Inordinate Seven-Year Delay In Filing Appeal Cannot Be Condoned Merely On Counsel Ill-Health Grounds
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Appeal Delay: The petitioner filed a tax case appeal against an ITAT order dated 03.04.2017 with a delay of 2,415 days.
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Grounds Cited: The petitioner sought condonation of delay, attributing the primary reason to the ill-health of their counsel and age-related ailments of the petitioner’s mother.
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Period Involved: The unexplained delay spanned over a period of nearly seven years before the appeal was presented before the High Court.
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Counsel’s Health Insufficient: In favor of Revenue. The health condition of a counsel cannot constitute “sufficient cause” to condone an inordinate delay of over seven years, as the litigant ought to have prudently engaged alternative counsel to file within the statutory limitation period.
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Family Illness Insufficient: In favor of Revenue. While age-related ailments of a senior citizen family member may explain minor delays, it cannot justify an extraordinary delay of nearly seven years.
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Dismissal of Condonation Application: In favor of Revenue. Finding no valid or sufficient reason for the delay, the High Court dismissed the petition seeking condonation of delay.
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Duty of Prudence on Litigants: Taxpayers must exercise due diligence and make alternative legal arrangements if their designated counsel is unable to act due to health reasons.
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Seven-Year Delay Exceeds Reasonable Limits: Inordinate and unexplained delays spanning multiple years cannot be condoned routinely on soft grounds without extraordinary, substantiated proof.
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Strict Construction of “Sufficient Cause”: Section 260A mandates adherence to statutory time limits; vague administrative or personal hardship claims do not meet the legal test for condonation of delay.
and G. Arul Murugan, J.
T.C.A.SR. No. 37994 of 2026†
| (i) | In Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (SC)/(2006) 4 SCC 322, the Supreme Court has held as follows: |
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.”
| (ii) | In Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Honorable Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judicially, and the expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party and the delay cannot be justified by imposing conditions. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder: |
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee AIR 1964 SC 1336, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal v. Veena (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157.)
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15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. ”
| (iii) | Long delay cannot be allowed to be condoned as a matter of course in view of the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025 INSC 1104), wherein it is held as under: |
“258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.”
| (iv) | Further, in a recent decision in Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran (2025 INSC 672), the Supreme Court held thus: |
“31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.”