ORDER
Arun Khodpia, Accountant Member. – These appeals are preferred by the assessee and the Revenue, directed against the orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals, National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi [in short, “the Ld. CIT(A)”], dated 17.11.2025 for the Assessment Year (AY) 2011-12, arises from the assessment orders under section 143(3) r.w.s 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [in short, “the Act”] dated 27.12.2017, passed byITO-24(2)(4), Mumbai [in short, “the Ld. AO”].
2. The Groundsof Appeal for both the appeals are as under:
Grounds in ITA 833/Mum/2026
“1. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in confirming the order passed by the Ld. AO u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 of the Act dated 27.12.2017 which is bad and invalid in the eyes of law.
2. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in not appreciating that the reopening of assessment u/s 148 of the Act and passing the reassessment order u/s 147 of the Act is invalid and bad in the eyes of law.
3. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in not appreciating that the Ld. AO did not have valid jurisdiction to carry out assessment proceedings in the present case.
4. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in not appreciating that the statutory notice issued u/s 143(2) of the Act is not valid in the eyes of law.
5. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in not appreciating that the impugned order is passed in violation of principles of natural justice.
6. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in not allowing additional claim of municipal taxes paid of Rs. 5,33,806/- [Rs. 25,54,306/- (-) Rs. 20,20,500/-] which is invalid and bad in the eyes of law.
7. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in confirming the action of the Ld. AO in disallowing interest expenditure of Rs. 46,09,124/- u/s 24(b) of the Act.
8. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and in facts in confirming the action of the Ld. AO in initiating penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act.”
Grounds in ITA 833/Mum/2026
“1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in granting relief for addition made in respect to unsecured loan to the assessee by placing reliance on an alleged/draft remand report which was neither finalized by the Assessing Officer and nor endorsed & transmitted to CIT(A) by Range head in accordance with the established procedure under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that the so-called remand report was only a draft remand report, which got reflected on Ld.CIT(A)’s portal due to a technical/system glitch, and the same was not endorsed or approved by the Range Head.
3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in treating the draft remand report as a valid and conclusive response of the Assessing Officer, despite the absence of mandatory administrative approval and finalization, thereby vitiating the appellate proceedings.
4. The reliance on an alleged/draft remand report which came on record due to a technical/system error, for which the Assessing Officer has already taken corrective measures by addressing the matter to the DG (Systems), renders the impugned order premature and legally infirm.
5. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the impugned order of the Ld. CIT(A) suffers from serious procedural lapses and deserves to be set aside as the foundation of the relief in respect to unsecured loan granted i.e. the draft remand report, is itself invalid and non-est in the eyes of law.
6. The Revenue respectfully prays that, the matter may be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) or alternatively to the Assessing Officer, as deemed fit, for fresh adjudication or assessment after granting due opportunity.
7. The appellant craves leave to add to, alter, amend or withdraw any of the above grounds of appeal at or before the time of hearing.”
3. The present appeal arises against the additions / disallowances made vide reopening assessment order u/s 147/143(3) dates 27.12.2017 passed by Income Tax Officer – 24(2)(4), Mumbai. The details of additions / disallowances are:
| 1. |
|
Addition u/s 68 for Rs. 14,02,96,481/- |
| 2. |
|
Disallowance u/s 24(b) Rs. 46,09,124/- |
| 3. |
|
Disallowance of unrealized Rent Claimed by the assessee – Rs.2,83,290/- |
| 4. |
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Disallowance of Municipal Taxes paid u/s 24(b) – 12,23,461/- |
4. Against the aforesaid disallowances/additions, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), who partly allowed the assessee’s appeal. The Ld. CIT(A), however, dismissed the contentions of the assessee challenging the validity of the assessment and the jurisdiction assumed by the Ld. AO, including the challenge to his pecuniary jurisdiction, the format of the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act, as well as the alleged violation of the principles of natural justice.
5. On merits, the Ld. CIT(A) allowed the contention of assessee qua additions under section 68 and directed the AO to delete the entire addition.
6. Regarding the disallowance of municipal taxes, the assessee assailed the disallowance of Rs. 12,23,461/- made by the Ld. AO and furnished evidence in support of municipal taxes amounting to Rs. 25,54,306/-, thereby requesting enhancement of the claim beyond the original claim of Rs. 20,20,500/-. The Ld. CIT(A), after obtaining a remand report from the Ld. AO, allowed the claim of the assessee to the extent of the original disallowance of Rs. 12,23,461/- made by the Ld. AO. However, did not express any finding or opinion with regard to the additional claim made by the assessee during the appellate proceedings. It is further noted that the Ld. AO, in the remand proceedings, had not recorded any adverse finding in respect of the said additional claim.
7. The disallowance of interest claimed under section 24(b) of the Act was upheld by the Ld. CIT(A), on the ground that the assessee had failed to substantiate the claim by producing corroborative evidence to establish that the term loan availed from PNB was utilized for acquisition of the house property.
8. The disallowance of unrealized rent was also directed to be deleted by the Ld. CIT(A). Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee was partly allowed.
9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid part relief granted by the Ld. CIT(A), the assessee has preferred the present appeal before us. Likewise, the Revenue is also in appeal against the reliefs granted by the Ld. CIT(A).
10. At the outset, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee assailed the assumption of jurisdiction by the Ld. AO on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction. It was contended that the Ld. AO, being not vested with the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction in terms of the administrative instructions issued by the CBDT, lacked lawful competence to assume jurisdiction, issue notice and ultimately frame the impugned reassessment order. It was submitted that the assessee had filed its return of income declaring total income of Rs. 31,55,524/-, and the said return was furnished in response to the notice issued under section 148 of the Act. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed upon CBDT’s Instruction No. 01/2011 dated 31.03.2011, whereby the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers and the Assistant/Deputy Commissioners of Income-tax has been demarcated in respect of non-corporate assessees. It was submitted that, in the case of metropolitan cities, an Income-tax Officer could exercise assessment jurisdiction only where the returned income did not exceed Rs. 20 lakhs, whereas, in cases where the returned income exceeded the said threshold, the assessment jurisdiction was prescribed to be exercised by the ACIT/DCIT. Accordingly, it was contended that, since the assessee had declared total income of Rs. 31,55,524/-, the Ld. AO, being an Income-tax Officer, was not competent to assume jurisdiction over the assessee and pass the impugned reassessment order. The assessee, therefore, challenged the validity of the assessment on the ground that the same was framed by an authority lacking the prescribed pecuniary jurisdiction. A copy of the aforesaid CBDT Instruction is reproduced hereunder for the sake of reference:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 1/2011
[F. NO. 187/12/2010-IT(A-I)]
DATED 31-1-2011
References have been received by the Board from a large number of taxpayers, especially from mofussil areas, that the existing monetary limits for assigning cases to ITOs and DCs/ACs is causing hardship to the taxpayers, as it results in transfer of their cases to a DC/AC who is located in a different station, which increases their cost of compliance. The Board had considered the matter and is of the opinion that the existing limits need to be revised to remove the abovementioned hardship.
An increase in the monetary limits is also considered desirable in view of the increase in the scale of trade and industry since 2001, when the present income limits were introduced. It has therefore been decided to increase the monetary limits as under:
|
Income Declared (Mofussil areas) |
Income Declared (Metro cities) |
|
ITOs |
ACs/DCs |
ITOs |
DCs/ACs |
| Corporate returns |
Upto Rs. 20 lacs |
Above Rs. 20 lacs |
Upto Rs. 30 lacs |
Above Rs. 30 lacs |
| Non-corporate returns |
Upto Rs. 15 lacs |
Above Rs. 15 lacs |
Upto Rs. 20 lacs |
Above Rs. 20 lacs |
Metro charges for the purpose of above instructions shall be Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Pune.
The above instructions are issued in supersession of the earlier instructions and shall be applicable with effect from1-4-2011.”
11. To support the aforesaid contentions, Ld. AR placed his reliance on CBDT’s Instruction and various decisions listed as under:
| 1. |
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CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011 [F. NO. 187/12/2010-IT(A-I)] dated 31.01.2011 |
| 2. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Ashok Devichand Jain v. UOI 452 ITR 43 (Bombay)] |
| 3. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of PCIT v. Mintu Das [2026 SCC Online 4006] |
| 4. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of PCIT v. Raghvendra Mohta (Calcutta) |
| 5. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of PCIT v. Shree Shoppers Ltd. [468 ITR 18] dated 15.03.2023 |
| 6. |
|
Order of Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Khadamat Integrated Solutions Pvt. Ltd 384 ITR 322 (Bombay) [ITA No. 3766/Mum/2024, dated 24-12-2025] |
| 7. |
|
Order of Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of ITO v. Svadeshi Enterprises [ITA No. 5865/Mum/2024, dated 6-11-2026] |
| 8. |
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Decision of Hon’ble Raipur Tribunal in the case of Amarjeet Singh Bhatia v. ACIT (Raipur – Trib.) |
| 9. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Raipur Tribunal in the case of Rahul Tyagi v. ITO (Raipur – Trib.) |
| 10. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC)] |
| 11. |
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Order of Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Combine Diamonds (P.) Ltd. v. ACIT 137 ITR(T) 129 (Mumbai – Trib.)/[ITA No. 2480/Mum/2025] dated 11.03.2026 |
| 12. |
|
Order of Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Indira Natvarlal Desai v. ACIT [ITA No. 613/Mum/2026. dated 21-5-2026] |
| 13. |
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Decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of PCIT v. Shodiman Investments Pvt. Ltd. [ [2020] 422 ITR 337 (Bombay) |
| 14. |
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Decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Khubchandani Healthparks Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO 384 ITR 322 (Bombay)] |
| 15. |
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Order of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Dulraj U. Jain v. ACIT [WP No. 1641 of 2018] dated 06.07.2018 |
| 16. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Saraswati Petrochem Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (Delhi) |
| 17. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Batra Bhatta Company 212 ITD 599 (Mumbai – Trib.)] |
| 18. |
|
Decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Modicare Foundation v. NFAC (Delhi)] dated 06.08.2021 |
| 19. |
|
CBDT Instruction No. [F.No. 225/162/2016/ITA.II] dated 11.07.2016 along with relevant annexures. |
12. Regarding other contentions, legal as well as on merits, also the assessee has furnished a written submission which reads as under:
“B. The reopening of assessment is invalid
6. In any case, the reopening is invalid for the following reasons:
The notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act was issued along with the reasons recorded, much before allowing opportunity to file objections and disposal of the objections contrary to the mandatory procedure as prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v.
ITO & Ors. [
[2003] 259 ITR 19 (SC)] [Pg 67-68 of PB-2), as reaffirmed by recent decisions of Hon’ble
Mumbai Tribunal in the case of
Combine Diamonds Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT [ITA No. 2480/Mum/2025) dated 11.03.2026 [Pg 69-78 of PB-2]
Indira Natvarlal Desai v. ACITIndira Natvarlal Desai v. ACIT [ITA No. 613/Mum/2026. dated 21-5-2026]]/[ITA No. 613/Mum/2026] dated 21.05.2026 [Pg 79-94 of PB-2].
b. The reasons recorded are without application of mind and without any tangible material having nexus with any income escaping assessment in the hands of the assessee.
1. The reasons recorded contain incorrect facts about the returned income. Further, the reasons refer to loans taken and repaid by assessee from 3 parties but does not allege how such loans are linked with any escapement of income. There is no nexus with the tangible material to form belief that income has escaped assessment. Moreover, the reasons compare financials of assessee of the preceding year with the year under consideration, indicating a fishing and roving inquiry sought to be made without tangible material. Such reopening of assessment cannot be held to be valid as held in the case of
–
Saraswati Petrochem Pvt. Ltd. v.
ITO [
(Delhi)] [Pg 106-111 of PB-2]
–
CIT v.
Batra Bhatta Company [
/212 ITD 599 (
Mumbai –
Trib.)] [Pg 112-116 of PB-2]
11. In the last para of the reasons recorded, it is concluded that the creditworthiness of the assessee needs to be verified. However, the creditworthiness of the assessee is nowhere linked with taking of loans or short term capital gains or interest on house property. Moreover, in the assessment order, there is no doubt raised by AO w.r.t. creditworthiness of the assessee.
c. Further, in the reasons recorded, reference is made to cost of acquisition claimed of Rs. 28.59 crores while computing short term capital gains of Rs. 21,41,835/-. It is stated in the reasons that the source of funds being deduction claimed u/s 48 of Rs. 28.59 crores is not explainable. However, this issue is not subject matter of addition in the final assessment order passed u/s 147 of the Act. As per the dictum of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of
CIT v.
Jet Airways (1) Pvt. [
331 ITR 236 (Bom)], where the issue for which reopening is made is not subject matter of addition, then no other additions can be made in the assessment order and reopening is invalid.
d. In the reasons recorded, there is no mention of the exact quantum of income escaping assessment in the reasons recorded. Infact, even in the approval u/s 151, the AO has mentioned the income escaping assessment to be blank supporting the fact that the actual quantum of income escaping assessment is not known to the AO while recording reasons. Such lapse of non mentioning of the quantum of income escaping assessment is fatal to the validity of the reassessment proceedings as held by Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court. Reference is invited to the following decisions:
– P CIT v. Shodiman Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO [ [2020] 422 ITR 337 (Bombay)] [Pg 9598 of PB-2]
– Khubchandani Healthparks Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO [ 384 ITR 322 (Bombay)] [Pg 99-102 of PB-2]
– Dulraj U. Jain v. ACIT & Ors. [WP No. 1641 of 2018 (Bom)) dated 06.07.2018 [Pg 103-105 of PB-2]
e. The approval taken under section 151 is mechanical: (i) the form for approval form is of the Jt. CIT-24 though approval was granted by the PCIT-24; (ii) the income escaping assessment is stated as blank (‘/’); (iii) the PCIT’s approval is cryptic; and (iv) it is granted on incorrect and irrelevant facts. (v) it is granted to the AO who does not have jurisdiction over the case. Various courts have quashed such mechanical approvals on similar facts.
f. In the order disposing of objections as well as the assessment order, the AO has raised new grounds not forming part of the original reasons recorded, effectively trying to improve upon them which is also not permissible in law. In the order disposing objections (reproduced at Page 6 of the assessment order), reference is made to scrutiny proceedings in case of the assessee for A.Y. 2012-13 where similar additions made which is a new reason supplemented to the original reasons recorded. Further, in the assessment order at Page 12, it is stated that information was received on 21.03.2017 from DDIT(Inv) that the assessee had transferred huge sum of money to M/s Shlok Media Pvt. Ltd. This reason is also not stated in the reasons recorded for reopening. Thus, the Ld. AO has exceeded his jurisdiction in improving his reasons for defending the reopening of assessment and sustaining the additions which is not permissible in law.
7. For the above reasons, the reopening of assessment is invalid.
C. Merits of the case
Unsecured loans of Rs. 14,02,96,481/-
During the assessment proceedings, the assessee could not furnish sufficient evidences. Before the Ld. CIT(A), various additional evidences were filed which were remanded to the Ld. AO for verification. The appellant filed evidence before the AO in remand proceedings such as ledger accounts, party confirmations, bank statements, affidavits, recovery letters, and proof of subsequent repayment – to prove identity, capacity and genuineness. It was also explained that similar additions in subsequent year i.e. A.Y. 2012-13 (involving some common parties) was ultimately deleted by the AO himself in the set aside proceedings.
9. The AO verified all these evidences to his satisfaction and issued a favourable remand report based on which the faceless CIT(A) deleted the loan additions. The department has appealed, contending the remand report was an inadvertently issued “draft,” and seeks to restore the matter to the AO/CIT(A).
10. It is submitted that the assessee has not received copy of the remand report by the AO. The said remand report is directly reproduced in the order of Ld. CIT(A) from Page 39-54 of CIT(A)’s order. It is submitted that the department’s “draft report” contention is untenable as the remand report is generated and transmitted through the department’s internal system only after enquiry. verification, authentication by the AO, and approval of the Addl. CIT/Range Head. It therefore cannot be later said that such report is not the final report. carries a presumption of validity and cannot later be disowned as a draft. Even if there were some errors, that is only an internal issue of the department which cannot adversely affect the assessee. Having been issued and acted upon by the CIT(A), it has attained finality and cannot be recalled on an internal administrative plea of some error in the system. Doing so would undermine the appellate process and give the Revenue an impermissible second opportunity, especially where the AO had already conducted complete enquiries and examined all evidence before submitting the report.
11. Significantly, the department has not challenged the remand report’s findings on facts or law, nor shown the additions sustainable on merits. Its appeal rests solely on the “inadvertent” plea. In absence of any challenge on merits, the CIT(A)’s order warrants no interference, and the department’s appeal should be dismissed.
Interest on loan under section 24(b) of Rs. 46,09,124/-
12. The AO did not issue any show cause notice before making this addition. Copy of the show cause notices are enclosed at [Pg. 140-144 of PB-1]. Additions made without a show cause notice as settled by various Courts to be bad in law.
Modicare Foundation v. NFAC [ (Delhi)] dated 06.08.2021 [Pg 117-120 of PB-2]
13. On merits, the appellant took a loan of Rs. 12 crore to purchase ‘Shlok House’, a commercial property and claimed the interest as a deduction u/s. 24(b) of the Act. The AO disallowed it, holding the loan unconnected to the property purchase. The assessee filed loan sanction documents, ledger accounts and EMI statements. [Pg. 133-139 of PB-1]. On verification in remand proceedings, the AO noted the loan was to be repaid from the property’s future lease rentals from such property. Despite this, the CIT(A) disallowed the interest, holding it unrelated to the property loan. It is submitted that the AO has not given any findings that the loans have been used for any other purpose. The interest should therefore be allowed against house property income.
14. Without prejudice, it is submitted that as the loan documents are old, all relevant documents could not be filed and the banks also did not provide all the details as it pertained to old period. The assessee prays that the AO may be directed to cause inquiries with bank and at the same time, the assessee shall also submit any other document to prove that the loans were taken for the purpose of purchase of the properties.
Additional claim of municipal tax of Rs. 5,33,806/-
15. Under section 43B of the Act, deduction for payment of tax is allowed on a payment basis. The assessee paid municipal tax of Rs. 25,54,306/- during the year but inadvertently claimed only Rs. 20,20,500/- in the return, of which Rs. 12,23,461/- was disallowed by AO. In appeal, an additional claim of Rs. 5,33,806/- (25.54 lakhs20.20 lakhs) was made, and evidence for the such entire amount of Rs. 25,54,306/- was filed and verified in remand proceedings. The CIT(A) deleted the Rs. 12,23,461/- addition but left the additional claim of Rs. 5,33,806/-unadjudicated.
16. As the evidences for entire amount of Rs. 25,54,306/- is on record and the claim is legally allowable, the additional claim of Rs. 5,33,806/- should be allowed to the assessee.”
13. Coming to the first contention of the assessee, challenging the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Ld. AO, the Ld. AR drew our attention to the various documents placed on record. The copy of the ITR along with computation of income for AY 2011-12, dated 31.03.2012, placed at pages 1 to 7 of the assessee’s paper book, reflects the returned income of Rs. 31,50,524/-, which is further corroborated from the assessment order, it self. It was further pointed out that notice under section 148 of the Act was issued by the ITO, Ward 24(2)(4), Mumbai, on 31.03.2017, a copy whereof is placed at page 8 of the paper book. In response to the aforesaid notice, the assessee, vide communication dated 08.05.2017, informed the Ld. AO that the return of income for AY 2011-12 had already been furnished on 31.03.2017 vide acknowledgement No. 382073510301312, and enclosed a copy thereof while requesting the Ld. AO to furnish the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment. The Ld. AO, vide letter dated 24.07.2017, furnished the extract/copy of the reasons recorded. Thereafter, the assessee raised objections to the reasons so furnished, which were disposed of by the Ld. AO vide written communication dated 11.10.2017, placed at page 15 of the paper book, rejecting the objections raised by the assessee. The impugned reassessment was thereafter completed by the Ld. AO on 27.12.2017.
14. The question of law raised before us by the assessee pertains to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Ld. AO. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the CBDT Instruction referred to hereinabove, and the judicial pronouncements relied upon by the assessee, the issue, in our considered view, is no longer res integra. The issue is required to be examined in the light of CBDT Instruction No. 01/2011 dated 31.03.2011 (extracted hereinabove), read with the judicial pronouncements rendered on the subject. Since the issue goes to the root of the jurisdiction assumed by the Ld. AO, the same requires consideration in the light of the aforesaid Instruction and the ratio laid down in the judicial pronouncements. The relevant findings thereof, which have a bearing on the issue under consideration, are reproduced hereunder:
| 1. |
|
Raghvendra Mohta (supra) |
“5. The assessee preferred appeal before the learned Tribunal challenging the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-10, Kolkata [CIT(A)] dated 26.9.2017. One of the grounds urgedbefore the learned Tribunal was that the Assessing Officer, who passed the assessment order did not have jurisdiction over the case of the assessee and, therefore, the notice as well as the assessment order are bad in law. The learned Tribunal took note of the facts and circumstances of the case and found that the assessee filed its return of income declaring the income to be nil. Subsequently, notice under section 143(2) was issued on 10.9.2015 and notice under section 142(1) dated 13.6.2016 was issued along with the questionnaire. The assessee contended that the notices were without jurisdiction and relied upon section 120 of the Act. In this regard, the assessee referred to the notification issued by the CBDT in Instruction No.1 of 2011. The learned Tribunal took into consideration the facts of the case and found that the assessment has been framed by theAssessing Officer, who inherently lacks jurisdiction to do so.
6. The learned Tribunal took note of the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of the learned Tribunal in the case of Bhagyalaxmi Conclave (P) Ltd. v. DCIT [IT Appeal No. 2517/Kol/2019, dated 3-2-2021] Apart from other decisions and allowed the assessee’s appeal, the revenue had challenged the order passed in the case of Pr. CIT v. Bhagyalaxmi Conclave (P) Ltd. [ITAT No. 221 of 2022, dated 6-12-2022] etc. and by a judgment reported in 2022 (12) TMI 1514, the appeal filed by the department was dismissed wherein one of the questions framed is identical to the substantial questions of law suggested by the revenue in the instant case. Thus, we find that the learned Tribunal was right in allowing the assessee’ appeal and setting aside the order passed by theAssessing Officer on the ground of lack of inherent jurisdiction.”
| 2 |
|
Shree Shoppers Ltd. (supra) |
“a. Based on the Central Board of Direct Taxes Instruction No. 1 of 2011 which revised the monetary limit for issuing notice by Income-tax Officers, Deputy Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners stating that in cases of corporates in metro cities declaring income above Rs. 30 lakhs, the jurisdiction of such corporate assessees would lie with the Deputy Commissioners or
b. Assistant Commissioners, held that the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the Income-tax Officer of the Ward for scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) for the assessment year 2012-13 was with-out jurisdiction.”
| 3 |
|
The Khadamat Integrated Solutions Private Ltd. (supra) |
“22. We further observe that Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal has dealt with the power of the Revenue Authorities and held as under:
be exercised or confers a power or imposes a duty on a *30. If a statute expressly co particular authority, then such power or duty must be power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then that performed by that authority itself. Further, when a statute vests certain authority has to exercise its power following the prescribed manner. Any exercise of power by statutory authorities inconsistent with the statutory prescription is invalid. Section 34 of the Income Tax Act 1922 prescribed a duty on Income Tax Officers to seek prior approval of the Commissioner before issuing a reassessment notice. In CIT v. Maharaja Pratapsingh Bahadur of Gidhaur, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that a notice issued under Section 34 without prior approval of the Commissioner was invalid.
31. The Income Tax Act 1961 also mandates assessing officers to fulfil certain preconditions before issuing a notice of reassessment. Section 149 requires assessing officers to issue a notice of reassessment under Section 148 within the prescribed time limits. Further, Section 151 requires assessing officers to obtain sanction of the specified authority before issuing notice under Section 148. In Chhugamal Rajpal v. S P Chaliha, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that Section 151 must be strictly adhered to because it contains “important safeguards.”
32. A statutory authority may lack jurisdiction if it does not fulfil the preliminary conditions laid down under the statute, which are necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. There cannot be any waiver of a statutory requirement or provision that goes to the root of the jurisdiction of assessment. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Any consequential order passed or action taken will also be invalid and without jurisdiction. Thus, the power of assessing officers to reassess is limited and based on the fulfilment of certain preconditions.”
23. As the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajeev Bansal has clearly held that” if a statute expressly confers a power or imposes a duty on a particular authority, then such power or duty must be exercised or performed by that authority itself. Further, when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then that authority has to exercise its power following the prescribed manner. Any exercise of power by statutory authorities inconsistent with the statutory prescription is invalid. A statutory authority may lack jurisdiction if it does not fulfil the preliminary conditions laid down under the statute, which are necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. There cannot be any waiver of a statutoryrequirement or provision that goes to the root of the jurisdiction of assessment. An nullity. Any consequential order passed or order passed without jurisdiction is action taken will also be invalid and without jurisdiction”. And the Hon’ble Apex Court in Hotel Blue Moon case (supra) laid down the dictum that “the notice under section 143(3) of the Act is mandatory for making the assessment and omission on the part of the assessing authority to issue notice under Section 143(2) cannot be a procedural irregularity and the same is not curable and, therefore, the requirement of notice under Section 143(2) cannot be dispensed with”. And in this case, it is a fact that the notice u/s 143(2) of the Act was not issued by the AC/DC, who ultimately passed the Assessment order, but the same was issued by the Income Tax Officer, who had no authority/competency/ power to make the assessment in the case of the assessee and/or assess the income of the assessee being beyond pecuniary jurisdiction/limit, as prescribed by the CBDT vide Instruction no. 01/2011, therefore we have no hesitation to quash the notice dated 01.08.2017 under section 143(2) of the Act, which is the foundation of the assessment order, along with the assessment order dated 25.05.2023 under section 147 read with section 144 read with section 144B of the Act. Thus, the same are quashed.”
| 4 |
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. Svadeshi Enterprises (supra) |
“7.1 In the instant case, the ITO, being the Assessing Officer issued notice u/s 143(2) of the Act and also completed the assessment order u/s 143(3) of the Act. Evidently he assumed wrong jurisdiction over the case as he was empowered to make the assessment as per the extant instruction of CBDT. Respectfully following the decisions of the coordinate Bench and ITAT Mumbai (supra), we are inclined to hold that the jurisdictional notice u/s 143(2) was not issued by appropriate authority i.e. AC/DCIT before completing the assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act. This defect in the assessment proceedings is fatal and uncurable. Accordingly, the assessment order passed in the present case is quashed and the ground in Cross objection raised by the assessee is allowed.”
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Amarjeet Singh Bhatia (supra) |
“16. We have considered the rival submissions, perused the material available on record and the case laws pressed into our service. Regarding admissibility of additional legal ground of the assessee with respect to challenging the jurisdiction of the AO which was not challenged before the AO under the provisions of Section 124(3) of the Act within the stipulated time period of one month from the date of which the notice u/s.143(2) of the Act was served upon the assessee, as opposed by the Id.Sr. DR, we take guidance from the observation of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal in the case of Sudhir Kumar Agrawal, (supra), wherein it has been observed in para 14 as under :-
14. We shall now deal with the objection raised by the Ld. DR that as the assessee had not called in question the jurisdiction of the Income-Tax Officer, Ward-2(2), Bhilai within the stipulated time period of one month Shri Sudhir Kumar Agrawal, Durg v. ITO, Ward- 2(2), Bhilai ITA No. 158/RPR/2017 from the date on which he was served with the notice(s) u/ss.143(2) and 142(1), dated 03.03.2015, therefore, it was not permissible for him to challenge the same for the first time in the course of the proceeding before the tribunal. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid claim of the id. DR we are unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the same. On a careful perusal of Section 124 of the Act, it transpires that the same deals with the issue of “territorial jurisdiction” of an Assessing Officer. Ostensibly, sub-section (1) of Section 124 contemplates vesting with the A.O jurisdiction over a specified area by virtue of any direction or order issued under subsection (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 120 of the Act. On the other hand sub-section (2) of Section 124 contemplates the manner in which any controversy as regards the territorial jurisdiction of an A.O is to be resolved. Apropos, sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, the same places an embargo upon an assessee to call in question the jurisdiction of the A.O where he had initially not raised such objection within a period of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or sub-section (2) of Section 143. In sum and substance, the obligation cast upon an assessee to call in question the jurisdiction of the A.O as per the mandate of sub-section (3) of Section 124 is confined to a case where the assessee objects to the assumption of territorial jurisdiction by the A.O, and not otherwise. Our aforesaid view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Peter Vaz v. CIT. Tax Shri Sudhir Kumar Agrawal, Durg v. ITO, Ward- 2(2), Bhilai ITA No. 158/RPR/2017 Appeal Nos. 19 to 30 of 2017, dated 05.04.2021 and that of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of CIT v. Ramesh D Patel 362 ITR 492 (Gujarat). In the aforesaid cases the Hon’ble High Courts have held that as Section 124 of the Act pertains to territorial jurisdiction vested with an AO under sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of Section 120, therefore, the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 124 which places an embargo on an assessee to raise an objection as regards the validity of the jurisdiction of an A.O would get triggered only in a case where the dispute of the assessee is with respectto the territorial jurisdiction and would have no relevance in so far his inherent jurisdiction for framing the assessment is concerned. Also, support is drawn from a recent judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax v. Nopany & Sons [2022] 136 t (Calcutta). In the case before the Hon’ble High Court the case of the assessee was transferred from ITO, Ward-3 to ITO, Ward-4 and the impugned order was passed by the ITO, Ward-4 without issuing notice u/s 143(2) and only in pursuance to the notice that was issued by the ITO, Ward-3, who had no jurisdiction over the assessee at the relevant time. Considering the fact that as the assessment was framed on the basis of the notice issued under Sec. 143(2) by the assessing officer who had no jurisdiction to issue the same at the relevant point of time, the Hon’ble High Court quashed the assessment. Apart from that, the aforesaid view is also supported by the order of the ITAT, Kolkata ‘B’ Bench in the case Shri Sudhir Kumar Agrawal, Durg v. ITO, Ward-2(2), Bhilai ITA No. 158/RPR/2017 of OSL. Developers (p) Ltd. v. 170, (2021) 211 TTJ (Kol) 621 and that of ITAT, Gauhati Bench in the case of Balaji Enterprise v. ACIT (2021) 1871TD 111 (Gau.). Accordingly, on the basis of our aforesaid observations, we are of the considered view that as the assessee’s objection to the validity of the jurisdiction assumed by the Income-Tax Officer, Ward-2(2), Bhilai is by no means an objection to his territorial jurisdiction, but in fact an objection to the assumption of jurisdiction by him in contravention of the CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, dated 31.01.2011, therefore, the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 124 would not assist the case of the revenue.
17. Admittedly, the assessee has filed its return of income for the assessment year 20072008 with a returned income of Rs.5,22,820/-, which is below Rs.15 lakhs. As per the CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, da ted 31.01.2011 and Instruction No.6/2011, dated 08.04.2011, the jurisdiction over the case of the assessee located in mofussil areas ie at Raipur, Chhattisgarh. Therefore, the jurisdiction to assess the case of the assessee was vested with an officer in the rank of ITO, whereas the case of the assessee was reopened by the DCIT-1(1), Raipur, which was subsequently transferred to ACIT, Circle-3(1), Raipur. Since the jurisdiction assumed by the ACIT Circle-3(1), Raipur, who has framed the assessment of the assessee was not in accordance with the CBDT Instruction No.01/2011, dated 31.01.2011 and 06/2011, dated 08.04.2011, therefore, the instruction assumed was invalid in terms of non-following the binding instructions issued by the CBDT and, therefore, the order remained on the basis of such reopening was also void ab initio and needs to be struck down. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 267 ITR 272 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, considering various earlier judgments, has held that the circulars/ instructions issued u/s.119 of the IT Act are binding on the revenue. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are as under:-
7. This Court has, in a series of decisions, held that circulars issued under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and 37B of Central Excise Act are binding on the Revenue. (See Navnit Lal C Jhaveri v. K.K. Sen [1965] 56 ITR 198 (SC) (SC); Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT 1972 CTR (SC) 71 [1971] 82 ITR 913 (SC)(SC): K.P. Varghese v. ITO (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358: 1981 (4) SCC 17i Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003) 184 CTR (SC) 450: 2003 (8) SCALE 287, 308 Collector of Central Excise v. Usha Martin Industries 1994 (94) ELT: 1997 (7) SCC 47 Ranadey Micronutrients v. CCE 1996 (8) ELT 19: 1996 (10) SCC 387; Collector of Centra Excise v. Jayant Dalai (P) Ltd. 1998 (100) ELT 10: 1997 (10) SCC 402; Collector of Centra. Excise v. Kores India Ltd. 1997 (89) ELT 441: 1997 (10) SCC 338; Paper Products Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise 1999 (112) ELT 765: 1997 (7) SCC 84; Dabur India Ltd. v. CCE 2003 (157) ELT 129).
8. The somewhat different approach in M/s. Hindustan Aeroneutics v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karnataka, Bangalore 2000 (5) SCC 365 by two learned Judges of this Court, apart from being contrary to the stream of authority cannot be taken to have laid down good law in view of the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara v. Dhiren Chemical Industries. After this Court had construed an exemption notification in a particular manner, it said (p. 130 of SCC and p. 557 of ITR):
“We need to make it clear that, regardless of the interpretation that we have placed on the said phrase, if there are circulars which have been issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs which place a different interpretation upon the said phrase, that interpretation will be binding upon the Revenue”.
9. Despite the categorical language of the clarification by the Constitution Bench, the issue was again sought to be raised before a Bench of three Judges in Central Board of Central Excise, Vadodara v. Dhiren Chemicals Industries: (2002) 143 SCC 654: 2002 (143) ELT 19 where the view of theConstitution Bench regarding t the binding nature of circulars issued under Section 37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was reiterated after it was drawn to the attention of the Court by the Revenue that there were in fact circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs which gave a different interpretation to the phrase as interpreted by the Constitution Bench. The same view has also been taken in Simplex Castings Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Vishakhapatnam 2003 (5) SCC.
10. The principles laid down by all these decisions are:
to raise ins in (1) Although a circular is not binding on a Court or an assessee, It is not open to the Revenue to the contention that is contrary to a binding circular by the Board. When a circular remains operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid nor that it is contrary to the terms of the statute.
(2) Despite the decision of this Court, the Department cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the instructions issued by the Board.
(3) A show cause notice and demand contrary to existing circulars of the Board are ab initio bad.
(4) It is not open to the Revenue to advance an argument or file an appeal contrary to the circulars.
18. In the case of Khirod Kumar Pattnaik, the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No.380/CTK/2019, vide order dated 10.12.2020, has held that, “it was the duty of the revenue authorities to give effect to the circulars/instructions issued by the CBDT which are binding on them. If the CBDT Instruction No. 1/2011, dated 31.01.2011 & No.6/2011, dated 08.04.2011 is not accepted by the revenue authorities, as has been occurred in the present case in hand, anyone can frame the assessment/reassessment even having no jurisdiction to enter into the same. The power conferred upon the CBDT to issue instructions and directions by section 119 of of the Act is for proper working of the Act, which should be followed by the revenue authorities in true spirit. Accordingly, the Tribunal quashed the reassessment framed by the ITO/AO, who was having no jurisdiction over the assessee.
19. Further, the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ravi Sherwani (supra), in para 11 has held that, “controversy involved in the present appeal lies in a narrow compass, i.e, sustainability of the assessment framed by the ACIT, Circle 4(1), Raipur vide his order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act, dated 29.03.2016, which in turn was based on a notice u/s 143(2) of the Act, dated 08.09.2014 issued by the ITO-1(3), Raipur, i.e a non-jurisdictional officer. We find that the issue involved in the present appeal is squarely covered by the order of this Tribunal in the case of Durga Manikanta Traders (supra); wherein, it has been held, that in case an A.O vested with jurisdiction over the case of the assessee, had framed an assessment u/s.143(3) of the Act, by assuming jurisdiction to frame such assessment on the basis of notice u/s 143(2) of the Act issued by a non-jurisdictional officer, ie an A.O who was not vested with pecuniary jurisdiction over the case of the assessee as per CBDT Instruction No.1 of 2011, then, the assessment so framed could not be sustained and was liable to be struck down for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction”.
20. In the backdrop of aforesaid observations, we are in agreement with the Id. AR that the reopening proceedings were initiated without having vested jurisdiction by the DCIT-1(1), Raipur and also the same was thereafter wrongly been framed by an officer, who was not having jurisdiction over the case of the assessee as per the criteria laid down by the CBDT Instructions, referred to supra. Since similar issues were decided by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in several different cases, referred to above, alongwith observations in these cases as are extracted hereinabove, therefore, respectfully following the view taken in the above judicial pronouncements, we are of the considered opinion that the order framed u/s.147/143(3) of the Act by the ACIT, Circle-3(1), Raipur, dated 11.02.2015 for the assessment year 20047-2008 in the case of assessee, is liable to be quashed and we do so. Thus, the legal ground of assessee is allowed.”
15-16. Similar findings have also been recorded in various other judicial pronouncements relied upon by the assessee; however, the same are not reproduced herein for the sake of brevity.
17. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted position that the assessee is a non-corporate assessee and had filed its return of income for AY 2011-12 declaring total income exceeding Rs. 20 lakhs. At the relevant point of time, however, the Ld. AO, being an Income-tax Officer, was vested with jurisdiction, in terms of CBDT Instruction No. 01/2011, to assess non-corporate assessees having returned income below the prescribed threshold of Rs. 20 lakhs. Thus, on the admitted facts, the Ld. AO was not vested with the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction over the assessee’s case. The aforesaid defect pertains to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Ld. AO and, therefore, goes to the root of the validity of the reassessment proceedings. Respectfully following the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, which are applicable to the issue under consideration, we find that the impugned reassessment order passed under section 147/148 of the Act on 27.12.2017, consequent to the proceedings initiated by an Assessing Officer lacking the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction, cannot be sustained in law. We further find that the proceedings culminating in the impugned reassessment order are also not in conformity with the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra) while the notice u/s 143(2) was issued by an AO not having valid jurisdiction on the case of assessee, as followed and reiterated in the various judicial pronouncements relied upon by the assessee and referred to in the written submissions extracted hereinabove.
18. Adverting to the merits of the additions, we find that the Ld. CIT(A) has examined the issues in detail and, in the course of appellate proceedings, called for a remand report from the Ld. AO. The Ld. AO, upon examination of the material furnished by the assessee, submitted a remand report which did not contain any adverse finding so as to dislodge the claims of the assessee. Taking into consideration the material available on record and the remand report of the Ld. AO, the Ld. CIT(A) recorded his findings and deleted the impugned additions. Before us, the Revenue has not been able to point out any infirmity in the findings so recorded by the Ld. CIT(A), nor has any contrary material, evidence or judicial pronouncement been brought on record to warrant a different view. It is well settled that a finding recorded by the first appellate authority on appreciation of the material on record cannot be interfered with merely on the basis of a challenge, unless the Revenue is able to demonstrate an error therein or bring on record material warranting such interference. In the present case, no such material has been brought to our notice.Accordingly, upon consideration of the findings recorded by the Ld. CIT(A), the remand report of the Ld. AO and the material available on record, and in the absence of any material brought on record by the Revenue to controvert the same, we find no legally sustainable basis to interfere with the order of the Ld. CIT(A). The grounds raised by the Revenue, therefore, fail to persuade us to disturb the relief granted by the Ld. CIT(A).
19. Upon thoughtful consideration of the aforesaid observations and deliberations, we find no substance in the grounds raised by the Revenue in the present appeal. At the same time, the appeal of the assessee merits acceptance, both on the jurisdictional ground as well as on merits. As discussed hereinabove, the Ld. AO was not vested with the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction in terms of CBDT Instruction No. 01/2011 dated 31.03.2011 to assume jurisdiction over the assessee’s case. The assumption of jurisdiction by an authority not vested with the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction thus goes to the root of the validity of the reassessment proceedings. Further, even on merits, the Revenue has not brought on record any substantive material to controvert the findings recorded by the Ld. CIT(A) or to warrant interference therewith. Consequently, the relief granted by the Ld. CIT(A), having remained uncontroverted by any cogent material before us, calls for no interference. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned reassessment order dated 27.12.2017, having been passed pursuant to assumption of jurisdiction by the Ld. AO without the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction, is unsustainable in law and is accordingly quashed.
20. Consequently, the captioned appeal of the assessee is allowed, whereas the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed, in terms of our aforesaid observations.