Reopening an assessment after four years is invalid without new material or proof of the assessee’s failure to disclose.

By | October 31, 2025

Reopening an assessment after four years is invalid without new material or proof of the assessee’s failure to disclose.


Issue

Can an assessment be reopened under Section 147 after four years from the end of the assessment year based on information that was already disclosed by the assessee during the original assessment proceedings?


Facts

  • The assessee’s original assessment was completed.
  • The Assessing Officer (AO) later issued a reopening notice after four years, citing information from the Insight portal and the Directorate of Investigation about “suspicious” high-value transactions.
  • However, the bank accounts and transactions in question were already fully disclosed by the assessee in the original proceedings through the tax audit report, financial statements, and income tax return.
  • The AO did not bring any new or tangible material on record that was not available during the initial assessment.
  • The “reasons to believe” failed to specify any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose all material facts fully and truly.

Decision

The High Court held that the reassessment proceedings were not sustainable in law and were quashed. It ruled that since the reopening was initiated after four years and there was no failure by the assessee to disclose material facts, the jurisdictional conditions for reopening the assessment were not met.


Key Takeaways

  • Conditions for Reopening After 4 Years: To reopen an assessment after four years, the revenue must prove two things: (1) income has escaped assessment, and (2) this escapement was due to the assessee’s failure to disclose all material facts fully and truly.
  • No Fishing Expeditions on Old Facts: An AO cannot simply re-examine the same set of facts and documents that were already on record and form a different opinion. This amounts to a “change of opinion,” which is not a valid ground for reopening.
  • New Tangible Material is a Must: The basis for reopening must be some fresh, tangible information that came to the AO’s possession after the original assessment was completed. Information already part of the record does not qualify.

An addition for unsecured loans is not justified if the assessee proves genuineness, even if lenders have low income.


Issue

Can an Assessing Officer treat unsecured loans as unexplained cash credits under Section 68 solely on the grounds that the lenders have low declared incomes or have not filed tax returns, even when the assessee provides substantial evidence to prove the transaction’s genuineness?


Facts

  • The assessee received unsecured loans from four different parties and submitted documentary evidence to prove their genuineness, including:
    • Loan confirmations, PANs, ITRs, and bank statements of the lenders.
    • Proof that the loans were received through proper banking channels.
    • Evidence that the loans were fully or substantially repaid with interest, and TDS was duly deducted.
  • The AO disregarded this evidence and made an addition under Section 68, reasoning that the transactions were not genuine because the lenders either had low incomes or had not filed returns.
  • The AO did not conduct any independent inquiry to disprove the evidence furnished by the assessee or to establish that the money actually belonged to the assessee.

Decision

The court held that there was no justification for sustaining the additions under Section 68. However, it remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer for the limited purpose of verifying the fact of loan repayment.


Key Takeaways

  • The Three Pillars of Section 68: To discharge the initial onus under Section 68, an assessee must prove three things about the creditor: (1) Identity, (2) Creditworthiness, and (3) the Genuineness of the transaction.
  • Repayment is Strong Evidence: The subsequent repayment of a loan, along with interest, is a very strong indicator of the genuineness of the transaction.
  • AO Cannot Act on Suspicion Alone: An AO cannot reject the evidence provided by the assessee based on mere suspicion or assumptions (like the lender’s low income). The AO must conduct their own inquiry and bring contrary evidence on record to disprove the assessee’s claims.
  • Low Income of Lender is Not Conclusive: While a lender’s financial capacity is relevant, their having a low taxable income is not, by itself, a sufficient reason to treat a loan as non-genuine, especially when the transaction is documented and routed through banks.
IN THE ITAT MUMBAI BENCH ‘C’
Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd.
v.
Principal Commissioner of Income-tax
Amit Shukla, Judicial Member
and Girish Agrawal, Accountant Member
IT Appeal No. 3293 (MUM) of 2025
[Assessment year 2018-19]
SEPTEMBER  29, 2025
J D Mistry, Sr. Adv. for the Appellant. R A Dhyani, CIT DR for the Respondent.
ORDER
Girish Agrawal, Accountant Member.- This appeal filed by the assessee is against the order of Ld. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai-2, vide order no. ITBA/REV/F/REV5/2024-25/1074272596(1), dated 10.03.2025, passed u/s.263 against the assessment order by Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13) r.w.s. 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), dated 19.07.2022, for Assessment Year 2018-19.
2. Grounds taken by the assessee are reproduced as under:
“The present appeal is being preferred on the following grounds amongst others which, it is prayed, may be considered without prejudice to one another
Ground No. 1. Revisionary proceedings under section 263 of the Act are had in law
1.1 On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-6 (‘PCIT’) erred in assuming jurisdiction, and thereby erred in initiating, continuing and concluding the proceedings under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’)
The Appellant prays that the order passed by the PCIT, initiating revisionary proceedings under section 263 of the Act be held as void and liable to be quashed, and that the assessment order dated 19 July 2022 passed by the assessing officer under section 143(3) read with section 1440(13) of the Act be restored as not being erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of revenue.
Without prejudice to Ground no 1 – Ground No. 2: Denial of deduction under Chapter VIA under section 80G of the Act
2.1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned PCTT erred in holding that deduction claimed under section 80G of the Act was erroneously allowed in the assessment order and disregarding the fact that the said amount is deductible in accordance with the law
The Appellant prays that the learned AO be directed to allow claim of deduction under section 80G of the Act.
Without prejudice to Ground no 1 – Ground No. 3: Disallowance of ESOP expense
3.1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned PCIT erred in holding that deduction towards Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) expenditure claimed under section 37(1) of the Act was erroneously allowed in the assessment order and disregarding the fact that the said amount being actually paid is deductible in accordance with the law.
The Appellant prays that the learned AO be directed to allow claim of ESOP expenditure paid under section 37(1) of the Act.”
2.1. Aforesaid grounds raised by the assessee in the present appeal relate to revisionary proceeding initiated u/s.263 and revisionary order passed thereunder. The issue raised in the revisionary proceedings relate to denial of deduction under Chapter-VIA u/s.80G and disallowance of Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP) expenditure claimed u/s.37(1).
3. Brief facts of the case are that assessee filed its return of income on 30.11.2018, reporting total income at Rs.992,46,65,080/-. Assessment was completed u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 144C(13), determining total income at Rs.1630,80,42,389/-. Assessee claimed deduction u/s.80G towards donations made by it. Details of donations so made is tabulated below:-
Name of DoneeINREligibleINR
Social Empowerment And Economic Development Society (Seed)60,00,00050%30,00,000
SEVA MANDIR65,00,00050%32,50,000
PRATHAM Mumbai Education Initiative10,00,00050%5,00,000
NETWORK IN THANE BY PEOPLE15,00,00050%7,50,000
WATER FOR PEOPLE INDIA TRUST1,20,00,00050%60,00,000
ACTION AND ASSOCIATION30,00,00050%15,00,000
Total Donation3,00,00,0001,50,00,000

 

3.1. Assessee furnished all the details and explanation in respect of the donations so claimed including the contribution towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) expenses. Assessee in its computation of total income had suo moto disallowed and added back the expenditure made towards CSR. It claimed deduction u/s.80G for an amount of Rs.1.50 Crores which were allowed by the ld. AO while completing the original assessment.
3.2. On the other issue in respect of claim of ESOP expenditure, assessee had debited Rs.9,41,63,548/- under the head ‘ESOP expenditure-Ind AS adjustment’ which was added back in the computation of total income. However, it claimed deduction of Rs.9,22,27,077/- out of the said expenses u/s.37(1).
4. As mentioned in para 2 of the impugned revisionary order, ld. PCIT from the perusal of the records noted that there were objections raised by the Revenue audit based on which took up the matter for revision on the above stated two issues by issuance of show-cause notice dated 30.01.2024 u/s.263. Before the ld. PCIT, assessee reiterated its submissions which were made in the original assessment proceedings, corroborated by documentary evidences. It also submitted that both the issues are squarely covered by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench in assessee’s own case for immediately preceding year i.e. A.Y.2017-18 in Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd v. Pr. CIT [IT Appeal No. 2645 (Mum) of 2024, dated 29-7-2024] Ld. PCIT took note of the submissions made by the assessee in para 8 of the impugned order. He also took note of the decisions of the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) whereby, the revision u/s.263 was set aside on both the issues which are raised in the present appeal.
5. We note that he has expressed his disagreement with the above stated decision of the Co-ordinate Bench by observing that the matter decided by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of CIT, LTU v. Biocon Ltd ITR 151 (Kar) dated 11.11.2020 is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the appeal filed by the department. According to him, since the matter is sub-judiced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, he expressed his disagreement with the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) and thus, continued to complete the revisionary proceedings by setting aside the assessment order and directing the ld. AO to make thorough enquiry on the matter and reassess the income after giving opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
5.1. At the outset, we deprecate such an expression of ld. PCIT of disagreeing with the decision of the Coordinate Bench which does not demonstrate adherence to judicial discipline, more particularly when there is no express stay granted by the higher forum on the operation of the said decision. Such an expression is ought to be avoided so as to reflect to the judicial hierarchy.
6. We perused the order of the Co-ordinate Bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y.2017-18 (supra) and find that it squarely covers the present appeal on both the issues raised by the ld. PCIT for invoking the revisionary proceedings and passing the impugned revisionary order. Before us, nothing cogent was brought on record by the Revenue to controvert the observations and findings of the Co-ordinate Bench in assessee’s own case for A.Y.2017-18.
6.1. In order to take note of the factual matrix in the present case, we refer to the computation of total income and tax for the year under consideration placed in the paper book wherein assessee has made suo moto disallowance of CSR expenses and added back Employees Stock Option Plan (ESOP) debited to P & L towards IndAS adjustment. It made claim towards Employee Stock Option Payments – transfer of employees IndAS adjustments and u/s.80G for the donations made. The said computation is extracted below for ready reference:-
Net Profit before tax as per P&L9,83,03,15,142
ADD: DISALLOWANECS
Donation85,000
Depreciation / Amortisation as per books1,56,50,99,857
Disallowance under section 14A (As per TAR)77,052
Corporate Social Responsibility16,72,37,651
Amount of Interest paid to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (As per Sec 23 of MSMED)29,43,000
Expenses allocable to Income from House Property4,09,562
Municipal Tax allocable to Income from House Property11,70,880
Income under section 41(3) – Sale of RTC asset30,502
Employee Stock Option debited to P&L – IND AS adjustment9,41,63,548
Disallowance under section Sec 40(a) (as per TAR)35,92,56,632
Disallowance under section Sec 43B (as per TAR)5,87,47,640
Amortisation of Prepaid Expenses for Security Deposited (INDAS)1,75,82,362
Loss on sale of Fixed Assets16,58,981
Provision for Doubtful Debt15,30,330
Gratuity + Pension benefits considered in Comprehensive Income1,64,59,336
Disallowance us 40A(3)38,372
Penalty4,93,8062,28,69,84,512
LESS: ALLOWANCES
Exceptional Items
Employee Stock Option Payments/Trf of employees – IND AS adjustment9,22,27,077
Amortisation of Notional Interest income for Security1,76,85,249
Deposited (INDAS)
Depreciation as per Income tax (As per TAR)1,77,35,32,863
Allowance under 32AD8,66,55,495
Interest Income considered separately27,25,34,751
Rental Income considered separately1,96,87,500
Deduction under section Sec 40(a) (as per TAR)11,30,08,030
VRS deduction u/s.35DDA5,85,10,841
2,43,38,41,806
Income from Business or Profession9,68,34,57,848
Income from other sources
244A Interest on Refund
Interest Income27,25,34,751
Less: Tax free interest income2,22,21,35025,03,13,401
Total Income from other sources25,03,13,401
Income from House Property
Rental Income1,96,87,500
Municipal Tax11,70,880
1,85,16,620
Less: 30%55,54,9861,29,61,6341,29,61,634
Income from Capital Gain
Long term capital gain on maturity of a Bond
Long term capital Gain on sale by way of Slump Sale
Less: Brought forward loss
GROSS TOTAL INCOME9,94,67,32,883
Chapter VI A deduction:
Section 80G(2)-Donations1,50,00,000
Section 80JJAA – Workmen70,67,8072,20,67,807
TOTAL INCOME9,92,46,65,076
ROUNDED TO9,92,46,65,071
Tax @ 30% on Other than Capital Gain2,97,73,99,521
Tax @ 20% on Capital Gain
2,97,73,99,521
Surcharge @ 12%35,72,87,943
Education CESS @ 3%10,00,40,624
Total tax payable including surcharge3,43,47,28,088
Tax payable u/s. 115JB – MAT2,09,68,56,443
Higher of the two3,43,47,28,088
Less: MAT credit
Net tax liability3,43,47,28,088
Less: Credit u/s 91
Less: Tax Deducted Source2,72,18,632
Balance Payable3,40,75,09,456
Less: Advance Tax paid
June 15, 201740,00,00,000
Sept 15, 20171,00,02,00,000
Dec 14, 20171,02,00,00,000
Mar 15, 201890,80,00,000
Balance payable/(Refundable)8,74,99,3103,41,56,99,310
Add: Interest u/s.234C81,89,846
Balance Payable(8)

 

6.2. Thus, there is no change in the factual matrix of the present case when compared to that of the one dealt by the Co-ordinate Bench in the appeal for A.Y.2017-18 and hence, the observations and findings apply mutatis mutandis on the two issues in appeal before us. We extract below the relevant paragraphs from the order of the Co-ordinate Bench (supra):
6. In respect to other query relating to employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), the reply of the assessee reads as under:-
7. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to consider the computation of income for the year under consideration and the same reads as under:-
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8. A careful perusal of the aforementioned computation of income show that the assessee has added Rs.15,58,06,642/- being expenditure claimed under Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). It can also be seen that the assessee has added employee stock option debited to its P&L account amounting to Rs.8,85,69,795/- and thereafter claimed a deduction of Rs.13,50,61,022/- and deduction under Chapter VIA u/s 80G(2) of the Act was claimed at Rs.1,50,42,600/-.
8.1. After considering the reply of the assessee to the first notice, on 16/03/2021, the AO issued another notice which is exhibited at page 115 to 119 of the paper book. The relevant queries reads as under:-

“1. With respect to Foreign Outward Remittances, made during the year please provide following:

1a) Kindly submit details of all the payments made under various to no-residents in the below format. Also explain the source of Foreign remittance made with supporting documents:

Name of PayeeAmount (Rs.)Country of Residence of PayeeNature of Payment

 

1b) Kindly explain for each such payment, weather income tax was not deducted or was deducted at lower rate. If you have any certificate to that extent from the Tax Department, please submit copy of the same.

1c) For all such payments where income tax is not deducted or deducted at lower rate, kindly submit copies of bills and TRC submitted by those parties along with copies of agreements entered into with them for those transactions.

1d) Please reconcile the amount of foreign remittances with the 15CA/CB certificates available with the department for the year consideration.

1e) kindly provide the complete bank account statement, highlighting such transactions.

5. With respect to Any Other Amount Allowable as deduction “claimed in Schedule BP of return, please furnish the justification on allowability of these deductions with supporting and legal arguments with respect specific section under Income tax Act.”

8.2. On 24/03/2021, the assessee filed a detailed reply which is exhibited at pages 126 to 131 of the paper book supported with documentary evidence placed at pages 132 to 136 of the paper book. The relevant part is extracted for ready reference:-
5) In relation to “Any Other Amount Allowable as deduction” we had already provided a break up in our submission dated March 5,2021. We further submit the brief explanation at Annexure 13 and supporting attached from Exhibit 1 to 4.”
8.3. Page 120 of the paper book is the copy of the e-mail sent along with annexures. All these evidences go on to show the level of enquiry made by the AO at the time of the scrutiny assessment proceedings. Assuming jurisdiction conferred upon him by the provisions of Section 263 of the Act, the PCIT issued following showcause notice to the assessee:-
9. Insofar as the issue relating to allowability of expenses on account of employee stock options, it was explained that Colgate Group has a global employee stock option policy where the employees of the Colgate Group company are given an option to acquire the shares of Colgate-Palmolive Company, US, for a prescribed grant price.
When the employees of the group company exercise such option, the Colgate-Palmolive Company, US, issues the shares to the employees at the pre-decided grant price and recovers the differential cost (i.e. difference between prevailing market price at the time of exercise less grant price) from the concerned Colgate Group Company. The said difference is also treated as income in the hands of the employees and taxed as perquisite.
9.1. It was further explained that the company recognized the ESOP expenses as a debit to P&L over the vesting period, which is the period over which all of the specified vesting conditions are to be satisfied, as determined on the grant date, based on the fair value of the options. It was further pointed out that such charge to P&L account is disallowed while computing the taxable income as has been show in the computation of income elsewhere.
10. This claim of the assessee was claimed to be supported by the decision of the Coordinate Benches in the case of Novo Nordisk India (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle- 12(2), Bangalore ,Northern Operating Services (P.) Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income-tax , and the decision of the Special Bench in the case of Biocon Ltd.  (SB) which has been subsequently approved by the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of Biocon Ltd.
11. Insofar as the claim of CSR expenses is concerned, it was pointed out that in the computation of income exhibited elsewhere, the assessee has disallowed the CSR expenses of Rs.15,58,06,642/-. It need to be pointed out here specifically that the claim of deduction u/s 80G is a different issues and the same has been explained by supporting evidence mentioned elsewhere. Considering the assessment proceedings, we are of the opinion that the AO has examined each and every issue thoroughly with vortex of evidence. Therefore, it would be unjust if the PCIT says that the impugned assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue because of non-enquiry on part of the AO.
12. While coming to the aforementioned conclusion, we draw support from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., 243 ITR 83 (SC), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the following ratio:-

“A bare reading of section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, makes it clear that the prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Commissioner suo moto under it, is that the order of the Income-tax Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Commissioner has to be satisfied of twin conditions, namely, (i) the order of the Assessing Officer sought to be revised is erroneous; and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. If one of them is absent–if the order of the Income-tax Officer is erroneous but is not prejudicial to the Revenue or if it is not erroneous but is prejudicial to the Revenue– recourse cannot be had to section 263(1) of the Act. The provision cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the Assessing Officer, it is only when an order 7 is erroneous that the section will be attracted. An incorrect assumption offacts or an incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous “.

13. Further, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Gabriel India Ltd. reported in [1993] 203 ITR 108 (Bombay), while dealing with identical issue has held as under:-

13. We, therefore, hold that in order to exercise power under sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Act there must be material before the Commissioner to consider that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer was erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. We have already held what is erroneous. It must be an order which is not in accordance with the law or which has been passed by the Income-tax Officer without making any enquiry in undue haste. We have also held as to what is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. An order can be said to be prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue if it is not in accordance with the law in consequence whereof the lawful revenue due to the State has not been realised or cannot be realised. There must be material available on the record called for by the Commissioner to satisfy him prima facie that the aforesaid two requisites are present. If not, he has no authority to initiate proceedings for revision. Exercise of power of suomotu revision under such circumstances will amount to arbitrary exercise of power. It is well-settled that when exercise of statutory power is dependent upon the existence of certain objective facts, the authority before exercising such power must have materials on record to satisfy it in that regard. If the action of the authority is challenged before the court it would be open to the courts to examine whether the relevant objective factors were available from the records called for and examined by such authority. Our aforesaid conclusion gets full support from a decision of SabyasachiMukharji J. (as his Lordship then was) in Russell Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. A. Chowdhury, Addl. CIT. In our opinion, any other view in the matter will amount to giving unbridled and arbitrary power to the revising authority to initiate proceedings for revision in every case and start re-examination and fresh enquiries in matters which have already been concluded under the law. As already stated it is a quasi judicial power hedged in with limitation and has to be exercised subject to the same and within its scope and ambit. So far as calling for the records and examining the same is concerned, undoubtedly, it is an administrative act, but on examination “to consider” or in other words, to form an opinion that the particular order is erroneous in so tar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, is a quasi-judicial act because on this consideration or opinion the whole machinery of re-examination and reconsideration of an order of assessment, which has already been concluded and controversy which has been set at rest, is set again in motion. It is an important decision and the same cannot be based on the whims or caprice of the revising authority. There must be materials available from the records called for by the Commissioner.

14. We may now examine the facts of the present case in the light of the powers of the Commissioner set out above. The Income-tax Officer in this case had made enquiries in regard to the nature of the expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee had given detailed explanation in that regard by a letter in writing. All these are part of the record of the case. Evidently, the claim was allowed by the Income-tax Officer on being satisfied with the explanation of the assessee. Such decision of the Income-tax Officer cannot be held to be “erroneous” simply because in his order he did not make an elaborate discussion in that regard. Moreover, in the instant case, the Commissioner himself, even after initiating proceedings for revision and hearing the assessee, could not say that the allowance of the claim of the assessee was erroneous and that the expenditure was not revenue expenditure but an expenditure of capital nature. He simply asked the Income-tax Officer to re-examine the matter. That, in our opinion, is not permissible. Further inquiry and/or fresh determination can be directed by the Commissioner only after coming to the conclusion that the earlier finding of the Income-tax Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Without doing so, he does not get the power to set aside the assessment. In the instant case, the Commissioner did so and it is for that reason that the Tribunal did not approve his action and set aside his order. We do not find any infirmity in the above conclusion of the Tribunal.”

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Max India Ltd. reported in [2007] 295 ITR 282 (SC), had the occasion to consider a similar challenge to 263 proceedings and held as under:-

“1. In our view at the relevant time two views were possible on the word ‘profits’ in the proviso to section 80HHC(3). It is true that vide 2005 amendment the law has been clarified with retrospective effect by insertion of the word ‘loss’ in the new proviso. We express no opinion on the scope of the said amendment of 2005. Suffice it to state that in this particular case when the order of the Commissioner was passed under section 263 of the Income-tax Act two views on the said word ‘profits’ existed. In our view the matter is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 as also by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Russell Properties (P.) Ltd. v. A. Chowdhury, Addl. CIT [1977] 109 ITR 229 at 243.

2. At this stage we may clarify that under para 10 of the judgment in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) this Court has taken the view that the phrase “prejudicial to the interest of the revenue” under section 263 has to be read in conjunction with the expression “erroneous” order passed by the Assessing Officer. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the Assessing Officer cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. For example, when the Income-tax Officer adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue; or where two views are possible and the Income-tax Officer has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue, unless the view taken by the Income-tax Officer is unsustainable in law. According to the learned Additional Solicitor General on interpretation of the provision of section 80HHC(3) as it then stood the view taken by the Assessing Officer was unsustainable in law and therefore the Commissioner was right in invoking section 263 of the Income-tax Act. In this connection he has further submitted that in fact 2005 amendment which is clarificatory and retrospective in nature itself indicates that the view taken by the Assessing Officer at the relevant time was unsustainable in law. We find no merit in the said contentions. Firstly, it is not in dispute when the Order of the Commissioner was passed there were two views on the word ‘profit’ in that section. The problem with section 80HHC is that it has been amended eleven times. Different views existed on the day when the Commissioner passed the above order. Moreover the mechanics of the section have become so complicated over the years that two views were inherently possible. Therefore, subsequent amendment in 2005 even though retrospective will not attract the provision of section 263 particularly when as stated above we have to take into account the position of law as it stood on the date when the Commissioner passed the order dated 5-3-1997 in purported exercise of his powers under section 263 of the Income-tax Act.”

15. Considering the facts in totality, in light of the judicial decisions discussed hereinabove, we set aside the order of the PCIT dt.12/03/2024 and restore that of the AO dt. 17/02/2022, framed u/s 143(3) r.w.s 144C(13) of the Act.
6.3. In the given set of facts and circumstances, we respectfully following the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench, quash the impugned revisionary order passed by ld. PCIT.
7. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.