Benami Act: Final Attachment Order Must Match Property in Show Cause Notice

By | January 27, 2026

Benami Act: Final Attachment Order Must Match Property in Show Cause Notice

 

Issue

Whether the Initiating Officer (IO) can issue a provisional attachment order under Section 24(4)(a)(i) for a property that is different from the property specified in the initial show-cause notice and provisional attachment order issued under Section 24(3). Essentially, can the IO “switch” or substitute the property mid-process?

Facts

  • The Notice (Section 24(3)): The Initiating Officer issued a notice to the appellant and provisionally attached their Bank Accounts with Andhra Bank.

  • The Order (Section 24(4)): Subsequently, while passing the order to continue the provisional attachment under Section 24(4)(a)(i), the IO did not attach the bank accounts. Instead, the order attached a completely different property.

  • The Confirmation: The Adjudicating Authority confirmed this attachment.

  • The Defense: The appellant argued that the order under Section 24(4) is merely for the continuance of the attachment made under Section 24(3). Therefore, the property cannot be changed at this stage without a fresh notice.

Decision

  • Continuance, Not Substitution: The Tribunal held that the scope of Section 24(4)(a)(i) is strictly limited to the continuance of the provisional attachment already made under Section 24(3). It does not grant the power to add, substitute, or change the property at the final order stage.

  • Mismatch is Fatal: Since the property mentioned in the initial notice (Bank Accounts) was different from the property attached in the final order, the process was fundamentally flawed.

  • Outcome: The impugned order confirming the provisional attachment was set aside. The proceedings were quashed in favor of the assessee.

Key Takeaways

  • Consistency is Mandatory: The description of the Benami property must be consistent from the Show Cause Notice (SCN) through to the Provisional Attachment Order and the Adjudication Order. Any variance (e.g., Notice says “Plot A”, Order says “Plot B”) renders the order invalid.

  • Scope of Section 24(4): The Initiating Officer cannot use the final order to “fix” mistakes or expand the scope of the attachment. If they want to attach a new property, they must issue a fresh notice under Section 24(1) and a fresh provisional attachment under Section 24(3).

  • Defense Strategy: Always cross-verify the Schedule of Properties in the SCN against the final Attachment Order. If there is even a slight discrepancy in survey numbers or asset descriptions, the order is liable to be challenged.

APPELLATE TRIBUNAL SAFEMANEW DELHI
Balkar Singh
v.
Initiating Officer*
MUNISHWAR NATH BHANDARI, Chairman
and G.C. Mishra, Member
MP-PBPT-1399,1400/LDH/2025 A.D.
MP-PBPT-2863 and 2865/LDH/2022 Stay
FPA-PBPT-2463, 2465 and 2470/LDH/2022
DECEMBER  17, 2025
Ashwani TanejaMs. Shreya ShandilyaShivam Kukreja and Ashish Tandon, Advs. for the Appellant. Manmeet S. Arora, SPP for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. By this set of appeals, a challenge has been made to the order dated 28.09.2022 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, confirming the Provisional Attachment Order while answering the reference. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant has referred to the facts of the case elaborately and for which even a convenience compilation has been filed with a copy to the Respondent. However, before opening the facts, a legal issue has been raised. It is for the reason that it goes in the root of the case.
2. Ld. Counsel submitted that while causing notice for order under Section 24(3) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions (PBPT) Act, 1988 (in short “the Act of 1988), the provisional attachment of the bank accounts of Andhra Bank in the name of the Appellant, Balkar Singh was made. However, while passing an order under Section 24(4)(a)(i), the attachment was made to the bank account with the Axis Bank of M/s Mala Petro Chemicals and Polymers. The Respondent have thus substituted the provisional attachment of the property indicated in the Provisional Attachment Order under Section 24(3) while passing the order under Section 24(4)(a)(i), though the said provision can be invoked to continue the provisional attachment caused under Section 24(3) of the Act of 1988 and not to substitute the property under Provisional attachment. Thus, being a legal issue, this Tribunal may pass an appropriate order. It is with the fair admission by the Counsel for the Appellant that the issue aforesaid was not raised before the Adjudicating Authority but being a legal issue, it has been raised at the stage of appeal. The reply to the appeal has been filed but effectively no response to the issue raised by the Appellant has been given.
3. The Ld. Counsel for the Appellant made reference of the order passed under Section 24(3) of the Act of 1988 and also the order under Section 24(4)(a)(i) of the Act of 1988 to demonstrate the substitution of the properties. In the light of the submission referred to above, prayer was made to cause interference in the impugned order.
4. Ld. Counsel for the Respondent opposed the prayer for quashing of the order for substitution of the property other than referred under Section 24(3). It may be due to oversight or bona-fide mistake. It is however with the admission that effectively reply to the issue raised by the Appellant in this appeal has not been given. In the light of the aforesaid, Ld. Counsel for the Respondent prayed for remand of the case or liberty to revisit the issue or pass the order afresh.
5. The prayer aforesaid has been opposed by the Counsel for the Appellant.
6. We have considered the rival submissions and find that the Appellant has raised a legal issue which goes in the root of the case and thus, taken up in isolation without touching the factual aspect of the matter for the reason that if the interference to be caused in the impugned order based on legal issue, there would be no purpose to enter into other aspects. It is more so when the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent was fair to look into the issue and submitted that there may be a bona-fide error on the part of the Initiating Officer in passing the order under Section 24(4)(a)(i) of the Act of 1988.
7. We find that the properties referred for provisional attachment in the notice and the order under Section 24(3) of the Act of 1988 are different than referred in the order under Section 24(4)(a)(i) of the Act of 1988. While the provision of Section 24(4)(a)(i) is for the continuance of the Provisional Attachment Order caused under Section 24(3) and not for addition or substitution. In the light of the fact aforesaid, we cause interference in the impugned order and are set aside, however, it is with the liberty to the Respondent to initiate action afresh, if so desire and for that this order would not come in their way because we have not touched upon the facts of the case but caused interference in the impugned order on a legal ground which otherwise is curable, if the proceedings are initiated afresh. Thus, this Tribunal is not intend to accept the objection raised by the Counsel for the Appellant on the aforesaid rather for the ends of justice, this Tribunal is appropriately passing the order giving chance to the Respondent for taking proceedings afresh but strictly as per the provisions of law.
8. The appeals are disposed of with the aforesaid.