Reopening quashed as Assessee’s name not in seized material and transaction nature misidentified
Issue
Whether the Assessing Officer (AO) can assume jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under Section 147 based on third-party search information alleging “bogus loans,” when the assessee’s name did not appear in the seized material and the actual transaction was of a different nature (commission payment).
Facts
Trigger: Information was received that a group company of one ‘D’ was providing accommodation entries. A search on ‘D’ yielded digital data showing huge bogus loans and advances.
Reopening: Based on this, the AO issued a reopening notice to the assessee-firm, alleging it had taken/given bogus loans from/to ‘D’.
Assessee’s Objection: The assessee objected, stating:
Its name did not appear in any of the seized material found with ‘D’.
It had never provided/taken any loans or advances to/from ‘D’.
It had only paid commission to ‘D’, which was duly recorded.
AO’s Rejection: The AO rejected the objections without bringing any contrary material on record, merely asserting on surmises that the assessee was a “beneficiary.”
Decision
No Link in Seized Data: The Court noted that the assessee’s name was admittedly not found in the seized digital data of ‘D’.
Wrong Basis: The entire premise of the reopening was “bogus loans and advances.” However, the assessee demonstrated that its only relation with ‘D’ was regarding “commission payments.” The AO failed to controvert this fact.
Surmises vs. Belief: Rejection of objections based on vague “surmises and conjectures” without specific evidence linking the assessee to the alleged type of transaction (loans) is legally unsustainable.
Lack of Jurisdiction: Since the very basis (loans) for the belief that income had escaped assessment was factually incorrect and unsupported by the seized material, the AO could not have formed a valid prima facie belief.
Ruling: The reassessment notice and the order rejecting objections were quashed.
Key Takeaways
Specific Link Required: Information from a third-party search must specifically link the assessee to the incriminating data. A general allegation against a “group” without naming the specific assessee is insufficient for reopening.
Nature of Transaction Matters: If the Reasons for Reopening allege “Bogus Loans” but the actual transaction is “Commission” or “Purchases,” the reopening is often liable to be quashed for “non-application of mind.”
HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Siddhi Corporation
v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax Circle – 3(1)(1) Ahmedabad
BHARGAV D. KARIA and Pranav Trivedi, JJ.
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5530 of 2023
SEPTEMBER 23, 2025
B.S. Soparkar for the Petitioner. Ms. Maithili D. Mehta for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
Bhargav D. Karia, J.- Heard learned advocate Mr. B.S. Soparkar for the petitioner and learned Senior Standing Counsel Ms. Maithili Mehta for the respondent.
2. Having regard to the controversy involved in this petition in narrow compass, with consent of learned advocates, the matter is taken up for hearing.
3. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Senior Standing Counsel Ms. Maithili Mehta waives service of notice of rule for respondent.
4. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘the Act’) dated 20.4.2021 and the order under Section 148A(d) of the Act dated 20.8.2022 and the notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 23.8.2022 issued pursuant to the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. Ashish Agarwal (SC).
5. The brief facts of the case are as under:
5.1 The petitioner, which is a partnership firm, filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2013-14 on 30.9.2013 declaring total income at Rs. 1,53,68,182/- which was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act.
5.2 The case of the petitioner was selected for scrutiny assessment and Assessment Order under Section 143(3) of the Act was passed on 17.12.2016 accepting the return income.
5.3 The petitioner, thereafter, received a notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 20.4.2021 for reopening the assessment for the A.Y. 2013-14. The said notice was issued under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act (for short ‘TOLA’) on the ground that there was extension of the time limit by the said Act, however, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ashish Agrawal (supra) and thereafter in case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal (SC) has provided guidelines for considering such notice issued under TOLA. Accordingly, the notice issued under Section 148 dated 20.4.2021 was considered to be notice issued under Section 148A(d) of the Act in view of the power exercised by the Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and the respondent Assessing Officer provided the information and the documents relied upon for issuance of the notice in the form of reasons recorded. The petitioner also received the documents from the respondent Assessing Officer for issuance of the notice. The petitioner filed the objections dated 15.6.2022 to the notice under Section 148A(d) of the Act issued by the respondent on 26.5.2022. The petitioner thereafter received a letter dated 20.6.2022, which was replied on 14.7.2022 and thereafter the impugned order under Section 148A(d) was passed on 20.8.2022 rejecting the objections of the petitioner along with notice under Section 148 of the Act dated 23.8.2022.
6. Being aggrieved the petitioner has preferred this petition.
7. Learned advocate Mr. B.S. Soparkar for the petitioner submitted that the respondent Assessing Officer did not provide all the documents as directed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Ashish Agarwal (supra) and there is no information made available to the petitioner which suggest that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment as, on perusal of the reasons recorded, name of the petitioner is not appearing in any of the information provided to the petitioner.
7.1 It was further submitted that the petitioner has not provided any loans or advances to the Dishman Group of Companies but the petitioner has only paid the commission to the Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited, which is considered as loans and advances. It was also pointed out from the reasons recorded that the name of “Bluetron’ was mentioned for transaction of amount of Rs.59,26,227/- entered into by the petitioner for payment of commission to Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited, during the year under consideration for the orders received from PGVCL and DGVCL respectively.
7.2 It was also pointed out that the petitioner has submitted before the Assessing Officer that the petitioner paid service tax on the amount of commission and TDS @ 10% was also deducted by the petitioner on the amount of commission paid to Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Limited. It was, therefore, submitted that there was no transaction of loans and advances between the petitioner and any of the Companies of Dishman Group, which is alleged to have been involved in providing accommodation entry.
7.3 Learned advocate Mr. Soparkar also submitted that the name of the petitioner is not appearing in any of the information and documents which were found during the course of search in the Dishman Group. It was, therefore, submitted that there is no information with the Assessing Officer to suggest that the income chargeable to tax has escaped the assessment for the year under consideration so as to assume the jurisdiction to reopen the assessment of the petitioner for A.Y. 2013-14. In support of his submission reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in case of Filco Trade Centre (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (Gujarat).
8. Per contra, learned Senior Standing Counsel Ms. Maithili Mehta for the respondent submitted that the petitioner has paid commission to the M/s. Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., however,the said Company is also involved in bogus purchase of expenses and, therefore, any transaction entered into such Company has to be considered as prima-facie bogus by the respondent Assessing Officer and, therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent Assessing Officer could not have assumed the jurisdiction on the basis of information received because it has inferred and concluded that when the loans and advances are received by M/s. Dishman Group of Companies, it implies that such amount of loans and advances are received by payment of equal cash to the petitioner.
8.1 In support of her submissions, reliance was placed on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent:
“5. The Brief facts of the case are that the assessee had filed its return of income for A.Y.2013-14 on 30.09.2013 declaring total income of Rs. 1,53,68,182/-. Return was processed by the CPC u/s 143(1) of the Act. The case was selected for scrutiny and the assessment was finalized u/s. 143(3) on 27.12.2016 assessing the income at return income. In the instant case, information(s) in the case of assessee was received for fictitious loan and fictitious purchases. Accordingly, reasons of reopening in the case of assessee were recorded and notice under section 148 of the Act was issued to the assessee on 20.04.2021.
On perusal of the information available on record, it is noticed that a search & seizure action u/s 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was conducted, in the case of “Dishman Group” of companies on 19/12/2019 on the office premises of M/s Dishman Carbogen Amics Limited situated at Dishman Corporate House, Ambli, Ahmedabad. From the said premises, various incriminating material such as loose papers, diary, cash books, vouchers, digital data were found and seized.
Upon verification of digital data in the computer of Shri Chirag Thakkar, accountant of the company, found and seized from the office premises of Dishman Carbogen Amics Limited, the group was found to be indulged in huge transactions of bogus loans and advances. The company M/s. DCAL (DPCL earlier) is found to have received Rs. 671,92,06,680/- in the form of bogus loans and advances. They have advanced Rs. 795,00,36,904/ in the form of bogus loans and advances between FY 2009-10 to FY 20192020 and had transactions with Jignesh Shah, Sanjay Tibrewal, Dahyabhai Thakkar, Umang Thakkar and Pratik Shah etc. The concerns operated by these persons, with whom transactions were made by Dishman group companies, were non-existent and dubious.
Digital Data found and seized from Dishman House; More particularly the desktop of Chirag Thakkar and data maintained in pen drive at Dishman House by Valjibhai Parmar contained evidences that unaccounted cash was exchanged against the transactions of bogus loans and advances. As admitted by Sh. Bharat Padia, Executive Director of DCAL, the group had received bogus loans and advances of Rs. 671,92,06,680/- and advanced non-genuine loans and advances of Rs. 795,00,36,904/-between FY 2009-10 to FY 2019-20.
On perusal of the information received it is found that Dishman Group is regularly involved in the practice of carrying out accommodation entries and Rajic Chimanlal Shah, CA is the main person who is facilitating accommodation entries in the books of Dishman Group in liaison with various accommodation entry providers. Siddhi Corporation is one of the beneficiaries who had made transaction in the form of bogus purchase/expense during F.Y. 2012-13 to the company DPCL and also made bogus transaction of loans and advances of Rs. 59,26,227/-.
6. Basis of forming reason to believe and details of escapement of income: On analysis of information received it is inferred and concluded that when loans and advances are received by any assessee from M/s. Dishman Carbogen Amics Ltd (Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd earlier), it implies that they have given equal cash to DCAL. When and advances are given by any assessee to M/s. DCAL (DPCL earlier), it implies they have received equal cash from DCAL. During the F.Y. 2013-14, the assessee Bluetron had made transaction of Rs. 59,26,227/ in the form of loans and advances. Hence, due to above mentioned facts the income of the assessee has escaped taxation. This gives a substantial basis for the formation of a reason to believe to initiate assessment u/s 147 of the Act.
9. Relying upon the above averments, it was submitted that no interference be called for while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner would have efficacious alternative remedy to challenge the assessment proceedings if any additions are made in the reassessment proceedings and the petitioner to raise all the relevant grounds.
10. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties, it appears that after considering the modus-operandi of providing accommodation entry by the Dishman Group of Companies, the Assessing Officer in the reasons recorded has observed as under, so far as the facts of the case is concerned by mentioning the name of “Bluetron” instead of name of the petitioner, in para-5 @ page-49M, which reads as under:
“5.Basis of forming reason to believe and details of escapement of income: On analysis of information received it is inferred that it is also concluded that when loans and advances are received by any assessee from M/s. Dishman Carbogen Amics Ltd (Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd earlier), it implies that they have given equal cash to DCAL. When loans and advances are given by any assessee to M/s. DCAL (DPCL earlier), it implies they have received equal cash from DCAL. During the F.Y. 2013-14) the assessee Bluetron had made transaction of Rs. 59.26.227 in the form of loans and advances. Hence, due to above mentioned facts the income of the assessee has escaped taxation. This gives a substantial basis for the formation of a reason to believe to initiate assessment u/s 147 of the Act.”
11. Except the above observation in the reasons recorded, there is no mention of the petitioner in any of the documents and the same is not controverted by learned Senior Standing Counsel Ms. Maithili Mehta that the name of the petitioner does not appear in any of the seized material or any transaction relating to or pertaining to the petitioner is reflected in any of the seized material. Even if we take it that the name of “Bluetron” is shown by mistake instead of name of the petitioner in the reasons recorded because the amount of Rs. 59,26,227/- is correctly mentioned by the Assessing officer, then also the objection raised by the petitioner that the petitioner has not paid any loans or advances to M/s. Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., but on the contrary, the petitioner has made payment of Rs.59,26,227/-after deducting TDS @10% towards commission for the orders received from PGVCL and DGVCL respectively in the year under consideration. The petitioner also paid service tax on the amount of commission under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 and, therefore, allegation of accommodation entry in form of loans and advances has been entered with by the petitioner with Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., is without any basis on the face of the record.
12. In the affidavit-in-reply also the fact of payment of commission by the petitioner is not denied or controverted by the respondent Assessing Officer. In the order dated 20.8.2022, passed under Section 148A(d) of the Act also, the respondent Assessing Officer has not brought on record any contrary material to what is stated by the petitioner in the objections for payment of commission to the Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., for the year under consideration.
13. In such circumstances, the respondent Assessing Officer has passed the impugned order rejecting the objections under Section 148A(d) of the Act only on the ground that the petitioner was beneficiary of the transactions with the Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., during the year under consideration. As the Bank statement was not legible to verify the transactions on the ground that the petitioner did not submit any details regarding commission payment and, therefore, the petitioner failed to accept the genuineness of the commission paid with proper documentary evidence. Therefore, the rejection of the objections raised by the respondent Assessing Officer is only on the basis of surmises and conjectures, without there being anything on record to show that the petitioner has entered into the transaction of loans and advances which was basis for issuance of notice for reopening. The respondent Assessing Officer has, therefore, without considering the objections filed by the petitioner, has insisted upon the petitioner to provide legible bank statement, ignoring the fact that the petitioner has paid service tax on the amount of commission paid and deducted TDS@ 10% on the amount of commission paid to the Dishman Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals Ltd., which is verifiable from the records available with the Assessing Officer. Therefore, the very basis of issuance of notice for reopening does not exist so as to come to a prima-facie conclusion that it is a fit case to reopen the assessment and, therefore, the respondent Assessing Officer could not have assumed the jurisdiction for reopening the assessment.
14. This Court in case of Filco Trade Centre (P.) Ltd. (supra) has held as under:
“9.4 We are, therefore, in a helpless situation as we cannot refer to any other information which is made available to us while examining the legality and validity of the impugned notices under Section 148 of the Act other than the reasons recorded as held by this Court in case of Kantibhai Dharamshibhai Narola (supra), wherein, this Court has laid down the following aspects with regard to the law of reopening of assessment under Section 147 of the Act which is well settled legal propositions wherein, it is held as under:-
32. The law as regards the reopening of the assessment under Section 147 of the Act, 1961 is well-settled.
| (i) | The Court should be guided by the reasons recorded for the reassessment and not by the reasons or explanation given by the Assessing Officer at a later stage in respect of the notice of reassessment. To put it in other words, having regard to the entire scheme and the purpose of the Act, the validity of the assumption of jurisdiction under Section 147 can be tested only by reference to the reasons recorded under Section 148(2) of the Act and the Assessing Officer is not authorized to refer to any other reason even if it can be otherwise inferred or gathered from the records. The Assessing Officer is confined to the recorded reasons to support the assumption of jurisdiction. He cannot record only some of the reasons and keep the others upto his sleeves to be disclosed before the Court if his action is ever challenged in a court of law. |
| (ii) | At the time of the commencement of the reassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer has to see whether there is prima facie material, on the basis of which, the department would be justified in reopening the case. The sufficiency or correctness of the material is not a thing to be considered at that stage. |
| (iii) | The validity of the reopening of the assessment shall have to be determined with reference to the reasons recorded for reopening of the assessment. |
| (iv) | The basic requirement of law for reopening and assessment is application of mind by the Assessing Officer, to the materials produced prior to the reopening of the assessment, to conclude that he has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment. Unless that basic jurisdictional requirement is satisfied-a postmortem exercise of analysing the materials produced subsequent to the reopening will not make an inherently defective reassessment order valid. |
| (v) | The crucial link between the information made available to the Assessing Officer and the formation of the belief should be present. The reasons must be self evident, they must speak for themselves. |
| (vi) | The tangible material which forms the basis for the belief that income has escaped assessment must be evident from a reading of the reasons. The entire material need not be set out. To put it in other words, something therein, which is critical to the formation of the belief must be referred to. Otherwise, the link would go missing. |
| (vii) | The reopening of assessment under Section 147 is a potent power and should not be lightly exercised. It certainly cannot be invoked casually or mechanically. |
| (viii) | If the original assessment is processed under Section 143(1) of the Act and not Section 143(3) of the Act, the proviso to Section 147 will not apply. In other words, although the reopening may be after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, yet it would not be necessary for the Assessing Officer to show that there was any failure to disclose fully or truly all the material facts necessary for the assessment. |
| (ix) | In order to assume jurisdiction under Section 147 where assessment has been made under sub-section (3) of section 143, two conditions are required to be satisfied; |
| (i) | The Assessing Officer must have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; |
| (ii) | Such escapement occurred by reason of failure on the part of the assessee either (a) to make a return of income under section 139 or in response to the notice issued under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or Section 148 or (b) to disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for his assessment for that purpose. |
| (x) | The Assessing Officer, being a quasi judicial authority is expected to arrive at a subjective satisfaction independently on an objective criteria. |
| (xi) | While the report of the Investigation Wing might constitute the material, on the basis of which, the Assessing Officer forms the reasons to believe, the process of arriving at such satisfaction should not be a mere repetition of the report of the investigation. The reasons to believe must demonstrate some link between the tangible material and the formation of the belief or the reason to believe that the income has escaped assessment. |
| (xii) | Merely because certain materials which is otherwise tangible and enables the Assessing Officer to form a belief that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, formed part of the original assessment record, per se would not bar the Assessing Officer from reopening the assessment on the basis of such material. The expression “tangible material” does not mean the material alien to the original record. |
| (xiii) | The order, disposing of objections or any counter affidavit filed during the writ proceedings before the Court cannot be substituted for the “reasons to believe”. |
| (xiv) | The decision to reopen the assessment on the basis of the report of the Investigation Wing cannot always be condemned or dubbed as a fishing or roving inquiry. The expression “reason to believe” appearing in Section 147 suggests that if the Income Tax Officer acts as a reasonable and prudent man on the basis of the information secured by him that there is a case for reopening, then Section 147 can well be pressed into service and the assessments be reopened. As a consequence of such reopening, certain other facts may come to light. There is no ban or any legal embargo under Section 147 for the Assessing Officer to take into consideration such facts which come to light either by discovery or by a fuller probe into the matter and reassess the assessee in detail if circumstances require. |
| (xv) | The test of jurisdiction under Section 143 of the Act is not the ultimate result of the inquiry but the test is whether the income tax officer entertained a “bona fide” belief upon the definite information presented before him. Power under this section cannot be exercised on mere rumours or suspicions. |
| (xvi) | The concept of “change of opinion” has been treated as a built in test to check abuse. If there is tangible material showing escapement of income, the same would be sufficient for reopening the assessment. |
| (xvii) | It is not necessary that the Income Tax Officer should hold a quasi judicial inquiry before acting under Section 147. It is enough if he on the information received believes in good faith that the assesee’s profits have escaped assessment or have been assessed at a low rate. However, nothing would preclude the Income Tax Officer from conducting any formal inquiry under Section 133(6) of the Act before proceeding for reassessment under Section 147 of the Act. |
| (xviii) | The “full and true” disclosure of the material facts would not include that material, which is to be used for testing the veracity of the particulars mentioned in the return. All such facts would be expected to be elicited by the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment. The disclosure required only reference to those material facts, which if not disclosed, would not allow the Assessing Officer to make the necessary inquiries. |
| (xix) | The word “information” in Section 147 means “instruction or knowledge derived from the external source concerning the facts or particulars or as to the law relating to a matter bearing on the assessment. An information anonymous is information from unknown authorship but nonetheless in a given case, it may constitute information and not less an information though anonymous. This is now a recognized and accepted source for detection of large scale tax evasion. The non-disclosure of the source of the information, by itself, may not reduce the credibility of the information. There may be good and substantial reasons for such anonymous disclosure, but the real thing to be looked into is the nature of the information disclosed, whether it is a mere gossip, suspicion or rumour. If it is none of these, but a discovery of fresh facts or of new and important matters not present at the time of the assessment, which appears to be credible to an honest and rational mind leading to a scrutiny of facts indicating incorrect allowance of the expense, such disclosure would constitute information as contemplated in clause (b) of Section 147. |
| (xx) | The reasons recorded or the material available on record must have nexus to the subjective opinion formed by the A.O. regarding the escapement of the income but then, while recording the reasons for the belief formed, the A.O. is not required to finally ascertain the factum of escapement of the tax and it is sufficient that the A.O had cause or justification to know or suppose that the income had escaped assessment [vide Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P.) Ltd.’s case (supra)]. It is also well settled that the sufficiency and adequacy of the reasons which have led to the formation of a belief by the Assessing Officer that the income has escaped the assessment cannot be examined by the court. |
35. The power to reopen a completed assessment under Section 147 of the Act 1961 has been bestowed on the Assessing Officer, if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. However, this belief that income has escaped assessment has to be the reasonable belief of the Assessing Officer himself and cannot be an opinion and/or belief of some other authority. On the basis of the information by itself received from another agency, there cannot be any reassessment proceedings. However, upon receipt of the information/material received from other source, the Assessing Officer is required to consider the material on record in case of the assessee by applying his mind and thereafter is required to form an independent opinion on the basis of the material on record that the information has bearing on the income of the assessee and such income has escaped assessment. Without forming such an opinion, solely and mechanically relying upon the information received from other source, there cannot be any reassessment. It is also established principle of law that if a particular authority has been designated to record his/her satisfaction on any particular issue, then it is that authority alone who should apply his/her independent mind to record his/her satisfaction and further mandatory condition is that the satisfaction recorded should be ‘independent’ and not ‘borrowed’ or ‘dictated’ satisfaction. Law in this regard is now well-settled.
36. The Supreme Court in the case of Anirudh Sinhji Karan Sinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat reported in [1995] 5 SCC 302 as well has held that if a statutory authority has been vested with the jurisdiction, it has to exercise it according to its own discretion. If discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authorities instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether. The cases reopened on the basis of information received from the other departments are also governed by the aforesaid principle of making an independent inquiry and recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act.
37. A third party information is only an information and does not constitute ‘reason to believe’ until and unless the third party information is subjected to investigation and, on the basis thereof, independent reasons are recorded by the Assessing Officer before issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act.
9.5 Considering the above conspectus of law, we are unable to look into the material referred to and relied upon by learned Senior Standing Counsel Mr.Patel to justify the reasons recorded so as to draw a presumption by us that the Assessing Officer has committed error while recording the reasons and therefore, no interference is required to be made in the facts of the case.”
15. In the facts of the present case also, considering the material on record in form of the reasons recorded and the objections raised by the petitioner which are dealt with in the impugned order under Section 148A(d) of the Act, it is apparent that firstly, the name of the petitioner was wrongly stated in the reasons recorded, secondly, regarding the explanation given by the petitioner that commission was paid by the petitioner and no loans or advances were made by the petitioner regarding the transaction of Rs. 59,26,227/-, the respondent Assessing Officer failed to consider the same and ignored the same by giving a flimsy reason in the impugned order rejecting the objections.
16. In view of the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act, 1961 dated 20.4.2021 and the order under Section 148A(d) of the Act dated 20.8.2022 for the A.Y. 2013-14 are hereby quashed and set-aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.