of judicial inquiry must not be so restricted that it prevents full inquiry into the question of legality. If that question cannot be properly explored by the judge, the right to review becomes meaningless. ‘It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeless formality for the litigant..

It reduces the judicial process in such cases to a mere feint.’ Two overriding considerations have combined to narrow the scope of review. The first is that of deference to the administrative expert. In Chief Justice Neely’s words:

‘I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a judge and from those limitations I generalise to the inherent limitations of all appellate courts reviewing rate cases. It must be remembered that this Court sees approximately 1262 cases a year with five judges. I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, stock broker, or systems management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of public utility operation.’

It is not the function of a judge to act as a superboard, or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator.

The result is a theory of review that limits the extent to which the discretion of the expert may be scrutinised by the non-expert judge. The alternative is for the court to overrule the agency on technical matters where all the advantages of expertise lie with the agencies. Ifa court were to review fully the decision of a body such as state board of medical examiners ‘it would find itself wandering amid the maze of therapeutics or boggling at the mysteries of the pharmacopoeia’. Such a situation as a state court expressed it many years ago ‘is not a case of the blind leading the blind but of one who has always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing and has always used them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to the matter in question’. The second consideration leading to narrow review is that of calendar pressure. In practical terms it may be the more important consideration. More than any theory of limited review it is the pressure of the judicial calendar combined with the elephantine bulk of the record in so many review proceedings which leads to perfunctory affirmance of the vast majority of agency decisions.”

94. The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.

(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

(4).”