Compulsory Purchase Order Abrogation: Suit for Declaration of Abrogation Maintainable

By | May 26, 2025
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I. Compulsory Purchase Order Abrogation: Suit for Declaration of Abrogation Maintainable

Issue: Whether a civil suit seeking a declaration that a compulsory purchase order stands abrogated and the suit property re-vests in the transferor (due to non-payment of consideration within the stipulated time under Section 269UG) is maintainable, and whether such a suit is barred by Section 269UN (which prohibits calling into question compulsory purchase orders).

Facts:

  • The suit sought a declaration that a compulsory purchase order stood abrogated because the Central Government failed to pay the consideration within the time frame stipulated in Section 269UG of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  • Consequently, the suit claimed that the suit property re-vested in the transferor.
  • The question arose whether such a suit would “call into question” the compulsory purchase order, thereby being barred by Section 269UN.

Decision: The court held that such a suit is maintainable because the abrogation takes place by operation of law provided consideration is not paid within the time frame stipulated in Section 269UG. Thus, the suit does not “call into question” the compulsory purchase order itself (i.e., its validity or legality at the time of issuance), but rather seeks a declaration of a consequence that flows from a statutory provision (Section 269UG) due to non-compliance. Therefore, the suit is not barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 269UN. The phrase “called in question” in Section 269UN refers to a situation where the validity or legality of an order passed under Section 269UD(1) or Section 269UF(2) is being challenged or disputed.

Key Takeaways:

  • Abrogation by Operation of Law: The court clarifies that if the Central Government fails to pay consideration for a compulsory purchase within the statutory period under Section 269UG, the compulsory purchase order automatically stands abrogated. This abrogation is a statutory consequence, not a judicial annulment of a valid order.
  • Interpretation of “Called in Question”: Section 269UN bars suits challenging the validity or legality of the compulsory purchase order itself. A suit seeking a declaration of abrogation due to subsequent non-compliance with the payment condition does not challenge the initial validity but rather seeks a declaration of a statutory effect.
  • Maintainability of Suit: This ruling is significant as it allows transferors (assessees) to seek legal recourse in civil courts when the government fails to complete the compulsory purchase process by not making timely payment, ensuring that the property rights are restored.
  • Distinction Between Validity and Consequence: The judgment draws a crucial distinction between questioning the legal validity of an order at its inception and seeking a declaration of a statutory consequence (abrogation) arising from subsequent non-compliance with statutory conditions for the order’s execution.

II. Bar of Suits in Civil Court (Section 293): Suit for Declaration of Abrogation Not Barred

Issue: Whether a civil suit seeking a declaration that a compulsory purchase order stands abrogated due to non-compliance with the provisions of Section 269UG would be barred by Section 293 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (which generally bars suits in civil courts challenging proceedings or orders under the Act).

Facts:

  • The suit sought a declaration that a compulsory purchase order stood abrogated on account of non-compliance with the provisions of Section 269UG.

Decision: The court held that such a suit would not set aside or modify any proceeding taken or order made under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Key Takeaways:

  • Scope of Section 293: Section 293 bars civil courts from setting aside or modifying “any proceeding taken or order made” under the Income-tax Act.
  • Declaratory Relief vs. Setting Aside/Modifying: A suit seeking a declaration that an order stands abrogated by operation of law due to subsequent events (like non-payment) is distinct from a suit that seeks to set aside or modify the order itself on grounds of its initial invalidity or irregularity. The former merely recognizes a factual and legal consequence, while the latter directly challenges the order’s existence or terms.
  • No Direct Challenge to Statutory Action: Since the suit does not challenge the initial procedural validity of the compulsory purchase order but rather seeks a declaration of its automatic cessation due to a failure in its execution as per statute, it does not fall within the prohibitory scope of Section 293.
  • Assessee’s Recourse: This further strengthens the position that assessees have a legitimate avenue in civil courts to seek restoration of their property rights if the government fails to complete its part of the compulsory purchase transaction.
HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Sasmita Investments Ltd.
v.
Appropriate Authority
B.P. COLABAWALLA and FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, JJ.
APPEAL NO.298 OF 2014
SUIT NO.2094 OF 2006
APRIL  25, 2025
Harish Salve, Zal Andhyarujina, Sr. Counsels, Shanay Shah, Gunjan Mangla, Serena Jethmalani, Darshan Mehta and Aaditya Mapara for the Appellant. R. Venkatramani, Adv., B.M. Chatterji, Sr. Adv., V. Vijayalakshmi, Shreyash Shah, Udayan Mukherjee and Raman Yadav for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
B. P. Colabawalla, J.- The above appeal takes exception to the order dated 7th April 2014 [for short the “impugned order”] passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the suit filed by the Appellant [Original Plaintiff] on the ground that it was barred under the provisions of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [for short the “IT Act, 1961”].
2. Initially, by order dated 29th January 2013, the learned Single Judge framed three preliminary issues [to be decided in the above suit] under the provisions of the Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for short “CPC”]. For the sake of convenience, the issues framed by the learned Single Judge are reproduced hereunder:-
1.Whether the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court to try, entertain and dispose of the present suit is barred under section 269UN of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as pleaded in paragraph 1 of the Written Statement and/or section 293 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
2.Whether the law of limitation bars the present suit?
3.Whether the plaintiff has the locus standi to maintain the present suit as pleaded in paragraph 11 of the written statement and/or is estopped from instituting the present suit?
(emphasis supplied)
3. Issue No.1 was answered in the affirmative, i.e. against the Appellant (original Plaintiff), and consequently the above suit was dismissed. Also, since the finding on Issue No.1 was in the affirmative, namely, that the suit was barred by virtue of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961, the other two issues were not answered by the learned Single Judge. It is being aggrieved by this order dismissing the suit that the above appeal is filed.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
4. Before we deal with the legal issues raised in the above appeal, it would be appropriate to deal with some basic facts. For the sake of convenience, we shall refer to the parties as they were arrayed before the learned Single Judge.
5. The Plaintiff is a Company inter-alia carrying on the business of investment in properties. The 1st Defendant is the appropriate authority constituted under the provisions of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. The 2nd Defendant is the Union of India impleaded through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance. Defendant Nos. 3 to 18 [hereinafter referred to as the “Mulanis”], as also one Mr. Omprakash Navani [i.e. Defendant No.19], are joined as Defendants as they have, together, executed a Deed of Conveyance dated 16th May 2006 in favour of the Plaintiff and sold their right, title and interest in the suit property to the Plaintiff. In the present suit, no reliefs are claimed against Defendant Nos. 3 to 19, and they have been added as proper parties and out of abundant caution.
6. On or about 16th May 1981 one Jaisingh Gopaldas Mulani and others [the Mulanis] on the one hand, and Defendant No.19 on the other, entered into an agreement for sale of 12,916 sq.ft. [approx] of unutilized Floor Space Index [FSI] forming a part of the plot of land bearing C.S. No. 152 admeasuring about 1962 square yards equivalent to 1636.30 sq.mtrs or thereabouts situated at Walkeshwar Road, Mumbai [together hereinafter referred to “the suit property”]. Thereafter, the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] entered into an Agreement dated 13th July 1991 with one M/s. Seawell Interdrill Services Pvt. Ltd. [for short “Seawell”] for sale of the suit property and also the rights of Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] therein under the Agreement dated 16th May 1981.
7. By the time the Agreement dated 13th July 1991 was executed by the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 in favour of Seawell, Chapter XX-C [consisting of Section 269-U to Section 269-UO] of the IT Act, 1961 was brought into force. Accordingly, the Mulanis submitted Form 37-I under Section 269-UC of the IT Act, 1961 to Defendant No.1, declaring their intention to sell the suit property in terms of the said Agreement dated 13th July 1991. On 27th September 1991, Defendant No.1 passed an order of compulsory purchase of the suit property under Section 269-UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961 [for short the “1st Compulsory Purchase Order”] on the ground that the consideration mentioned in the said Agreement was understated. Being aggrieved by the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 27th September 1991], the Mulanis as well as Seawell preferred Writ Petition No. 3159 of 1991 and Writ Petition No. 3251 of 1991 respectively. What was sought in the aforesaid Writ Petitions was quashing of the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order.
8. By order dated 12th April 1993, this Court set aside the 1st Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 27th September 1991] and remanded the matter back to Defendant No.1 to dispose of Mulanis’ application for approval [in Form 37-I] in accordance with law and keeping in view the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of C.B. Gautam v. Union of India [(1993) 199 ITR page 530 : (1993) 1 SCC 78].
9. After the remand, Defendant No.1 once again passed an order for compulsory purchase dated 29th June 1993 [for short the “2nd Compulsory Purchase Order”] on the ground that the consideration mentioned in the Agreement dated 13th July 1991 was understated. Once again, being aggrieved by the 2nd Compulsory Purchase Order, the Mulanis and Seawell filed Writ Petitions in this Court, being Writ Petition No. 2131 of 1993 and Writ Petition No. 1782 of 1993. This Court, by its order dated 11th June 2002, disposed of the Writ Petition filed by the Seawell by quashing and setting aside the 2nd Compulsory Purchase Order and remanded the matter once again to Defendant No.1 with a direction that in case Defendant No.1 decides again to compulsorily purchase the suit property, Seawell will be free to re-approach this Court, if necessary, against such decision of Defendant No.1.
10. According to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant once again mechanically and without application of mind, passed an order dated 12th September 2002 compulsorily purchasing the suit property [for short the “3rd Compulsory Purchase Order”]. Subsequent to the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002], the 1st Defendant addressed a letter dated 24th September 2002 to the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] inter-alia stating that it was willing to pay the apparent consideration after possession of the suit property, free from all encumbrances, along with documents and relevant papers in original, was handed over to Defendant No.1, and all liabilities of the vendors [as per their agreement] were discharged.
11. In response to this letter, the Mulanis addressed a letter dated 4th October 2002 inter alia stating that the suit property stood vested with the Central Government under Section 269-UE of the IT Act, 1961 and the amount of Rs.7,74,99,000/- as provided in the agreement for sale dated 13th July, 1991 [being the apparent consideration] must be immediately deposited with the advocates of the owners. According to the Plaintiff, the request of the Mulanis to deposit the apparent consideration with their lawyers, M/s. Kanga and Company, fell on deaf ears. Neither was the consideration offered to the vendors, nor the vendors ever refused to accept the same. Further, the IT Department did not deposit the apparent consideration anywhere after the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order was passed on 12th September 2002.
12. Considering how the matter had progressed, Seawell [the original purchaser] addressed a letter dated 12th December 2002 to Defendant No.1 inter-alia stating that as per the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order, it was the statutory obligation of Defendant No.1 and/or No.2 to tender the apparent consideration to the vendors [the Mulanis and Defendant No.19] by 31st October 2002 in accordance with Section 269-UG of the IT Act, 1961. They having failed to do so, the suit property statutorily revested with the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 by virtue of Section 269-UH(1) of the IT Act, 1961. By this very letter dated 12th December 2002, Seawell [the Original Purchaser] also called upon the appropriate authority to issue a declaration under the IT Act, 1961 to the effect that the order dated 12th September 2002 [the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order] stood abrogated [under Section 269-UH(2)]. However, no such declaration was issued by the appropriate authority.
13. It appears that thereafter between January 2003 to May 2005, the Mulanis made several visits and requested Defendant No.1 to pass a formal order declaring that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stood abrogated. However, no decision was taken or response given by the 1st Defendant either on the request of the Mulanis or to the letter dated 12th December 2002 addressed by Seawell.
14. It appears that in the year 2004, Seawell was merged with an entity called Trikaya Investment Ltd. [for short “Trikaya”]. This was done pursuant to an order dated 29th September 2004 passed by this Court sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation between Seawell and Trikaya. Accordingly, Trikaya by its letter dated 20th May 2005, made another representation to Defendant No.1 repeating and reiterating the contents of the letter dated 12th December 2002 addressed by Seawell. In other words, Trikaya also requested Defendant No.1 to make a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order dated 12th September 2002 stood abrogated. In response to this letter, Defendant No.1 wrote a letter dated 10th June 2005 to Seawell inter-alia stating that the vendors had not complied with their request for handing over peaceful possession along with the title documents and other papers pertaining to the suit property, and in the absence of which the payment of the apparent consideration was withheld by the 1st Defendant. A similar letter was also addressed on 19th December 2005 to Trikaya.
15. It appears that thereafter, the Mulanis, Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] and Trikaya terminated the agreement dated 13th July 1991, and the Plaintiff herein purchased the suit property from the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] by a Deed of Conveyance dated 16th May 2006 [registered as document No.4720/2006 with the Sub- Registrar of Assurances, Mumbai] for a total consideration of Rs. 18,25,00,000/-, of which Rs.7,50,00,000/- was paid to the Mulanis, and Rs. 10,75,00,000/- was paid to Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani], respectively.
16. It is in these facts that the Plaintiff has approached this Court by filing the above suit inter-alia seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stands abrogated on and from 31st October 2002, and on and from the said date, all the rights, title and interest in the suit property and all rights to the FSI thereto, stood re-vested in the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] respectively. A further declaration is sought that on and from 16th May 2006, the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property and has absolute right, title and interest therein, including the right to sell, develop, alienate, transfer, create any interest in and in any manner to deal with and dispose of the suit property without any hindrance. The other consequential prayer sought is to restrain the Defendants and/or their servants and agents from in any manner interfering with the Plaintiff’s possession and/or its right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, or create any interest in the suit property. For the sake of convenience, the prayers in the above suit are reproduced hereunder:-
“A. For a Declaration that:
i.The said Order dated 12th September, 2002 of Compulsory Purchase of the said Property stands abrogated on and from 31st October, 2002;
ii.on and from 31st October, 2002 all right, title and interest in the said Property, and all rights to the said FSI, stood re-vested in the Mulanis and Om Prakash Navani, respectively, and
iii.On and from 16th May, 2006, the Plaintiff is the absolute owners of the said Property and have the absolute right, title and interest in the said Property including the right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, create any interest in and in any manner to deal with and dispose of the said Property without any let or hindrance.
B. For a Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants and their servants and agents from in any manner interfering with the Plaintiff’s possession and/or its right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, create any interest in and in any manner to deal with and dispose of the said Property.
(B1) In the alternative to prayer (B) above, if this Hon’ble Court holds that the Defendants are in actual possession of the said Property, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to forthwith deliver or cause to be delivered possession of the said Property to the Plaintiff.
C. For Mandatory Injunction directing the Defendants and their servants and agents to forthwith remove their Board and security personnel on and from the said Property.”
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF:
17. In this factual backdrop, Mr. Salve, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff, submitted that the learned Single Judge committed a gross error in holding that the suit filed by the Plaintiff seeking the aforesaid declarations was barred by virtue of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. To substantiate this argument, Mr. Salve took us through the scheme of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. He submitted that under Section 269-UC, no transfer of any immovable property [in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees as may be prescribed], can be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property [the transferor] and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred [the transferee], in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UC(2), at least four months before the intended date of transfer. Further, the agreement must be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of other parties. Mr. Salve submitted that once this statement is submitted, the appropriate authority, if it is of the opinion that the consideration is understated, may make an order under Section 269-UD(1) for purchase of the said property at an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration, namely, in the present case, the consideration mentioned in the agreement. He submitted that once an order is made under Section 269-UD(1) by the appropriate authority in relation to any immovable property, such property shall vest in the Central Government under Section 269-UE(1) of the IT Act, 1961. He, thereafter, brought to our attention Section 269-UF(1) and submitted that where a compulsory order for the purchase of any immovable property is made by the appropriate authority [under Section 269-UD(1)], the Central Government shall pay, by way of consideration, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. He submitted that under Section 269-UG, this amount is to be paid within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the concerned immovable property becomes vested in the Central Government under subsection (1), or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269UE.
18. Mr. Salve thereafter turned our attention to Section 269-UH which stipulates that if the Central Government fails to tender [under subsection (1) of Section 269-UG] or deposit [under sub-section (2) or subsection (3) of Section 269-UG], the whole or any part of the amount of consideration required to be tendered or deposited within the period specified, the order to purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand re-vested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period. He submitted that this happens by operation of law as stipulated in Section 269-UH. Here, it is the specific case of the Plaintiff that since the consideration was not tendered within the time stipulated as set out under Section 269-UG [i.e. by 31st October 2002], the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002], by operation of law, stood abrogated and the suit property stood re-vested in the transferors, namely, the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] after the expiry of the aforesaid period. It is this declaration that is sought in the above suit. Since the Plaintiff has thereafter purchased the suit property from the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani], consequential reliefs are also sought as set out earlier.
19. Mr. Salve submitted that if one carefully goes through the scheme of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961, then it is clear that the declaration sought by the Plaintiff in the above suit is clearly not barred under any provision of the IT Act, 1961. He submitted that the learned Single Judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Chapter XX-C whilst coming to the conclusion that the above suit is barred by virtue of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. Mr. Salve submitted that Section 269-UN stipulates that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XX-C, any order made under Section 269-UD(1) or any order made under Section 269-UF(2) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceedings, either under the IT Act, 1961 or in any other law for the time being in force. Mr. Salve submitted that in the present case, the order dated 12th September 2002 passed under Section 269-UD(1) [the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order] is not being called into question at all in the present suit. In fact, the present suit proceeds on the basis that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] is valid. What the Plaintiff seeks in the present suit is a declaration that due to non-compliance of the provisions of Section 269-UF read with Section 269-UG, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stands abrogated and the suit property stands re-vested in the name of transferors, namely, the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani], under Section 269-UH. This, by no stretch of the imagination, can be construed to mean that the Plaintiff is calling into question the order passed by the appropriate authority under Section 269-UD(1) of the IT Act, 1961. He, therefore, submitted that the reliance placed on Section 269-UN to oust the jurisdiction of this court, is wholly misconceived and misplaced.
20. Similarly, Mr. Salve submitted that even Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961 does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court. He submitted that Section 293 bars a suit to set aside or modify any proceedings taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961, and no prosecution, suit or other proceedings shall lie against the Government or any officer of the Government for anything done in good faith or intended to be done in good faith under the IT Act, 1961. The present suit does not in any way seek to modify or set aside any proceedings taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961. What the present suit seeks is only a declaration that by virtue of Section 269-UH, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stands abrogated and the suit property re-vests in the transferors. This relief is sought solely on the basis that the apparent consideration was not tendered or deposited within the time stipulated in Section 269-UG. Mr. Salve submitted that the reliefs prayed for in the suit are in fact in alignment with the scheme of Chapter XX-C, and not to set aside or modify any proceeding taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961. He, therefore, submitted that on the plain reading of the aforesaid sections, it is clear that the jurisdiction of this Court is not barred by virtue of any of the provisions of the IT Act, 1961. Mr. Salve submitted that if this be the case, the impugned order clearly proceeds on the wrong premise and therefore requires interference in appeal.
21. Mr. Salve was at pains to point out that the learned Single Judge has in fact grossly erred when he came to the conclusion that as the Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated, this Court will have to further declare that the said order [dated 12th September 2002] stood annulled, cancelled or set aside. He submitted that the abrogation takes place by operation of law and there is no question of giving a further declaration that the order is set aside. In fact, Mr. Salve pointed out that the learned Judge erroneously proceeded on the basis that if the declaration sought in the suit is granted, this Court will have to declare that the proceedings initiated under Chapter XX-C are illegal and therefore barred under Sections 269-UN and/or 293 of the IT Act, 1961. In the facts of the present case, there is no question of declaring the proceedings illegal as the Plaintiff itself proceeds on the basis that the proceedings, and which culminated in the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002], are valid, was the submission. In light of the declaration sought, the Plaintiff can never contend that either the proceedings, or the order dated 12th September 2002, are illegal. The Plaintiff cannot seek a declaration of abrogation and yet contend that the order which stood abrogated, was illegal. If the order was illegal, there would be no question of its abrogation, was the submission. For all these reasons, Mr. Salve submitted that impugned order is wholly incorrect and ought to be quashed and set aside.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIA:
22. On the other hand, the learned Attorney General of India submitted that the present suit challenging the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. He submitted that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present suit seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] passed under Section 269-UD of the IT Act, 1961 stands abrogated, as this would amount to an inquiry into all matters and issues allegedly leading to the alleged abrogation. This would be wholly impermissible in view of Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. The learned Attorney General submitted that Section 293 unequivocally bars any civil suit or legal proceeding in respect of any action taken under the IT Act, 1961, including orders passed under Section 269-UD. The bar under Section 293 applies to the entire IT Act, 1961 enacting a bar against any adjudication of proceedings under the Act by any court. This would necessarily include all matters in relation to 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] passed under Section 269-UD.
23. The learned Attorney General then submitted that the relief sought by the Plaintiff, namely, that there is an abrogation under Section 269-UH(1), is an indirect way of questioning the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002]. It does not make any difference that the Plaintiff says that it is not questioning the said order. Implicit in the examination of abrogation under Section 269-UH is the rescinding of the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order. Consequently, without any inquiry into the stand taken by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, and their conduct under Section 269-UE, there cannot be any adjudication under Section 269-UH. In other words, without examining the legality or otherwise of all matters leading to the alleged abrogation, there cannot be any declaration under Section 269-UH. The bar under Section 293 cannot be evaded by resorting to framing the suit the way it has been framed, was the submission.
24. The next submission of the learned Attorney General of India was that Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is itself premised upon the availability of jurisdiction. If a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, bars adjudication by any court, then Section 9 will stand automatically excluded. The question as to whether an abrogation has really taken place, is a question within the scope of the IT Act, 1961. Any inquiry in this regard will be treated as a proceeding under the IT Act, 1961. The widely stated provision of Section 293, which includes adjudication of matters under Chapter XX-C, can neither be truncated, nor is it open to the court to add any exceptions or additions to the provisions, by permitting adjudication in relation to Section 269-UH.
25. The learned Attorney General of India thereafter submitted that Section 293 and Section 269-UN must be read harmoniously, both ousting the civil court’s jurisdiction. He submitted that though distinct in their textual formulation, Section 293 and Section 269-UN must be read together, as they serve the common legislative purpose of excluding the civil court’s jurisdiction over disputes arising from actions taken under Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. The learned Attorney General submitted that Section 293 applies to the entire IT Act, 1961 including orders passed under Section 269-UD. The contention that Section 269-UN only partially ousts the jurisdiction and that Section 293 does not apply in the present case is wholly incorrect. Any argument that the special provision [Section 269-UN] would negate the applicability of the general ouster clause [Section 293] is misconceived, as there is no conflict between these two provisions. The special versus the general principle will apply only when there is an express intent to substitute a field already occupied. In fact, Section 293 existed even before the amendment introducing Chapter XX-C, and continues to apply broadly to all actions under the IT Act, 1961 including the compulsory purchase orders passed under Section 269-UD. According to the learned Attorney General, the harmonious construction of Section 269-UN and Section 293 reinforces the legislative intent to completely oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters related to compulsory purchase orders passed under Section 269-UD. Therefore, any challenge to such an order by way of a civil suit must fail. The legislative history of Section 293 and the scheme of Chapter XX-C clearly indicate that once an order is passed under Section 269-UD, it is meant to attain finality, thereby preventing interdiction of purchase orders through civil litigation.
26. The learned Attorney General thereafter submitted that it is the plaintiff’s case that they have a right to demand a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] passed under Section 269-UD is abrogated, due to the alleged non-compliance of Section 269-UH. In order to get into the question whether the court could pass such a declaration, the court would first have to decide the antecedent facts leading to such abrogation. According to the learned Attorney General, in light of the express language of Section 293, the civil court cannot examine these factual questions, and consequently, cannot give any declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stood abrogated.
27. The learned Attorney General submitted that it is pertinent to note that the plaintiff has not challenged the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] under writ jurisdiction. Even after the payment period [under Section 269-UH] expired on 31st October 2002, there was no writ petition filed either by Defendant Nos.3 to 18 [the Mulanis] or Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani] or Seawell. It is only in 2006, when the original vendors cancelled the purchase agreement with Seawell, and entered into a new agreement with the plaintiff [that led to the transfer of the suit property to the plaintiff], who then filed the above suit. What is also important to note is that the 1st compulsory purchase order [dated 27th September 1991] and the 2nd compulsory purchase order [dated 29th June 1993] were challenged by the original vendors by filing writ petitions. However, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] has not been challenged at any point of time by filing a writ petition. The learned Attorney General submitted that it was the argument of the Plaintiff they filed a suit rather than filing a writ petition because there were disputed questions of fact that required adjudication. The learned Attorney General submitted that such an argument appears to be one of convenience rather than there actually being any disputed questions of facts involved. He submitted that there is no question of fact involved as such which needs to be decided in the suit. The issue involved in this case could successfully be decided in a writ petition, was the submission. According to the learned Attorney General, the suit is filed as an afterthought to avoid delay and latches caused by the original vendors in taking appropriate action. The Plaintiff is only taking advantage of its own wrong by purchasing litigation, was the submission.
28. Without prejudice to the aforesaid arguments, the learned Attorney General submitted that under Section 269-UH(2), when an order under Section 269-UD(1) is abrogated and the immovable property is revested in the transferor, the appropriate authority [Defendant No.1] is required to make a declaration in writing to that effect and follow the further process stipulated under Section 269-UH(2). It was submitted that none of the legal requirements as stipulated in Section 269-UH(2) had occurred, namely, that the appropriate authority did not issue any declaration in writing, or deliver a copy of such declaration to the transferors or any person interested therein, or deliver or caused to be delivered possession of the suit property back to the transferors. In the absence of the mandatory legal compliance of Section 269-UH(2), i.e. passing of a declaration by the appropriate authority, the transferor or any other person cannot take upon themselves and declare that the compulsory purchase order passed under Section 269-UD(1) stood abrogated, and thereafter proceed to deal with the immovable property.
29. For all the aforesaid reasons, it was submitted that no exception can be taken to the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge who held that the suit filed by the Plaintiff was clearly barred by the provisions of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961.
30. We must mention that the learned Attorney General also addressed us on the merits of the matter, namely, that in fact the Government has duly complied with the provisions of Chapter XX-C and deposited the apparent consideration within the time frame set out therein, and consequently, there is no question of seeking any declaration of abrogation. To be fair, even Mr Salve, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, addressed us on this issue. We, however, made it clear to both parties that the merits of the matter was not the scope of the present appeal and hence we wouldn’t be deciding whether in fact the Government had complied with the time-frame for depositing the apparent consideration so that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] did not stand abrogated. That is an issue which would have to be decided in the suit, subject of course to the fact that we come to the conclusion that the suit is maintainable as contended by the plaintiff. Hence we are not burdening this judgement with this aspect of the matter.
REASONING, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
31. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. We have also perused the papers and proceedings in the above appeal and the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Before we proceed to decide whether the suit filed by the Plaintiff is barred under the provisions of Sections 269- UN and/or 293 of the IT Act, 1961, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. Though only some sub-sections of the provisions of Chapter XX-C are relevant for our purposes, for the sake of convenience, we have reproduced the entire section/provision and highlighted the relevant sub-sections.
32. Section 269-UA is the definitions Section and stipulates that in Chapter XX-C, unless the context otherwise requires, the words defined therein shall mean and/or include what is stated therein. For our purposes, the definition of the words “apparent consideration” and “immoveable property” are relevant and reproduced hereunder:-
“(b) “apparent consideration”,—
(1) in relation to any immovable property in respect of which an agreement for transfer is made, being immovable property of the nature referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (d), means,—
(i)if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of sale, the consideration for such transfer as specified in the agreement for transfer;
(ii)if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of exchange,—
(A)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things only, the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made;
(B)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things and a sum of money, the aggregate of the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made, and such sum;
(iii)if the immovable property is to be transferred by way of lease,—
(A)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of premium only, the amount of premium as specified in the agreement for transfer;
(B)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of rent only, the aggregate of the moneys (if any) payable by way of rent and the amounts for the service or things forming part of or constituting the rent, as specified in the agreement for transfer;
(C)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of premium and rent, the aggregate of the amount of the premium, the moneys (if any) payable by way of rent, and the amounts for the service or things forming part of or constituting the rent, as specified in the agreement for transfer,
and where the whole or any part of the consideration for such transfer is payable on any date or dates falling after the date of such agreement for transfer, the value of the consideration payable after such date shall be deemed to be the discounted value of such consideration, as on the date of such agreement for transfer, determined by adopting such rate of interest as may be prescribed in this behalf.
(2) in relation to any immovable property in respect of which an agreement for transfer is made, being immovable property of the nature referred to in subclause (ii) of clause (d), means,—
(i)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a sum of money only, such sum;
(ii)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things only, the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made;
(iii)in a case where the consideration for the transfer consists of a thing or things and a sum of money, the aggregate of the price that such thing or things would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date on which the agreement for transfer is made, and such sum, and where the whole or any part of the consideration for such transfer is payable on any date or dates falling after the date of such agreement for transfer, the value of the consideration payable after such date shall be deemed to be the discounted value of such consideration, as on the date of such agreement for transfer, determined by adopting such rate of interest as may be prescribed in this behalf;”
(emphasis supplied)
“(d) “immovable property” means—
(i)any land or any building or part of a building, and includes, where any land or any building or part of a building is to be transferred together with any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things, such machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things also.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this subclause, “land, building, part of a building, machinery, plant, furniture, fittings and other things” include any rights therein;
(ii)any rights in or with respect to any land or any building or a part of a building (whether or not including any machinery, plant, furniture, fittings or other things therein) which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, accruing or arising from any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member of, or acquiring shares in, a cooperative society, company or other association of persons or by way of any agreement or any arrangement of whatever nature), not being a transaction by way of a sale, exchange or lease of such land, building or part of a building;”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the transfer [by way of sale] of the “immovable property” in question is one as defined in Section 269-UA(d)(i), and therefore, the “apparent consideration” would be as defined in Section 269-UA(b)(1)(i). Section 269-UB gives power to the Central Government to constitute an “appropriate authority” for carrying out the functions as stipulated in Chapter XX-C and not relevant for the purposes of the present appeal.
34. Section 269-UC puts a restriction on the transfer of certain immovable properties and stipulates as under:-
“269-UC. Restrictions on transfer of immovable property.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), or in any other law for the time being in force, no transfer of any immovable property in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees, as may be prescribed shall be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property (hereinafter referred to as the transferor) and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred (hereinafter referred to as the transferee) in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) at least four months before the intended date of transfer.
(2) The agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.
(3) Every statement referred to in sub-section (2) shall,—
(i)be in the prescribed form;
(ii)set forth such particulars as may be prescribed; and
(iii)be verified in the prescribed manner,
and shall be furnished to the appropriate authority in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed, by each of the parties to such transaction or by any of the parties to such transaction acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.
(4) Where it is found that the statement referred to in subsection (2) is defective, the appropriate authority may intimate the defect to the parties concerned and give them an opportunity to rectify the defect within a period of fifteen days from the date of such intimation or within such further period which, on an application made in this behalf, the appropriate authority may, in its discretion, allow and if the defect is not rectified within the said period of fifteen days or, as the case may be, the further period so allowed, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Chapter, the statement shall be deemed never to have been furnished.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. To put it in a nutshell, what Section 269-UC stipulates is that no transfer of any immovable property [in such area and of such value exceeding five lakh rupees as may be prescribed], can be effected except after an agreement for transfer is entered into between the person who intends transferring the immovable property [the transferor] and the person to whom it is proposed to be transferred [the transferee], in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UC(2), at least four months before the intended date of transfer. Further, the agreement must be reduced to writing in the form of a statement by each of the parties to such transfer or by any of the parties to such transfer acting on behalf of himself and on behalf of the other parties.
36. Section 269-UD inter alia provides that once the agreement of transfer [in the form of a statement as required under Section 269-UC(2)] is furnished, and the appropriate authority is of the opinion that the consideration mentioned therein is understated, it can purchase the said property by making an order to that effect as stipulated in Section 269-UD(1). Section 269-UD reads as under:-
“269-UD. Order by appropriate authority for purchase by Central Government of immovable property.—(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (1-A) and (1-B), the appropriate authority, after the receipt of the statement under sub-section (3) of Section 269-UC in respect of any immovable property, may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or any instrument or any agreement for the time being in force, [* * *] make an order for the purchase by the Central Government of such immovable property at an amount equal to the amount of apparent consideration:
Provided that no such order shall be made in respect of any immovable property after the expiration of a period of two months from the end of the month in which the statement referred to in Section 269-UC in respect of such property is received by the appropriate authority:
Provided further that the statement referred to in Section 269-UC in respect of any immovable property is received by the appropriate authority on or after the 1st day of June, 1993, the provisions of the first proviso shall have effect as if for the words “two months”, the words “three months” had been substituted :
Provided also that the period of limitation referred to in the second proviso shall be reckoned, where any defect as referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 269-UC has been intimated, with reference to the date of receipt of the rectified statement by the appropriate authority:
Provided also that in case where the statement referred to in Section 269-UC in respect of the immovable property concerned is given to an appropriate authority, other than the appropriate authority having jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UB to make the order referred to in this sub-section in relation to the immovable property concerned, the period of limitation referred to in the first and second provisos shall be reckoned with reference to the date of receipt of the statement by the appropriate authority having jurisdiction to make the order under this sub-section:
Provided also that the period of limitation referred to in the second proviso shall be reckoned, where any stay has been granted by any court against the passing of an order for the purchase of the immovable property under this Chapter, with reference to the date of vacation of the said stay.
(1-A) Before making an order under sub-section (1), the appropriate authority shall give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation of the property, the transferee and to every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property.
(1-B) Every order made by the appropriate authority under sub-section (1) shall specify the grounds on which it is made.
(2) The appropriate authority shall cause a copy of its order under sub-section (1) in respect of any immovable property to be served on the transferor, the person in occupation of the immovable property if the transferor is not in occupation thereof, the transferee, and on every other person whom the appropriate authority knows to be interested in the property.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Once an order of compulsory purchase is passed under Section 269-UD(1), the immoveable property, which forms the subject matter of the said order, vests in the Central Government as stipulated in Section 269-UE(1) or 269-UE(6), as the case may be. For the sake of convenience Section 269-UE reads as under:
“269-UE. Vesting of property in Central Government.—(1) Where an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is made by the appropriate authority in respect of an immovable property referred to in subclause (i) of clause (d) of Section 269-UA, such property shall, on the date of such order, vest in the Central Government in terms of the agreement for transfer referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 269-UC:
Provided that where the appropriate authority, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the transferor, the transferee or other persons interested in the said property, under sub-section (1-A) of Section 269-UD, is of the opinion that any encumbrance on the property or leasehold interest specified in the aforesaid agreement for transfer is so specified with a view to defeat the provisions of this Chapter, it may, by order, declare such encumbrance or leasehold interest to be void and thereupon the aforesaid property shall vest in the Central Government free from such encumbrance or leasehold interest.
(2) The transferor or any other person who may be in possession of the immovable property in respect of which an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is made, shall surrender or deliver possession thereof to the appropriate authority or any other person duly authorised by the appropriate authority in this behalf within fifteen days of the service of such order on him:
Provided that the provisions of this sub-section and subsections (3) and (4) shall not apply where the person in possession of the immovable property, in respect of which an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is made, is a bona fide holder of any encumbrance on such property or a bona fide lessee of such property, if the said encumbrance or lease has not been declared void under the proviso to sub-section (1) and such person is eligible to continue in possession of such property even after the transfer in terms of the aforesaid agreement for transfer.
(3) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the provisions of sub-section (2), the appropriate authority or other person duly authorised by it under that sub-section may take possession of the immovable property and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the appropriate authority may, for the purposes of taking possession of any property referred to in sub-section (1), requisition the services of any police officer to assist him and it shall be the duty of such officer to comply with such requisition.
(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in this section shall operate to discharge the transferor or any other person (not being the Central Government) from liability in respect of any encumbrances on the property and, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, such liability may be enforced against the transferor or such other person.
(6) Where an order under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is made in respect of an immovable property, being rights of the nature referred to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of Section 269-UA, such order shall have the effect of—
(a)vesting such right in the Central Government; and
(b)placing the Central Government in the same position in relation to such rights as the person in whom such a right would have continued to vest if such order had not been made.
(7) Where any rights in respect of any immovable property, being rights in, or with respect to, any land or any building or part of a building which has been constructed or which is to be constructed, have been vested in the Central Government under sub-section (6), the provisions of subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall, so far as may be, have effect as if the references to immovable property therein were references to such land or building or part thereof, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied)
38. Thereafter, Section 269-UF inter alia provides that where an order is made to purchase the immovable property [under Section 269-UD(1)], the Central Government shall pay by way of consideration, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration. Section 269-UF reads as under:
“269-UF. Consideration for purchase of immovable property by Central Government.—(1) Where an order for the purchase of any immovable property by the Central Government is made under subsection (1) of Section 269-UD, the Central Government shall pay, by way of consideration for such purchase, an amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where, after the agreement for the transfer of the immovable property referred to in that sub-section has been made but before the property vests in the Central Government under Section 269-UE, the property has been damaged (otherwise than as a result of normal wear and tear), the amount of the consideration payable under that sub-section shall be reduced by such sum as the appropriate authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing, may by order determine.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. Section 269-UG provides for a time-frame for payment or deposit of the consideration referred to in Section 269-UF. It basically stipulates that the amount of consideration payable in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UF shall be tendered to the person entitled thereto within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property concerned becomes vested in the Central Government, either under Section 269-UE (1) or 269-UE (6), as the case may be. Section 269-UG reads thus:
“269-UG. Payment or deposit of consideration.—(1) The amount of consideration payable in accordance with the provisions of Section 269-UF shall be tendered to the person or persons entitled thereto, within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the immovable property concerned becomes vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1), or, as the case may be, sub-section (6), of Section 269-UE:
Provided that if any liability for any tax or any other sum remaining payable under this Act, the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), the Gift Tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), or the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 (7 of 1964), by any person entitled to the consideration payable under Section 269-UF, the appropriate authority may, in lieu of the payment of the amount of consideration, set off the amount of consideration or any part thereof against such liability or sum, after giving an intimation in this behalf to the person entitled to the consideration.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount of consideration amongst persons claiming to be entitled thereto, the Central Government shall deposit with the appropriate authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the person entitled to the amount of consideration does not consent to receive it, or if there is any dispute as to the title to receive the amount of consideration, the Central Government shall deposit with the appropriate authority the amount of consideration required to be tendered under sub-section (1) within the period specified therein:
Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of the amount of consideration for any immovable property vested in the Central Government under this Chapter to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
(4) Where any amount of consideration has been deposited with the appropriate authority under this section, the appropriate authority may, either of its own motion or on an application made by or on behalf of any person interested or claiming to be interested in such amount, order the same to be invested in such Government or other securities as it may think proper, and may direct the interest or other proceeds of any such investment to be accumulated and paid in such manner as will, in its opinion, give the parties interested therein the same benefits therefrom as they might have had from the immovable property in respect whereof such amount has been deposited or as near thereto as may be.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. Thereafter, Section 269-UH, which is important for our purposes, provides for the consequences if the Central Government fails to tender the consideration as stipulated in Section 269-UG(1) or deposit the same under Section 269-UG(2) or 269-UG(3). Basically, what this Section stipulates is that if the Central Government fails to either tender or deposit the consideration [as stipulated in the said Section], the order of compulsory purchase passed under Section 269-UD(1) shall stand abrogated and the immovable property [forming the subject matter of the said order] shall stand re-vested in the transferor. This Section further stipulates that where an order under Section 269-UD(1) is abrogated and the immovable property re-vests with the transferor, the appropriate authority shall make a declaration to that effect. Section 269-UH reads as under:
“269-UH. Revesting of property in the transferor on failure of payment or deposit of consideration.—(1) If the Central Government fails to tender under subsection (1) of Section 269-UG or deposit under subsection (2) or sub-section (3) of the said section, the whole or any part of the amount of consideration required to be tendered or deposited thereunder within the period specified therein in respect of any immovable property which has vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, sub-section (6) of Section 269-UE, the order to purchase the immovable property by the Central Government made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand revested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period:
Provided that where any dispute referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 269-UG is pending in any court for decision, the time taken by the court to pass a final order under the said sub-sections shall be excluded in computing the said period.
(2) Where an order made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD is abrogated and the immovable property revested in the transferor under subsection (1), the appropriate authority shall make, as soon as may be, a declaration in writing to this effect and shall—
(a)deliver a copy of the declaration to the persons mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 269-UD; and
(b)deliver or cause to be delivered possession of the immovable property back to the transferor or, as the case may be, to such other person as was in possession of the property at the time of its vesting in the Central Government under Section 269-UE.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Section 269-UI stipulates the powers of the appropriate authority and Section 269-UJ gives the power to the appropriate authority for rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. Both these Sections are not germane for deciding the issue in the present appeal, and therefore, are not reproduced hereunder.
42. Section 269-UK puts certain restrictions on revocation or alteration on certain agreements for transfer of immovable property. This Section basically stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall revoke or alter an agreement for the transfer of an immovable property, or transfer such property, in respect of which a statement has been furnished to the appropriate authority under Section 269-UC unless: (a) the appropriate authority has not made an order for the purchase as contemplated under Section 269-UD; or (b) in a case where an order for the purchase of immovable property by the Central Government has been made [under Section 269-UD (1)], but the said order stands abrogated under Section 269-UH(1). This Section also stipulates that any transfer of immovable property made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 269-UK shall be void. For the sake of convenience, Section 269-UK reads thus:-
“269-UK. Restrictions on revocation or alteration of certain agreements for the transfer of immovable property or on transfer of certain immovable property.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall revoke or alter an agreement for the transfer of an immovable property or transfer such property in respect of which a statement has been furnished under Section 269-UC unless,—
(a)the appropriate authority has not made an order for the purchase of the immovable property by the Central Government under Section 269-UD and the period specified for the making of such order has expired; or
(b)in a case where an order for the purchase of the immovable property by the Central Government has been made under subsection (1) of Section 269-UD, the order stands abrogated under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UH.
(2) Any transfer of any immovable property made in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be void.”
(emphasis supplied)
43. Section 269-UL puts restrictions on registration etc of documents in respect of transfer of immovable property and stipulates that no registering officer appointed under the Registration Act, 1908 shall register any document which purports to transfer the immovable property exceeding the value prescribed under Section 269-UC unless a certificate from the appropriate authority is obtained stating that it has no objection to such transfer.
44. Thereafter, and what is important for our purposes, is Section 269-UN. This Section provides that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XX-C, any order made under Section 269-UD (1) or under Section 269-UF (2) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceeding, either under the IT Act, 1961, or under any other law for the time being in force. For the sake of convenience, Section 269-UN is reproduced hereunder:-
“269-UN. Order of appropriate authority to be final and conclusive.—Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, any order made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD or any order made under subsection (2) of Section 269-UF shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceeding under this Act or under any other law for the time being in force.”
45. The other Section and which is relevant for our purposes is Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. What this Section stipulates is that no suit shall be brought in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961, and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against the Government or any Officer of the Government for anything done in good faith or intended to be done in good faith under the IT Act, 1961. Section 293 reads thus:-
“293. Bar of suits in civil courts.—No suit shall be brought in any civil court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken or order made under this Act, and no prosecution, suit or other proceeding shall lie against the Government or any officer of the Government for anything in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.”
46. We have referred to all these Sections for the purposes of understanding the scheme of Chapter XX-C of the IT Act, 1961. At the risk of repetition, to summarize, what these provisions stipulate is that firstly, before a transfer of immovable property is done (of a value and area prescribed) the agreement entered into for such transfer has to be reduced to writing in the form of a statement and submitted to the appropriate authority [Section 269-UC]. Once this is done, and the appropriate authority is of the opinion that the consideration in the agreement is understated, it can pass an order compulsorily purchasing the property for the amount equal to the amount of the apparent consideration [Section 269-UD]. Once the order of compulsory purchase is passed under Section 269-UD, the immovable property, from the date of the said order, vests in the Central Government as provided in Section 269-UE (1) or 269-UE(6), as the case may be. For this purchase of immovable property, the Central Government has to pay consideration equal to the amount of the apparent consideration as stipulated in Section 269-UF. It is not as if the Government can take its own sweet time in paying the said consideration. Under Section 269-UG, the consideration has to be paid within a period of one month from the end of the month in which the said immovable property becomes vested in the Central Government under Section 269-UE(1) or Section 269-UE(6), as the case may be. If this consideration is not paid within the stipulated period [i.e. the period mentioned in Section 269-UG], then Section 269-UH stipulates that the compulsory order of purchase passed under Section 269-UD(1) shall stand abrogated and the immovable property shall stand re-vested in the transferor after the expiry of the aforesaid period. Section 269-UH further stipulates that once an order is abrogated and the immovable property is re-vested in the transferor [as stipulated in Section 269-UH (1)], the appropriate authority shall make a declaration to that effect. As mentioned earlier, Section 269-UN stipulates that any order made under Section 269-UD(1) or Section 269-UF(2) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any proceeding under the IT Act, 1961 or any other law for the time being in force.
47. What we have to consider in this appeal, firstly, is whether the reliefs sought in the present suit are barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961. As mentioned earlier, in the present suit, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that:
(i)the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [dated 12th September 2002] stands abrogated on and from 31st October 2002;
(ii)that on and from 31st October 2002 all right, title and interest in the suit property and all rights to the said FSI, stands re-vested in the Mulanis [Defendant Nos.3 to 18] and Omprakash Navani [Defendant No.19] respectively; and
(iii)on and from 16th May 2006 the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property and has the absolute right, title and interest in the same including the right to develop, alienate, sell, transfer, or create any 3rd party rights, interest without any hindrance.
48. The question is whether these declarations are hit by the prohibition as stated in Section 269-UN. After carefully considering the submissions made by Mr. Salve, as well as by the learned Attorney General of India, we are unable to see how Section 269-UN would bar the jurisdiction of this Court from giving such declarations. As mentioned earlier, Section 269-UN stipulates that save as otherwise provided in Chapter XX-C, no order made under sub-section (1) of Section 269-UD or any order made under subsection (2) of Section 269-UF shall be “called in question” in any proceeding either under the IT Act, 1961 or under any other law for the time being in force. The declaration sought in the above suit that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order (dated 12th September 2002) stands abrogated on and from 31st October 2002, and from that date the suit property re-vests in the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 [Omprakash Navani], does not in any way “call in question” the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order dated 12th September 2002. In fact, the case of the Plaintiff proceeds on the basis that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order is valid, and because the consideration was not paid within the time stipulated in Section 269-UG, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated as provided in Section 269-UH of the IT Act, 1961. The abrogation takes place by operation of law as stipulated in Section 269-UH(1) provided the consideration is not paid within the time frame as stipulated in Section 269-UG. This by no stretch of the imagination could mean that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order [passed under Section 269-UD (1)] is being “called in question” in the present suit.
49. To our mind, the phrase “called in question” appearing in question 269-UN refers to a situation where the validity or the legality of the order passed under Section 269-UD (1) or under Section 269-UF (2) is being challenged or disputed. On the other hand, seeking a declaration that the order under Section 269-UD (1) stands “abrogated” means that the said order is officially brought to an end, either by law or by agreement. As per our knowledge, the word “abrogate” means to officially end a law, an agreement, etc. or to end a law, agreement, or custom formally. Seeking a declaration that the order passed under Section 269-UD(1) stands abrogated can never mean that the said order is being challenged or being “called in question” as referred to in Section 269-UN. In fact, seeking a declaration that an order stands abrogated, proceeds on the basis that the said order, which now stands abrogated, was valid. Once this is the case, we are clearly of the view that the suit filed by the Plaintiff is not barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961.
50. However, the matter does not stop here. We also have to examine whether the suit would be barred by virtue of the provisions of Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. As mentioned earlier, Section 293 inter alia stipulates that no suit shall be brought in any Civil Court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961. From the language of Section 293, it is clear that it is of wide import. If any suit is brought which has the effect to set aside or modify any proceeding taken under the IT Act, 1961, or to set aside or modify any order made under the said Act, the same would be barred. The question therefore is whether the declaration sought by the Plaintiff would have the effect of either setting aside or modifying any proceeding taken, or order made, under the IT Act, 1961. Here also, we are clearly of the view that the declarations sought by the Plaintiff do not have any such effect. What is sought in the above suit is that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order passed by the appropriate authority [under Section 269-UD (1)] stands abrogated. This declaration is sought on the basis that the consideration payable for the purchase of the immovable property by the Central Government was not paid within the time stipulated in Section 269-UG. We fail to see how seeking such a declaration would either set aside or modify any proceeding taken under the IT Act, 1961 or to set aside or modify any order made under the IT Act, 1961. All that the Plaintiff seeks in the present suit is that by virtue of Section 269-UH the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stood abrogated for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 269-UG. If the Plaintiff, at trial, fails to establish this fact, it would not be entitled to the declaration. This, however, does not mean that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It is now well settled that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. This is the purport of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This has been so held by a Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai ETC v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another [(1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78: 1968 SCC Online SC 40]. Paragraphs 9 and 32 of this judgment reads thus:-
“9. To which category do such cases belong in India? The controversy in India has revolved round the principles accepted in 67 Ind App 222 = (AIR 1940 PC 105) and in Raleigh Investment Co. v. Government General in Council, 74 Ind App 50 = (AIR 1947 PC 78). In the first case it was laid down by the Judicial Committee that the ouster of the jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be lightly inferred and can only be established if there is an express provision of law or is clearly implied. In the second case it was held that where a liability to tax is created by statute which gives special and particular remedies against illegal exactions the remedy contemplated by the statute must be followed and it is not open to the assessee to pursue the ordinary civil process of courts. To the latter case we shall refer in some detail presently. Opinion in this Court has, however, wavered as to how far to go with the dicta of the Privy Council in the two cases.
**********
32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = (AIR 1964 SC 322) or Kamla Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = (AIR 1965 SC 1942) can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows:

(7) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statue or not.

(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under the Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of Tribunals.

(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.

(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected a suit lies.

(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.

(emphasis supplied)
51. In the present case, we do not find that the declaration sought by the Plaintiff in the above suit is expressly barred under Section 269-UN or under Section 293. We also do not find any clear intendment in these provisions which would bar the Civil Court from granting the relief sought. We agree with the learned Attorney General of India that Section 293 and Section 269-UN of the IT Act, 1961 have to be read harmoniously. However, even reading them harmoniously, in the facts of the present case, we fail to see how these two provisions would oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. As mentioned earlier, all that the Plaintiff seeks in the present suit is a declaration that on and from 31st October 2002, the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated and the suit property re-vests in the Mulanis and Defendant No.19 (Omprakash Navani). This declaration, in no way, calls into question the said order as referred to in Section 269-UN and neither does it seek to modify or set aside the said order as contemplated under Section 293. In these circumstances, even when Section 269-UN and Section 293 are read harmoniously, and together, they would not oust the jurisdiction of this Court.
52. With the greatest respect, we are unable to agree with the learned Attorney General of India that the question, as to whether an abrogation has really taken place, is a question within the scope of the IT Act, 1961, and that any inquiry in this regard will be treated as a proceeding under the IT Act, 1961. The abrogation referred to in Section 269-UH takes place by operation of law provided the consideration is not paid within the time-frame as stipulated in Section 269-UG. What is pertinent to note is that there is no machinery under the IT Act, 1961, when the authorities under the IT Act, 1961 refuse to recognize the abrogation which comes into effect by the operation of law. We, therefore, fail to understand as to how any inquiry with regard to whether the abrogation taken place or otherwise would be a proceeding under the IT Act, 1961. A “proceeding” under the IT Act, 1961 would necessarily mean a proceeding initiated under the relevant provisions of said Act, and not otherwise.
53. In fact, as held by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhulabhai ETC (supra), where the statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunals, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is an adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further opined that such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases whether the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act should be undertaken to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided, and which may be relevant but not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary, and in such a case it is necessary to see if the statute creates special rights or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability, and further lays down that all questions about the said right and/or liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that the exclusion of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is not readily to be inferred unless it is barred, either expressly or by necessary implication. We therefore find that the argument canvassed by the learned Attorney General of India that the present suit is barred because any inquiry to be done with reference to whether an abrogation has taken place or otherwise would be a proceeding under the IT Act, 1961, does not commend to us. Consequently, we are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Attorney General of India that the present suit is barred either under the provisions of Section 269-UN or under Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961.
54. As correctly submitted by Mr. Salve, the learned Single Judge has erred when he came to the conclusion that as the Plaintiff is seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated, this Court will have to further declare that the said order stood annulled, canceled or set aside. The abrogation of the order takes place by operation of law and there is no question of giving a further declaration that the order is canceled or set aside. In other words, by seeking the declaration of abrogation, the order passed under Section 269-UD (1) is not called into question at all. We further agree with Mr. Salve that the learned Single Judge erroneously proceeded on the basis that if the declaration sought in the suit is granted, this Court will have to declare the proceedings initiated under Chapter XX-C are illegal and therefore barred under Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961. The fact that the Plaintiff seeks a declaration of abrogation proceeds on the basis that the proceedings initiated under Chapter XX-C are in fact valid and not illegal. The declaration of abrogation is sought by virtue of Section 269-UH because the consideration was not paid within the time stipulated under Section 269-UG. Once this is the case, we are unable to agree with the findings of the learned Single Judge that by seeking the aforesaid declarations, the Plaintiff is either seeking to set aside the order passed under Section 269-UD (1) or that the proceedings initiated under Chapter XX-C would be rendered as illegal. In light of our findings, we find that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. We accordingly set aside the impugned order and answer issue No.1 in the negative i.e. against the Revenue (Defendant Nos.1 and 2) and in favour of the Plaintiff. As far as other two issues are concerned, since they have not been answered by the learned Single Judge, we are not giving any findings on the same.
55. Before concluding, we must refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Bhubaneswar and Another v. Parmeshwari Devi Sultania and Others [(1998) 3 SCC 481], and which has been heavily relied upon [in paragraph 48 of the impugned order] by the learned Single Judge to come to the conclusion that he did. In the case of Parmeshwari Devi (supra) the Plaintiff had filed a suit for partition against seven defendants, Defendant Nos 6 and 7 being the Union of India through the Finance Secretary, and Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa, respectively [who were the Appellants before the Supreme Court]. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 were the step-brothers and Defendants 3 to 5 were the step-sisters of the Plaintiff (Parmeshwari Devi). The Plaintiff stated that she was the daughter of one Shri. Bansidhar Agarwal from his first wife, while Defendant Nos.1 to 5 were the children of Bansidhar Agarwal from his second wife. Defendant No.1 was Babulal whose residential and business premises were subjected to a search and seizure operation under Section 132 of the IT Act, 1961 and various assets including certain gold ornaments [being the subject matter of the suit filed by the Plaintiff], were seized. In the suit, the Plaintiff (Parmeshwari Devi) prayed for partition of those very gold ornaments seized under the IT Act, 1961. The Plaintiff stated that her mother died in 1938 and at that time she was possessed of 200 tolas of gold ornaments which was her stridhan. Her mother made a Will bequeathing the gold ornaments to the Plaintiff and the other children of Bansidhar from his second wife in proportion of the number of daughters of each of such children to meet the dowry demand and marriage requirements of their daughters. These ornaments were kept in the custody of the father of the Plaintiff who died on 10th February 1990. After his death the ornaments came in the custody of Babulal (Defendant No.1). It was at that time that the family decided to partition the ornaments. According to the Plaintiff, since the Plaintiff had 5 daughters, she was entitled to 5/14th share in the ornaments. However, before the partition could take place, the Income Tax Officer raided the house of the 1st Defendant and seized those gold ornaments which weighed 2128 gms along with other assets. The Plaintiff filed a Petition before the Income Tax Officer for return of the ornaments, but he refused. The Plaintiff then issued a notice to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Defendant No.7) who, according to the Plaintiff, assured her that justice would be done to her claim and had stated that her case would be disposed of within three months. Since nothing happened, this, according to the Plaintiff, gave rise to a cause of action to the Plaintiff who then filed the partition suit. In this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 3, noticed that from the facts it was quite obvious that the Plaintiff would not have filed the suit for partition as there was no dispute to her claim by the other relatives but for the fact that gold ornaments were then in the custody of the Income Tax Department. It is in this light and looking at the averments in the plaint that the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the suit was barred under Section 293 of the Income Tax Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court basically came to the conclusion that if ultimately the suit is to result in a decree, it would have the effect to set aside or modify the proceedings taken and order made under the IT Act, 1961. It therefore held that the suit would not be maintainable. We fail to see how this decision can apply to the facts of the present case. There can be no dispute about the proposition that if ultimately the suit results in a decree which has the effect of setting aside or modifying any proceedings taken, or order made under the IT Act, 1961, such a suit would not be maintainable in light of the express language of Section 293. However, in the facts of the present case, we fail to see how seeking a declaration that the 3rd Compulsory Purchase Order stands abrogated would in any way either directly or indirectly set aside or modify any proceedings taken under the IT Act, 1961, or any order made thereunder. We, therefore, find that the fact situation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parmeshwari Devi (supra) was completely different from the factual matrix before us.
56. We must mention here that it is too well settled a proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said a long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. If one must refer to any authority on this subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (K.V.) Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra and Others [2008 (1) SCC 494] has very succinctly and eloquently reiterated the said proposition. Paragraphs 14 to 18 of the said judgment reads thus:-
“14. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : (1900-1903) All ER Rep 1 (HL)] : (All ER p. 7 G-I)

“Before discussing Allen v. Flood [1898 AC 1 : (1895-1899) All ER Rep 52 (HL)] and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make; and one is to repeat what I have very often said before—that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”

(emphasis supplied)
We entirely agree with the above observations.
15. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213] (vide SCC p. 221, para 18) this Court observed:

“18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it.”

16. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111] (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) this Court observed:

“59…. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.”

(emphasis supplied)
17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12)

“9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D)

‘The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge,…’

10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said,

‘Lord Atkin’s speech… is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.’ (All ER p. 297g)

Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971) 2 All ER 1267], observed : (All ER p. 1274d)

‘One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;’

And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [1972 AC 877 : (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said : (All ER p. 761c)

‘There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.’

11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

12. The following words of Hidayatullah, J. in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus : (Abdul Kayoom v. CIT [AIR 1962 SC 680], AIR p. 688, para 19)

‘ 19…. Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.’

***

‘Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.’ ”

(emphasis supplied)
18. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions and the principles laid down therein, because often decisions are cited for a proposition without reading the entire decision and the reasoning contained therein. In our opinion, the decision of this Court in Sarguja Transport case [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88] cannot be treated as a Euclid’s formula.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. We, therefore, with the greatest respect, find that the learned Single Judge erred in heavily relying upon the aforesaid decision in the case of Parmeshwari Devi (supra) to hold that the present suit was barred by virtue of Section 269-UN and/or Section 293 of the IT Act, 1961.
58. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hereby set aside the impugned order and answer issue No.1 in the negative i.e. against the Revenue (Defendant Nos.1 and 2) and in favour of the Plaintiff. As far as the other two issues are concerned, since they have not been answered by the learned Single Judge, we are not giving any findings on the same, including whether they can be tried as preliminary issues or whether they should be tried with all other issues. The above appeal succeeds in the aforesaid terms. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Since the above suit is of the year 2006, the hearing of the suit is expedited. Now that the suit is restored, the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Notice of Motion No.2340 of 2006 in Suit No.2094 of 2006 dated 9th & 10th October 2007, shall stand revived and continue till the disposal of the suit.
59. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/ Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.