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	<title>Assistant Commissioner of GST Archives - Tax Heal</title>
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		<title>Waiver of interest and penalty cannot be denied solely for depositing tax under the wrong head if the full liability was discharged within the statutory timeframe.</title>
		<link>https://www.taxheal.com/senthilkumar-ramamoorthy-j-4.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashwani Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 05:41:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assistant Commissioner of GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Excise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIGH COURT OF MADRAS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.taxheal.com/?p=135422</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Waiver of interest and penalty cannot be denied solely for depositing tax under the wrong head if the full liability was discharged within the statutory timeframe. Issue Whether the tax authority was justified in rejecting the petitioner&#8217;s application for waiver of interest and penalty under Section 128A of the CGST/TNGST Act solely because a portion… <span class="read-more"><a href="https://www.taxheal.com/senthilkumar-ramamoorthy-j-4.html">Read More &#187;</a></span></p>
]]></description>
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<p data-path-to-node="0"><strong>Waiver of interest and penalty cannot be denied solely for depositing tax under the wrong head if the full liability was discharged within the statutory timeframe.</strong></p>
<h2 data-path-to-node="1">Issue</h2>
<p data-path-to-node="2">Whether the tax authority was justified in rejecting the petitioner&#8217;s application for waiver of interest and penalty under Section 128A of the CGST/TNGST Act solely because a portion of the tax demand was inadvertently deposited under the wrong tax head (IGST instead of CGST/SGST), despite the entire tax liability being discharged on time.</p>
<h2 data-path-to-node="3">Facts</h2>
<ul data-path-to-node="4">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="4,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Demand Adjudication:</b> An Order-in-Original was passed against the assessee under the standard demand provisions (Section 73, not involving fraud), determining a specific tax liability.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="4,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Timely Payment:</b> The assessee deposited the entire demanded tax amount within the prescribed statutory timeline.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="4,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Wrong Head Remittance:</b> Out of the total payment, an amount of ₹3.69 lakhs was accidentally deposited under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) head, even though there was no actual IGST liability.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,3,0"><b data-path-to-node="4,3,0" data-index-in-node="0">Waiver Rejection:</b> The assessee filed an application seeking a waiver of interest and penalty under the conditional amnesty scheme, citing full payment of the principal tax. The tax authority rejected the application due to the wrong head payment.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,4,0"><b data-path-to-node="4,4,0" data-index-in-node="0">Writ Petition:</b> Aggrieved by the rejection, the assessee filed a writ petition before the High Court to challenge the authority&#8217;s order.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 data-path-to-node="5">Decision</h2>
<ul data-path-to-node="6">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Substance Over Procedure:</b> The High Court held that while concessionary statutory provisions require strict compliance regarding the substance of the condition (paying the full tax), procedural aspects allow for &#8220;substantial compliance.&#8221;</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Liability Discharged:</b> The court observed that the entire tax liability stood effectively discharged within the statutory time limits, satisfying the core objective of the waiver scheme.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Rejection Unsustainable:</b> Denying the waiver benefit purely due to an inadvertent error in the remittance head was ruled unsustainable in law.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,3,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,3,0" data-index-in-node="0">Remand and Rectification:</b> The High Court set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter back to the tax authority for fresh consideration, directing them to provide the assessee an opportunity to correct the head-wise payment entry.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h2 data-path-to-node="7">Key Takeaways</h2>
<ul data-path-to-node="8">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Substantial Compliance Matters:</b> If a taxpayer pays 100% of the tax due within the deadline, a purely clerical or technical error—like selecting the wrong tax ledger head—should not strip away statutory amnesty benefits.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Wrong Head is Rectifiable:</b> Depositing tax under an incorrect head (e.g., IGST instead of CGST) is a curable procedural defect, especially when read alongside Section 77, which deals with tax wrongfully collected and paid to the Central or State Government.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Amnesty Intent Preserved:</b> The primary intent of waiver provisions like Section 128A is the recovery of principal tax revenue; once the revenue is secured on time, minor structural adjustments in accounting should be permitted.</p>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div id="111070000000000010" style="text-align: center;">HIGH COURT OF <span class="researchdochighlight">MADRAS</span></div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Ayiswarya Polymers</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">v.</div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Assistant commissioner of GST and Central Excise</div>
<div id="dbs_judge" style="text-align: center;"><span id="111170000000099303">Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy</span>, J.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">WP No. 22814 of <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span><br />
W.M.P. Nos. 24747 &amp; 24748 of <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">JUNE  25, <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div id="digest">
<div><b>G. Sudhakar</b> <i>for the Petitioner. </i><b>K.S. Ramasamy</b>, Sr. SC<i> for the Respondent.</i></div>
</div>
<div id="caseOrder">
<div>
<div>ORDER</div>
<div></div>
<div><b>1. </b>An order in original was issued on 30.12.2022. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner made payments on 27.03.2023 and 06.09.2024. It is common ground that the entire tax demand under said order in original was discharged. The petitioner, however, erroneously remitted a sum of Rs.3,69,334/- in the wrong head, i.e., IGST, instead of CGST and SGST. On that basis, the application for waiver under Section 128-A of applicable GST enactments was rejected. Said order is challenged herein.</div>
<div><b>2. </b>Mr.K.S.Ramasamy, learned standing counsel, accepts notice on behalf of the respondent. He submits that no case is made out for interference because the petitioner admittedly made payment under the IGST head instead of CGST and SGST.</div>
<div><b>3. </b>Under Section 128-A, a person is eligible to apply for waiver if such person pays the full amount of tax payable as per the show cause notice or order under Section 73 or appellate order under Section 107. In the case at hand, the agreed position is that the entire tax liability was discharged, albeit by making payment under the wrong head.</div>
<div><b>4. </b>Learned counsel for the petitioner asserts that this was merely a clerical error in as much as the petitioner has no IGST liability. This factual possession is not controverted by the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, adds that the statute and the rules framed therein do not enable transfer from one head to the other.</div>
<div><b>5. </b>A provision for waiver or exemption is required to be construed strictly with regard to substantive requirements. As regards procedural requirements, substantial compliance is sufficient. This principle was affirmed by the Supreme Court in cases such as <i>Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai</i> v. <i>Dilip Kumar &amp; Company </i>69 GST 239 (SC)/(2018)9 SCC 1.</div>
<div><b>6. </b>Given the fact that the petitioner remitted the full tax upon receipt of an order under Section 73 within the time limit specified in that regard, I am of the view that there is substantial compliance. Consequently, the matter warrants reconsideration. To enable such re-consideration, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded for re-consideration. After providing a reasonable opportunity to the petitioner, the application for waiver shall be re-considered after taking note of the observations contained in this order. A fresh order shall be issued within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall comply with any procedural requirements in order to ensure that the tax is remitted into the appropriate head.</div>
<div><b>7. </b>The writ petition is disposed of on the above terms. Consequently, connected writ miscellaneous petitions are closed. There shall be no order as to costs.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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		<title>GST Authorities Can Lawfully Recover Crystallized Partnership Firm Dues From a Partner&#8217;s Personal Bank Account Under Section 79</title>
		<link>https://www.taxheal.com/senthilkumar-ramamoorthy-j-3.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashwani Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 06:02:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assistant Commissioner of GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Excise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIGH COURT OF MADRAS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.taxheal.com/?p=135228</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>GST Authorities Can Lawfully Recover Crystallized Partnership Firm Dues From a Partner&#8217;s Personal Bank Account Under Section 79 Issue Whether the GST authorities can lawfully issue a garnishee recovery notice under Section 79(1)(c)(i) to attach the personal bank account of a partner for the crystallized tax liabilities of a partnership firm, without invoking the provisional… <span class="read-more"><a href="https://www.taxheal.com/senthilkumar-ramamoorthy-j-3.html">Read More &#187;</a></span></p>
]]></description>
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<p data-path-to-node="0"><strong>GST Authorities Can Lawfully Recover Crystallized Partnership Firm Dues From a Partner&#8217;s Personal Bank Account Under Section 79</strong></p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="1">Issue</h3>
<p data-path-to-node="2">Whether the GST authorities can lawfully issue a garnishee recovery notice under Section 79(1)(c)(i) to attach the personal bank account of a partner for the crystallized tax liabilities of a partnership firm, without invoking the provisional attachment powers under Section 83.</p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="3">Facts</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="4">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,0,0">The petitioner is a partnership firm that challenged a departmental recovery communication issued to its bank for the assessment period 2019–20.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,1,0">The firm alleged that the department unlawfully attached the bank account of an erstwhile partner without serving a prior notice.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,2,0">The petitioner argued that only the Commissioner could authorize a provisional attachment under Section 83, thereby mischaracterizing the recovery action as a provisional measure.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,3,0">Official records revealed that the tax liability of the partnership firm had already been crystallized under an order-in-original, which the firm chose not to challenge.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,4,0">Following this crystallization, the department issued a garnishee recovery notice directly to the bank under Section 79(1)(c)(i).</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,5,0">An evidentiary affidavit disclosed that although the partner resigned from the firm at a later date, he was actively a partner during the relevant assessment period when the tax liability accrued.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="5">Decision</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="6">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Firm Lacked Standing for Partner:</b> The High Court observed that the writ petition was filed by the partnership firm itself, and not by the individual partner whose personal account was affected.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Garnishee Powers Upheld:</b> The Court held that Section 79(1)(c) explicitly empowers GST authorities to proceed against a third party (the bank as a garnishee) to recover government dues.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Partners Jointly and Severally Liable:</b> Since the firm&#8217;s tax liability was fully crystallized and partners are fundamentally liable for the dues of the firm, executing recovery actions against the partner&#8217;s personal bank account was entirely permissible.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,3,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,3,0" data-index-in-node="0">Misconception Cleared:</b> The Court ruled that the petitioner&#8217;s reliance on Section 83 was completely unfounded, as the impugned communication was a final recovery notice under Section 79(1)(c)(i), not a provisional attachment.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,4,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,4,0" data-index-in-node="0">Petition Dismissed:</b> Finding no legal infirmity or procedural deviation in the department&#8217;s actions, the High Court dismissed the writ petition in favor of the revenue.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="7">Key Takeaways</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="8">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Section 79 vs. Section 83:</b> Section 83 is a provisional attachment tool used <i data-path-to-node="8,0,0" data-index-in-node="76">during</i> pending proceedings to protect revenue. Once a tax liability is finalized and remains unpaid, the department can directly deploy Section 79 garnishee powers to seize funds.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Retrospective Liability of Partners:</b> A partner cannot escape tax liabilities that accrued during their tenure in a partnership firm by simply resigning from the firm before the recovery stage.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Direct Recovery Vectors:</b> Because partnership liabilities extend to the personal assets of the partners under general partnership law and GST frameworks, the department can bypass the firm’s accounts and recover outstanding crystallized dues straight from a partner&#8217;s personal bank accounts.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<div id="111070000000000010" style="text-align: center;">HIGH COURT OF <span class="researchdochighlight">MADRAS</span></div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">VRAA and Co.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">v.</div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Assistant Commissioner of GST and Central Excise</div>
<div id="dbs_judge" style="text-align: center;"><span id="111170000000099303">Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy</span>, J.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">WP No. 22458 of <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span><br />
W.M.P. Nos. 24381 and 24382 of <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">JUNE  23, <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div id="digest">
<div><b>C. Baktha Siromoni</b> <i>for the Petitioner. </i><b>K.S. Ramasamy</b>, Jr. SC<i> for the Respondent.</i></div>
</div>
<div id="caseOrder">
<div>
<div>ORDER</div>
<div></div>
<div><b>1.</b> A communication issued to the ICICI Bank Limited under Section 79(1) (<i>c</i>) of applicable GST enactments is challenged in this writ petition.</div>
<div><b>2.</b> Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the individual bank account of an erstwhile partner of the petitioner firm has been attached pursuant to the impugned notice. He submits further that said partner resigned from the partnership on 04.06.2020. He also submits that prior notice was not issued before attaching the bank account. Relying on Section 83 of applicable GST statutes, learned counsel submits that only the Commissioner is empowered to exercise power under Section 83, whereas the Assistant Commissioner has issued the recovery notice.</div>
<div><b>3.</b> Mr.K.S.Ramasamy, learned junior standing counsel, accepts notice on behalf of the first respondent. He submits that the writ petition is completely misconceived and that the Assistant Commissioner is empowered to issue a notice under Section 79(1)(<i>c</i>)(<i>i</i>) read with Section 5(3).</div>
<div><b>4.</b> The writ petition has been filed by the partnership firm and not by the partner. Recovery proceedings pertain to financial year 2019-20. As per the averments in the affidavit, Mr.K.Iyyappan resigned from the partnership on 04.06.2020. Therefore, it appears that he was a partner during the relevant period. The petitioner has proceeded under the misconception that a provisional attachment was effected under Section 83 of applicable GST statutes. On perusal of the impugned communication, it is clear that such communication has been issued under Section 79(1)(<i>c</i>)(<i>i</i>) pursuant to the crystallisation of the tax liability of the partnership firm. Section 79(1)(<i>c</i>) empowers the GST authorities to initiate action against a garnishee. The petitioner has not challenged the order in original making a tax demand on the firm. The partners of a partnership firm are personally liable for the dues of the firm. Since the notice has been issued in relation to the bank account of a partner of the firm, I find no infirmity in the order warranting interference under Article 226.</div>
<div><b>5.</b> Therefore, this writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs. Consequently, connected writ miscellaneous petitions are closed.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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		<title>Sprinkling Jaggery Water on Raw Tobacco Is Not Manufacture; Falls Under Heading 2401 As Unmanufactured Tobacco</title>
		<link>https://www.taxheal.com/sprinkling-jaggery-water-on-raw-tobacco-is-not-manufacture-falls-under-heading-2401-as-unmanufactured-tobacco.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashwani Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Jul 2026 04:39:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assistant Commissioner of GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Excise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIGH COURT OF MADRAS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.taxheal.com/?p=135211</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Sprinkling Jaggery Water on Raw Tobacco Is Not Manufacture; Falls Under Heading 2401 As Unmanufactured Tobacco Issue Whether the manual processing of raw tobacco—specifically sprinkling jaggery water, shade drying, and bulking—transforms it into a &#8220;manufactured&#8221; product classifiable under HSN 2403, or if it retains its character to remain classified as &#8220;unmanufactured tobacco&#8221; under Heading 2401.… <span class="read-more"><a href="https://www.taxheal.com/sprinkling-jaggery-water-on-raw-tobacco-is-not-manufacture-falls-under-heading-2401-as-unmanufactured-tobacco.html">Read More &#187;</a></span></p>
]]></description>
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<p data-path-to-node="0"><strong>Sprinkling Jaggery Water on Raw Tobacco Is Not Manufacture; Falls Under Heading 2401 As Unmanufactured Tobacco</strong></p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="1">Issue</h3>
<p data-path-to-node="2">Whether the manual processing of raw tobacco—specifically sprinkling jaggery water, shade drying, and bulking—transforms it into a &#8220;manufactured&#8221; product classifiable under HSN 2403, or if it retains its character to remain classified as &#8220;unmanufactured tobacco&#8221; under Heading 2401.</p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="3">Facts</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="4">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,0,0">The petitioner is a partnership firm engaged in the tobacco trade for the period spanning April 2020 to March 2021.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,1,0">The petitioner maintained that its handling processes did not alter the essential character of the raw tobacco.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,2,0">In its returns, the petitioner initially classified the product under HSN 2403 99 90 and paid a Compensation Cess of 96%.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,3,0">The Revenue Department disputed this, insisting the product should be reclassified under HSN 2403 99 10, which attracted a higher cess rate.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,4,0">The Assistant Commissioner finalized an assessment order upholding the department&#8217;s reclassification under HSN 2403 99 10, demanding short-paid tax along with applicable interest and penalties.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,5,0">The petitioner challenged this assessment order through a writ petition.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="5">Decision</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="6">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">No Manufacture Occurred:</b> The High Court held that basic processing like sprinkling jaggery water, shade drying, and bulking does not bring into existence a new substance with a distinct name, character, or use.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Precedent Followed:</b> The Court relied on the Division Bench ruling in <i data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="69">W.A.(MD) No. 746 of 2025</i>, which applied the settled legal principle from <i data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="142">Pachiappa Chettiar v. State of Madras (1963)</i> to hold that such minimal processing does not amount to manufacture.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Legal Test Applied:</b> The Court invoked the Supreme Court&#8217;s landmark tests of manufacture from <i data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="93">UOI v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills</i> and <i data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="134">Holostic India Ltd v. CCE</i>, alongside the HSN Explanatory Notes, to confirm the product remains unmanufactured.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,3,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,3,0" data-index-in-node="0">Correct Classification Ordered:</b> The Court ruled that as long as the petitioner&#8217;s activities are confined to the processes approved in the <i data-path-to-node="6,3,0" data-index-in-node="138">Pachiappa Chettiar</i> case, the product properly falls under Central Excise Tariff Heading (CETH) 2401 20 90.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,4,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,4,0" data-index-in-node="0">Impugned Order Quashed:</b> The classification under HSN 2403 99 10 or 2403 99 90 was held to be unsustainable, the Assistant Commissioner&#8217;s order was set aside, and the writ petition was allowed in favor of the assessee.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="7">Key Takeaways</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="8">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">The &#8220;Manufacture&#8221; Threshold:</b> Mere processing or conditioning of an agricultural produce to make it marketable or preservable (like sprinkling water/jaggery or shade drying) does not equate to &#8220;manufacture&#8221; under GST or Excise laws unless a completely new commercial commodity emerges.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Binding Precedents Control Classification:</b> Old judicial definitions under erstwhile Sales Tax or Excise regimes regarding what constitutes &#8220;raw&#8221; vs. &#8220;manufactured&#8221; goods continue to serve as strong persuasive or binding guidelines in GST classification disputes.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Correction of Self-Assessment:</b> Even if an assessee mistakenly files returns under a manufactured category (HSN 2403), they are not precluded from claiming the correct, lower tax classification (Heading 2401) if the legal merits and processes align with the unmanufactured category.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<div id="111070000000000010" style="text-align: center;">HIGH COURT OF <span class="researchdochighlight">MADRAS</span></div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Renganathan &amp; Sons</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">v.</div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Assistant Commissioner of GST &amp; Central Excise</div>
<div id="dbs_judge" style="text-align: center;"><span id="111170000000015043">G.R. Swaminathan</span>, J.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">W.P.(MD) No. 26461 of 2025<br />
W.M.P.(MD) No. 20541 of 2025</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">JUNE  1, <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
</div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div id="digest">
<div><b>R.Sivaraman</b> <i>for the Petitioner. </i><b>R.Gowri Shankar</b> <i>for the Respondent.</i></div>
</div>
<div id="caseOrder">
<div>
<div>ORDER</div>
<div></div>
<div><b>1. </b>The petitioner is a registered partnership firm. It is engaged in tobacco business. The petitioner contended that since the product sold by them had not undergone any manufacturing process so as to change the character of the raw material, they classified their product under chapter heading 24039990 and filed returns accordingly and paid compensation cess at the rate of 96%. This was not acceptable to the department. The jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner called upon the petitioner to re-classify their product under the chapter heading 24039910 and pay enhanced compensation cess. The final order was passed on 13.02.2025 by the respondent in the following terms:-</div>
<div>&#8220;14.In view of the above discussion and findings, I pass the following order:</div>
<div>ORDER</div>
<div>(<i>i</i>) I order that the final product manufactured and cleared by M/s. R.Renganathan &amp; Sons, No.68, Nagai Road, Tiruvarur 610001, during the period from April 2020 to March 2021 is rightly classifiable under chapter heading HSN 2403 99 10 of CGST Act, 2017 for the purpose of payment of Compensation Cess under Central Goods and Services (Compensation to States) Act. 2017;</div>
<div>(<i>ii</i>) I confirm the demand of Rs.1,31,98,398/- (Rupees One Crore Thirty One Lakhs Ninety Eight Thousand Three Hundred and Ninety Eight only) being the short payment of Compensation Cess during the period from April, 2020 to March 2021 from M/s R.Renganathan &amp; Sons, No.68, Nagai Road, Tiruvarur 610001 as per the provisions of Section 73 (9) of Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 read with Section 11 of the Central goods and Services (Compensation to States) Act, 2017,</div>
<div>(<i>iii</i>) I order that M/s R.Renganathan &amp; Sons, No.68, Nagai Road, Tiruvarur 610001, shall pay interest at appropriate rates on the amount of demand confirmed under Sl. No.(<i>ii</i>) above in terms of the provisions of Section 50 of the CGST Act, 2017 from the date on which such amount is payable till it is actually paid,</div>
<div>(<i>iv</i>) I impose a Penalty of Rs.13,19,840/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty only) on M/s R.Renganathan &amp; Sons, No.68, Nagai Road, Tiruvarur 610001, under Section 73(9) of CGST Act, 2017 read with Section 122 (2) (<i>a</i>) of the Central Goods and Services Act, 2017 and section 11 of the Central Goods and Services (Compensation to States) Act, 2017.&#8221;</div>
<div>Challenging the same, this writ petition has been filed.</div>
<div><b>2. </b>The very same issue was posed for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.(MD)No.746 of 2025. The said writ appeal was disposed of in the following terms:-</div>
<div>13.This issue is no longer res-integra. It was authoritatively settled long ago in Pachiappa Chettiar V. State of <span class="researchdochighlight">Madras</span> ((1963) 2 MLJ 71). It is relevant to note that this question came up for consideration in connection with interpreting Section 5(<i>viii</i>) and (<i>vii</i>) of the <span class="researchdochighlight">Madras</span> General Sales Tax Act. In the very opening line, the question was formulated in the following terms :</div>
<p>&#8220;Whether the goods sold by the assessee, which is described as tundu tobacco, is &#8220;chewing tobacco&#8221; produced as a result of any manufacturing operations and assessable as a manufactured product&#8221;.</p>
<div>The process employed by the assessee was described as follows :</div>
<p>&#8220;The raw tobacco is cut into pieces. It is periodically sprinkled with palm jaggery water to keep it soft and wet. Otherwise, the tobacco becomes brittle and cannot be cut into pieces. The tobacco so treated with palm jaggery water is taken out little by little and cut into pieces. They are then separately arranged, packed in bundles, pressed and labelled.&#8221;</p>
<div>The above product was contrasted with what was known as &#8220;scented tobacco&#8221;, the manufacture of which involved the mixing up of quantities of jaggery, cardamom and other spices and conversion into a pasty mass and sold to customers. The Hon&#8217;ble Division Bench referred to an earlier decision rendered in 12 STC 126 (Bell Mark Tobacco Company v. Government of <span class="researchdochighlight">Madras</span>) in which decision also the raw tobacco purchased by the assessees was subjected to soaking in jaggery water, dried in the shade and periodically subjected to the process of bulking. The Division Bench in Bell Mark Tobacco Company case held that if thereafter flavoring essences were added, leaf shredded and shredded tobacco was packed and labelled, that would amount to a manufacturing process. The Hon&#8217;ble Division Bench held that mere sprinkling of jaggery water, drying tobacco in the shade and subjecting it to the process called &#8220;bulking&#8221; would not convert the raw tobacco into some other product. It was further held that the Bell Mark was an authority for the proposition that up to the stage of these processes, no manufacturing of the raw tobacco into some other product is involved. The argument of the department is that on account of the processes adopted by the assessee, the tobacco has become capable of being chewed. This argument was specifically rejected. It was observed that even without adopting the aforesaid processes, a tobacco could be chewed. Would it then become a chewing tobacco?. While the raw product may be capable of a particular use, &#8220;manufacture&#8221; involves some change in that article. Though basically the material might remain the same, it is being adopted to a particular use which in the original form it was not capable of. That is the essence of manufacture. The same view was taken in Deputy Commissioner v. C.Abdul Shahoor Sahib and Co., (1963) 2 MLJ 343.</div>
<div>14.One of us (GRSJ) followed Pachiappa Chettiar V. State of <span class="researchdochighlight">Madras</span> ((1963) 2 MLJ 71) <i>in E.S.Mydeen and Company</i> v. <i>Designated Officer WP(MD)No. </i>18115 of 2021 while dealing with a circular/notification issued under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. Even though Pachiappa Chettiar was cited before the learned Single Judge, it was not dealt with at all. Before us, the learned Standing Counsel argued that E.S.Mydeen was rendered in connection the Food Safety and Standards Act and that therefore, the learned Single Judge did not deal with the same. We are unable to subscribe to the aforesaid submission of the learned Standing Counsel. While E.S.Mydeen arose under the Food Safety and Standards Act, Pachiappa Chettiar arose under a taxing statute. The facts involved in Pachiappa Chettiar and the facts obtaining in the present case are not similar but identical. Pachiappa Chettiar is by a Division Bench. On the authority of Pachiappa Chettiar, we hold that the product made by the appellant is &#8220;unmanufactured tobacco&#8221; because it does not involve any manufacturing activity.</div>
<div>15.The ratio laid down in Pachiappa Chettiar finds an echo in the Explanatory Notes of HSN with respect to unmanufactured tobacco (24.01). It reads as follows :</div>
<p>&#8220;24.01 &#8211; Unmanufactured tobacco; tobacco refuse.</p>
<p>2401.10 &#8211; Tobacco, not stemmed/stripped</p>
<p>2401.20 &#8211; Tobacco, partly or wholly stemmed/stripped</p>
<p>2401.30 &#8211; Tobacco refuse</p>
<p>This heading covers:</p>
<p>(1)Unmanufactured tobacco in the form of whole plants or leaves in the natural state or as cured or fermented leaves, whole or stemmed/stripped, trimmed or untrimmed, broken or cut (including pieces cut to shape, but not tobacco ready for smoking).</p>
<p>Tobacco leaves, blended, stemmed/stripped and &#8220;cased&#8221; (&#8220;sauced&#8221; or &#8220;liquored&#8221;) with a liquid of appropriate composition mainly in order to prevent mould and drying and also to preserve the flavour are also covered in this heading.&#8221;</p>
<div>It was held in Holostic India Ltd v. CCE (2015) 7 SCC 401, that HSN Explanatory Notes are relevant and are a safe guide in case of doubt. The Hon&#8217;ble Supreme Court followed an earlier ruling in CCE v. Wood Craft Products Ltd., (1995) 3 SCC 454 in which it was held that to resolve any dispute relating to tariff classification, a safe guide is the internationally accepted nomenclature emerging from the HSN. Thus, the case on hand passes muster when tested on the touchstone of the Explanatory Notes to HSN.</div>
<div>16.If the appellant&#8217;s product involved addition of flavors and fragrances, it would certainly qualify as a manufactured product. In fact, the appellants were originally engaged in making such products. Following the ban imposed by the Government, they restricted their activities up to the stage indicated in Pachiappa Chettiar and refrained from engaging themselves in any manufacturing tobacco. This is evident from the cover label of the appellant&#8217;s product. Earlier, it was called as &#8220;Special Panneer Tobacco&#8221;. Now, following the giving up of adding flavors and fragrances, the product is called as &#8220;unmanufactured tobacco&#8221;. The shift in the activity of the appellant is reflected in the nomenclature of the product also.</div>
<div>17. We have answered the issue in the light of what was laid down by the Division Bench of this Court. We do not want to stop with this. We would also seek to reinforce our conclusion by referring to the principles laid down by the Hon&#8217;ble Supreme Court in UOI v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd., (1962) 10 TMI 1-SC. It was held therein as follows :</div>
<p>&#8220;Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet, every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be a transformation ; a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use&#8221;.</p>
<div>This decision had been followed in a number of subsequent decisions. What was hitherto a judicial dictum has now become a statutory definition. Section 2(72) of CGST Act, 2017 is as follows :</div>
<p>&#8220;manufacture&#8221; means processing of raw material or inputs in any manner that results in emergence of a new product having a distinct name, character and use and the term &#8220;manufacturer&#8221; shall be construed accordingly;</p>
<p>Applying the above, one can notice that as a result of the process adopted by the assessee, no new product having a distinct name, character and use has emerged. The product continues to be raw tobacco. It was capable of being chewed in the first instance and is capable of the very same use even post the process adopted by the assessee. Hence, one has to hold that there is no manufacturing activity involved.</p>
<div>18<i>. </i>Another decision that is squarely applicable to the case on hand is Crane Betel Nut Powder Works v. CCE, Thiruppathi (2007) 4 SCC 155. It was held therein as follows :</div>
<p>&#8220;30&#8230;.the issue involved in this appeal boils down to the question as to whether by crushing betel nuts and processing them with spices and oils, a new product could be said to have come into being which attracted duty separately under the Schedule to the Tariff Act.</p>
<p>31. In our view, the process of manufacture employed by the appellant Company did not change the nature of the end product, which in the words of the Tribunal, was that in the end product the &#8220;betel nut remains a betel nut&#8221;. The said observation of the Tribunal depicts the status of the product prior to manufacture and thereafter. In those circumstances, the views expressed in Delhi Cloth &amp; General Mills Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 791 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 586] and the passage from the American judgment (<i>supra</i>) become meaningful. The observation that manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation is apposite to the situation at hand. The process involved in the manufacture of sweetened betel nut pieces does not result in the manufacture of a new product as the end product continues to retain its original character though in a modified form.</p>
<p>32.In our view, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals) has correctly analysed the factual as well as the legal situation in arriving at the conclusion that the process of cutting betel nuts into small pieces and addition of essential/non-essential oils, menthol, sweetening agent, etc. did not result in a new and distinct product having a different character and use.&#8221;</p>
<div>In the case on hand, the appellant has not gone up to that stage at all. The appellant&#8217;s process falls far short of what was dealt with in Crane Betel Nuts case. Crane Betel Nuts case is holding the field till date. If even the process referred to in Crane Betel Nuts will not be a manufacturing activity, it is needless to mention that an activity that does not travel that far will also not be a manufacturing activity.</div>
<div>19. The department has nowhere claimed that the appellant is adding any other material apart from jaggery water to the dried tobacco leaf. The assessee had challenged the department to subject their product to testing to find out if any new material has been added. The department did not pick up the gauntlet. We initially thought of remanding the matter on this ground. But on second thoughts we felt that when there was no dispute whatsoever on facts, there was no need for subjecting the goods in question to any test. Only if there is a divergence of view on facts which could be resolved by a lab test, we need to make a remand. Such is not the case here. The appellant has taken a firm stand that except sprinkling with jaggery water, no other material is added. The department has nowhere contested this assertion. What is to be adjudicated is not a question of fact but a pure question of law in respect of facts on which there is consensus. We have held that a similar question was already answered by a Division Bench in Pachiappa Chettiar. We after a careful reading of that judgment are of the respectful view that it was rightly decided and we have no hesitation in following the same.</div>
<div>20. The learned Single Judge was under the impression that the ban imposed by the Government of Tamil Nadu was in force from 2013 onwards. The learned Judge is both right and wrong. The ban was in force in respect of gutkha and pan masala. The ban was extended to chewing tobacco only with effect from May 2017. That is why, the assessees changed their business model. They ceased to make chewing tobacco. They stopped with unmanufactured tobacco.</div>
<div>21. Looked at from any angle, we are of the view that not only the department failed to discharge the onus cast on them, the assessee has more than established that their stand is correct. We hold that so long as the appellants are confining their activity to what was approved in Pachiappa Chettiar case, their product would fall under CETH 2401 20 90.</div>
<div>22. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order impugned in the writ petition as well as the order of the learned Single Judge assailed in this appeal. This writ petition as well as the writ appeal stand allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.&#8221;</div>
<div><b>3</b>. The issue raised in the present writ petition is identical. In view of the judgment made in W.A.(MD)No.746 of 2025, the order impugned in this writ petition is set aside. So long as the writ petitioner is confining its activity to what was approved in Pachiappa Chettiar&#8217;s case, its products would fall under CETH 2401 20 90.</div>
<div><b>4</b>. This writ petition is allowed accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Assistant Commissioner Lacks Legal Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Show Cause Notices Issued by the DGGI</title>
		<link>https://www.taxheal.com/c-saravanan-j-6.html</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashwani Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2026 07:21:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Assistant Commissioner of GST]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HIGH COURT OF MADRAS]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.taxheal.com/?p=134814</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Assistant Commissioner Lacks Legal Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Show Cause Notices Issued by the DGGI Issue Whether an Assistant Commissioner has the legal competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate a Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) under the CGST/IGST framework, or if such powers are exclusively vested in higher-ranking officers.… <span class="read-more"><a href="https://www.taxheal.com/c-saravanan-j-6.html">Read More &#187;</a></span></p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="model-response-message-contentr_3bdb751512cf4792" class="markdown markdown-main-panel tutor-markdown-rendering enable-luminous-fast-follows enable-updated-hr-color" dir="ltr" aria-live="polite" aria-busy="false">
<p data-path-to-node="0"><strong>Assistant Commissioner Lacks Legal Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Show Cause Notices Issued by the DGGI</strong></p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="1">Issue</h3>
<p data-path-to-node="2">Whether an Assistant Commissioner has the legal competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate a Show Cause Notice (SCN) issued by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) under the CGST/IGST framework, or if such powers are exclusively vested in higher-ranking officers.</p>
<h3 data-path-to-node="3">Facts</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="4">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,0,0">The Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) issued a Show Cause Notice (SCN) to the petitioner proposing a tax demand under the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,1,0">The Assistant Commissioner acted as the adjudicating authority and passed an Order-in-Original that confirmed the tax proposals outlined in the DGGI&#8217;s notice.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,2,0">The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, explicitly challenging the legal competence and structural jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to adjudicate an SCN originating from the DGGI.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,3,0">Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax originally appointed proper officers under Sections 3 and 5 of the CGST Act, read with Section 3 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) Act.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,4,0">A subsequent amendment via Notification No. 02/2022-Central Tax inserted Clause 3A and Table V into the parent notification.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="4,5,0">This amendment specifically mandated that the power to decide DGGI notices under core enforcement sections (including Sections 67, 73, 74, 76, 122, 125, 127, 129, and 130) is vested exclusively in Additional Commissioners or Joint Commissioners who are subordinate to the Principal Commissioners or Commissioners.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="5">Decision</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="6">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Absence of Jurisdictional Competence:</b> The Assistant Commissioner lacked the statutory competence to adjudicate the DGGI-issued Show Cause Notice, as the law explicitly excludes lower-tier officers from handling these specific enforcement actions.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Violation of Statutory Notifications:</b> The impugned Order-in-Original directly contravened the strict assignment of powers laid down in Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax (as amended by Notification No. 02/2022-Central Tax) and therefore suffered from a fatal procedural irregularity.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="6,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="6,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Final Ruling:</b> The High Court quashed the invalid adjudication order and remitted the matter back to the department. The revenue was directed to ensure a fresh de novo order is passed on merits by a competent authority in strict compliance with Notification No. 02/2017, as modified by Notification No. 27/2024. The case was decided in favor of the assessee by way of a remand.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h3 data-path-to-node="7">Key Takeaways</h3>
<ul data-path-to-node="8">
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,0,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,0,0" data-index-in-node="0">Strict Construction of Proper Officer Roles:</b> Jurisdiction under GST law is not interchangeable among officers. An officer cannot assume adjudication powers over specialized notices (like those from the DGGI) unless a specific board notification explicitly assigns that category of cases to their rank.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,1,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,1,0" data-index-in-node="0">Fatal Effects of Jurisdictional Defects:</b> If an tax order is passed by an officer lacking the inherent authority to decide that specific matter, the entire order becomes void ab initio (invalid from the start) due to structural and procedural irregularity, regardless of the underlying merits of the tax demand.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p data-path-to-node="8,2,0"><b data-path-to-node="8,2,0" data-index-in-node="0">Dynamic Tracking of Amending Notifications:</b> Tax administrations and practitioners must continuously track active amendments (such as Notification 02/2022 and Notification 27/2024) because updates to tables and clauses completely shift monetary and administrative boundaries between Assistant, Joint, and Additional Commissioners.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<div id="111070000000000010" style="text-align: center;">HIGH COURT OF <span class="researchdochighlight">MADRAS</span></div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Kay Arr Engineering Services</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">v.</div>
<div id="" style="text-align: center;">Assistant Commissioner of GST &amp; Central Excise</div>
<div id="dbs_judge" style="text-align: center;"><span id="111170000000170375">C. SARAVANAN</span>, J.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">W.P. No. 5854 of 2025<br />
W.M.P. No. 6437 of 2025</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">JUNE  3, <span class="researchdochighlight">2026</span></div>
</div>
<div></div>
<div></div>
<div>
<div id="digest">
<div><b>Ms. Aparna Nandakumar</b> <i>for the Petitioner. </i><b>Sai Srujan Tayi</b>, Sr. Standing Counsel and <b>Ms. Pooja Jain</b>, Jr. Standing Counsel<i> for the Respondent.</i></div>
</div>
<div id="caseOrder">
<div>
<div>ORDER</div>
<div></div>
<div><b>1. </b>The petitioner has challenged the Order-in-Original No. 1/2024 dated 16.01.2025 passed by the first respondent. By the impugned order, the proposal in Show Cause Notice No. 38/2024 GST dated 26.06.2024, issued by the second respondent (DGGI), has been confirmed.</div>
<div><b>2. </b>The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 is not applicable to the facts of the case. It is submitted that the petitioner had bonafidely adopted the classification under S.No. 234 of the First Schedule to Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) (taxed at 5%, later revised to 12%) regarding maintenance charges for wind-operated electricity generators. The Revenue&#8217;s allegation that the petitioner suppressed facts to avoid a higher rate under S.No. 135 of the Fourth Schedule (taxed at 14% CGST) is without merit, as the issue arises out of a bona fide interpretation of the classification entries.</div>
<div><b>3. </b>Adverting to the issue of jurisdiction, the learned Senior Counsel would draw the attention of this Court to Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax as amended by Notification No. 02/2022 dated 11.03.2022 and further amended by Notification No. 27/2024 dated 25.11.2024.</div>
<div><b>4. </b>It is submitted that by virtue of the latest amendment, for notices issued by the DGGI, only an officer in the rank of Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner is competent to pass the adjudication order whereas in the present case, the impugned order has been passed by the Assistant Commissioner of GST &amp; Central Excise, who lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate notices issued by the second respondent.</div>
<div><b>5. </b>The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on the judgment of this Court in <i>Titan Company Ltd. </i>v. <i>Joint Commissioner of GST &amp; Central Excise</i> (<span class="researchdochighlight">Madras</span>)/(W.P. No. 33164 of 2023), wherein it was categorically held that the authorities cannot bunch multiple assessment years or pass composite orders in a manner that bypasses the individual limitation periods prescribed under the Act.</div>
<div><b>6. </b>Per contra, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondents would submit that the classification issue is a matter of fact to be adjudicated by the Appellate Authority under Section 107 and cannot be entertained in summary proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On jurisdiction, he would refer to the parent Notification No. 02/2017 to argue that the Assistant Commissioner remains a &#8220;proper officer&#8221; for adjudication and that subsequent notifications only expanded the powers of higher-ranking officers without divesting the first respondent of his authority.</div>
<div><b>7. </b>Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax dated 19.06.2017 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3 read with Section 5 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and Section 3 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. By virtue of the said notification, the Central Board of Excise and Customs appointed the officers specified therein as &#8220;proper officers&#8221; and designated the Central Tax Officers subordinate to them, vesting them with all powers under the said Acts and the Rules framed thereunder, in respect of the jurisdiction specified in the table appended thereto, as follows:</div>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">&#8220;(<i>a</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Principal Chief Commissioners of Central Tax and Principal Directors General of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>b</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Chief Commissioners of Central Tax and Directors General of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>c</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Principal Commissioners of Central Tax and Principal Additional Directors General of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>d</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Commissioners of Central Tax and Additional Directors General of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>e</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Additional Commissioners of Central Tax and Additional Directors of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>f</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Joint Commissioners of Central Tax and Joint Directors of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>g</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Deputy Commissioners of Central Tax and Deputy Directors of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>h</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Assistant Commissioners of Central Tax and Assistant Directors of Central Tax,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>i</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Commissioners of Central Tax (Audit),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>j</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Commissioners of Central Tax (Appeals),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<table class="list">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td class="list" align="right" valign="top">(<i>k</i>)</td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top"></td>
<td class="list" align="justify" valign="top">Additional Commissioners of Central Tax (Appeals)&#8221;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div><b>8. </b>At the time of issuance of the above notification, there were four tables appended to it, as detailed below:-</div>
<table class="allborder" width="100%">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><i>Table No.</i></td>
<td valign="top"><i>Heading</i></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">1.</td>
<td valign="top">Clause 2 &#8211; The Principal Chief Commissioners of Central Tax or the Chief Commissioners of Central Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">2.</td>
<td valign="top">Clause 3 &#8211; The principal Commissioners of Central Tax or the Commissioners of Central Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">3.</td>
<td valign="top">Clause 4 &#8211; The Commissioners of Central Tax (Appeals) and Additional Commissioners of Central Tax (Appeals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">4.</td>
<td valign="top">Clause 5 &#8211; The Commissioners of Central Tax (Audit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div><b>9. </b>Subsequently, the said notification was amended by Notification No.2/2022 &#8211; Central Tax dated 11.03.2022, whereby Clause 3A and Table V were inserted. By virtue of Clause 3A, inserted through the aforesaid amending notification, the Additional Commissioners or Joint Commissioners of Central Tax, subordinate to the Principal Commissioners of Central Tax or Commissioners of Central Tax, were vested with the powers specified in the corresponding entry under Column (3) of Table V.</div>
<div><b>10. </b>Table V, as extracted from the amending notification, reads as follows:-</div>
<div><i>TABLE V</i></div>
<div>Powers of Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner of Central Tax for passing an order or decision in respect of notices issued by the officers of Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence.</div>
<table class="allborder" width="100%">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><i>Sl. No.</i></td>
<td valign="top"><i>Principal Commissioner or Commissioner of Central Tax</i></td>
<td valign="top"><i>Powers (Exercisable throughout the territory of India)</i></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top"><i>(1)</i></td>
<td valign="top"><i>(2)</i></td>
<td valign="top"><i>(3)</i></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">1.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Ahmedabad South</td>
<td rowspan="10">Passing an order or decision in respect of notices issued by the officers of Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence under Sections 67, 73, 74, 76, 122, 125, 127, 129 and 130 of Central Goods and Services Tax Act 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">2.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Bhopal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">3.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Chandigarh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">4.</td>
<td valign="top">Commissioner Chennai South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">5.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Delhi North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">6.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Guwahati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">7.</td>
<td valign="top">Commissioner Rangareddy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">8.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Kolkata North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">9.</td>
<td valign="top">Principal Commissioner Lucknow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top">10.</td>
<td valign="top">Commissioner Thane</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div><b>11. </b>Thus, in respect of notices issued by officers of the Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence (DGGI), namely the second respondent herein, only the Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner of Central Tax has been notified / designated to pass orders.</div>
<div><b>12. </b>However, the impugned Order-in-Original No.1/2024-GST dated 16.01.2025 has been passed by the first respondent, which is clearly contrary to Notification No.2/2022 &#8211; Central Tax dated 11.03.2022. Therefore, the impugned order suffers from procedural irregularity and has been passed in violation of the aforesaid notification.</div>
<div><b>13. </b>Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and accordingly, the same is quashed and the case is remitted back to pass a fresh order by any competent authority as per Notification No. 02/2017-Central Tax dated 19.06.2017 modified by Notification No. 27/2024 dated 25.11.2024 on merits and in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, in terms of the aforesaid notification and by exercising jurisdiction thereunder.</div>
<div><b>14. </b>Needless to state, before passing the final order, an opportunity of hearing shall be afforded to the petitioner.</div>
<div><b>15. </b>This Writ Petition stands disposed of with the above observations. No costs. Connected Writ Miscellaneous Petition is closed.</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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