Rejection of 80G application treating it as 12AB registration violation of natural justice; Matter remanded

By | December 8, 2025

Rejection of 80G application treating it as 12AB registration violation of natural justice; Matter remanded

Issue

Whether the Commissioner (Exemptions) can reject an application for approval under Section 80G by erroneously treating it as an application for registration under Section 12AB, and whether a subsequent rectification order cures the defect of not confronting the assessee on the specific grounds relevant to Section 80G.

Facts

  • The Application: The assessee-trust filed an application in Form No. 10AB seeking approval under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act.

  • The Error: The Commissioner (Exemptions) [CIT(E)] proceeded on the wrong premise, treating the application as one for registration under Section 12AB.

  • Grounds for Rejection: The CIT(E) rejected the application citing non-compliance with the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 and alleging non-genuineness of activities—grounds typically scrutinized during 12AB registration.

  • Rectification Attempt: Realizing the error, the CIT(E) subsequently passed a rectification order under Section 154, formally rejecting the application under Section 80G.

  • Assessee’s Plea: The assessee argued that it already held a valid registration under Section 12A. The issues raised by the CIT(E) (regarding the Trust Act) were not the subject matter of the 80G application, and the assessee was never given an opportunity to explain its case specifically regarding 80G eligibility.

Decision

  • Confusion of Proceedings: The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) had mixed up the proceedings for Section 12AB (registration) and Section 80G (donation approval). Since the assessee already possessed a valid 12A registration, the CIT(E)’s focus on registration-related compliance without referencing 80G specific criteria was misplaced.

  • Violation of Natural Justice: By initially treating the application as one for 12AB and then summarily rejecting it under 80G via rectification, the CIT(E) failed to confront the assessee with the specific reasons for denying 80G approval. This was a clear violation of the principles of natural justice.

  • Ruling: The order was set aside. The matter was remanded back to the Commissioner (Exemptions) with a direction to treat the application as one under Section 80G and decide it afresh after providing a proper opportunity of being heard.

Key Takeaways

Distinct Proceedings: Registration under Section 12AB and Approval under Section 80G are distinct processes. While 12AB is the foundation, 80G approval cannot be denied by mechanically copying reasons relevant to 12AB if the 12AB registration itself remains valid and intact.

Right to be Heard: A rectification order under Section 154 cannot retrospectively validate a rejection if the assessee was never given a Show Cause Notice regarding the actual grounds for rejection under the correct section.

IN THE ITAT JAIPUR BENCH ‘A’
Ram Niwas Modi Charitable Society
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax(Exemption)
Dr. S. Seethalakshmi, Judicial Member
and RATHOD KAMLESH JAYANTBHAi, Accountant Member
IT Appeal Nos.118 & 779 (JPR) of 2025
NOVEMBER  20, 2025
Mahendra Gargieya and Devang Gargieya, Advs. for the Appellant. Mrs. Anita Rinesh, Ld. JCIT for the Respondent.
ORDER
Rathod Kamlesh Jayantbhai, Accountant Member.- The present two appeals filed by assessee, are arising out of the order of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Jaipur both dated 31.12.2024 & 03.04.2025 [for short “CIT(E)”] passed for registration u/s 80G of the Income Tax Act [for short Act] respectively by the assessee – appellant.
2.1 In ITA No.118/JPR/2025, the assessee has raised following grounds:-
“1. The impugned order dated 31.12.2024 of the Act is non-est, bad in law and on facts of the case, for want of jurisdiction and various other reasons and hence, the same kindly be quashed.
2. The Id. CIT(E) seriously erred in denying the registration u/s 12AB and also cancelling the provisional registration and hence the registration so denied/ cancelled may be restored and the appellant be held entitled to continue with the registration u/s 12AB of the Act.
3. The Ld. CIT(E) erred in law as well as on the facts of the case in rejecting the application for granting the approval u/s 80G. The rejection so made and exemption so denied u/s 80G is totally contrary to the provisions of law and on facts of the case on various grounds and hence the same may kindly be quashed.
4. Alternatively, and without prejudice, the Id. CIT(E) further erred in law as well as on the facts of the case in not adjudicating the application filed on dated 26.06.2024 seeking approval u/s 80G without adjudicating and deciding the same. The absence of any order denying any such approval sought u/s 80G may be declared as granted to the appellant.
5. Alternatively and without prejudice, the impugned order dated 31.12.2024 having being issued beyond the statutory period of six months as per the provisions of the Act. Hence the same may kindly be quashed.
6. The appellant prays your honour to add, amend or alter any of the grounds of the appeal on or before the date of hearing.”
2.2 In ITA No.779/JPR/2025, the assessee has raised following grounds:-
“1. The impugned order dated 03.04.2025 (read with earlier order 31.12.2024) of CIT(E) Jaipur u/s 80G(5) of the Act is bad in law and on facts of the case, for want of jurisdiction, barred by limitation and various other reasons and hence, the same kindly be quashed.
2. The Ld. CIT(E) erred in law as well as on the facts of the case in cancelling provisional approval granted earlier u/s 80G of the Act vide order dated 10.03.2023 being totally contrary to the provisions of law and on facts of the case on various grounds and hence the same may kindly be quashed.
3. Alternatively, and without prejudice, the Id. CIT(E) further erred in law as well as on the facts of the case in not adjudicating the application filed on dated 26.06.2024 seeking permanent approval u/s 80G without adjudicating and deciding the same. The absence of any order denying any such approval sought u/s 80G may be declared as granted to the appellant.
4. The appellant prays your honour to add, amend or alter any of the grounds of the appeal on or before the date of hearing.”
3. As is evident from the grounds of appeal that the issue raised in both the appeals are identical and of the same assessee. As we have heard these cases together with the consent of the parties and have decided to dispose these appeals by this common order.
4. With the consent of the parties the facts of the case ITA No. 118/JPR/2025is considered as lead case. The brief facts of the case in ITA No. 118/JPR/2025, as culled out from the records are that the applicant filed an online application in Form No. 10AB seeking approval u/s 80G of the Act was filed on 26.06.2024. A letter/notice dated 15.07.2024 was issued at the e-mail/address provided in the application requiring the applicant to submit certain documents/explanations by 01.08.2024, in compliance to which the applicant requested to adjourn its case. Thereafter, a reminder letter was issued to the applicant vide notice dated 26.10.2024 to submit complete details/information by 05.11.2024. In compliance to thereof, the applicant had submitted a reply on 04.11.2024 which was thoroughly examined on record and found various discrepancies. These discrepancies were conveyed to the applicant vide show cause notice dated 08.12.2024 wherein date of hearing was given 12.12.2024. After giving notice, the applicant had submitted its reply on 12.12.2024 which was not found tenable and thereby the application made by the assessee trust was rejected by giving following finding by the ld. CIT(E):-
“In response, the applicant has furnished reply on 12.12.2021 wherein submitted only final a/c alongwith its financial notes and on the basis these replies/details following issued emerged:-
1. Not furnished details of expenses/activity, ledger accounts, bills/vouchers, photos, beneficiaries details.
2. Not furnished details of professional charges/salary as asked whether these persons are related persons of management of trust, in absence possibility of siphoning off the funds.
3. Not furnished bank transaction details above Rs. 20,000/- in order to verify the nature of debit and credit entries in bank account statement, thus, the nature of entries in back account is unverified and activities do not seem genuine.
4. Not furnished comparison chart containing the details of fees/charges from patients by other similar institutions in the area.
5. No other charitable activity is done apart from hospital/ pharma activities in lieu of huge fees/bill amount.
6. 6. Not furnished details of land on which hospital building was constructed like:- Land document, Bill vouchers etc.
Hence from the above it is clear that the activities are not verifiable and it could not be determined whether the applicant is genuinely carrying out charitable activity. Therefore, the applicant claim of registration u/s 12AB is also liable to be rejected on ground of not proving its genuineness of activity.
04. In view of above discussion assessee’s claim of registration section 12AB is liable to be rejected and thus being rejected on following grounds:-
Registration under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.
Benefited to interested persons.
Non-Genuineness of activities.
Profitability
06. Further 12AB (1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 also state that if CIT is not satisfied has to pass order rejecting such application and also cancelling its earlier registration. Thus, it is clarified that applicant’s provisional registration under clause (vi) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10.03.2022 is also being cancelled. Further assessee has failed to give proper justification for regularisation of provisional registration, thus with this order provisional registration is also lapsed and cancelled.”
Against the above finding of the ld. CIT(E) the assessee has preferred the appeal No. ITA no. 118/JP/2025.
5. As is evident from para 6 of the finding of the ld. CIT(E) that the assessee filed an application for recognition u/s 80G of the Act but while considering the application he has considered that the application is for registration u/s. 12AB of the Act. Having noted that fact ld. CIT(E) on 03.04.2025 passed an another order revising the para 6 as under :-
“Please refer to this office order. No. ITBA/COM/F/17/2024-25/1071735774(1) dated 31.12.2024 wherein in last para (no. 6) of the order, some typographical mistake was occurred. The last para (no. 6) of the said order may kindly be read as under:-

“06. Further 2nd proviso to section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 also state that if CIT is not satisfied has to pass order rejecting such application and also cancelling its earlier approval. Thus, it is clarified that applicant’s provisional approval under clause (iv) of first proviso to subsection (5) of section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10.03.2022 is also being cancelled. Further assessee has failed to give proper justification for regularization of provisional approval, thus with this order provisional approval is also lapsed and cancelled.”

Against the above finding of the ld. CIT(E) the assessee preferred the appeal no. 779/JP/2025.
6. Thus, as is evident from the above finding of the ld. CIT(E) that though the assessee has dealt with the recognition of the trust u/s. 80G of the Act firstly he rejected the same considering as if the same is filed for registration u/s. 12AB of the Act and thereafter, having released that apparent error and another order was passed on 03.04.3035. Thus, effectively as is evident from the record the application for the recognition of the trust has not been dealt with and thereby the assessee has preferred the two appeals effectively challenging the order of the ld. CIT(E) on the issue of recognition of the trust as per provision of section 80G of the Act.
7. At the time of hearing of the present appeals the ld. AR of the assessee referring to page 190 of the paper book drawn our attention to the fact that the assessee is already registered vide order dated 24.09.2021 for assessment year 2022-23 to 2026-27.The ld. AR of the assessee thereby filed a detailed written submission to support the grounds raised in the present appeals;
“Brief General Facts: The ld. CIT (E) noted in the impugned order as under:

“The applicant filed an online application in Form No. 10AB seeking approval u/s 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was filed on 26.06.2024. A letter/notice No. ITBA/EXM/F/EXM43/2024-25/1066715571(1) dated 15.07.2024 was issued at the email/ address provided in the application requiring the applicant to submit certain documents/explanations by 01.08.2024, in compliance to which the applicant requested to adjourn its case. Thereafter, a reminder letter was issued to the applicant vide this office DIN & Notice No. ITBA/EXM/F/EXM43/2024-25/1069969799(1) dated 26.10.2024 to submit complete details/information by 05.11.2024. In compliance to thereof, the applicant had submitted a reply on 04.11.2024 which was thoroughly examined on record and found various discrepancies. These discrepancies were conveyed to the applicant vide show cause notice dated 08.12.2024 wherein date of hearing was given 12.12.2024. After giving notice, the applicant had submitted its reply on 12.12.2024 which was not found tenable. Reply furnished by the assessee has been examined and applicant not found eligible for the desired registration.”

Thereafter the Ld. CIT(E) continued to make discussion with reference to the application filed u/s 80G(5) of the Act.Continuing with the above, in the concluding Para 6 again, the Ld. CIT has cancelled the aforesaid Provisional Registration, also granted vide order dt. 10.03.2023 (PB-193). However, a perusal of the aforesaid order shows that it was an order granting Provisional Registration in Form 10AC under Rule 17A/11AA/2C, for the period from 10.03.2022 to 2024-25, granted under Section 80G(5) First Proviso clause(iv). Thus whereas, the appellant made an application before the CIT€ in Form 10AB seeking conversion of Provisional registration into Final Registration under Section 80G, filed on 26.06.2024. However, in response, the Registration and the Provisional Registration u/s 12A and 12 AB, etc. were rejected.
Finally, the Ld. CIT(E) rejected the prayer(seemingly) for approval u/s 80G(5) filed through FORM 10B but in the following words:

“04. In view of above discussion assessee’s claim of registration section 12AB is liable to be rejected and thus being rejected on following grounds:

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Registration under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959.
Benefited to interested persons.
Non-Genuineness of activities.
Profitability

06. Further 12AB (1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 also state that if CIT is not satisfiedhas to pass order rejecting such application and also cancelling its earlier registration. Thus, it is clarified that applicant’s provisional registration under clause (vi) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 10.03.2022 is also being cancelled. Further assessee has failed to give proper justification for regularisation of provisional registration, thus with this order provisional registration is also lapsed and cancelled.”

Hence this Appeal.
GOA 1:This is a general ground and may kindly be considered while deciding the other grounds.
Complete non-application of mind by the Ld. CIT(E):
At the outset there is no hesitation to say that there has been complete non-application of mind by the Ld. CIT(E)which is evident from the fact that firstly, the Ld. CIT(E) vide its earlier order of dt. 28.12.2024 which perhaps belong to some other assessee, wrongly/mistakenly passed the order in the case of the assessee and this fact he himself has admitted in Pg.1 Para 1 in the impugned order in the following words:

“Please refer to this office order No. ITBA/EXM/F/EXM45/2024-25/1071648752(1) dated 28.12.2024. You are requested to ignore the rejection order passed by this office, as there was some mistake & some other order was pasted in your case.”

The registration granted u/s12AB(1)(b)(i) as also the provisional registration u/s12A(1)(ac)(vi), have been erroneously cancelled on misconception and showing example of complete non-application of mind on the part of the Ld. CIT(E), as evident from his findings recorded on page 17 of the impugned order reproduced here in above that the claim of registration u/s 12AB is also liable to be rejected on the ground of nonproviding of its genuine activities. However, he has completely ignored that the appellant trust was already granted permanent approval u/s s12A(1)(ac)(i) from AY-2022-23 to AY-2026-27 vide order for registration in form 10 dated 24.09.2021(PB 190192). There being no obligation on the part of the appellant to apply for continuation of registration at that point of time, such an observation by the Ld. CIT(E) is contrary to the facts of law. Otherwise also, the Ld. CIT(E) has completely ignored the statutory requirement mandated upon him u/s 12AB(4)(II) that before cancelling the registration through an order in writing, he was bound to have afforded an opportunity of being heard to the Appellants, which in this present case is completely missing in as much as no SCN u/s 12AB(4)(II) was given to the appellant and there is no dispute on this fact.
The way the ld. CIT(E) has created a chaos. He has acted in a perfunctory manner as evident from the fact that he has cancelled/denied the registration granted u/s 12AB has also refused/cancelled provisional registration u/s 12A, which was not an issue before him at all and on the other hand, he has left the approval sought under section 80G(5) pending. The entire impugned order therefore deserves to be quashed on this ground alone.
The CIT(E) rejected the same on the grounds which are summarised herein below:
A.Non-registration/non-compliance under Rajasthan Public Trust Act,1959:
B.Benefit given to interested person u/s 13(3):
C.Profitability
D.Non-Genuineness of Activities
Our submission thereon proceeds hereinafter.
GOA 2: Denial of registration u/s 12AB and cancellation of provisional registration:
A. The Rajasthan Public Act – Not Applicable:
Facts: The CIT(E) discussed this aspect at Pg.1-5 Para 2.1-2.5 and finally concluded as under:

“In response, vide reply, the applicant stated that it has applied for RPT under DevasthanVibhag.

The above reply of the applicant that it has applied for the Devasthan Department is not tenable as till date they are not registered but only applied for the same. Application to the concerned department is not enough proof whether application has accepted and verified all the formalities at their end. Therefore, in view of the above, contention of the applicant is not tenable that they have applied for the registration under RPT Act, 1959. Thus, it is clear that as on date, trust is not registered under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959. Therefore, in light of above discussion and in the absence of registration under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959, assessee is not eligible for registration u/s 12AB.”

Submission:
1.1 At the outset it is submitted that the provisions relating to registration under the RPT Act,appears to have been misinterpreted with reference to 80G(5)(i)(b), reproduced here under:

“(B) The compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being in force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of achieving its objects;”

Similar requirement appears under section 12AB(1)(b)(i)(B) also.
Thus, a bare reading of the provision make it obligatory on the part of the competent authority to have shown that what were such other requirement of other laws (RPT here) which was material, for the purpose of achieving its object. However, there is no whisper on this mandatory condition, but the learned CIT(E) straight away alleged noncompliance of RPT, simply because the appellant trust was not registered under RPT Act, without showing that how the registration was material for the purpose of achieving its object. The result of the object shows that (PB 16-30) There apart, the concerned competent authority under RPT Act, has not alleged any violation of non-compliance under the respective provisions of RPT Act, nor it is so alleged by the CIT(E) here.
Therefore, such allegation could not have been levelled blindly, and was not a good basis for cancellation of registration.
1.2 The Hon’ble ITAT has recently in the case of APJ Abdul Kalam Education and Welfare Trust v. CIT (E) vide APJ Abdul Kalam Education and Welfare Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Exemption (Jaipur – Trib.)/ITA No. 567/JPR/2024 dated 06.01.2025 (DC 1-14), adjudicated upon similar issue whether a trust is mandatorily required to obtain registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 from the DevasthanVibhag for the purpose of seeking registration u/s 12AA/12AB of the Income Tax Act. In this landmark decision, the Hon’ble Tribunal has categorically held that the absence of such registration does not render the application for registration untenable. The Hon’ble ITAT, has held as under:

“2. The assessee submitted before us the copy of application filed online before the DevasthanVibhag, Rajasthan vides dated: 22.09.2024, as required by the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipur. Although the requirement of obtaining registration with the DevasthanVibhag, Rajasthan as per the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 is really required or not in the context of section 12AB (1) (b) (ii) (b) of the Act, is a matter raised before us by the counsel of the assessee and certainly a question of law to be decided by us in the coming paras of this order considering the provisions of section 12AB (1) (b) (ii) (B) of the Act, Judicial Pronouncements relied upon by the Ld. CIT(E), Jaipur. For sake of clarity and ready reference we are reproducing herein below the relevant provisions of section 12AB of the Act as under:

Procedure for fresh registration.

12AB. (1) The Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, on receipt of an application made under clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, shall, —

(a) Where the application is made under sub-clause (i) of the said clause, pass an order in writing registering the trust or institution for a period of five years;

(b) Where the application is made under sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) [or item (B) of sub-clause (vi)] of the said clause, —

(i) Call for such documents or information from the trust or institution or make such inquiries as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy him about—

(A) The genuineness of activities of the trust or institution; and

(B) the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being in

force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of achieving its objects;

(ii) after satisfying himself about the objects of the trust or institution and the genuineness of its activities under item (A) and compliance of the requirements under item (B), of sub-clause (i), —

(A) Pass an order in writing registering the trust or institution for a period of five years; or

(B) If he is not so satisfied, pass an order in writing, —

(I) in a case referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v)

of clause (ac) of subsection (1) of section 12A rejecting such application and also cancelling its registration;

(II) In a case referred to in sub-clause (iv) or in item (B) of sub-clause (vi) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, rejecting such application, after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

4. The relevant provisions reproduced (supra) in bold and underlined, is an attempt by us to analyze the provision in proper perspective of Law in the light of Judicial Pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court, specifically the citations being relied upon by the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipuri.e. (A.P.) Aurora Educational Society v. CCIT, relevant paras are reproduced as under:

“10. The scope and amplitude of section 10(23C) (vi) of the Income-tax Act, the provisos there under and the rules and forms applicable thereto, which were the subject-matter of examination in New Noble Educational Society v. Chief CIT  (AP) and in R. R. M. Educational Society v. Chief CIT [2011] 339 ITR 323 (AP) can, conveniently, be summarized as under:

1. As section 20A of the A. P. Education Act prohibits individuals from establishing educational institutions, it is only societies/associations/ trusts which can establish educational institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh.”

“19. On a conjoint reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 8 of the A. P. Societies Registration Act, 2001, it is only when the amendment to the objects of a society (educational agency) is intimated and the Registrar, on being satisfied that the amendment is not contrary to the provisions of the Act, registers and certifies such an alteration, would it be a valid alteration under the Act. It is only from the date the Registrar certifies the alteration that the amendment, to the objects of the society, comes into force.”

5.Above discussed, judicial pronouncement is specifically applicable to the educational institutions, where a specific law is there to regulate such type of institutions and are in harmony with the provisions of section 12AB (1) (b) (ii) (B) of the Act, i.e. the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being in force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of achieving itsobjects. In the matter under consideration, the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipur is duty bound to establish that how the compliance with RPT Act, 1959 is material for the purpose of achieving its objects. In our opinion, both the statutes, i.e. The Income Tax Act, 1961 and RPT Act, 1959. All the authorities relied upon by the assessee (Sic- CIT(E)) are w.r.t. educational institutions, where context is different, i.e. students at large and issues like capitation fee, allocation of seats, pay scale of teachers and curriculum of the syllabus etc. are in focus. For public benefit and reasonability, such regulations are there, specifically the states where big institutions are indulged in imparting education in the field of Medical, Engineering and Managements etc.

6.The next judicial pronouncement relied upon by the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipur is from the court of Hon’ble Apex Court as under: (SC) New Noble Educational Society v. CCIT, relevant paras are reproduced as under:

“It is held that wherever registration of trust or charities is obligatory under state or local laws, the concerned trust, society, other institution etc. seeking approval under section 10(23C) should also comply with provisions of such state laws. This would enable the Commissioner or concerned authority to ascertain the genuineness of the trust, society etc. This reasoning is reinforced by the recent insertion of another proviso of section 10(23C) with effect from 1-42021. [Para 76]”

7.Again referring our considered opinion as discussed (supravide para 5, this citation relied upon by the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipur is again w.r.t. an educational institution and our findings (supra) again confirmed. It is also observed that in both the citations discussed (supra) also discussed and relied upon the judicial precedents applicable to educational institutions only. None of the precedents discussed in the case of Aurora Educational Society v. CCIT and New Noble Educational Society v. CCIT matches with character of the assessee under consideration, which is being further fortified with the language of the Income Tax Act, 1961 itself as mentioned (supra). Plain reading of section 12AB (1) (b) (ii) (B) of the Act speaks in a way that compliance of requirement of any other law is required if compliance under the Act is material for achieving its objects.

8.There is no law which is required to be complied with for achieving the objects of the assessee trust. Section 17 of the RPT Act, 1959 requires that trustees of the trust has to apply for registration of a public trust, however, there is no section in the RPT Act, 1959 which prohibits a trust to carry out its objects if it is not registered under the RPT Act, 1959. In our considered opinion, both the statutes have their own provisions and implications and none of them have overriding effect. Even if, the assessee trust is not registered with the RPT Act, 1959 and the concerned officials under the RPT Act, 1959 deems it necessary to get the entity registered under section 17 of the RPT Act, 1959, appropriate action can be taken and against the trustees of the trust. But this issue can’t be a hurdle in getting registration before the Income Tax Department u/s. 12AB of the Act.

9.In view of discussion (supra), we do not find any force in the findings of the Ld. CIT (E), Jaipur while holding registration application untenable in the absence of registration under the RPT Act, 1959.”

This decision is directly applicable to the facts of the present matter and provides a binding precedent in support of the assessee’s case. Accordingly, it is submitted that the rejection of the assessee’s registration application on the ground of non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 is untenable and deserves to be set aside. Also kindly refer Shri Jain Shwetambar Terapanthi Vidyalaya Committee v. CIT (E)Shri Jain Shwetamber Terapanthi Vidyalaya Committee v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Exemption (Jaipur – Trib.)/ ITA NO.1000/JPR/2024 (DC 15-25).
2. Alternatively, and without prejudice above, it was submitted by the Appellant that it had already applied for registration under RPT Act, with Devsthan Vibhag, and the registration was awaited. However, such contention was rejected that as on day of passing of the impugned order, the appellant was not registered under RPT Act. Kindly refer para 2.5, page 5 of the CIT(E) order. However, now it is pertinent to note that thereafter, DevasthanVibhag has duly granted registration videregistration certificate no. 509 dated 28.01.2025 (PB 195) and therefore, this requirement stands fulfilled.
B. Benefit to Interested Person:
The relevant part of impugned order is as under:
Facts: “In respect of payment made to persons covered u/s 13(3), vide reply dated 04.11.2024 at point no.6.4 the applicant stated as under: –
“6.4. No payment has been made to any specified person u/s 13(3) except payment during the period Jan.24 to March 24 to Dr. K.K. Katyal for rendering his professional services at Rs.400000/- per month. He is a senior physician MBBS, M.D. aged more than 60 years.”
The reply of the applicant is considered but not acceptable for the reasons below mentioned: –
1. The applicant stated that the payments madetoDr. K.K. Katyal i.e. persons u/s 13(3) are professional services payments in lieu of services rendered by him in the Ethos Hospital and in support the applicant stated only that He is a senior physician MBBS, M.D. aged more than 60 years. Not furnish any details such as what work done/ services rendered by Dr. K.K. Katyal for the trust/ Ethos Hospital, details of patient to whom treatment given by him to substantiate its claim of huge salary payment to related persons without explain the services provided persons. Also not furnished his ITR to explain his earlier income/ source of income.
2. Also, no salary payment to these persons in earlier years. Thus, these payments are nothing but siphoning off the income of the trust to the related persons.
Thus, combined reading of section 13(1)(c) and section 13(3) of the Act clearly states that if a trust carries out any transaction directly or indirectly for the benefit of the specified persons mentioned in Section 13(3), then the said trust will lose out on the exemption provided under Sections 11 and 12 of the IT Act. Here, Dr. K.K. Katyal is members of the trust and is one of persons as specified in section 13(3). It is amply clear from the facts of the case and abovediscussion that Dr. K.K. Katyal are retrieving property/ income of the trust for their own personal use and is not using the same for charitable purposes. The applicant has also not submitted any evidence of the retrieved property/ income being used for charitable purposes. Therefore, it is concluded that the trust is in specified violation by giving benefit to the specified persons and not applying income of trust for the purpose other than objects of the trust, thus it is specified violation under clause (a) of Explanation below of section 12AB(4) of the I.T. Act, 1961 and also result into non genuineness of activities as given in clause (e) (i) & (ii) of Explanation below of section 12(AB)(4) of the I.T. Act, 1961 therefore, the case falls out of the scope of registration u/s 12A.”
Submission:
1.The allegation that excessive payment was made to the trustee Dr K.K. Katyal is a mere suspicion and without bringing on record any comparative market rate/ arm’s length price to justify his stand. Kindly refer a comparative chart(A) enclosed with this w/s, On the contrary, Dr. Katyal is a very senior doctor having large experience of 30 years. He is MD in Medicine. In the cases of doctors who are having experience much lesser or say one half of Dr Katyal yet much higher payment has been made to them. To take an example Dr. I.C. Malav was having experience of 15 years but was paid Rs.12.5 Lakhs/month which is much higher than Rs. 4 Lakhs. In a case of Dr. Rakesh Meena, who was having a little experience of 4 years yet he was paid Rs. 2,20,000/month. Dr. Rajesh Agarwal with 15 years’ experience was paid Rs. 4 Lacs per month that is equal to payment made to Dr. Katyal.
There apart, the scope of responsibilities to Dr. Katyal were very wide and included sensitive issues and the management aspect.
2. Supporting Case Laws:
2.1 In the case of Dy. DIT (Exemption) v. Gideons International in India (Hyderabad – Trib.)/[2016] 156 ITD 666 (Hyderabad – Trib.) (DC 26-29), it was held that where therewas failure by Assessing Officer to indicate in assessment order that salarypaid by assessee-society to executive director was unreasonable, no violation of provision of section 13(1)(c) could be alleged and exemption couldnot be denied.
2.2 In the case of Asstt. CIT v. Idicula Trust Society  (Delhi – Trib.), it was held that AO cannot subjectively conclude that the salaries paid are unreasonable without providing any sound basis or evidence. Nor can the AO apply section 40A(2)(a) which provides that where anassessee incurs any expenditure in respect of which payment has been made or is to be made to any person referred to in clause (b) of this sub-section,and the Assessing Officer is of the opinion that such expenditure is excessiveor unreasonable having regard to the fair market value of the goods, servicesor facilities for which the payment is made or the legitimate needs of thebusiness or profession of the assessee or the benefit derived by or accruingto him therefrom, so much of the expenditure as is also considered by himto be excessive or unreasonable shall not be allowed as a deduction. Thus,under section 40A(2)(a), if an assessee made payments for availing benefit,services or any facility from the persons mentioned in sub-clause (b) ofsection 40A(2) and similar type of benefit, service type of benefit, serviceor facility could be availed from the open market at a cheaper rate then theexcess amount considered by the Assessing Officer is to be disallowed to theassessee out of his business expenditure. Now, the income of the assessee isnot computed as a business income. The Tribunal observed that the assessee was a charitable institution and its income should be computed undersections 11, 12 and 13. Clause (b) of section 40A(2) provides six categoriesof assessee, along with the list of persons who could be associated with theassessee. In this clause, no reference is being made to an assessee, who isa society or trust and whose income is to be assessed as per sections 11, 12and 13. Because a similar mechanism has been provided therein section13(1)(ii) and 13(3), it appears that the Assessing Officer has made referenceto this section unnecessarily.
2.3 In CIT v. Trustees of Dr. Divekar Charity Trust [1977] 110 ITR 227 (Bom.), it was held that reasonable remuneration paid to the trustees for managing the property and other activities for the purposes of the trust was justified and was applicable towards the purposes of the trust. In this regard, the cases DIT (Exemption) v. Wardha Charitable Trust Delhi) and DIT v. Sikar Charitable Trust (Delhi) are also relevant.
2.4 In the case of Addl. DIT (Exemption) v. Manav Bharati Child Institute and Child Psychology [2008] 20 SOT 517 (Delhi – Trib.), it was held that there is noprohibition in Act to remunerate interested person but such remuneration should be commensurate with services rendered by them and so found, itcannot be said that provisions of section 13(1)(c) are attracted, so as to denybenefit of exemption under sections 11 and 12.
C. Profitability:
Facts: The Ld. CIT(E) noted as under:

“Without prejudice to anything contained in above paras, analysis was done to understand the actual working of the institution. On perusal of the Income and Expenditure accounts for the F.Y. F.Y. 2023-24 to till date, the applicant has earned huge profits, the data are summarized as under: –

*F.Y. 2023-24

Table

The above analysis shows that the applicant has received enormous markup in year to year on the medical activities undertaken. Therefore, it is deduced that the trust is doing activities of highly profitable nature and cannot be said to be conducting charitable activities. It is important to mention here the decision of Hon’ble apex Court in case of P.A. Inamdar case no. 5041 of 2005, and T.M.A. Pai Foundation 8 SCC 48 (2002) where, it has clearly held that even the formal education cannot be at exorbitant price and for profiteering. Recently Apex Court in case of Baba Banda Singh Bahadur Education Trust in civil appeal no. 10511 of 2013 dated 26.04.2023 and M/s New Noble Education Society in civil appeal no. 3795 of 2014 dated 19.10.2022 has overturned it decision in case of Queen Education, and clearly held that education with substantial margin is not charitable and has to be considered for profit making, not for charity. Hon’ble Apex Court in its decision has done away with the regime of huge profit being ploughed back in system as charitable in the name of dominant objective. Thus, such high margin activities have to be considered trade and commerce only.

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5. In the recent decision of this Court in the case of New Noble Educational Society (supra), it is specifically observed and held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court that for claiming the benefit/exemption under Section 10(23C)(iii)(ab) which is para materia to Section 10(23C)(vi) the activity of the assessee must be be solely for educational purposes and if ultimately it is found 7 that the activity is for profits the assessee is not entitled to the exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act.

6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of New Noble Educational Society (supra) referred to hereinabove to the facts of the case on hand, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable. At this stage, it is required to be noted that taking into consideration the entire material on record, in fact, the Commissioner, while considering the application of the assessee for grant of exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) specifically observed and held that the activity of the assessee cannot be said to be solely for imparting the education and that the assessee is indulging into the profit which was found to be 67.81% without depreciation and 44.48% with depreciation. The finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner, as such, not been upset by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and is, accordingly, quashed and set aside.”

The decision of Hon’ble Apex court is latest decision available on issue and is basically have been given on the basis of finding of Hon’ble Apex Court decision in case of New Noble Education. It is important to mention here that decision of

Hon’ble Apex Court in case of New Noble Education society is very big, detailed judgment, where in Hon’ble Apex court has considered all prior judgment on issue. By these two orders, Hon’ble Apex court has defined the not-for-profit phrase as available in section 10(23C) and cleared that profit is not allowed while doing activities in charity per say also, and is assesse is imparting the education or conducting activity it has to be at cost or at nominal margin, other same would fall from purview of not for profit and thus would fall from applicability of 10(23C). It is also important to mention here that though both decision are specifically for 10(23C), however, if we read the decision of New Noble education, Hon’ble Apex court has discussed the various provision of section 11 and 12 also in this regard, and it became clear that decisions are equally applicable even for registration under 12A also, which itself is available for charity and can no way considered tax exemption to entities which are collecting huge fee with enormous margin. It has also been discussed in this decision that margins are to be taken before depreciation, and other applications, including the application for new building etc. Thus, after this decision, even when the profits are ploughed back for creating another institute or infrastructure or otherwise, will not change the character of being exist for profit.

Now the question would arise that what margin can be considered nominal. Though Hon’ble apex court is silent in these two cases on this issue, however, as thesedecisionshas overturned the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Queens Education are important to be considered. Regarding issue of surplus, also the Hon’ble Uttarakhand High Court in the case of CIT v. Queens Educational Society considered the below financials and notfound assessee eligible for exemption.

TABLE

If we see that in that case the margin from activities were about as low as 0.84% in 2001-02 & only about 18% in 1999-2000. In fact, the year involved in that case were only 2001-02 & 2000-01, which were having margin on 0.84% and 7.5% only. Even otherwise, margin of 5-10% in any business is considered a good margin (that too being tax free). Section 44AD consider net profit of 8%. Thus, in my view the nominal margin may be taken at about 8% only.

In present case too applicant is generating huge surplus and profit that further is being applied in construction of hospital building and plant & machinery (and benefit is going in the hands of land owners.

Hence, the application of the applicant for registration u/s 12AB is liable to be rejected on the ground of profitability and benefit to members and related persons which is also non genuine activity.”

Submission:
1.1 Scope of Enquiry shall be limited to objects and genuineness:
It is submitted that at the time of granting of registration the CIT(E) is not supposed to go in the aspect being profitability, alleged excessive payment made to a trustee u/s 13(1)(c) etc. What the law requires is only to ensure u/s 12AB (1)(b)(i) clauses (A) and (B) that –
“(i) call for such documents or information from the trust or institution or make such inquiries as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself about—
(A) the genuineness of activities of the trust or institution; and
(B) the compliance of such requirements of any other law for the time being in force by the trust or institution as are material for the purpose of achieving its objects;”
Similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Rajasthan HC in the case of CIT v. Vijay Vargiya Vani Charitable Trust Reported in (2014) 90 CCH 0209 (RAJ. HC)(DC 30-32).
Hence, such allegations may be relevant while making the Assessment of a given year when the AO is empowered to deny or allow the benefit of S. 11 and 12 r/w S.12A of the Act.
1.2 Firstly, such aspect should not have been considered by the ld. CIT(E) at the time of registration, as already submitted in earlier part of this w/s. Section 12AB nowhere visualise such a situation. The Ld. CIT(E) however, appears to have invoked section 12AB (4) of the act which is only meant for cancellation of the registration already granted. However, there is a pre-condition before the CIT proceeds to cancel registration u/s 12AB (4) in as much as the law mandatorily requires CIT(E) to provide an opportunity of being heard before a registration is cancelled, but not complied with.
2.1 The ld. CIT vaguely alleged that there were huge profits were earned by the Appellant, however has completely failed to demonstrate/ corroborate his allegation with any evidence. No facts and figures were furnished to justify his stand. On the contrary a careful perusal of the chart (B) Pg 18-19enclosed with this WS shows that if the donations are excluded and depreciation is reduced, (proceeding on the concept of commercial basis) there was a huge loss of Rs 4.80 Cr in AY 2022-23 Rs 4.59 Cr in AY 2023-24 and meager surplus of Rs 11.30 Lakhs in AY 2024-25, which were the last 3 years, examined by the Ld. CIT(E) at the time of registration. Further in AY 25-26 (part) he wrongly considered Net Surplus of Rs. 2.97cr as receipt which were Rs. 17.56cr. (PB 174 & 182)
2.2 A notable aspect is that in the case of New Noble Education Society largely applied by the ld. CIT.In para 6 he has noted the fact that in that case the assessee was indulged into profit which was found to be 67.81% without depreciation and 44.48% with Depreciation (Pg. 12 of CIT order). Thus, such a huge amount of profit was found objectionable. Again the ld. CIT at pg. 13 of the order has taken the figures from the case of CIT v. Queen’s Education Society (Uttarakhand high court), the profit margins were 0.84% and 7.5% only. Thus, when this factual aspect is compared with the facts of the appellant’s case,it can’t be said that the appellant was not at all generating hugeprofits and it was not meant for earning the profits only. He also vaguely alleged that the profit earned were applied in the construction of hospital building and plant& machinery and benefit going to the hands of the land owners. Again, there is no corroboration.The investment in the infrastructure was substantially met by the donations and/or loans etc.
3. There apart, almost 50% or more of the patients were covered by CGH Schemes (Chiranjivi Scheme) where the fees towards treatment, test etc. are to be charged only in accordance with the state govt. guidelines and there is no scope of any excessive (or exorbitant) charging in those cases. But in addition, even in other cases, the appellant has passed on a substantial amount of discount at the average rate of 22%. Kindly refer the chart (C) Page 22 enclosed with this Written Submission. Also please refer (PB 77124).
Thus, there is no substance in the allegation of huge profit making.
D: Non-Genuineness of Activities:
Facts: This aspect has been discussed by the CIT(E) on Pg. 17. He finally concluded that:

“Hence from the above it is clear that the activities are not verifiable and it could not be determined whether the applicant is genuinely carrying out charitable activity.Therefore, the applicant claim of registration u/s 12AB is also liable to be rejected on ground of not proving its genuineness of activity.”

Submission:
2. All activities are genuine:While satisfying the genuineness of activities the CIT checks whether the activity of trust is falling within the meaning of charitable purpose as defined in section 2(15). The context of genuineness is that ‘activities of trust should be real and not sham or bogus’. Further, the activities of the trust or institution should be in accordance with the objectives set out in the constitution of trust or institution and there is no allegation on that aspect. All activities were towards charity. (PB 125-132).
The courts at various occasions have held that the newly registered NGO is entitled to registration on basis of its objects, without any activity having been undertaken. Hence, the powers of CIT were limited to see only the nature of activities and not commencement of activities. The new scheme of registration has introduced a separate category of registration for cases where the activities are yet to be commenced by NGO.
3.The courts in this context have held that the registration could not be denied on the following grounds:
3.1 In the case of CIT v. Red Rose School (Allahabad) (All.)the issue of registration under section 12A and the scope of enquiry at the stage of section 12AA was discussed, it was categorically held in the said decision that section 12AA does not speak anywhere that the CIT, while considering the application for registration, shall also see that the income derived by the trust or the institution is either not being spent for charitable purposes or such institution is earning profit. Profit earning or misuse of the income derived by charitable institution from its charitable activities may be a ground for refusing exemption only with respect to that part of the income but cannot be taken to be a synonym to the genuineness of the activities of the trust or the institution. While considering the registration under section 12AA, the scope of enquiry of the Commissioner would be limited to the aforesaid extent only.
3.2Income not spent for charitable purpose: Section 12AA does not mention anywhere that Commissioner, while considering application for registration, shall also see that income derived by trust or institution is either not being spent for charitable purpose or such institution is earning profit [CIT v. Red Rose School (Allahabad) (All.)(DC 57-63).
3.3Non-filling of return of income: Non-filing of return is not a valid ground to deny registration as the Commissioner (Exemptions) had to satisfy himself only about the charitable nature of the objects and genuineness of the activities of the trust. The provisions of section 13 were to be looked into by the Assessing Officer at the time of assessment proceedings and not at the time of granting registration under section 12AA. [CIT (Exemption) v. Shri Shirdi Sai Darbar Charitable Trust (Dharamshala) (Punj. & Har.)]
3.4Shortcomings in functioning: Shortcomings in the functioning of society cannot be considered as lack of genuineness of activities of the society, therefore, registration under section 12AA cannot be denied. [DIT (Exemption) v. Venkatesha Education Society [2012] 48(1) ITCL 27 (Kar.)]
4.In the case of B.M. Malani v. CIT (SC), the Court observed:

“‘8. The term ‘genuine’ as per the New Collins Concise English Dictionary is defined as under:

“”Genuine’ means not fake or counterfeit, real, not pretending (not bogus or merely a ruse).”

For interpretation of the aforementioned provision, the principle of purposive construction should be resorted to. Levy of interest although is statutory in nature, inter alia for recompensating the Revenue from loss suffered by nondeposit of tax by the assessee within the time specified therefor. The said principle should also be applied for the purpose of determining as to whether any hardship had been caused or not. A genuine hardship would, inter alia, mean a genuine difficulty. That per se would not lead to a conclusion that a person having large assets would never be in difficulty as he can sell those assets and pay the amount of interest levied.

The ingredients of genuine hardship must be determined keeping in view the dictionary meaning thereof and the legal conspectus attending thereto. For the said purpose, another well-known principle, namely, a person cannot take advantage of his own wrong, may also have to be borne in mind. The said principle, it is conceded, has not been applied by the Courts below in this case, but we may take note of a few precedents operating in the field to highlight the aforementioned proposition of law. (See Priyanka Overseas (P.) Ltd.&Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 102, para 39, Union of India & Ors. v. Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Madan Lal Yadav (1996) 4 SCC 127 at 142, paras 28 and 29, Ashok Kapil v. Sana Ullah (dead) & Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 342 at 345, para 7, Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (2003) 8 SCC 673 at 692, para 65, first sentence, Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 447, paras 13, 14 and 16).’

5. Yet however, in the entire order the ld. CIT(E) has not demonstrated how he could find such activities to be sham or fake or made-up affair. It is not his case that some of the expenditures were found bogus/ sham or the claimed activity were found nonexistent. Therefore, this allegation holds no water and deserves to be quashed. He wrongly alleged (PB 16-17) of non-submitting certain details which were submitted to the extent practicable. But he could have asked the appellant.

Other Supporting case laws:CIT v/s Shyam Mandir Committee CIT v. Shyam Mandir Committee (2018) 400 ITR 466 (Raj)(DC 33-53)andCIT v. D.N. Memorial Trust CIT v. D.N Memorial Trust (Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh) (Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh)/ (Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh) (DC 5456).

At the end thus, it is prayed that registration u/s 12AB and provisional registration u/s 12A may be restored. Further the approval denied u/s 80G(5) be also granted and the ld. CIT(E) be directed accordingly and oblige.

The above submissions have been made based on the instructions and the information provided of/by the client.”

8. In support of the contention raised in the written submission and the oral arguments the ld. AR of the assessee relied upon the following evidence / records / judgement:-
S. No.ParticularsPg. No.
1.APJ Abdul Kalam Education and Welfare Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Exemption (Jaipur – Trib.)/ITA No. 567/JPR/20241-14
2.Shri Jain Shwetambar Terapanthi Vidyalaya Committee v. CIT(E) (Jaipur – Trib.)/ ITA NC. 1000/JPR/202415-25
3.Dy. DIT (Exemption) v. Gideons International in India (Hyderabad – Trib.)26-29
4.CIT v. VijayVargiya Vani Charitable Trust Reported in (2014) 90 CCH 0209 (RAJ. HC)30-32
5.CIT v. Shyam Mandir Committee CIT v. Shyam Mandir Committee (2018) 400 ITR 466 (Raj)33-53
6.CIT v. D.N Memorial Trust (Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh)54-56
7.CIT v. Red Rose School (Allahabad)57-63

 

S. No.ParticularsPage No.
1.Copy of notice for proceeding u/s 80G(5)(iii) dt. 15.09.2024 requiring to furnish various documents/clarification/information on or before 01.08.2024.1-8
2.Copy of application for adjournment dt. 29.07.2024 along with acknowledgement attached.9
3.Copy of notice for proceeding u/s 80G(5)(iii) dt. 26.10.2024 as a final opportunity to furnish Documents/clarification/information on or before 05/11/2024.10
4.Copy of Reply letter dt. 04.11.2024 with the following annexures:
1. Members of the Society
2. Registration Certificate & Constitution of the Society
3. Publication of Notice under Rajasthan Public Trust Act,1959(Devsthan Vibhag) and other related documents.
4. Audited Accounts for FY 2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24.
5. Details of Donation received for FY 2021-22, 2022-23, 2023-24.
6. Details of charitable activities and discount given.
7. Newspaper cuttings and photos of free camps.
8. Lease deed of land.
9. Details of Bank Accounts.
10. Details of telephone no. and Email lD’s.
11.Proof of ownership of vehicles.
12. Certificate under Clinical Establishment Act.
15
16-30
31-35
36-71
72-76
77-124
125-132
133-140
142-161
141
142-161
162-165
5Copy of notice dt. 08.12.2024166 168
6Copy of Reply dt. 12.12.2024 with the following annexures:
1. Provisional Financial Statements for the period 0.04.2024 to 31.10.2024.
2. Audit Report and Financials for last three years.(Already filed vide letter dated 04.11.2024 with Anx.4)
3. List of some beneficiaries from charity given.
4. Details of sources of income. Publication of Notice under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (DevsthanVibhag) and other related documents. (Already filed vide letter dated 04.11.2024)
169-172
173-182
183-184
185-189
7Copy of Registration u/s 12A and 80G in FORM 10AC1 go-194
8Copy of registration certificate registered under Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (DevsthanVibhag) dt. 28.01.2025195
9Certificate of Registration under Rajasthan Medical Council of Dr. Krishan Kumar Katyal.196
10Dr. Krishan Kumar Katyal pension letter dt. 08.01.2019197

 

9. Ld. AR of the assessee in addition to the written submissions vehemently argued that through the application filed by the assessee deal with the recognition u/s 80G(5) of the Act, but the impugned order discusses all the facts related to the registration of the trust u/s 12AB of the Act. But the fact remains that the assessee is already given registration u/s 12A and therefore, the application so made u/s 80G(5) of the Act is to be decided considering that aspect of the matter and therefore, when the application of the assessee is for recognition u/s 80G the same cannot be reviewed in that application for which the registration has already granted. As is evident from the record that the ld. CIT(E) has passed a different order as is evident from page 17 of the impugned order and therefore, the present appeal is filed by the assessee, challenging the non-granting of recognition u/s 80G(5) of the Act. Records also reveal that on being aware by this apparent error on the part of the Learned CIT(E), he has on 03.04.2025, rectified an order correcting that mistake and thereby the assessee is in appeal in ITA No. 779/JPR/2025 on that issue of passing an order rectifying that error. Considering the fact not disputed that the assessee trust already enjoining benefit of u/s 12A and has already been registered action denying registration u/s 12AB of the Act in the application made u/s 80G(5) of the Act is invalid action and therefore, the assessee be granted recognition u/s 80G(5) of the Act. Since the assessee applied for that there is not averment or finding on the application moved by the assessee.
10. Per contra, the ld. DR heavily relied upon the orders of Learned CIT(E) and has also relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of CIT(E) v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute 265 (SC)/ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 19528/2018 wherein the Court has held that the very purpose for any assessee to seek registration under section 12AA of the Act is to claim exemption under sections 10 and 11 respectively of the Act, as the case may be. Therefore, before seeking registration, it is essential that the trust should adduce cogent material to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the activities are genuinely charitable in nature. In support of the various grounds so raised the ld. AR of the assessee, ld. DR filed a detailed written submission dated 13.05.2025 and 23.09.2025 which is extracted herein below: –
Submission dated 13.05.2025
Sub: Appellate proceedings before the Hon’ble ITAT, Jaipur in the case Ram Niwas Modi, ITA No.118/JPR/2025 (PAN:AAATR8150J) for A.Y. 2022-23-reg.
Please refer to your e-mail dated 03.04.2025 on the subject mentioned above.
In this context, it is to clarify that no separate order for cancellation of provisional registration was passed in this case.
Facts of the case:-
2. The assessee e-filed an application in Form 10AB seeking approval u/s 80G of the L.T. Act, 1961 on 26.06.2024 and the application was rejected vide order dated 31.12.2024, along with that rejection, assessee’s provisional approval under clause(iv) of first proviso to 80G is liable to be cancelled. However, it seems that that typographical error has occurred while mentioning the cancellation were inadvertent reference has been given to 12AB in place of 80G. Assessee was already having 12A registration under clause(1), which has not been disturbed with this order. This typographical mistake has been rectified by separate order dated 04.04.2025, copy of same is annexed.
3. The 2nd proviso to 80G(5), is as under-
(b) after satisfying himself about the genuineness of activities under item (4), and the fulfilment of all the conditions under item (B), of sub-clause (0)
(4) pass an order in writing granting it approval for a period of five years, or
(B) if he is not so satisfied pass an order in writing
in a case referred to in clause (i) or clause (y of the first proviso rejecting such application and cancelling its approval, or
Thus, the provision 80G(5) says that order under 80G be passed for rejecting of application & also cancelling its earlier approval. Thus, as per the position of Act, no separate order is required. Similar analogues provisions exist under 12AB(1)(ii)(B)(1), which alos require cancellation of provisional registration while passing order under clause (iii). Further, provisional registration/approval itself means provisional that is subject to final order, which is such cases are passed when assessee apply under clause (iii), and once that application which is for regularisation of provisional approval/registration has been rejected, it includes the cancellation of provisional approval/registration. However, as per these sections cancellation of earlier registration or approval is limited to orders of those sections only. Thus while rejecting the application of clause (iii) of first proviso to 80G, would imply cancellation of earlier approval under 80G only, and similarly while rejecting the application for application for clause(iii) of 12A(1)(ac) would only lead to cancellation of provisional registration under clause(vi)/(ivA) only, and these acts would not require any separate orders.
Submission dated 23.09.2025
“1. ISSUE
1.1 Whether delay beyond six months after remand by the Hon’ble ITAT for fresh consideration under Section 12AA/12AB/80G leads to deemed registration of the assessee-trust, or whether the Commissioner of Income-tax (Exemptions) [CIT(E)] retains jurisdiction to pass a speaking order even after expiry of six months.
2. LEGAL POSITION-CASE LAW IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE
2.1 For fairness, Revenue acknowledges that historically several courts have accepted the assessee’s argument that failure to decide within six months results in automatic registration.
2.2 Key authorities are:
2.2.1 CIT v. Sahitya Sadawart Samiti (2017) 396 ITR 46 (Raj HC)-Six-month limit held mandatory; failure results in deemed registration.
2.2.2 CIT v. Gettwell Health & Education Samiti (2019) 419 ITR 353 (Raj HC) -Deemed registration directed after four-year delay post-remand.
2.2.3 CIT v. Society for Promotion of Education. (2016) 382 ITR 6 (SC)-Dismissal of Revenue appeal treated as affirmation of deemed registration concept.
2.2.4 CIT v. Surya Educational & Charitable Trust (2013) 355 ITR 280 (P&H HC)-Non-disposal within six months results in deemed grant.
2.2.5 DIT(E) v. St. Ann’s Educational Society (2020) 425 ITR 642 (Kar HC) -Similar view of deemed approval.
3. REVENUE’S COUNTER-LATER BINDING PRECEDENTS
3.1 Supreme Court has settled the law that there is no deeming fiction.
3.1.1 CIT v. Muzafar Nagar Development Authority (2015) 372 ITR 209 (All) (FB) – No deeming provision in Section 12AA(2); jurisdiction continues.
3.1.2 Harshit Foundation, Sehmalpur v. CIT (2022) 447 ITR 372 (SC) – Apex Court categorically held that Parliament has not provided for automatic registration; delay does not result in deemed grant.
3.1.3 CIT v. Dr. Kasliwal Medical Care & Research Foundation (Bom HC, 2024) Reversed ITAT’s deemed registration order, delay does not extinguish power of CIT(E).
3.1.4 CIT(E) v. International Health Care Education & Research Institute (Raj HC 2025, affirmed by SC) Registration is not automatic; scrutiny of objects and genuineness is mandatory.
3.2 Principle of Harmonious Construction: Section 12AA(2) is intended to secure expeditious disposal but does not nullify the jurisdiction of CIT(E) after six months. If assessee is aggrieved by delay, remedy lies in seeking a direction from High Court, not in claiming a legal fiction that does not exist.
4. CBDT INSTRUCTIONS
4.1 CBDT Instructions (e.g., Instruction No. 16/2015) stress that applications must be disposed of within six months.
4.2 These are administrative mechanisms to monitor performance; they cannot override the Act or judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court.
4.3 Non-compliance may invite internal action but does not create deemed registration.
5. REVENUE’S SUBMISSION
5.1 In view of the binding ratio of the Supreme Court in Harshit Foundation (2022), the plea of deemed registration cannot be sustained.
5.2 Jurisdiction of CIT(E) remains alive until a speaking order is passed.
5.3 The appropriate course, if delay is excessive, is for the Tribunal/High Court to direct CIT(E) to pass a fresh order rather than bypassing statutory scrutiny.
6. PRAYER
It is humbly prayed that:
6.1 The assessee’s claim of deemed registration be rejected in light of Supreme Court and High Court decisions holding that Section 12AA(2) contains no deeming fiction.
6.2 The matter, if necessary, be remanded to the CIT(E) after providing opportunity of hearing.
6.3 Such a direction will balance expeditious disposal with the legislative intent of examining the genuineness of objects and activities before grant of registration.
7. CASE-LAW TABLE FOR BENCH REFERENCE
SI No.Case/CitationCourtRatio/relevance
1.Sahitya Sadawart Samiti (396 ITR 46)Raj. HCEarlier view six-month limit mandatory deemed registration
2.Gettwell Health & Education Samiti (419) 2 ITR 353)Raj. HCDeemed registration even postremand (now overtaken)
3.Society for Promotion of Education (382 3 SC ITR 6)SCAppeal dismissed used by assessees for deemed grant
4.Muzafar Nagar Development Authority All (372 ITR 209)ALL HCHC No deemed fiction continues jurisdiction
5.Harshit Foundation (447 ITR 372)SCSettles law- no automatic registration after six months
6.Dr. Kasliwal Medical FoundationBom. HCDelay / deemed registration
7.International Health Care & Research Raj InstituteRaj. HC (Aff. SC)CIT(E) must examine genuineness; registration not automatic
8.CBDT Instruction No. 16/2015CBDTInternal timeline guidance- directory only

 

On 26.09.2025 ld. DR also filed following submission:-
“REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF THE REVENUE
Respected Members of the Hon’ble Tribunal,
May it please your Honours,
The Revenue respectfully submits its written arguments in rebuttal to the submissions of the assessee.
Ground 1: Deemed Registration – Limitation of CIT(E)’s Order
1. The assessee contends that delay in disposal by CIT(E) results in “deemed registration.”
2. Binding precedent:
• Harshit Foundation v. CIT (SC, 2022) – Para 8:
“There is no provision in Section 12AA(2) of the Act providing for deemed registration if the application is not decided within six months. The Allahabad High Court (Full Bench) in Muzaffar Nagar Development Authority has rightly held so. We are in complete agreement.”
CIT v. Muzaffar Nagar Development Authority (All HC, Full Bench, 2015)-Para 18:
“Even where the CIT fails to pass an order within six months, it does not follow that registration must be deemed to have been granted.
Such a deeming fiction is absent in the statute.”
• CIT v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (All HC, 2012)-Para 11:
“Time limit is directory and not mandatory. No deemed registration accrues from mere inaction.”
3. The assessee’s reliance on older ITAT rulings (pre-Harshit Foundation) is misplaced. Once the Apex Court has spoken, earlier contrary views stand overridden under Article 141.
Hence, Ground 1 is not maintainable.
Ground 2: Ground 2: Genuineness of Activities
1. The assessee has claimed that its activities are charitable in nature and that discounts given to patients constitute charity.
2. However, from the paper book submitted by the assessee on 10.03.2025, the following facts emerge:
• Pg. 72-73: List of donations allegedly received from individuals.
• Pg. 75-124: List of donations/receipts for F.Y. 2023-24.
• Pg. 77-124: Ledger styled as “Discounts given to patients” for F.Y. 202223, containing columns:
• UHID
• Patient Category
• Patient Name
• Bill No.
• Gross Amount
• Bill Amount
• Deduction
3. Revenue’s Findings:
• On careful perusal of Pg. 77-124, it is observed that a majority of patients are categorized under “Chiranjeevi” along with Star Health, ICICI Lombard, Cash, etc.
• Chiranjeevi Yojna is a State-run health insurance scheme launched by the Government of Rajasthan on 01.05.2021, providing cashless treatment through empanelled hospitals at package rates fixed by the Government.
• Payments are made by the State Government directly to the hospital for the treatment of beneficiaries. The so-called “deduction” reflected in the assessee’s paper book is nothing but the difference between gross charges raised by the assessee and package rates fixed by the Government.
4. Key Observations (Pg. 77-124):
• Example entries (illustrative):
• UHID 11234-Category: Chiranjeevi-Gross ?45,000-Bill Amount ?30,000-
Deduction ?15,000.
• UHID 11456-Category: Chiranjeevi – Gross 1,10,000-Bill Amount 275,000-Deduction ?35,000.
• In every such case, the “deduction” is shown as if it were “charity,” whereas in fact, it is merely reimbursement adjustment under a contractual insurance arrangement.
5. Legal Implication:
• The element of voluntary charity is completely absent.
• The relationship between assessee and Government under Chiranjeevi Yojna is that of service provider and payer under contract.
• As held in CIT v. Gujarat Maritime Board (SC, 2007), where the predominant object is contractual service, it cannot qualify as charitable activity.
• Further, in DIT(E) v. Chembur Gymkhana (Bom HC, 2012), activities carried out against reimbursement from members/third parties were held to be non-charitable commercial services.
6. Therefore:
• The claim of the assessee that “discounts given” represent charity is factually incorrect.
• It is a B2B contractual adjustment arising from State Government’s fixed package rates under Chiranjeevi Yojna.
• The assessee has not produced any independent evidence of voluntary charitable expenditure apart from these contractual deductions.
Conclusion: Pages 77-124 of the paper book clearly demonstrate that the receipts are contractual reimbursements under Chiranjeevi Yojna and other insurance tie-ups, not charity.
Hence, genuineness is not proved; activities are commercial, not charitable. Conclusion
• Ground 1: Settled by Harshit Foundation (SC, 2022). No deemed registration exists.
• Ground 2: The assessee’s activities are contractual, not charitable. They fail the test of Section 2(15). Burden of proof remains undischarged.
Accordingly, both grounds of appeal deserve dismissal.”
11. We have heard the rival contentions and perused material available on record. First, we take up the appeal the assessee in ITA no.118/JPR/2025 wherein the assessee has raised five separate grounds of appeal but all the grounds relate to the application of the assessee trust for recognition of the assessee trust u/s 80G of the Act but while dealing with that application ld. CIT(E) has recorded finding for 12AB of the Act but that issue was not before the ld. CIT(E) and thereby the observation so recorded is also without jurisdiction on that issue. Considering the overall facts, decision cited before us and the arguments advanced before us we are of the considered view that lisbetween the parties has to be decided on merits so that nobody’s rights could be scuttled down without providing the proper opportunity of being heard and thereby the principles of natural justice to be followed. Here in this case record reveals that the assessee has applied for recognition u/s 80G of the Act but while considering that application ld. CIT(E) inadvertently considered that application for 12AB and recorded finding. But in fact, that issue was not referred to before him and the issue of registration of the assessee trust was not an issue as the same was already granted to the assessee [page 190 of the paper book]. The ld. CIT(E) having noted that mistake tried to cover up that error passed another order on 03.04.2025 wherein he rejected the application u/s. 80G of the Act and thereby he has also cancelled the provisional registration. But we see from the record that the assessee was not confronted on the issue of his recognition u/s. 80G of the Act and therefore, having noted that the assessee is already granted registration u/s. 12AB of the Act the action of rejecting the recognition application is against the principles of natural justice and therefore, even though the assessee has filed detailed written submission on the merits of the dispute and various case laws, but we are of the considered view that the ld. CIT(E) without dealing with the assessee’ application u/s. 80G of the Act even on the merits of the dispute the matter required to be set aside to the file of the ld. CIT(E) to deal the application a fresh in accordance with the law as after 12AB the registration, being not disputed and the recognition u/s 80G is consequential, therefore, the Ld. CIT(E) shall decide the issue without prejudice to what has happened in this case in the past.
Before parting, we may make it clear that our decision to restore the matter back (supra) to the file of the ld. CIT(E) shall in no way be construed as having any reflection or expression on the merits of the dispute, which shall be adjudicated by the ld. CIT(E) independently in accordance with law.
In the result, both the appeal of the assessee are disposed off thereby allowing the appeal of the assessee in ITA No. 779JPR/2025, AS we have quashed the 154 order and thereby allow the appeal in ITA No. 118/JPR/2025 for statistical purpose.