Writ petition is dismissed as an alternate efficacious statutory appeal exists for challenging reasoned GST evasion orders.

By | May 28, 2026
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Writ petition is dismissed as an alternate efficacious statutory appeal exists for challenging reasoned GST evasion orders.

Issue

  • Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained to challenge a reasoned GST adjudication order when an alternate, efficacious statutory appeal is available under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

  • Whether the DGGI and CGST officers have the valid legal jurisdiction to act as “proper officers” for conducting searches, issuing Show Cause Notices (SCN), and passing adjudication orders.

  • Whether the vires (legal validity) of Board Circulars governing officer jurisdiction can be entertained in a writ proceeding without clear, particularized grounds of constitutional infirmity.

Facts

  • Search and Seizure: A search and seizure operation conducted by the DGGI Siliguri on the petitioners’ business premises and directors’ residences unearthed incriminating unaccounted hand-written cash books, party-wise cash ledgers, and loose slips.

  • Tax Evasion Uncovered: The seized records indicated a massive tax evasion of approximately Rs. 1.90 crores, showing that the petitioners were making business supplies without issuing statutory invoices or transit documents.

  • Adjudication Order: Following the investigation, a Show Cause Notice (SCN) was issued. The petitioners filed a reply and were granted a personal hearing, culminating in an elaborate and reasoned adjudication order dated December 3, 2025, which imposed tax, interest, and penalties under Section 74.

  • Writ Jurisdiction Invoked: Instead of filing a statutory appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act, the petitioners directly approached the High Court via a writ petition under Article 226, challenging the jurisdiction of the officers and the validity of various Board Circulars (dated 2017, 2018, and 2022).

  • Arguments Advanced: The petitioners contended that the DGGI/CGST officers were not “proper officers” and that an officer different from the SCN-issuing authority could not legally adjudicate the matter. However, they did not advance oral arguments to support their constitutional challenge against the circulars, nor did they meaningfully dispute the factual findings of evasion.

Decision

  • Writ Dismissed due to Alternate Remedy: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that since an alternate and efficacious statutory appellate remedy was readily available, there were no exceptional circumstances present to warrant bypassing it.

  • Jurisdiction Upheld: The Court held that the jurisdictional objections lacked merit even prima facie. Under Notification No. 14/2017-Central Tax and statutory board assignments, DGGI and CGST officers are fully empowered to function as proper officers for search, investigation, and adjudication.

  • Vires Challenge Rejected: The Court rejected the challenge to the Board Circulars, observing that a challenge to the vires of a provision requires a strong prima facie case with particularized grounds, none of which were established by the petitioners.

  • Liberty to Appeal: The Court dismissed the petition without adjudicating the tax dispute on its merits, granting the petitioners the liberty to pursue their statutory appeal before the appropriate appellate authority.

Key Takeaways

  • Statutory Remedies Take Precedence: Writ courts will generally refuse to entertain challenges against detailed, reasoned tax adjudication orders if the taxpayer attempts to bypass the standard statutory appellate channel (Section 107) without establishing extraordinary exceptions.

  • Validity of DGGI Jurisdiction: Central tax notifications and Board assignments validly empower DGGI and CGST intelligence officers as “proper officers.” Their jurisdiction to investigate, issue SCNs, and adjudicate cannot be casually brushed aside using general procedural objections.

  • Strict Burden on Constitutional Challenges: Plenary challenges to the validity of administrative circulars or statutory notifications cannot rest on vague pleadings. Taxpayers must present robust, prima facie evidence of constitutional infirmity at the very earliest opportunity to invite judicial review under Article 226.

HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
NE Ferro and Alloys (P.) Ltd.
v.
Union of India*
Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.
WPA No. 552 of 2026
APRIL  28, 2026
Arijit Chakraborty and Ms. Esha Acharya, Advs. for the Petitioner. Dilip Kumar Agarwal, Bishwa Raj Agarwal, Ms. Rima Sarkar, Advs. and Joyjit Choudhury, Ld. AAG for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 3 December, 2025 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, CGST and CX, Siliguri Division in a proceeding initiated under section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017.
2. Briefly, pursuant to an investigation conducted by the Siliguri Zonal Unit of the Directorate General of GST Intelligence, (DGGI) under section 67(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, diverse premises of the petitioners as well the residence of the directors were raided. Upon such raids being conducted, incriminating documents including hand-written cash books (Rokas) were found. The statements of concerned persons were also recorded under section 70 of the Act. Based on such seizures it was found that goods were allegedly purchased from Expandable Enterprise Private Limited and transported through M/s. Ravi Transport Service. Upon further enquiries, the fact of transportation was categorically denied by the transporter M/s. Ravi Transport Service. In this background, after conducting necessary inquiries and based on available records, it was concluded that the petitioners had availed of Input Cash Credit without any actual movement of goods and were liable to pay CGST.
3. Pursuant to the above, a show-cause notice dated 29 March, 2023 was issued under section 74 of the Act. The petitioners availed of their opportunity of hearing and participated in the proceedings and ultimately an order dated 3 December, 2025 imposing a demand of GST, penalty and interest was passed.
4. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the petitioners instead of availing of their statutory remedy of appeal under section 107 of the CGST Act, filed this writ petition not only challenging the order dated 3 December, 2025 but also challenging the Circulars dated 26 June, 2017, 5 July, 2017, 9 February, 2018, 12 March, 2022 respectively.
5. The main grievance of the petitioners is that in view of the Circular dated 23 June, 2017 read with the Circular dated 5 July, 2017, there is no jurisdiction under sections 73(1), 74(1) and sections 73(9) and 74(9) of the Act which could have been exercised by the Officer in the same case. In addition, there was also a question of jurisdiction which has been raised insofar as assignment of functions of the Officers are concerned. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a show-cause notice issued by one Authority cannot be adjudicated by a different Officer and that the Officers of the DCGI were not the proper officers under the framework of the Act. Insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, save and except a bald denial the petitioners did not advance any arguments on the merits. In support of such contentions, the petitioners also relied on an unreported decision dated 21 December, 2024 passed in Northern East Water Tank Manufacturing Private Limited. v. Union of India [MAT No. 1 of 2024] by the High Court at Calcutta.
6. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that the petitioners have an available statutory alterative remedy under section 107 of the Act and should exhaust the same before approaching the Writ Court. There are no exceptional grounds as to why the statutory remedy of appeal should be bypassed. Insofar as the challenge to the different Circulars are concerned, it is submitted that in view of the decisions in AKA Logistics (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India  (Jharkhand)/2024 ITL (GST) 2767 and Yasho Industries Ltd. v. Union of India  (Gujarat)/2021 ITL (GST) 507, there are no grounds of challenge.
7. At the outset, insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, the petitioners did not raise any objections to the findings of the Adjudicating Authority. The facts of the case demonstrate that not only were search and seizure operations conducted by the GST officials but diverse incriminating materials in the form of unaccounted cash books of daily cash sheets (rokad), hand written partywise cash ledgers, loose slips and other incriminating documents had been seized. In almost all cases, the goods had been supplied without cover of statutory transit documents, namely, invoices etc. It was thus evident that the sole intent of the petitioners was to evade tax. The total value of GST evasion was to the extent of Rs.1,90,53,714/- and the petitioners were found to be in contravention of the Act.
8. Pursuant to the above, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioners. The petitioners replied to the demand-cum-show-cause notice. A personal hearing was also granted to the petitioners. In this background, the impugned order dated 3 December, 2025 was passed which is elaborately reasoned and deals with all the issues raised by the parties.
9. There is no merit even prima facie on the aspect of jurisdiction raised by the petitioners. In Aka Logistics Private Limited (supra), a Division Bench of the High Court at Jharkhand had on a similar question of jurisdiction raised by the petitioners held as follows:
“49. The notification dated 01st July, 2017 and 09th February, 2018 thus confers power upon the Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax or Additional Director General, Audit to act as Commissioner and the Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax or Deputy/Assistant Director, Audit to act as Deputy Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner as would be evident from the tabular chart but the aforesaid distinguishable fact as per the discussion made of the factual aspect in the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Sayed Ali and Anr. (supra) is not available, therefore, this Court is of the view that by virtue of the power exercised by the Board under Section 5 of the Act, 2017, a notification has been issued conferring power upon the Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax or Additional Director General, Audit to act as a Commissioner and the Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax or Deputy/Assistant Director, Audit to act as Deputy Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner and as such, it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioners to take the ground that the Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax or Additional Director General, Audit and the Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax or Deputy/Assistant Director, Audit are having no power to initiate a proceeding under the Act, 2017.
50. This Court, therefore, is of the view based upon the aforesaid discussion that the ground which has been taken by the petitioner to quash the show cause notices due to want of jurisdiction is having no substance.
51. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Additional Director General, Goods and Services Tax or Additional Director General, Audit and the Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax Intelligence or Deputy/Assistant Director, Goods and Services Tax or Deputy/Assistant Director, Audit are having jurisdiction to issue show cause notices.”
10. Similarly, in Yasho Industries Limited(supra), a Division Bench of the High Court at Gujarat has also held as follows:
“13. From the bare reading of section 70 of the CGST Act, it clearly emerges that the proper officer has the power to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce the documents in any inquiry in the same manner in the case of a Civil Court under the CPC. Now, as per the definition of ‘proper officer as contained in section 2(91), a ‘proper officer’ in relation to any function to be performed under the CGST Act means the Commissioner or the officer of the Central Tax, who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board. It is pertinent to note that as stated in the petition itself, the respondent No. 3 is an officer of Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence (DGGI) holding the designation of Senior Intelligence Officer, who was appointed as the Central Tax Officer with all the powers under the CGST Act and IGST Act and the Rules made thereunder, as are exercisable by the Central Tax Officers of the corresponding rank of Superintendent as specified in the Notification No. 14 of 2017-CT dated 1-7-2017 issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs. It is further pertinent to note that the respondent No. 3 being the officer of the Central Tax and the Superintendent under the CGST Act by virtue of the said Notification dated 1-7-2017, he was also assigned the powers of proper officer by the Board vide Circular dated 5-7-2017 issued in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (91) of section 2 of the CGST Act read with section 20 of the IGST Act. Therefore, the respondent No. 3 is a proper officer in relation to the function to be performed under the CGST Act as contemplated under section 2(91), and as such, was entitled to issue summons under section 70 of the CGST Act in connection with the inquiry initiated against the petitioner.
14. The submission of Mr. Rastogi that the said assignment of function has to be by way of Notification and not by way of Circular in view of section 167 of the CGST Act is thoroughly misplaced. Section 167 of the CGST Act pertains to the delegation of powers by the Commissioner exercisable by any authority or officer under the Act to be exercisable also by another authority or officer as may be specified in the Notification. So far as section 2(91) is concerned, it pertains to the proper officer in relation to any function to be performed under the CGST Act to be the Commissioner or the officer of Central Tax, who is assigned that function by the Commissioner in the Board. Here the Board means the “Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs” as defined in section 2(16) of the CGST Act. Vide the Circular dated 5-7-2017 the said Board namely the Central Board of Excise and Customs in exercise of the powers conferred by section 2(91) of the CGST Act read with section 20 of the IGST Act and subject to section 5(2) of the CGST Act has assigned the officers the functions as that of proper officers in relation to the various Sections of the CGST Act and the Rules made thereunder, and as such the Superintendent of Central Tax has been assigned the function of section 70(1) of the CGST Act. Thus, there being no delegation of powers by the Commissioner, the provisions contained in section 167 of the CGST Act could not be said to have been attracted, nor was there any necessity to issue Notification as sought to be submitted by Mr. Rastogi. There could not be any disagreement to the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Canon India (P.) Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the learned Advocate Mr. Rastogi that when a statute directs that the things to be done in a certain way, it must be done in that way alone. However, in the instant case, the Board has assigned the officers to perform the function as proper officers in relation to various Sections of CGST Act and the Rules made thereunder by issuing the Circular in question, the question of issuing Notification for delegation of powers by the Commissioner as contemplated under section 167 of the CGST Act does not arise. Mr. Rastogi appears to have misread the powers of the Board to assign the officers to perform the function as proper officers in relation to the various Sections of the CGST Act, as the delegation of powers by the Commissioner to the other authority or the officer as contemplated in section 167 of the CGST Act. The Court, therefore, does not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Rastogi that the respondent No. 3 was not the ‘proper officer’ as per the definition contained in section 2(91) of the CGST Act, and therefore, had no powers to issue summons under section 70 of the CGST Act.
15. The Court also does not find any force in the submission made by Mr. Rastogi that two parallel proceedings in connection with the same issue were not sustainable. It may be noted that the communication dated 11-11-2020 was issued by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Kolkata Zonal Unit, requesting the office of the petitioner at Mumbai to furnish details of the imports and exports during the period from 23-10-2017 till the date in the prescribed proforma was in relation to the inquiry in connection with the incorrect availment of double benefits i.e. exemption of IGST on the input material imported under Advance Authorization/EOU Scheme and refund of IGST paid of goods imported, whereas the respondent No. 3 has issued summons to the petitioner at Vapi in relation to the inquiry in connection with the refund of ITC under the CGST Act. It is needless to say that the proceedings of issuing summons under section 70 of the CGST Act are the proceedings of judicial nature and the petitioners are bound to respect the same, and cooperate with the inquiry. As such, no prejudice is going to be caused to the petitioners if the statement is tendered or the documents are produced as required by the respondent No. 3.”
11. In addition, by a Notification bearing no.14/2017 dated 1 July, 2017, the Central Board of Excise and Customs, Ministry of Finance, has enumerated powers to be exercised by the Central Tax Officers. The said Notification has also been relied on in the impugned order. The stalling of the proceedings and bypassing the statutory mandate causes serious loss, prejudice and damage to the extent that it emasculates the object of the Act. Then again, there is an added reason to avoid payment of the mandatory statutory deposit when preferring an appeal which such litigants intend to avoid.
12. In this context, the decision cited on behalf of the petitioners in Northern East Water Tank Manufacturing Private Limited (supra) is distinguishable. In the said decision, the Notification dated 1 July, 2017 bearing no.14/2017 was not even considered. In any event, the question of jurisdiction has also been dealt with on merits in the impugned order and rejected.
13. Insofar as the challenge in the pleadings no oral submissions to the vires of the Circulars are concerned, it is well settled that any challenge to the vires is to be made at the earliest point of time. In P.G.F. Ltd. v. Union of India  (SC)/[2014] 125 SCL 243 (SC)/(2015) 13 SCC 50 it has been held as follows:
37. The Court can, in the first instance, examine whether there is a prima facie strong ground made out in order to examine the vires of the provisions raised in the writ petition. The Court can also note whether such challenge is made at the earliest point of time when the statute came to be introduced or any provision was brought into the statute book or any long time-gap exists as between the date of the enactment and the date when the challenge is made. It should also be noted as to whether the grounds of challenge based on the facts pleaded and the implication of the provision really has any nexus apart from the grounds of challenge made. With reference to those relevant provisions, the Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation. The Court should also examine the extent of financial implications by virtue of the operation of the provision vis-a-vis the State and alleged extent of sufferance by the person who seeks to challenge based on the alleged invalidity of the provision with particular reference to the vires made. Even if the writ court is of the view that the challenge raised requires to be considered, then again it will have to be examined, while entertaining the challenge raised for consideration, whether it calls for prevention of the operation of the provision in the larger interest of the public. We have only attempted to set out some of the basic considerations to be borne in mind by the writ court and the same is not exhaustive. In other words, the writ court should examine such other grounds on the above lines for consideration while considering a challenge on the ground of vires to a statute or the provision of law made before it for the purpose of entertaining the same as well as for granting any interim relief during the pendency of such writ petitions. For the above stated reasons it is also imperative that when such writ petitions are entertained, the same should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and on a time-bound basis, so that the legal position is settled one way or the other.
38. Keeping the above factors relating to the constitutional challenge to a provision of law made in mind, we proceed to examine the challenge made by PGF Ltd. to Section 11 -AA of the SEBI Act. In fact, the challenge to the provision was twofold. The main contention of PGF Ltd. was that since indisputably the business of PGF Ltd. was sale and development of agricultural land, the same would be governed by Entry 18 of List II, namely, the State subject and, therefore, the Central legislation brought about by Parliament in introducing Section 11 -AA of the SEBI Act cannot be sustained. It was alternatively contended that even assuming that the section can be held to be valid, inasmuch as the business is solely sale and development of agricultural land again falling under Entry 18 of List II Section 11 -AA it can be read down to the effect that the said provision will have no application to the business activity of PGF Ltd.
14. More recently, in Pravinsinh Hmatsinh Zala v. State of Gujarat 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 3280 it has been held as follows:
31.The principles of law as discernible from the above may be summarized as under;
(a) The Writ Court should consider whether a prima facie strong ground has been made out by the writ applicants in order to examine the vires of the provisions questioned in the writ petition.
(b) The Writ Court should also consider whether such challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions raised in the writ petition has been made at the earliest point of time when the statute came to be introduced or any provision was brought into the statute book. The Court owes a duty to consider whether any long time-gap exists as between the date of the enactment and the date when the challenge is made.
(c) The Writ Court should also consider whether the grounds of challenge based on the facts pleaded and the implication of the provision really has any nexus apart from the grounds of challenge made.
(d) With reference to the relevant provisions, the Writ Court should be conscious of the position as to the extent of public interest involved when the provision operates the field as against the prevention of such operation.
(e) The Writ Court should also examine the extent of financial implications, if any, by virtue of the operation of the provision vis-avis the State and the alleged extent of sufferance by the person who seeks to challenge based on the alleged invalidity of the provision with particular reference to the vires made.
(f) Even if the Writ Court is of the opinion that the challenge deserves to be considered, then., again, it should be examined while entertaining the challenge raised for consideration, whether it calls for prevention of the operation of the provision in the larger interest of the public.
In the light of the above decisions, there is no prima facie case insofar as the challenge of vires is concerned. In such circumstances, there is no case made out for avoiding of the statutory remedy. The facts of the case reveal that diverse incriminating materials were found on the basis of search and seizure operations carried out by the respondent authorities which also disentitles the petitioner to any discretion being exercised in their favour.
15. In the light of the statutory alternative remedy of appeal under section 107 of the Act, the petitioners have been unable to make out any grounds as to why this Court should entertain the writ petition. It is true that there are exceptional circumstances as laid down in a catena of decisions, i.e., Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1999 SC 22, Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata v. Vijay Kumar Arya 2009 SCC OnLine CAL 266; Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer – Cum- Assessing Authority 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95 which have held that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar in entertaining a writ petition. Nevertheless, the petitioners have been unable to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances as to why the Writ Court should entertain the petition.
16. In view of the above, the writ petition WPA/552/2026 is dismissed. It is made clear that there has been no final adjudication on the merits of the case and the petitioners are at liberty to avail of its remedy of statutory appeal in accordance with law, if so advised.
Category: GST