Service Tax Demand Order Quashed Due to Unexplained Delay in Adjudication
Issue: Whether a Service Tax demand order passed under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994, invoking the extended period of limitation, can be sustained if the Adjudicating Authority fails to pass the order within the period prescribed by Section 73(4B)(b) (one year from SCN issuance for extended period cases), and fails to provide any justification for such delay.
Facts:
- For the financial periods October 2015 to March 2016 and July 2017 (up to June 2017), the respondent authority determined a service tax liability upon the assessee under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.
- The extended period of limitation (beyond the normal one year) under the proviso to Section 73(1) was invoked.
- The assessee submitted that the order-in-original had been passed approximately three and a half years from the date of issuance of the Show Cause Notice (SCN).
- The assessee argued that it was incumbent upon the authority to determine tax liability either within the prescribed period of one year under Section 73(4B)(b) or to at least show prima facie that it was not possible to determine the liability within that period.
- The respondent authority conceded that the determination was delayed but contended that the one-year period prescribed under Section 73(4B)(b) was not an absolute and mandatory period. They cited a Co-ordinate Bench decision in Kanak Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors. (CWJC No. 18398 of 2023, dated 4-4-2024), which purportedly supported their view that the period was not final.
Decision: The impugned order was set aside. The court acknowledged that in Kanak Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench had indeed agreed that the one-year period in Section 73(4B)(b) was not an “absolute mandate.” However, it also critically noted that Kanak Automobiles simultaneously held that a duty is cast upon the Department to show that it was not possible to pass an order determining the amount within one year for cases falling under the extended period. Since, in the instant case, the counter-affidavit had “no whisper” to prima facie satisfy the Court that it was not possible for the Taxing Authority to determine the tax liability within the prescribed one-year period, the ratio of Kanak Automobiles was applicable in favor of the assessee. The decision was in favor of the assessee.
Key Takeaways:
- Conditional Nature of “Wherever Possible” in Section 73(4B)(b): While Section 73(4B)(b) of the Finance Act, 1994 (pertaining to Service Tax adjudication) uses the phrase “wherever it is possible to do so” regarding the one-year time limit for extended period cases, this does not grant indefinite leeway to the department.
- Department’s Burden to Justify Delay: The core principle established is that if the department fails to adhere to the one-year period, it must affirmatively demonstrate and justify why it was not possible to pass the order within that timeframe. Mere inaction or silence regarding the delay is insufficient.
- No Presumption of Justifiable Delay: The burden is on the revenue to explain the delay, particularly when an extended period of limitation (which often implies a more serious default by the assessee) is involved.
- Importance of Counter-Affidavit: The court specifically noted the absence of any justification in the counter-affidavit, indicating that the department failed to meet its evidentiary burden to explain the delay.
- Consequences of Unexplained Delay: An unexplained and inordinate delay in adjudication, even if the statutory period is not “absolute,” can lead to the quashing of the demand order, as it can be seen as an arbitrary exercise of power and prejudicial to the assessee.
- Spirit of Timely Adjudication: The ruling reinforces the legislative intent behind prescribing time limits for adjudication – to ensure certainty for taxpayers and efficient disposal of disputes.
“9. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of National Building Construction Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; 2019 (20) G.S.T.L. 515 (Del.) has held as under:-
“20…. Sub-section 4B to Section 73 of the Fin Act fixes the time or limitation period within which the Central Excise Officer has to adjudicate and decide the show cause notice. The time period fixed under Clause A or B is six months and one year respectively. Limitation period for passing of the adjudication order, described as Order-in-Original, starts from the date of notice under Sub-section 1 to Section 73 of the Fin Act.”
“When the legislature has used the expression “where it is possible to do so”, it means that if in the ordinary course it is possible to determine the amount of duty within the specified time frame, it should be so done. The legislature has wisely not prescribed a time limit and has specified such time limit where it is possible to do so, for the reason that the adjudicating authority for several reasons may not be in a position to decide the matter within the specified time frame, namely, a large number of witnesses may have to be examined, the record of the case may be very bulky, huge workload, nonavailability of an officer, etc. which are genuine reasons for not being able to determine the amount of duty within the stipulated time frame. However, when a matter is consigned to the call book and kept in cold storage for years together, it is not on account of it not being possible for the authority to decide the case, but on grounds which are extraneous to the proceedings. In the opinion of this court, when the legislature in its wisdom has prescribed a particular time limit, the CBEC has no power or authority to extend such time limit for years on end merely to await a decision in another case. The adjudicatory authority is required to decide each case as it comes, unless restrained by an order of a higher forum.”