ORDER
C.N. Prasad, Judicial Member. – This appeal is filed by the Assessee against the order of the Ld.CIT(Appeals)-12, New Delhi dated 14.12.2017 for the AY 2009-10.
2. The assessee in her appeal raised the following grounds:
1. “Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in confirming the assessment order which is ex-facie illegal arbitrary and without jurisdiction being against the principles of natural justice and against the provisions of IT Act, 1961.
2. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in confirming the assessment order in spite of the fact that notice issued u/s 148 is ex-facie illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.
3. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in confirming the assessment order in spite of the fact that approval u/s 151 of the IT Act, 1961 was not attached with reasons forwarded to the appellant.
4. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in not allowing relief u/s 50G without appreciating the fact in proper perspective.
5. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in not allowing relief u/s 50G in spite of the fact that industrial unit has been shifted from Urban Area to Non Urban Area and not from one Urban Area to another Urban Area as notified by the Central Government vide notification no. SO 619(E) dt. 27/04/2006 and in holding that this issue has not been addressed before him (para 20) though the submission on this issue were filed vide para 12 of written submission dt. 11/12/2017.
6. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in confirming the addition of Rs.60,00,000/- made u/s 50C/50G of the IT Act, 1961 in spite of the fact that investment in new asset being Rs.69,43,070/- is much more than the capital gain on transfer of old asset.
7. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in confirming the addition of Rs.60,00,000/- made u/s 50C of the IT Act, 1961.
8. The Ld. CIT(A) grossly erred on facts as well as in law in ignoring the ground no. 9 where in it is requested that without prejudice to other grounds, addition u/s 50G is w.r.t to sale of capital asset, any addition will amount to capital gain only and not income from other source.”
3. At the outset, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that ground no.8 of grounds of appeal is not pressed. Accordingly ground no.8 of grounds of appeal is dismissed as not pressed.
4. Coming to ground nos. 6 & 7 i.e. in respect of application of provisions u/s 50C of the Act the Ld. Counsel submits that during the assessment year under consideration the assessee sold industrial unit at Narela, Delhi for a consideration of Rs.60 lakhs on 28.08.2008. Ld. Counsel submitted that assessee paid stamp duty on the valuation adopted by the Sub Registrar at Rs.1,20,00,000/-. Ld. Counsel submitted that Assessee objected to the value adopted by the stamp value authority and therefore, the Ld. AO made a reference to the DVO on 28/01/2016. Ld. Counsel submitted that the DVO vide letter dated 11/3/2016 (Pg: 19, PB) wrote to the Ld. AO that the purchaser of the property has not allowed his team to enter the premises. A copy of this letter was also given to the appellant. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Assessee vide letter dated 23/3/2016 (Pg: 20, PB) requested the Ld. AO to refer the matter back to the DVO for determination of fair market value in the interest of natural justice. The Ld. AO did not refer the matter hack to the DVO and vide letter dated 28/3/2016 (Pg: 21, PB), rejected the request without assigning any reason. Even the assessment order was passed just the next day. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel submitted that the AO considered the fair market value at Rs.1,20,00,000/- and added Rs. 60,00,000/- u/s 50C. The issue has been decided in a hurried manner without application of mind and against the principles of natural justice.
5. Ld. Counsel for the Assessee further submitted that the impugned property was a leasehold property (Pg: 27, PB) and the Assessee transferred the leasehold rights in the impugned property. The Ld.AO has made the addition u/s 50C ignoring the fact that the Assessee has not sold free hold property and the impugned transfer is of leasehold rights. Ld. Counsel submitted that Section 50C is not applicable on transfer of lease hold rights as settled judicially for the following reasons:
“a) Section 50C refers to “land or building or both” only without referring to “right in land or building or both”. In fact, the distinction between a capital asset being ‘land or building or both’ and any ‘right in land or building or both’ is well recognized under the I.T. Act itself. Sec. 54D deals with certain cases in which capital gain on compulsory acquisition of land and building is charged. Sub-sec.(1) of sec. 54D opens with: “Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), where the capital gain arises from the transfer by way of compulsory acquisition under any law of a capital asset, being land or building or any right in land or building, forming part of an industrial undertaking”. The Legislature in its wisdom has used both the terms in sections 54D which proves beyond doubt that these two terms are different. Similarly, section 5(1)(xxxii) of Wealth Tax Act also refers to “not being any land or building or any rights in land or building “, It is palpable from both these sections that ‘land or building’ is distinct from ‘any right in land or building’. Similar is the case with sections 35(2)(a), 54G(1), 54GA(1), 269UA(d) and explanation to section 155(5A). Had it not been so, there was no need to use both the terms & only term “land & building” could have been used. It has been clearly held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.V.K. Industries Ltd. v. ITO. (2011) 2 SCC 36 that the express mention of one implies the exclusion of another. But in section 50C, unlike these sections, both the term are not used but only the term “Capital asset, being land or building or both” has been used. Therefore, it is conclusively proved that ‘land & building’ excludes ‘right in land & building’. Hence, ‘right in land & building’ is not covered u/s 50C. Reliance is placed on the following case law:-
GVK Industries Ltd. v. ITO (2011) 4 SCC 36 (SC)
“54 In this case it is the territory of India that is specified by the phrase “for the whole or any part of the territory of India.” “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”- the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. In this case Parliament has been granted powers to make laws “for” a specific territory – and that is India or any part thereof; by implication, one may not read that the Parliament has been granted powers to make laws “for” territories beyond India.
(b) There is a latest judgement on this issue by the jurisdictional ITAT wherein it is held that section 50C does not apply to transfer of leasehold rights in land / building. Relevant extract is reproduced hereunder for ready reference;
Rajesh Kumar Sharma v. CIT (A)/NFAC, Delhi [ITA No. 1785/Del/2025]
6. Ld. Counsel for the assessee further referring to various other decisions including the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of V.S. Chandrashekar v. Asstt. CIT (Karnataka) and also various other decisions made the following further submissions:
“4. That being the case, we notice that the learned CIT(A)/NFAC has itself extracted the corresponding sale/purchase deed executed between the parties in the relevant previous year involving “lease rights” that the prescribed capital asset(s) of “land and building” as per section 56(2)(vii) Explanation (d)(i) of the Act. The Revenue could hardly dispute that the impugned statutory provision is pari materia to section 50C of the Act applicable in case of capital gain arising from sale/transfer of the specified capital asset “land and building” only. Faced with this situation, learned departmental representative quotes Vidarbha Veneere Industries Ltd. v. ITO (Bom.) that the impugned statutory provision also could be invoked in sale/transfer of lease rights as well. The assessee on the other hand places strong reliance on V.S. Chandrashekar v. ACIT (2021) [2021] V.S. Chandrashekar v. Asstt. CIT /[2021] 432 ITR 330 (Karnataka) (Karnataka)/(Karnataka)/[2021] 432 ITR 330 (Karnataka) (Kar.) deciding the very issue in his favour. No guidance has admittedly come from Hon’ble jurisdictional high court at Delhi. We therefore quote CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973) 88ITR 192 (SC) that in such an instance of conflicting Hon’ble non-jurisdictional High Courts’ decisions, a view which favour s the assessee ought to be adopted and delete the impugned section 56(2)(vii) addition herein amounting to Rs.21,95,375/- in very terms. Ordered accordingly.
5. All other pleadings between the parties on merits stand rendered academic.
6. This assessee’s appeal is allowed in above terms. Order Pronounced in the Open Court on 29/09/2025.”
(c) Relevant extract from the judgement of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court is also reproduced hereunder for ready reference;
“11. Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is axiomatic that Explanation 1 to section 2(47) uses the term ‘immovable property’ whereas, Section 50C uses the expression ‘land’ instead of immovable property. It is also pertinent to mention that wherever the legislature intended to expand the meaning of the land to include rights or interests in land, it has said so specifically viz., Section 35(1)(a), Section 54G(1), Section 54GA(1) and Section 269UA(d) and Explanation to Section 155(5A). Thus, Section 50C applies only in case of a transferor of land which in the instant case is M/s Namaste Exports and not the assessee who was only a consenting party and not a transferor/co-owner of the property.
Undoubtedly, the assessee had certain rights under the agreement, however, from the clear plain and unambiguous language employed in Section 50C, it is evident that the same does not apply to a case of rights in land. It is equally well settled rule of statutory interpretation with regard to taxing statute that an assessee cannot be taxed without clear words for that purpose and every Act of the Parliament has to be read as per its natural construction of words. For the aforementioned reasons, in our considered opinion, the provisions of Section 50(c) are not applicable to the case of the assessee. In the result, the first substantial question of law is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee.”
12. Reliance is also placed on the following case laws:
Noida Cyber Park Pvt. Ltd., v. ITO; ITA NO. 165/DEL/2020; dt. 12/10/2020
“11. Thus, the expression ‘land or building’ in its coverage is quite distinct from the expression ‘any right in land or building’. The legislature, in its wisdom, has used the expression ‘land or building or both’ in Section 50C(1) of the Act, and not the expression ‘any right in land or building’. Therefore, the express use of one expression would exclude the other, a legal premise which is supported by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GVK Industries Ltd. v. ITO – (2011) 4 SCC 36 (SC). In this view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the point sought to be raised by the assessee deserves to be upheld. Such a distinction also has found approval of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of C.I.T. v. Greenfield Hotels & Estates Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and other Tribunal decisions which have been referred to in the earlier part of this order. Apart from that, we find that a recent decision of our Coordinate Bench in the case of Manish Traders v. ITO in ITA No. 4481/D/2016 dated 22.7.2019 (reported in 2019 (7) TMI 1268 – ITAT Delhi has observed that assessee’s leasehold right for a period of 90 years in question is a capital asset to which provisions contained u/s 50C are not applicable.
13. In view of the aforesaid factual position and in law, we find that the present transaction of six properties in question does not warrant invoking of section 50C(1) of the Act as the property in question is not of the nature covered by section 50C(1) of the Act. Therefore, on this point itself, we set aside the order of the Id. Commissioner of Income Tax(A) and direct the Assessing Officer to delete the addition.”
Ritz Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO, 2020-TIOL-307-ITAT-KOL
“19……As section 50C of the Act applies only to a capital asset, being land or building or both, it cannot be made applicable to lease rights in a land. As the assessee has transferred leasehold right for 99 years in the shop and not land itself, the provision of section 50C of the Act cannot be invoked.”
Shri Kishan Dass v. DIT; ITA No: 915/Del/2012; Dt. 07/06/2013; Hon’ble ITAT Delhi
“9……As s.50C applies only to a capital asset, being land or building or both, it cannot be made applicable to lease rights in a land. As the assessee transferred lease right for sixty years in the plot and not land itself, the provisions ofs.50C cannot be invoked….”
CIT v. M/s. Greenfield Hotels & Estates Pvt. Ltd; APPEAL NO. 735 OF 2014; dt. 24/10/2016; Hon’ble Bombay High Court
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the CIT(A) in deleting the addition of Long Term Capital Gain of RS.80,58,000/- on the ground that provisions of section 50C of the IT Act, 1961 were not applicable to transfer of land and building, being a leasehold property, ?”
5. In the above view, the question as framed by the Revenue does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Thus, not entertained.”
Atul G. Puranik v. ITO; (Mumbai ITAT]
“Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Whether lease right in a plot of land cannot be included within scope of ‘land or building or both’ and, thus, in case of transfer of leasehold rights in land, provisions of section 50C cannot be invoked – Held, yes [In favour of assessee]”
Kancast Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO; [2015] (Pune – Trib.)
“Section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Whether provisions of section 50C apply only to capital asset being land or building or both, however, said provisions do not apply in case of transfer of leasehold rights in land or building – Held, yes [Para 11] [In favour of assessee]”
13. In view of the above judicial pronouncements, it is very clear that 50C applies only to a capital asset, being land or building or both, it cannot be made applicable to lease rights in land or building or both. Accordingly, it is requested that the addition made by the Ld. AO amounting to Rs.60,00,000/- may kindly be deleted as the transfer involved is in respect of leasehold rights in property at Narela.
Two Interpretations
14. It is also judicially settled that even if there are two interpretations on a subject, still in view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT v. Vegetable products 88 ITR192 =”2002-TIOL-574-SC-IT-LB,” the assessee is entitled to application of judgment benefiting to it. This view has also been followed by the Hon’ble ITAT in its judgment in the case of Optitech Software (P) Ltd. v. ITO, 2015-TIOL-394-ITAT-DEL.”
7. On the other hand, the Ld. DR strongly placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in the case of Vidharbha Vineer Industries Ltd. v. ITO [Tax Appeal no.24 of 2022, dated 01-04-2022] and submitted that the Bombay High Court considered an identical issue as to whether the lease rights would fall under the purview of section 50C of the Act or not and held that the provisions of section 50C do apply for the lease rights. Ld. DR strongly supported the orders of the authorities below.
8. Heard rival contentions, perused the orders of the authorities below. The primary issue in this appeal to be adjudicated is as to whether the provisions of section 50C are applicable to the leasehold right in the property sold by the assessee. We observed that the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of V.S. Chandra Shekhar (supra) had considered the expression “Land” appearing in section 50C and held that from the clear plain and unambiguous language employed in section 50C, lease rights in land the provision of section 50C does not apply to a case of rights in “Land”. While holding so the Hon’ble High Court held as under:
“11. Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is axiomatic that Explanation 1 to section 2(47) uses the term ‘immovable property’ whereas, Section 50C uses the expression ‘land’ instead of immovable property. It is also pertinent to mention that wherever the legislature intended to expand the meaning of the land to include rights or interests in land, it has said so specifically viz., Section 35(1)(a), Section 54G(1), Section 54GA(1) and Section 269UA(d) and Explanation to Section 155(5A). Thus, Section 50C applies only in case of a transferor of land which in the instant case is M/s Namaste Exports and not the assessee who was only a consenting party and not a transferor/co-owner of the property.
Undoubtedly, the assessee had certain rights under the agreement, however, from the clear plain and unambiguous language employed in Section 50C, it is evident that the same does not apply to a case of rights in land. It is equally well settled rule of statutory interpretation with regard to taxing statute that an assessee cannot be taxed without clear words for that purpose and every Act of the Parliament has to be read as per its natural construction of words. For the aforementioned reasons, in our considered opinion, the provisions of Section 50(c) are not applicable to the case of the assessee. In the result, the first substantial question of law is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee.”
9. We also observed that recently the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajiv Kumar Sharma v. CIT [ITA No.1785(Del) of 2025, dated 29-9-2025] following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Vegetables Products Ltd. ([1973] 88 ITR 192 (SC)) and applying the ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of V.C. Chandra Shekhar (supra) held that provisions of section 56(2)(vii) of the Act which are peri-materia to the provisions of section 50C held that these provisions have no application to the lease rights involved in a capital asset of “Land and Building”.
10. Thus, respectfully following the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of V.C. Chandra Shekhar (supra) and the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Rajiv Kumar Sharma (supra), we hold that provisions of section 50C has no application to the facts of the assessee’s case since what was sold by the assessee was not “land or building” or both but only the lease rights in the land. Resultantly Ground no.6 and 7 are allowed.
11. Coming to ground no.4 & 5 which is in respect of denying relief u/s 54G of the Act, Ld. Counsel for the assessee referring to page 5 of the assessment order submitted that the Assessing Officer stated that as per the provisions of section 54G(1) of the IT Act, 1961, the assessee was required to purchase the new asset within one year from the sale of original asset and this observation of the Ld. AO is completely incorrect. Ld. Counsel submitted that as per the provisions of section 54G(1) of the IT Act, 1961, the assessee was required to purchase the new asset within a period of one year before or three years after the date on which the transfer took place. Therefore, the observation of the Ld. AO that new property has to be purchased within one year is incorrect and against the provisions of law.
12. Ld. Counsel further submitted that one of the basis of disallowance made by the Ld. AO was that since the Assessee purchased the new property after one year, the amount of capital gain has to be deposited in capital gains account. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Assessee sold the industrial unit at Narela, Delhi for a consideration of Rs.60,00,000/- on 28/08/2008. After which, the Assessee purchased for Rs.69,43,070/- (Pg: 33 & 34, PB) an industrial plot in Sector A-3, Tronica City, Loni, Ghaziabad for which UPSIDC gave permission to transfer the plot in the name of the Assessee on 16/09/2008 (Pg: 40, PB) subject to certain payments and the payments were duly made by Assessee on 15/10/2008 (Pg: 47, PB). Therefore, it is submitted that this clearly indicates that the plot at Ghaziabad was allotted to the Assessee on 16/09/2008, this is further confirmed from the fact that UPSIDC vide letter dt 17/12/2008 (Pg: 48, PB) raised the demand on the Assessee for the installment of premium due on 01/01/2009. It is submitted that since, the plot was allotted on 16/09/2008, further demand could be raised by UPSIDC on 17/12/2008 otherwise it would have been raised on the earlier owner. Ld. Counsel therefore submitted that by now it is judicially settled that date of allotment should be considered as date of purchase and not the date of registration and accordingly, in the case of the Assessee, date of purchase is 16/09/2008 and not 06/11/2009. Therefore, it is submitted that the Assessee purchased the new property i.e. industrial plot within one year of the sale of old property.
13. For the proposition that for the purpose of capital gain, it is the date of allotment which is to be considered and not the date of registration Ld. Counsel placed reliance on following case laws:
(i) CIT v. K. Ramakrishnan (Delhi HC)
“IT: In order to determine taxability of capital gain arising from sale of property, it is date of allotment of property which is relevant for purpose of computing holding period and not date of registration of conveyance deed”
(ii) PCIT v. Vembu Vaidyanathan (SC)/2019-TIOL 293-SC-IT
“Having heard the parties, the Supreme Court condoned the delay and dismisses the SLP, thus concurring with the opinion of High Court on the issue of ‘the date of issuance of allotment letter to be equated with date of acquisition of property’. Revenue’s SLP dismissed”
(iii) Karna Singh v. ACIT2021-TIOL-1281-ITAT-DEL
“6.4. Since the assessee in the instant case was allotted the property vide agreement Dated 11.04.2011 and allotment letter dated 08.07.2011, therefore, he has acquired a right in the asset and such right is a capital asset and payment of installments as per the terms is only a follow-up action and taking delivery of possession is only a formality. Therefore, the assessee in our opinion has correctly computed the long term capital loss. We, therefore, set aside the Order of the Ld. CIT(A) and direct the A.O. to allow the long term capital loss claimed by the assessee.”
13.1 Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Assessee sold the industrial unit at Narela, Delhi for a consideration of Rs.60,00,000/-on 28/08/2008 and the Assessee purchased an industrial plot in Sector A-3, Tronica City, Loni, Ghaziabad for which UPSIDC gave permission to transfer the plot in the name of the Assessee on 16/09/2008. Therefore, the Assessee acquired the plot before the due date of furnishing the return i.e. 30.09.2009. Thus, it is submitted that there was no need to deposit the capital gain in capital gain account. Further, the whole amount of Rs.69,43,070/-was paid by 15/04/2009 (Pg: 34, PB). Therefore, no money was left to be deposited in capital gain account. Hence, question of depositing money in capital gain account does not arise.
14. Ld. Counsel for the Assessee further submitted that the Ld. AO has stated in the assessment order that the Assessee has shifted her industrial unit from one urban area to another urban area which is factually incorrect. Ld. Counsel submitted that Explanation to section 54G of the Act has defined the urban area as the one declared to be an urban area by the Central Govt. Accordingly the Central Govt, has notified the urban area vide notification attached in the paper book (Pg: 37-39, PB). According to this notification, Tronica City is not included as urban area. Hence, the Assessee has shifted her industrial unit from an urban area, i.e., Narela to the other area, i.e., Tronica City, Ghaziabad which is not urban area and therefore, sec 54G is clearly applicable and the Assessee is entitled to deduction u/s 54G of the Act.
15. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Ld. CIT(A) confirmed the addition/disallowance on the ground that the Assessee did not make any submission on this issue and in the present appeal proceedings also the Assessee has not addressed this particular issue (para 20, page 22 of CIT(A)’s order). Ld. Counsel submitted that all the above submissions along with the documentary evidences were duly filed before the Ld. CIT(A) and the Ld. CIT(A) in fact extracted the submissions of the Assessee at page 21 of his order which proves that the Ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the additions without even considering the submissions filed by the assessee and therefore the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) is ex-facie illegal and against the material on record. Thus, the Ld. Counsel for the Assessee prayed that the assessment order may kindly be annulled or in the alternative, the addition of Rs.60,00,000/- u/s 50C may kindly be deleted and relief u/s 54G may kindly be given.
16. On the other hand, Ld. DR strongly supported the orders of the Assessing Officer.
17. Heard rival submissions, perused the orders of the authorities below. In order to claim relief u/s 54G(1) of the Act the assessee was required to purchase the new asset within a period of one year before or three years after the date in which the transfer took place. The claim for relief u/s 54G was denied to the assessee by the AO observing that the assessee was required to purchase the new asset within one year from the sale of original asset.
18.1 Admittedly, the assessee sold the asset namely, Industrial Unit at Narela on 28.08.2008. It is evident from pages 40 & 41 of the Paper book furnished by the Assessee that UPSIDC give permission to transfer the plot in the name of the assessee on 16.09.2008 namely Industrial Plot No.D-30 & D-31 Industrial Sector, A-3 at Tronica City, Loni, Ghaziabad. The assessee also paid certain amounts pursuant to the transfer of allotment of industrial plot on the assessee’s name on 16.09.2008 and also made further payments against demand notice dated 17.12.2008 which is evident from pages 47 & 48.
18.2 The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of K.Rama Krishnan (supra) held that for the purpose of determining the capital gains arising from sale of property it is the date of allotment of property which is relevant for purpose of computing holding period and not date of registration of conveyance deed. In the case of the assessee though the conveyance deed was registered on 06.11.2009 since the Industrial plot was allotted on 16.09.2008 the date for the purpose of computing holding period should be the date of allotment i.e. 16.09.2008.
19. We also observed that the assessee sold Industrial Unit at Narela for a consideration of Rs.60 lakhs on 28.08.2008 and purchased an Industrial Plot in Sector-A-3, Tronica City, Loni, Ghaziabad for which UPSIDC granted permission to transfer the plot in the name on 16.09.2008 and the assessee has paid the entire purchase consideration before the due date for furnishing of return i.e., 30.09.2009 for the assessment year under consideration AY 2009-10 and therefore the question of depositing the sale consideration in capital gain again did not arise.
20.1 We also observed that there is considerable merit in the submission of the assessee that the observation of the AO that the assessee sold industrial plot in urban area and invested the same in another urban area by purchasing another industrial plot is factually incorrect.
20.2 On perusal of the notification issued by the Central Government wherein the “urban area” was notified for the purpose of section 54G of the Act and the industrial area of Sector A-3, Tronica City, Loni, Ghaziabad is not notified as “urban area” and therefore the observation of the AO that the assessee has shifted her industrial unit from one urban area to another urban area is factually incorrect.
21. Therefore, in view of the above discussion and for the reasons explained above, we are of the view that the assessee satisfied the conditions stipulated in section 54G of the Act and thus entitled for deduction u/s 54G of the Act. Accordingly we direct the AO to allow the deduction claimed u/s 54G of the Act to the assessee for the assessment year under consideration. Ground nos. 4 & 5 of grounds of appeal of the assessee are allowed.
22. Since we have allowed the claims of the assessee on merits, we are not inclined to go into the validity of the approval granted u/s 151 of the Act and the legality of initiation of proceedings u/s 148 of the Act at this stage and the same are left open.
23. In the result, the appeal of the Assessee is partly allowed.