Statutory Rigidity of Limitation in GST Appeals

1. The Core Dispute: Delay Beyond the “Outer Limit”

The petitioner challenged an order from the Appellate Authority which had rejected their appeal as time-barred. The appeal pertained to a demand order for the period 2020-21 but was filed significantly after the statutory deadline.

Assessee’s Stand: Claimed that the delay was due to a “misunderstanding” of the order (mistaking it for a duplicate) or “lack of knowledge” regarding the uploading of the order on the GST portal.
Revenue’s Stand: Argued that the Appellate Authority has no jurisdiction to condone any delay beyond the additional one-month grace period provided under Section 107(4).

2. Legal Analysis: The 120-Day Inflexible Barrier

The High Court meticulously examined the legislative framework of the GST Act to determine the extent of its own writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in relation to statutory timelines.

I. Legislative Intent and Section 107(4)

The Court noted that Section 107 prescribes a specific limitation of three months, with an additional condonable period of one month (totaling approximately 120 days) if sufficient cause is shown.

The Ruling: The Court held that this 120-day limit is a “statutory command.” Any attempt by the High Court to condone a delay beyond this period would render the legislative intent otiose (useless). Even the wide powers under Article 226 cannot be used to bypass an explicit legislative bar.

II. The Requirement for Taxpayer Vigilance

The Court rejected the assessee’s plea of “lack of portal knowledge.”

Finding: As a registered person engaged in business and filing refund applications, the assessee is expected to be digitally literate and regularly verify the GST portal. Taxing statutes function within strict timeframes to ensure revenue certainty; “portal ignorance” is not a valid legal excuse in a digital tax regime.

3. Final Ruling: Judicial Restraint and Dismissal

The Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a “creature of statute” and must be exercised within the conditions set by that statute.

Verdict: The writ petition was rejected.
Observations: The Court noted that the assessee only sought to challenge the original show-cause notice after the appeal was dismissed on delay—a “sudden wisdom” that the Court found lacked merit.

Key Takeaways for Taxpayers

The 120-Day Rule is Absolute: Unlike the general Limitation Act, GST law provides a hard cap. Once 120 days pass from the date of communication of the order, neither the Appellate Authority nor the High Court can typically revive the appeal.
Portal Monitoring is Mandatory: Relying on physical notices is insufficient. Taxpayers must treat the GST portal as the primary communication hub.
Avoid Alternative Reasons: The Court took a dim view of the assessee providing different reasons for the delay in the application (misunderstanding) versus the writ petition (lack of knowledge), labeling them as unsatisfactory.

HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Hariom Industries

State of Gujarat^*

A.S. Supehia and Pranav Trivedi, JJ.

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15039 of 2025

JANUARY 22, 2026

Abhay Y Desai for the Petitioner. Ms Nimisha Parekh, AGP for the Respondent.

ORDER

A.S. Supehia, J.- The present writ petition has been filed seeking direction for quashing and setting aside the impugned Show Cause Notice dated 10.09.2024, order dated 30.12.2024, and the appellate order dated 02.08.2025.

2. The Appellate authority, the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax, (Appeal-1), Division-2, Ahmedabad, vide order dated 02.08.2025 has been rejected the appeal on the ground of delay. Admittedly, the appeal has been filed after a delay of 408 days, which is beyond the statutory period of 120 days.

3. The present petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and supplying submersible pump stampings. The petitioner is duly registered under GST in the State of Gujarat bearing registration No.24ALZPP5568Q1ZQ.

4. During Financial Year (FY) 2020-21, the petitioner had purchased / received goods (i.e. SS Round Bar) from Vinayak Steel (proprietorship of Patel Jayeshbhai Babubhai) (“supplier”), bearing GSTIN: 24AJPPP1801N1ZY, for a taxable value of Rs.51,09,450/-. The said supplier had issued tax invoices from time to time for the supply of goods and charged applicable GST at 18%, amounting to Rs.9,19,702/- (CGST: Rs.4,59,851/- & SGST: Rs.4,59,851/-) on the invoices and collected the same from the petitioner. The said supplier had also generated the e-way bill for the movement of the goods from its place of business to the place of business of the petitioner as per Rule 138(1) of the Gujarat State GST Rules, 2017 (“the GGST Rules, 2017”), read with Section 68 of the Gujarat State GST Act, 2017(“the GGST Act, 2017”).

5. During the same period (FY 2020-21), the petitioner also purchased inputs from Umiya Enterprise (proprietorship of Patel Hiren Bharatbhai), bearing GSTIN 24BUIPP3185Q1ZV. The petitioner availed ITC amounting to Rs.8,80,210/- (CGST of Rs.4,40,105/- and SGST of Rs.4,40,105/-) in GSTR-3B filed for FY 2020-21.

6. The State Tax Officer, Enforcement-2, Ahmedabad, undertook scrutiny of the returns filed by the petitioner for FY 2020-21 and issued an intimation in FORM DRC-01A dated 03.10.2022, indicating that the ITC of Rs.8,80,210/- availed by the petitioner in respect of purchases from Umiya Enterprise was not eligible since the said supplier was alleged to be nonexistent. A show-cause notice dated 14.12.2022 came to be issued under Section 74(1) of the GGST Act, 2017, seeking to recover the ITC availed in respect of the said supplier.

7. The petitioner preferred an appeal on 30.05.2024 against the aforementioned order dated 13.05.2024 under Section 107(1) of the GGST Act, 2017.

8. Subsequent to the issuance of the aforementioned order dated 13.05.2024, the respondent No. 1, based on algorithmbased scrutiny of the returns filed by the petitioner, issued a pre-SCN intimation under Rule 142(1A) of the GGST Rules, 2017, read with Section 74(5) of the GGST Act, 2017, in Part-A of FORM GST DRC-01A dated 13/06/2024, intimating the proposed tax liability of Rs. 17,99,912/- (CGST: Rs. 8,99,956/-& SGST: Rs. 8,99,956/-), along with applicable interest under Section 50 of the GGST Act, 2017, and penalty under Section 74 of the GGST Act, 2017, alleging that the ITC of Rs.9,19,702/-availed on inward supplies received from M/s. Vinayak Steel and ITC of Rs.8,80,210/- availed on inward supplies received from Umiya Enterprise was found to be from non-genuine/non-existent taxpayers, and hence the said Input Tax Credit (ITC) was allegedly ineligible under Section 16(2) of the GGST Act, 2017.

9. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a reply to the said pre-Show Cause Notice (SCN) intimation in Part-B of FORM GST DRC-01A on 22/06/2024. The petitioner submitted that, in respect of the ITC dispute pertaining to Umiya Enterprise, it had already received an order demanding the said ITC and hence requested dropping of further proceedings. With respect to the ITC availed pertaining to M/s.Vinayak Steel, the petitioner submitted copies of the bills, payment details, e-way bills, as well as GSTR-2A reflecting the said ITC. The petitioner also submitted that the GST registration of M/s. Vinayak Steel was duly active at the time of receiving the inward supplies.

10-11. The petitioner filed an appeal in FORM GST APL-01 before the learned Deputy Commissioner of State Tax (Appeal-1), Division-2, Ahmedabad (“Appellate Authority”) on 08.05.2025 against the order passed by the respondent No. 2. As the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed time limit, the Petitioner also submitted an application for condonation of delay, citing bona fide reasons. Ultimately, the appeal has been rejected on the ground of delay.

12. Learned advocate Mr.Abhay Y. Desai, appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner was under the bona fide belief that, after making the submissions, the respondent-authorities would have dropped the demand and he was not aware of the order being passed by the adjudicating authority as it was issued only on the GSTN portal, hence, no action could be taken by the petitioner in the absence of any such knowledge of the order. It is submitted that since the petitioner was issued the notice on 25.04.2025 and the bank had received the notice on 06.05.2025, it informed the petitioner on 06.05.2025 about the receipt of the notice for recovery of the dues. It is submitted that the petitioner immediately filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax (Appeal-1), Division-2, Ahmedabad, challenging the order passed by the respondent No.2; however, the same has been rejected on the ground of delay. Thus, it is submitted that the delay had occurred because of lack of knowledge of the passing of the order on the GSTN portal and also because, for the same year, i.e. 2020-2021, an order dated 13.05.2025 had already been issued by the State Tax Officer, Division-2, Gujarat, on the same issue of ineligible Input Tax Credit. The petitioner had hoped that the appeal would have been entertained. Thus, it is urged that the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that the impugned Show Cause Notice itself was issued without jurisdiction and hence, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside.

13. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Nimisha Parekh, appearing for the respondent-authorities, has urged that the writ petition may not be entertained in view of the settled legal precedent and in view of the statutory provisions of law that the delay beyond the statutory period of 120 days may not be entertained.

14. It is not in dispute that the petitioner filed an appeal under the provisions of Section 107 of the GGST Act, 2017 before the office of the Deputy Commissioner of State Tax. The appeal was against the order dated 30.12.2024. It is also an admitted fact that the same was beyond the statutory limitation of 120 days.

15. At this stage, we may refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Asstt. Commissioner (CT) LTU v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd.GSTL 305 (SC)/19 SCC 681. The Apex Court while examining the issue analogs to the issue of Sales Tax and Value Added Tax (VAT), Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and provisions of Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides power of Appellate Authority to condone the delay and power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has held that the Appellate Authority has no power to condone the delay, if an appeal is preferred after the aggregate period. However, it is held that though the powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. It is held as under :-

“16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors., the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result, this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors., Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors. and Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited v. Electricity Department represented by its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.”

16. Thus, the Apex Court in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. (supra) has cautioned that the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court (High Court) for maintaining an appeal beyond the maximum period provided in Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2023, it has held as under :-

“15 In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court went to observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however added a word of caution and expounded that the Constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pas orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.”

17. The Apex Court has also referred to the array of decisions dealing with provision of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in case of Special Legislation. One of such which has been rendered in the said decision is in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC 42, wherein it is held thus :-

“15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584]. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.”

18. The Apex Court has further held in the case of Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. (supra) as under :-

“19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company v. Commissioner of Central Excise (AppealI), Bangalore 20. The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) 33 on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also nonsuit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act,the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose.

xxx xxx xxx

22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such.”

19. Thus, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition is filed after the expiry of maximum prescribed period of limitation, though alternative efficacious remedy is available, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course and doing so would be in teeth of principle of dictum underlying the dictum of three Judge’s Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. (supra). The Apex Court has further held that, albeit, the High Court has wide powers, but the same does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and if the same is done, it would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. Thus, on the same principles as enunciated by the Apex Court, we are not inclined to set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority and more particularly in wake of the lame excuse given by the petitioner for condoning the delay such as the illness of the Accountant and closure of business.

20. We may also refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur [2008] 12 STT 21 (SC)/Appeal (Civil) No.5949 of 2007 decided on 14.12.2007 wherein the Apex Court has refused to accept the reason of belatedly filing of the appeal on the pretext of lack of experience and closure of business.

21. Section 107 (4) of the CGST / GGST Act, 2017 grants discretion to the Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case he/she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from presenting the appeal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression “sufficient cause” can be raised by the appellant during the extended period of one month. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with “Savings”, which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the “sufficient cause”. The reason assigned by the appellant in his application for condonation of delay dated 08.05.2025 is appeal memo is that due to misunderstanding of the appellate order as an original order, though it was an duplicate, the delay has occurred. Whereas in the writ petition, the reason mentioned is lack of knowledge of passing the order on GSTIN portal. We do not find the reason assigned by the petitioner satisfactory, as the petitioner is supposed to verify all orders passed on the GSTIN portal since he is engaged in business and has also filed refund applications. We clarify that even if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days. The taxpayers are supposed to remain vigilant of all proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal. The taxing statutes operate within very strict time frames, and any relaxation or easing of the limitation period will have a cascading effect on the functioning of the revenue.

22. It is interesting to note that the petitioner is seeking to challenge the show-cause notice after his appeal has been dismissed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of delay. The petitioner did not choose to challenge the show-cause notice at the relevant time and, all of a sudden, wisdom prevailed upon him, and he has challenged the same after the dismissal of the appeal.

23. In view of the settled legal precedents, we are not inclined to interfere neither with the impugned show cause not nor the impugned order.

24. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is REJECTED.