Section 161 Rectification Does Not Apply to a Show-Cause Notice; Objections Must Be Raised in SCN Reply.
Issue
Can a taxpayer file an application under Section 161 of the CGST Act to rectify alleged “errors apparent on the record” (like valuation disputes or non-consideration of paid taxes) in a Show-Cause Notice (SCN)?
Facts
- The petitioner received a Show-Cause Notice (SCN).
- Instead of filing a formal reply, the petitioner filed a rectification application under Section 161.
- The application alleged that the SCN was defective as it ignored taxes already paid and raised incorrect valuation issues, which the petitioner considered “errors apparent.”
- The tax authority rejected this rectification application without a prior hearing.
- The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the rejection.
Decision
- The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
- It held that the power to rectify “errors apparent on the record” under Section 161 applies to orders, decisions, or notices that have an immediate prejudicial or demand effect.
- A Show-Cause Notice (SCN) does not create any liability; it merely initiates a proceeding. Therefore, it is not an instrument that can be rectified under Section 161.
- The court ruled that the alleged “mistakes” (like valuation issues) are disputed questions of fact and law, not “errors apparent.”
- The proper forum for the petitioner to raise these objections is in their reply to the SCN.
- The court viewed the use of Section 161 in this manner as inappropriate and a tactic to delay the adjudication.
Key Takeaways
- A Show-Cause Notice (SCN) is not an order, decision, or notice that can be rectified under Section 161 of the CGST Act.
- The legal remedy to challenge the contents, facts, or legal basis of an SCN is the SCN reply itself, where all objections must be raised.
- “Errors apparent” are clerical or arithmetical mistakes, not complex, disputed questions of fact (like valuation of supplies).
- Filing a rectification application against an SCN is an inappropriate procedure and may be seen as an attempt to delay the adjudication process.
HC Declines to Quash SCN on Parallel Proceedings Plea, Citing Disputed Facts.
Issue
Can a High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, quash a Show-Cause Notice (SCN) at the pre-adjudication stage on the grounds of a bar on parallel proceedings (Section 6(2)(b)), especially when the scope of the parallel proceedings is a disputed factual matter?
Facts
- The petitioner received a Show-Cause Notice (SCN).
- Instead of filing a reply, the petitioner immediately filed a writ petition seeking to quash the SCN.
- The primary ground for the writ was the statutory bar on parallel proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, alleging another authority was investigating the same matter.
- The case was at the pre-adjudication stage, and no final order had been passed.
Decision
- The High Court dismissed the writ petition as premature.
- It held that a writ petition to quash an SCN is only maintainable in exceptional cases (e.g., total lack of jurisdiction, clear breach of natural justice), and this was not one of them.
- The court ruled that the petitioner’s plea requires a factual examination to determine if the scope and periods of the parallel proceedings are truly identical, which is a disputed question of fact.
- Such factual inquiries cannot be conducted in writ jurisdiction.
- The petitioner has an efficacious alternate remedy: they must file a reply to the SCN and raise the Section 6(2)(b) plea before the adjudicating authority.
Key Takeaways
- A High Court will generally not interfere with a Show-Cause Notice (SCN) at the pre-adjudication stage.
- The plea of a bar on “parallel proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b) is a mixed question of fact and law (it requires proving the “same subject matter”).
- The correct procedure is to raise all objections, including jurisdictional ones, in the SCN reply for the adjudicating authority to decide first.
- Filing a writ petition against an SCN is generally considered premature and will be dismissed if an alternate remedy exists.
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
JSW Techno Projects Management Ltd.
v.
Union of India*
M.S. Sonak and Advait M. Sethna, JJ.
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 30130 OF 2025
OCTOBER 9, 2025
Vipin Kumar Jain, Vishal Agarwal, Advs. and Ms. Heema Doshi for the Petitioner. Ram Ochani, Ms. Sangeeta Yadav, Addl.G.P and Ms. Jyoti Chavan, Addl. G.P. for the Respondent.
ORDER
M.S. Sonak, J.- Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The challenge in this Petition is to the impugned Rejection Letter dated 21 August 2025, by which the Petitioners’ Application under Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“CGST Act”), for correcting, what the Petitioners described as an error apparent on the face of the record in the show cause notice dated 30 June 2025, was rejected.
3. The Petitioners have also independently challenged the show cause notice dated 30 June 2025, on the ground that it violates the provision of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate GST 400/101 GSTL 289 /(2025) 145 GSTR 385 (SC).
4. Mr Jain submitted that the impugned show cause notice dated 30 June 2025 does not give credence to the taxes already paid by the Petitioner. This, according to him, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned show cause notice dated 30 June 2025, and therefore, this error was required to be corrected by the authority which had issued the impugned show cause notice by exercising the powers under Section 161 of the CGST Act. He submitted that in any event, a hearing should have been granted before rejecting the Petitioner’s Application for Rectification.
5. We have considered the above submission, but we find no merit in the same. Section 161 no doubt refers to rectification of errors apparent on the face of record in any decision, order, notice, certificate, or any other document to rectify any error which is apparent on the face of record.
6. However, the reference to “notice”, must be construed in the context of the other documents or instruments referred to under Section 161. So construed, that would include a notice, which has some immediate effect of occasioning any serious prejudice to the Petitioner or demanding from the Petitioner some amount based upon an adjudication or finalized adjudication.
7. In this case, we are only concerned with a show-cause notice. Apart from the fact that no case of an error apparent on the face of the record has been established, we believe that any error, if any, in the show cause notice can always be pointed out by the Petitioner by submitting a response to the show cause notice. If a response is submitted, supported by documentary evidence of payments as claimed, we see no reason to doubt that the adjudicating authority would not consider it. This approach of seeking rectification of a showcause notice seems to be a tactic to delay the adjudication process related to the show-cause notice for as long as possible.
8. The show-cause notice, by itself, imposes no liability or raises no binding demands upon the petitioner. If the petitioners believe that figures stated therein are excessive or erroneous, they can always point out the alleged errors in the show-cause notice in their response. The adjudicating authority would then consider such a cause or contention. But, resorting to Section 161 simply to correct what the petitioners perceive is an error, is inappropriate, and an attempt to unnecessarily delay the adjudication proceedings by adopting such a stratagem.
9. We get the impression that the Petitioner is intent on delaying the adjudication in the show cause notice at all costs. Therefore, an application was filed to amend the show cause notice itself so that a significant amount of time would pass before a decision is made on such an application. Further time is spent prosecuting a challenge against the decision.
10. The petitioners, aware of the heavy pressure on the Court’s dockets, tend to see if any notice, or even interim relief, can be wriggled out. Even with a notice, proceedings are invariably delayed by citing pendency. As a writ Court exercising equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, we do not believe we should assist the petitioners in hindering or delaying the adjudication, especially since they have ample opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and present their grievances.
11. The rectification application, in any event, proceeds upon some complicated claim of discharging GST on the entirety of job charges received from JSW Steel. There is also an issue of interpretation of section 15(2)(b) and Circular dated 26.03.2018 involved in determining whether the value of the free of cost supplies, such as water or power, is includable. These contested and disputable issues can hardly qualify as any errors apparent on the face of the record. All these matters could not have been examined under section 161 of the CGST Act. These matters will need to be examined during the adjudication proceedings if the petitioners raise such issues in response to the show-cause notice. The writ Court also cannot be expected to examine such disputed issues, particularly when the purpose of raising such disputed issues in this manner appears to be a ploy to take a chance and see if some interim relief could be wriggled out to stall or at least delay the adjudication proceedings as long as possible.
12. Regarding the hearing, we observe that the impugned rejection does not dismiss the petitioners’ claims on the merits but solely because of the absence of an apparent error on the face of the record. In any case, we have heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners thoroughly, and we are also convinced that there was no need to seek rectification in the show-cause notice when all arguments about the alleged nonaccounting of payments could have been raised in response to it. There is no such thing as a technical breach of natural justice. No prejudice has been established whatsoever. No decision regarding rectification in a show-cause notice was cited before us, possibly because a show-cause notice is issued precisely to give the opportunity for the notice to present its side or even point out errors in the allegations contained within the notice.
13. Regarding the argument based upon the provision of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, again, we note that there are factual issues that will have to be gone into before such an argument is accepted. The scope of the proceedings initiated by the third respondent and the present proceedings would have to be examined in depth to see if the provisions of Section 6(2)(b) are indeed attracted to the facts of this case. Only if a clear case not admitting of any such disputed issues is involved, could we have entertained a petition. Armour Security (supra) was one such case.
14. As observed earlier, before applying the decision in the case of Armour Security (India) Ltd. (supra), the factual aspects that need to be examined, the scope and import of the two proceedings need to be examined, and some reference to factual issues now raised in this petition would also need to be verified. All these matters need not be examined in these proceedings when the petitioners have not made out any exceptional case to deviate from the normal practice of not entertaining writ petitions unless all alternate remedies are exhausted.
15. The Petitioner should at least place such facts by responding to the show cause notice. Apart from some overlap, even the periods for which the impugned show-cause notice is issued, at least prima facie, appear to be different. A mere assertion that the issue is common is not sufficient to make out a case that the impugned show-cause notice is wholly without jurisdiction to attract the principle in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1
16. To that extent, we find that this Petition is quite premature and has been filed merely to take a chance. The filing of such Petitions is on the rise in this Court, and we have addressed such issues in the case of Oberoi Constructions Ltd. v. Union of India GSTL 101 (Bombay)/2024 SCC OnLine 3508. By adopting the reasoning in the said decision and the precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to therein, we decline to entertain this petition.
17. Nonetheless, we have intentionally refrained from making any detailed observations on the two pleas now presented by the petitioner because we do not wish to even remotely prejudice the petitioner in its defence during the adjudication proceedings.
18. However, we clarify that it would be open to the Petitioners to respond to the show cause notice and place all facts and circumstances necessary to sustain an argument based on Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. Again, there is no reason to believe that such a contention or for that matter, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Armour Security (India) Ltd. (supra), will not be considered by the authority that has issued the show cause notice.
19. For the above reasons, we decline to entertain this Petition. For taking the chance, we were inclined to impose costs payable to the Government KEM Hospital, within four weeks from the date of uploading this order. However, at the persuasion of Mr Jain, we refrain from imposing any costs. Still, we feel that the Petitioner should, on its own, consider offering an amount of at least Rs. One lakh to the Government KEM Hospital as a part of its corporate social responsibility. Again, we clarify that this is not a direction.
20. The Petition is dismissed in the above terms.