Reassessment under Section 150(1) is invalid without specific Tribunal directions and if independently time-barred.

By | July 16, 2026
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Reassessment under Section 150(1) is invalid without specific Tribunal directions and if independently time-barred.

Issue

Whether the Assessing Officer can validly invoke Section 150(1) to reopen a time-barred assessment for AY 2008-09 based on a Tribunal order from a preceding year that merely quashed a reassessment without giving explicit findings or directions, and whether such reopening is independently barred by the limitation constraints of Section 150(2).

Facts

  • The assessee, an individual co-owner of a plot of land, entered into a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) with a developer on March 29, 2007, in exchange for a share of the constructed area.

  • For the assessment year 2007-08, the Assessing Officer (AO) reopened the assessment and taxed the capital gains, operating on the premise that the JDA execution date constituted a transfer under Section 2(47).

  • The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) subsequently quashed that reassessment for AY 2007-08, ruling the reopening invalid because the actual conversion of the land occurred during the subsequent financial period, corresponding to AY 2008-09.

  • Relying on the Tribunal’s observations as a functional “finding or direction” under Section 150(1), the AO recorded reasons and issued a fresh notice under Section 148 on March 19, 2018, to reopen the assessment for AY 2008-09.

  • The assessee strongly objected to the proceedings, asserting that the Tribunal did not issue any explicit directions under Section 150(1) and that the notice was heavily time-barred under the regular limitation windows.

Decision

  • Held, yes: The issue was decided entirely in favor of the assessee, and the impugned Section 148 notice as well as the consequential reassessment were declared void ab initio.

  • Absence of Finding or Direction: The court held that the Tribunal’s order for AY 2007-08 merely deleted an addition on merits and did not contain a categorical, binding “finding” or “direction” requiring the AO to tax the income in another year within the meaning of Section 150(1).

  • Want of Jurisdiction: Because the foundational order lacked clear operational directions, the invocation of Section 150(1) by the AO to bypass regular time limits for reopening AY 2008-09 was entirely without jurisdiction.

  • Barred by Section 150(2): The court ruled that the reopening was independently unsustainable because the statutory limitation under Section 149 for AY 2008-09 had already expired on March 31, 2015; therefore, no reassessment could legally have been initiated on the date the initial appellate authority (CIT(A)) passed its order on February 2, 2017.

Key Takeaways

  • Strict Construction of Section 150(1): A casual observation, logical inference, or finding of fact by an appellate forum regarding the correct assessment year of an income stream does not automatically qualify as a statutory “direction” to reopen that other year.

  • The Protection of Section 150(2): Section 150(1) cannot resurrect a dead claim if the target assessment year was already time-barred under Section 149 at the time the order forming the subject matter of the appeal was originally passed.

  • Limitation Shield Safeguarded: Tax authorities cannot use the relief-granting orders of appellate tribunals to indefinitely extend assessment windows or circumvent the statutory deadlines designed to provide finality to tax liability.

IN THE ITAT BANGALORE BENCH ‘B’
Sonnenahalli Venkataramanappa Narayana Swamy
v.
Income-tax Officer
Keshav Dubey, Judicial Member
and Waseem Ahmed, Accountant Member
IT Appeal No. 1825 (Bang.) of 2025
[Assessment year 2008-09]
JUNE  11, 2026
Hemasunder Rao P. and Rahu Modi, CAs for the Appellant. Madhav Nansaheb Deshmukh, Addl. CIT (DR) for the Respondent.
ORDER
Waseem Ahmed, Accountant Member. – The present appeal filed by the assessee pertaining to A.Y. 200809 is directed against the order of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) (hereafter- the learned CIT(A)) under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereafter- the Act) vide order dated 30/06/2025.
2. The assessee has multiple grounds of appeal challenging the validity of reopening the assessment as well as grounds on the merit of the addition. First, we proceed to deal with the legal ground challenging the validity of the reopening of the assessment.
3. The necessary facts are that the assessee along with his brother was the owner of the land property. For the impugned land property, the assessee entered into joint development agreement as on 29th March 2007 with developer. In lieu of transfer of land property under the JDA the assessee was to get certain portion of constructed area in the developed property. In view of the JDA, the assessment of the assessee for A.Y. 2007-08 was reopened on premise that as per the provision of section 2(47) of the Act transfers of land under the JDA was completed on the date of JDA itself. Accordingly, the assessment order under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act was made for the A.Y. 2007-08 vide order dated 23rd March 2015 and capital gain was brought to tax making addition to the total income.
4. The assessee filed appeal before the learned CIT(A) against the assessment framed for A.Y. 2007-08. The learned CIT(A) vide order dated 02nd February 2017 dismissed the assessee’s appeal and confirmed the finding of the AO.
4.1 Against the learned CIT(A) order dated 02nd February 2017, the assessee filed subsequent appeal before the Tribunal in Dr. S. V. Narayanaswamy v. ITO [IT Appeal No. 724 (Bang.) of 2017, dated 21-11-2017]. The Tribunal vide order dated 21st November 2017 held that the reopening of the assessment for the A.Y. 2007-08 is not valid for the reason that the transfer of the land under the dispute was not completed during the impugned assessment year. The Bench noted that as per para 12.3 of the JDA, the landowner (assessee) required to give possession of schedule property in duly converted condition i.e. from agricultural to non-agricultural condition. The scheduled property was converted into NA property as on 04-02-2008 which was subsequent to the A.Y. 2007-08. Accordingly, it was held that the reason recorded for reopening for A.Y. 2007-08 was not valid and thereby the assessment order under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 was quashed. The relevant finding of the Bench of Tribunal reads as follows:
4. We have considered the rival submissions. We find that as per the Para 12.3 of JDA, the land owner has to render schedule property to the developer in duly converted conditions from the earlier agricultural to Non agricultural residential use from the competent authority and we also find that the conversion has taken place on 04.02.2008. In the light of these facts of the present case, we examine the applicability of the tribunal order rendered in the case of Smt. Lokamma & others v. DCIT (supra) in which one of us i.e. the J.M. is the author. For ready reference, we reproduce Para 6 of this tribunal order. This reads as under:-
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5. In the present case, notice u/s 148 was issued by the A.O. on 27.03.2014 and as per the summary ofreasons noted by the A.O. in Para 2 ofthe assessment order, there is no mention that the land in question is a converted land. In fact, in the entire assessment order or in the order of CIT (A), there is no reference to this aspect that the land in question is a converted land or not in the present year in spite of the fact that as per the JDA, this was a specific obligation of the assessee being land owner that he has to render schedule property to the developer in duly converted conditions from the earlier agricultural to Non agricultural residential use from the competent authority. Learned DR of the revenue has submitted before us the copy of Form for recording of reasons for initiating proceedings u/s 148 for obtaining approval of the Commissioner/Addl. Commissioner of Income tax along with Annexure there of containing reasons and in that also, there is no mention about conversion of land. As per the Official Memorandum dated 04.02.2008 brought on record before us by way of additional evidence, the conversion of land in the present case has taken place on 04.02.2008. Hence, this tribunal order is squarely applicable in the present case and the judgment of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court rendered in the case of CIT v. Dr.T. K. Dayalu (supra) was duly considered by the tribunal in this case. Hence, respectfully following this tribunal order, we hold that reopening in the present case is not valid because the same is without application of mind on the crucial fact of conversion of agriculture land to non agriculture land on subsequent date not falling in the present assessment year and hence, it does not constitute a tangible material to form a belief that the income has escaped assessment for the present year. Accordingly, we hold that the reopening is not valid and consequential assessment is quashed.
4.2 The AO considered the above finding of the Tribunal for A.Y. 200708 as finding or direction as per section 150(1) of the Act, for reopening of assessment for A.Y. 2008-09 i.e. year under dispute before us. Accordingly, the AO recorded reason to believe and issued notice under section 148 of the Act as on 19th March 2018.
4.3 The assessee objected the reopening of the assessment for the A.Y. 2008-09 by contending that the Tribunal order for A.Y. 2007-08 does not contain any finding or direction for invoking the provision of section 150(1) of the Act. The Hon’ble Tribunal only observed that the transfer under section 2(47) of the Act did not get complete in the year relevant to A.Y. 2007-08 and the reason recorded for the A.Y. 2007-08 was without application of mind. Accordingly, the assessee contended that provision of section 150 of the Act cannot be invoked in the present case for reopening the assessment for the year under dispute. Furthermore, the notice issued under section 148 of the Act for the year under dispute is time barred.
4.4 However, the objection filed by the assessee was dismissed by the AO vide separate order. Thereafter, the assessment under section 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act was framed vide order dated 28th December 2018 wherein addition of capital gain of Rs. 3,24,25,254/- was made to the total income of the assessee.
5. The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before the learned CIT(A) challenging the validity of the notice issued under section 148 of the Act for the year under dispute (A.Y. 2008-09) on several ground including on the ground of limitation and on the ground of wrongly invoking the provision of section 150 of the Act. However, the learned CIT(A) dismissed the assessee’s ground and confirmed the order of the AO.
6. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned CIT(A), the assessee is in appeal before us.
7. The learned AR before us submitted that the notice issued under section 148 r.w.s. 150 of the Act for AY 2008-09 is barred by limitation and consequently the reassessment proceedings are void ab initio.
7.1 The learned AR drew our attention to the provisions of section 150(1) and section 150(2) of the Act and submitted that though section 150(1) permits issuance of notice under section 148 at any time for giving effect to a finding or direction contained in an appellate order, such power is expressly restricted by section 150(2) of the Act. It was contended that section 150(1) of the Act cannot be read in isolation and has to be read harmoniously with section 150(2), which places a statutory embargo on reopening assessments that had already become time-barred on the relevant date.
7.2 The learned AR submitted that the alleged finding or direction relied upon by the AO emanates from the order of the Tribunal passed for AY 2007-08 on 21.11.2017. Pursuant thereto, the AO sought to reopen the assessment for AY 2008-09 by issuing notice under section 148 on 19.03.2018.
7.3 It was contended that under the provisions of section 149 as applicable at the relevant point of time, the maximum period available for reopening AY 2008-09 was six years from the end of the relevant assessment year, which expired on 31.03.2015. Therefore, on the date when the Tribunal passed the order on 21.11.2017, the assessment for AY 2008-09 had already attained finality and had become barred by limitation.
7.4 The learned AR further submitted that even if the date of the order of the learned CIT(A), being 02.02.2017, is taken as the relevant date for the purpose of section 150(2) of the Act, the position remains unchanged because on that date also the limitation period for reopening AY 2008-09 had already expired on 31.03.2015. Therefore, by virtue of section 150(2) of the Act, the provisions of section 150(1) could not be invoked for reopening the assessment.
7.5 The learned AR argued that section 150 does not confer power upon the Revenue to revive a dead or time-barred assessment. The provision merely removes the limitation prescribed under section 149 in cases where the assessment sought to be reopened was otherwise alive on the date of the appellate or revisionary order. Once the assessment had become time-barred, section 150(2) prohibits any reopening notwithstanding the existence of a finding or direction in an appellate order.
7.6 In support of the above proposition, reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.M. Sharma v. ITO  254 ITR 772 (SC), wherein it was held that section 150(2) restricts the operation of section 150(1) of the Act and does not permit reopening of assessments which had already become final on account of expiry of limitation prescribed under section 149 of the Act.
7.7 The learned AR also relied on the various other case laws including the decision of Jaipur Tribunal in the case of Ramesh Chand Soni (HUF) v. ITO  (Jaipur – Trib.), wherein it has been consistently held that section 150(2) acts as a complete bar against reopening of assessments which had already attained finality under the law of limitation. Accordingly, the learned AR submitted that since the limitation for reopening AY 2008-09 had expired on 31.03.2015, much prior to the appellate orders relied upon by the Revenue, the notice issued under section 148 of the Act on 19.03.2018 is barred by limitation in view of section 150(2) of the Act and, therefore, the reassessment proceedings deserve to be quashed as being without jurisdiction and invalid in law.
7.8 Furthermore, the learned AR submitted that the very foundation for invoking section 150 of the Act is absent in the present case, as the order of the Hon’ble Tribunal for AY 2007-08 does not contain any specific “finding” or “direction” for reopening the assessment of AY 2008-09.
7.9 The learned AR submitted that section 150 of the Act provides a limited exception to the normal law of limitation and can be invoked only when there exists a clear, specific and binding finding or direction contained in an appellate order. In the absence of such finding or direction, the provisions of section 150 of the Act cannot be pressed into service to bypass the limitation prescribed under section 149 of the Act.
7.10 Referring to the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ITO v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das [1964] 52 ITR 335 (SC) and Rajinder Nath v. CIT 120 ITR 14 (SC), the learned AR submitted that a “finding” must be one which is necessary for disposal of the appeal before the appellate authority. Any incidental observation, collateral remark or consequential inference cannot be regarded as a finding within the meaning of section 150 of the Act. Likewise, a “direction” must be an express and mandatory command requiring positive action. Mere liberty granted to the Department or a casual observation does not constitute a direction.
7.11 The learned AR submitted that the Tribunal while deciding AY 200708 merely held that the reopening for that year was invalid because the conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land took place on 04.02.2008, which did not fall within the relevant previous year corresponding to AY 2007-08. Consequently, the reassessment for AY 2007-08 was quashed.
7.12 It was argued that nowhere in the order of the Tribunal, any finding/ direction was given to the AO to reopen AY 2008-09. Similarly, the Tribunal did not record any finding that capital gains were chargeable to tax in AY 2008-09. The issue before the Tribunal was confined to the validity of reassessment for AY 2007-08 and not the taxability of income in AY 2008-09.
7.13 The learned AR submitted that the AO has incorrectly interpreted the Tribunal order as containing a finding that “the taxability of LTCG arises in AY 2008-09 and not in AY 2007-08”. Likewise, the learned NFAC erred in observing that the Tribunal had held that the transaction under the JDA was not chargeable in AY 2007-08 and that the appropriate year of taxation would be AY 2008-09. According to the learned AR, neither of these observations find place in the actual order of the Tribunal.
7.14 The learned AR further submitted that the Tribunal’s observation regarding conversion of land on 04.02.2008 was only an incidental factual observation made for deciding whether reassessment for AY 2007-08 was valid. Such observation cannot be elevated to the status of a statutory finding for reopening another assessment year.
7.15 The learned AR argued that a finding capable of invoking section 150 of the Act must be an integral and necessary part of the adjudication. A finding rendered in favour of the assessee, resulting in quashing of reassessment proceedings, cannot ordinarily constitute a finding for reopening another assessment year. In the present case, the entire order of the Tribunal was in favour of the assessee and culminated in quashing the reassessment for AY 2007-08.
7.16 The learned AR further submitted that if the Department’s interpretation is accepted, every incidental observation made in an appellate order could be treated as a finding for reopening assessments of other years, which would defeat the safeguards built into sections 149 and 150 of the Act. Such an interpretation has consistently been rejected by courts.
7.17 Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajinder Nath (supra) and Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra), as well as the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Rakesh N. Dutt v. Asstt. CIT [2009] 311 ITR 247 (Bombay), wherein it was held that only a finding necessary for disposal of the appeal or an express direction can attract section 150 of the Act and not incidental observations or inferences.
7.18 The learned AR further submitted that the order disposing of the assessee’s objections also demonstrates complete non-application of mind. Instead of dealing with the assessee’s specific objection regarding absence of any finding or direction under section 150 of the Act, the AO merely relied upon decisions relating to “reason to believe” under section 147 of the Act. The issue involved in the present case is not existence of reasons to believe but satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements prescribed under section 150 of the Act. Therefore, the objections were rejected mechanically without addressing the real controversy.
7.19 Accordingly, the learned AR submitted that since the order of the Hon’ble Tribunal for AY 2007-08 does not contain any specific finding or direction concerning AY 2008-09, the essential jurisdictional condition for invoking section 150(1) is absent. Consequently, the notice issued under section 148 r.w.s. 150 and the reassessment framed pursuant thereto are without jurisdiction, invalid in law and liable to be quashed.
8. On the contrary, the learned DR submitted that the Tribunal’s order for AY 2007-08 clearly established that the transfer under the JDA did not occur in AY 2007-08 but arose only after conversion of the land on 04.02.2008. Such finding necessarily identified AY 2008-09 as the correct year of taxability. Therefore, reopening under section 150(1) was valid and not hit by limitation.
9. We have carefully considered the rival submissions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record. The primary issue arising for our consideration is whether the reassessment initiated for AY 2008-09 by issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act dated 19.03.2018 could be sustained by invoking the provisions of section 150(1) of the Act on the basis of the order of the Tribunal passed in assessee’s own case for AY 2007-08. The ancillary issue is whether, even assuming the existence of a finding or direction, the reopening is nevertheless barred by virtue of section 150(2) of the Act. At the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of section 150 of the Act:
“150(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 149, the notice under section 148 may be issued at any time for the purpose of making an assessment or reassessment or recomputation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order passed by any authority in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference or revision or by a Court in any proceeding under any other law.
150(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in any case where any such assessment, reassessment or recomputation relates to an assessment year in respect of which an assessment, reassessment or recomputation could not have been made at the time the order which was the subject matter of appeal, reference or revision, as the case may be, was made by reason of any other provision limiting the time within which any action for assessment, reassessment or recomputation may be taken.”
9.1 A plain reading of the above provisions shows that section 150(1) is an exception to the limitation prescribed under section 149 of the Act. However, such exception is not absolute. The Legislature itself has imposed a restriction through section 150(2) of the Act, which acts as a safeguard against revival of assessments that had already become time-barred. Therefore, before invoking section 150(1) of the Act, the Revenue must establish two jurisdictional conditions. Firstly, there must exist a valid “finding” or “direction” contained in an appellate, revisional or judicial order. Secondly, the assessment sought to be reopened should not have already become barred by limitation on the date contemplated under section 150(2) of the Act.
9.2 We shall first examine whether the Tribunal order for AY 2007-08 contains any finding or direction within the meaning of section 150(1) of the Act.
9.3 From the material placed before us, we note that the assessment for AY 2007-08 was reopened on the premise that transfer under the Joint Development Agreement dated 29.03.2007 had taken place during the relevant previous year. The Tribunal while adjudicating the validity of such reopening examined clause 12.3 of the JDA and noted that the land-owner was required to hand over the property after conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The Tribunal further noted that such conversion had admittedly taken place only on 04.02.2008. On these facts, the Tribunal held that the reopening for AY 2007-08 was without application of mind and that no tangible material existed to form a belief that income had escaped assessment in that year. Consequently, the reassessment for AY 2007-08 was quashed.
9.4 Thus, the entire controversy before the Tribunal in AY 2007-08 was confined to the validity of reopening for that year. The Tribunal neither adjudicated nor was called upon to adjudicate the taxability of capital gains in AY 2008-09. The Tribunal merely held that the conversion of land had taken place on 04.02.2008 and, therefore, the reasons recorded for reopening AY 2007-08 were factually incorrect. Beyond this, no determination was made regarding the assessment year in which the alleged capital gains were chargeable to tax.
9.5 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra) has held that a finding for the purpose of section 150 of the Act must be one which is necessary for disposal of the appeal. Similarly, in Rajinder Nath (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the expressions “finding” and “direction” have a limited meaning. A finding must be directly involved in the disposal of the case, and a direction must be an express mandate requiring positive compliance. Incidental observations, collateral remarks or inferences do not constitute a finding or direction. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts before us, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the stand of the Revenue that the Tribunal had recorded a finding that the capital gains were taxable in AY 2008-09. No such finding can be found in the operative portion or reasoning of the Tribunal order. Equally, there is no direction requiring the AO to reopen or assess AY 2008-09. The Tribunal merely quashed the reassessment for AY 2007-08. Such an order rendered in favour of the assessee cannot be converted into a statutory finding authorising reopening of another assessment year.
9.6 In our considered opinion, the AO as well as the learned NFAC have read into the Tribunal order something which is not contained therein. The observation that conversion took place on 04.02.2008 was only a factual circumstance relied upon by the Tribunal to hold that reopening for AY 2007-08 lacked foundation. Such observation was neither intended nor required to determine taxability in AY 2008-09. Therefore, it cannot be elevated to the status of a “finding” within the meaning of section 150(1) of the Act.
9.7 The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Rakesh N. Dutt (supra) has also held that an incidental observation in an appellate order cannot be treated as a finding or direction for invoking section 150 of the Act. The jurisdiction under section 150 cannot arise by implication or inference. It must flow from an express and necessary finding contained in the appellate order itself. Accordingly, we hold that the Tribunal order passed in assessee’s own case for AY 2007-08 does not contain any finding or direction capable of invoking section 150(1) of the Act. The very jurisdictional foundation assumed by the AO for issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act is therefore absent. On this ground alone, the reassessment deserves to be quashed.
9.8 Even otherwise, we find substantial merit in the alternate contention of the assessee based on section 150(2) of the Act. The undisputed facts are that the notice under section 148 for AY 2008-09 was issued on 19.03.2018. Under the provisions of section 149 as applicable at the relevant time, the outer limitation for reopening AY 2008-09 expired on 31.03.2015. Thus, the notice issued under section 148 of the Act is admittedly time-barred.
9.9 The question then arises as to the point of time at which limitation is required to be examined under section 150(2) of the Act. This issue is no longer res integra. The Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ramesh Chand Soni (HUF) v. ITO [2018] [2018]   (Jaipur – Trib.) after considering the provisions of section 150(2) of the Act and the decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in CIT v. Vaikundom Rubber Co. Ltd. 249 ITR 19 (Kerala) held that where the Tribunal passes a finding or direction in second appeal, the relevant date for examining limitation under section 150(2) is not the date of the Tribunal order but the date of the order which was the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal, namely the order of the ld. CIT(A). The Tribunal categorically held that limitation under section 149 has to be reckoned upto the date of the appellate order which was under challenge before the Tribunal.
9.10 Respectfully following the aforesaid decision, we hold that for the purposes of section 150(2) of the Act, the relevant date in the present case is the date of the CIT(A)’s order for AY 2007-08, which was the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal.
9.11 In the present case, the learned CIT(A) passed the order for AY 2007-08 on 02.02.2017. By that date, the limitation for reopening AY 2008-09 under section 149 had already expired on 31.03.2015. Therefore, on the date when the order which formed the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal came into existence, the assessment for AY 2008-09 had already become time-barred.
9.12 Section 150(2) expressly provides that section 150(1) shall not apply in such circumstances. The legislative intent is clear. Section 150 cannot be utilised as a mechanism to revive a dead assessment or to reopen an assessment which had already become barred by limitation on the relevant date. The provision only saves those cases where the assessment was still alive and capable of being reopened on the date contemplated under section 150(2) of the Act. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Tribunal order contained a finding or direction, the Revenue would still be confronted with the statutory bar contained in section 150(2) of the Act. Since the limitation for reopening AY 2008-09 had expired on 31.03.2015 and no time was available on 02.02.2017, the extended jurisdiction contemplated under section 150(1) stood expressly excluded by operation of section 150(2) of the Act.
9.13 In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the Tribunal order for AY 2007-08 did not contain any finding or direction within the meaning of section 150(1) of the Act. Consequently, invocation of section 150(1) by the AO for reopening AY 2008-09 was without jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the reopening is independently barred by section 150(2) of the Act since the limitation prescribed under section 149 had already expired on 31.03.2015 and no valid reassessment could have been made on the date of the CIT(A)’s order dated 02.02.2017, which was the order forming the subject matter of appeal before the Tribunal. Therefore, the notice issued under section 148 dated 19.03.2018 and the consequential reassessment framed pursuant thereto are void ab initio, barred by limitation and unsustainable in law. Accordingly, we quash the notice issued under section 148 of the Act as well as the consequential reassessment order. Since we have allowed the legal grounds challenging the assumption of jurisdiction itself, the other grounds raised on merits become academic and do not call for adjudication. Hence, the legal grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.
10. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.