proceedings
The instant proceedings have arisen out of an appeal filed by M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP, F-79, Industrial Area, Bahadrabad, Haridwar-249402 having GSTIN: 05AAFFI9899H1ZS (hereinafter referred to as the “Appellant”) under Section 100 of the CGST Act, 2017 against the Advance Ruling No. 05/2025-26 dated 17.03.2026 – 2026-VIL-68-AAR passed by the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) for the State of Uttarakhand.
At the outset, we would like to state that the provisions of both the CGST Act and the SGST Act are the same except for certain provisions; therefore, unless a mention is specifically made to such dissimilar provisions, a reference to the CGST Act would also mean a reference to the same provisions under the SGST Act.
1. Brief Facts of the Case:
1.1 As per the facts available on records, the Appellant had filed an Application No. 03/2025-26 under Section 97 (1) of the CGST Act, 2017 before the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) for the State of Uttarakhand on 27.06.2025. The Advance ruing application comprised the query/seeking advance ruling as to: –
| a. |
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Whether the operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics by the Applicant under identical Operation & Management Agreements with Braithwaite & Co. Limited (PSU-executing agency), funded exclusively through 15th Finance Commission health grants routed via Braithwaite and Company Limited and providing healthcare services to citizens free of cost, constitutes exempt “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)? |
| b. |
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Whether, in the alternative, the said activities qualify as “pure services” provided to the State Government (through its designated PSU-executing agency under formal MoU) in relation to Article 243W functions (public health, hospitals, dispensaries – Twelfth Schedule Entries 6, 8, 23), and are therefore exempt under Entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate)? |
1.2 The matter was decided by Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) vide AAR Ruling/Order No. 05/2025-26 dated 17.03.2026 – 2026-VIL-68-AAR ruling that:
| a. |
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The operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics) by the applicant under identical Operation & Management Agreements with Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU-executing agency) do not constitute exempt “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” under Entry no.74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). |
| b. |
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The said activities do not qualify as “pure services” provided to the State Government in relation to Article 243W functions (public health, hospitals, dispensaries – Twelfth Schedule Entries 6, 8, 23), and are therefore not exempt under Entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). |
Accordingly, the services supplied by the Applicant are liable to GST at the applicable rates under the CGST/SGST Acts.
2. Case for the Appellant- As per the Appeal; it has been stated as follows:
| i. |
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That, M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant”) is a Limited Liability Partnership duly incorporated under the provisions of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 and is registered under the Goods and Services Tax laws bearing GSTIN 05AAFFI9899G1ZS. The registered office of the Appellant is situated at F-79, Industrial Area, Bahadrabad, Haridwar, Uttarakhand – 249402, and the Appellant is engaged, inter alia, in the operation, management and implementation of Government healthcare facilities and public health programmes, including Urban Health and Wellness Centres (“UHWCs”), now renamed as Urban Ayushman Aarogya Mandir (“UAAM”) pursuant to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare’s Order dated 25.11.2023, as well as polyclinics established under various Central and State Government health schemes. The said facilities are part of the Government’s flagship primary healthcare architecture, equipped with infrastructure, human resources, drugs, diagnostics and IT framework, and are designed to deliver accessible primary healthcare services to the public, particularly the weaker and underserved sections of society. |
| ii. |
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That the Appellant is engaged in operating and managing Government UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics established under a public health programme funded through grants recommended by the 15th Finance Commission and implemented by the Government of Uttarakhand through its Urban Development Directorate (“UDD”), and the said programme is executed through M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, a Government of India Public Sector Undertaking (“PSU”), acting as the designated Operating agency for implementation, administration and monitoring of the project. |
| iii. |
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That M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, being a Government of India PSU functioning under the administrative control of the Ministry of Railways, Government of India, has been formally nominated by the State Government of Uttarakhand as the Operating agency for establishment, operation and monitoring of UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics under the said programme, and its role is confined to conducting tender processes, entering into operation and management agreements with healthcare operating agencies, coordinating implementation, monitoring performance and disbursing Government health grants in accordance with prescribed guidelines and financial rules, without itself providing or consuming any healthcare services. |
| iv. |
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On 30.05.2025, the UDD, Government of Uttarakhand, executed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoU”) with M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited, appointing it as the executing agency for the implementation, operation and monitoring of 115 UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and 23 Polyclinics under a Government health programme, with an approved project cost of approximately Rs. 81.57 crores. |
| v. |
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Further, as per Clause 11 of the said MoU, all activities are required to be carried out strictly within the grant amount approved by the Government of Uttarakhand, thereby clearly establishing that the entire project is funded through a government grant-in-aid and is not a commercial contract in nature. |
| vi. |
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The scope of work defined under Clause 3 of the said MoU further makes it abundantly clear that the executing agency is responsible for ensuring delivery of comprehensive healthcare services, including preventive, promotive, curative, rehabilitative, and palliative care, along with provision of free essential drugs and diagnostics, public health functions, disease surveillance, and community outreach programmes. |
| vii. |
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That pursuant to a transparent public tender process conducted by M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, the Appellant, along with Bombay Shiva Health Services JV, and Vital Teleradiology, was selected as an operating agency for a cluster of Government UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, and accordingly operation and management agreements were executed for the operation of Government healthcare facilities in specified urban areas of Uttarakhand. The selection was made pursuant to Letter of Intent issued under the relevant tender (LOI No. BCL/PUR/LOI/UHWC-UK/25-26 dated 14.05.2025), followed by execution of a detailed Operation & Management Agreement dated 27.09.2025. |
| viii. |
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In terms of the Agreement, the Appellant was awarded specified clusters of UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics for operation and management in designated urban areas of Uttarakhand and undertook obligations relating to deployment of medical and paramedical staff, provision of diagnostic and pharmacy services, facility management, and compliance with Government-prescribed healthcare standards, strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and directions of the operating agency. |
| ix. |
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That under the said agreement, the Appellant has been entrusted with the responsibility of operating and managing Government healthcare facilities including UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, deploying qualified medical practitioners, specialists, paramedical staff and support staff as per Government-prescribed norms, and providing outpatient consultations, diagnostic services, medicines, preventive healthcare services, community health outreach programmes and referral services, strictly in accordance with Government guidelines and public health protocols. |
| x. |
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That the Appellant is required to operate the said healthcare facilities strictly in accordance with the directions, instructions, and guidelines issued by the UDD and other Government authorities from time to time under the said Government healthcare programme. |
| xi. |
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That all healthcare services provided at the said UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics are rendered entirely free of cost to the beneficiaries and no amount whatsoever is charged from patients or beneficiaries for consultations, diagnostics, medicines or any healthcare services, the entire expenditure for operation of the said facilities being met exclusively out of Government health grants released under the said programme, thereby evidencing absence of any quid pro quo or commercial consideration from the recipients of such services. |
| xii. |
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That the payments to the Appellant are released in instalments and are subject to receipt of funds under the Government grant programme and compliance with performance conditions, utilisation certificates, and reporting requirements as prescribed under the scheme guidelines. |
| xiii. |
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That in terms of the contractual framework governing the project, it is expressly provided under the MoU that the Appellant, that the consideration payable to the Appellant is not in the nature of a fixed commercial fee but. is released strictly out of Government health grants, in a phased/instalment manner, subject to availability and release of funds under the 15th Finance Commission programme, and conditional upon fulfilment of prescribed performance parameters, submission of utilisation certificates, and adherence to monitoring, audit and reporting requirements under the scheme guidelines. |
| xiv. |
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That the entire project is required to be executed strictly within the grant-in-aid amount approved, and no additional cost beyond the sanctioned budget is permissible under the scheme. Thus, the Appellant has no pricing autonomy and no independent revenue generation mechanism, and is obligated to utilise the funds strictly for the purpose of operating Government healthcare facilities in accordance with conditions attached to the grant-in-aid, which clearly indicates the absence of any commercial or business element in the arrangement. |
| xv. |
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That the Appellant has no authority to levy any charges or consideration from patients or beneficiaries, nor any discretion to alter the nature, scope, or pricing of services, and the entire framework of operations is predetermined and regulated by Government guidelines, thereby excluding any element of commercial discretion or entrepreneurial activity. |
| xvi. |
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That in the aforesaid factual and legal backdrop, characterised by a wholly Government-funded, non-commercial, and constitutionally mandated public healthcare framework, the Appellant has sought an Advance Ruling under the Goods and Services Tax law to obtain clarity regarding applicability of GST on the activities undertaken, particularly in view of interpretational issues arising from contractual clauses referring to tax, so as to ensure compliance and avoid future disputes or litigation. |
| xvii. |
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That in the aforesaid factual background, the Appellant had approached the Authority for Advance Ruling, Uttarakhand, under Section 97 of the CGST/SGST Act, seeking a ruling on the applicability of GST on the activities undertaken by it in relation to operation and management of Government UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics under the said Government-funded public healthcare programme, in view of interpretational ambiguities arising on account of the conduct of M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, which, while acting as the executing agency, was deducting and withholding GST amounts from the payments due to the Appellant, despite the Appellant’s bona fide understanding that the services rendered were exempt from GST; and since the financial bid submitted by the Appellant in the tender was premised on such exemption, resulting in minimal margins, the continued withholding of GST had a direct adverse financial impact on the Appellant; further, although the Appellant had obtained a reasoned legal opinion supporting the exemption and had furnished the same to M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, the said entity did not accept the position and continued with such deductions, thereby compelling the Appellant to seek an authoritative determination by way of the present advance ruling. |
| xviii. |
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That before the Authority for Advance Ruling, the Appellant had, inter alia, contended that the services rendered by it squarely qualify as “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” and are therefore exempt under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 (“the CGST Services Exemption Notification”), as amended, inasmuch as the Appellant is operating Government healthcare facilities through qualified medical professionals and providing diagnosis, treatment, care and preventive healthcare services to patients, which are undisputedly healthcare services in nature, and the exemption is based on the nature of services and not on the identity of the recipient or the mode of payment. |
| xix. |
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That without prejudice to the above, the Appellant had further contended that the services provided by it also qualify as “pure services” supplied to State Government in relation to functions entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution, particularly public health, sanitation and primary healthcare, and are therefore exempt under Entry 3 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification, since the entire activity is carried out under a Government scheme, funded through Government grants, without any commercial consideration or profit element, and in discharge of sovereign/public welfare functions. |
| xx. |
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That the Appellant had specifically submitted that the entire arrangement is a grant-based public health programme, wherein funds are routed through the Government and its nominated executing agency, and the Appellant merely acts as an implementing arm of the Government healthcare system, with no independent commercial relationship with patients, no pricing autonomy, and no profit-oriented activity, thereby satisfying both the test of healthcare services as well as pure services in relation to municipal functions. |
| xxi. |
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That however, the Authority for Advance Ruling, Uttarakhand, vide its impugned ruling, did not accept the aforesaid contentions of the Appellant and held that the services rendered by the Appellant are taxable, primarily on the reasoning that the contractual arrangement is between the Appellant and M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, and that the consideration flows from the said entity, thereby treating the supply as a contractual service to a PSU rather than as healthcare services rendered to patients or as services provided to Government in discharge of public functions. |
| xxii. |
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That the Ld. Advance ruling Authority, while passing the impugned ruling, failed to appreciate that the nature of supply is to be determined based on the intrinsic character of the services rendered, i.e., provision of healthcare services through clinical establishments, and not merely on the contractual flow of funds or the identity of the intermediary entity through which Government grants are channelized, and further failed to consider that the Appellant is operating Government healthcare facilities as part of a public health system where services are rendered free of cost to beneficiaries. |
| xxiii. |
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That the Ld. Advance ruling Authority further erred in not appreciating that the role of M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited is limited to that of a Government-designated executing agency for administrative and financial coordination, and it is neither the consumer nor the beneficiary of the healthcare services, and therefore, the mere routing of funds through such agency cannot alter the essential character of the services as healthcare services or as services provided to Government in relation to public health functions. |
| xxiv. |
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That the Appellant is aggrieved by the impugned Advance Ruling as the same proceeds on an erroneous interpretation of law and facts, ignores the settled position that exemption under Entry 74 is based on the nature of services and not the recipient, and fails to correctly apply the provisions relating to exemption for pure services under Entry 3 read with Article 243W, thereby resulting in an incorrect classification of a Government-funded public healthcare activity as a taxable commercial service |
| xxv. |
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That being aggrieved by the aforesaid ruling, and the present appeal being filed within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 100 of the CGST/SGST Act, the Appellant is filing the present appeal before the Hon’ble Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling, seeking appropriate relief by way of setting aside the impugned ruling and holding that the services rendered by the Appellant are exempt from GST under the applicable provisions of law. |
3. Grounds of Appeal (as per appeal):
At the outset, it has been submitted that the impugned ruling is wholly arbitrary, illegal, and contrary to the statutory scheme of the GST laws. The said ruling fails to appreciate the clinical nature of the services provided and the public health mandate under which the Appellant operates. The Authority has erred in denying exemption merely on the ground that the receipt of payment is from the Operating Agency under a contract, while overlooking the settled position that the receipt of payment, by itself, cannot be the criterion to determine the nature of supply. Under the CGST Act, consideration may flow from a person other than the actual recipient, and therefore, the payer-recipient distinction cannot be elevated into a test for classifying the service.
If the Authority’s reasoning is accepted, it would lead to an anomalous and absurd result. For instance, where a patient’s treatment bill is paid by a friend, relative, employer, insurer, or Government scheme, the payment is not made by the recipient himself, yet the service does not cease to be healthcare service or lose its exemption merely because the money comes from another source. Likewise, in Government hospitals or other public healthcare institutions, treatment is often rendered free of cost or funded through insurance or public schemes, but the healthcare character of the service remains unchanged. The legal test is always the end use and true nature of the service, not the identity of the payer. On the same principle, the present case of the Appellant cannot be treated differently merely because the grant/payment is routed through the Operating Agency under the public health implementation structure. Such an interpretation adopted by the AAR is therefore patently artificial, contrary to the statutory scheme, and leads to absurd consequences.
In the present case as well, the Appellant is admittedly engaged in providing healthcare services to patients through Government health facilities under a public health programme, and the routing of funds through an executing agency is merely a mechanism for implementation of the scheme. The executing agency neither consumes the healthcare services nor alters their intrinsic nature. Therefore, the reasoning adopted by the Authority collapses the distinction between the recipient, the beneficiary, and the payer, and results in an interpretation that is not only contrary to the statutory framework but also leads to absurd consequences. The Impugned Ruling thus fails to appreciate the clinical nature of the services provided and the public health mandate under which the Appellant operates.
A. ARBITRARY AND ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF EXEMPTION UNDER ENTRY 74 OF THE CGST SERVICES EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION IN RESPECT OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE APPELLANT
| A.1 |
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That the impugned ruling is wholly arbitrary, contrary to the statutory provisions, and unsustainable in law, inasmuch as it erroneously denies the benefit of exemption available under Entry 74 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification to the Appellant, despite the undisputed factual position that the Appellant is engaged in providing healthcare services through duly established and registered clinical establishments; the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has misdirected itself by disregarding the true nature and character of the services rendered and by adopting an incorrect and narrow interpretation of the exemption provision, thereby vitiating the findings recorded in the impugned ruling. |
| A.2 |
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The Ld. Advance ruling Authority has gravely erred in denying the exemption despite recording a categorical finding that the UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics operated by the Appellant are duly registered under the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 (“CE Act”) and that the Appellant is recorded as the owner of such establishments. This factual finding conclusively satisfies the statutory requirement under Entry 74, which hinges upon the status of the supplier as a “clinical establishment.” Once such registration and ownership are admitted on record, there remains no legal basis to dilute or disregard such status. The impugned ruling, however, proceeds to ignore its own finding and introduces an artificial distinction by recharacterizing the Appellant as merely an operating agency, which is contrary to both the evidence and the statutory framework. |
| A.3 |
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That, Entry 74 of the CGST Service Exemption Notification, exempts: |
“Healthcare services by a clinical establishment, an authorised medical practitioner or para-medics.”
| A.4 |
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That, the term “clinical establishment” in the CGST Services Exemption Notification must be interpreted consistently with the CE Act, which provides the statutory definition and framework. This interpretational principle follows from: |
| a. |
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Harmonious construction: Two statutes operating in the same subject matter (healthcare regulation) must be read harmoniously. |
| b. |
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Statutory reference: When the CGST Services Exemption Notification uses “clinical establishment,” it implicitly incorporates the CE Act definition. |
| A.5 |
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That, Para 2(zg) of the CGST Service Exemption Notification defines “healthcare services” as: |
“health care services” means any service by way of diagnosis or treatment or care for illness, injury, deformity, abnormality or pregnancy in any recognised system of medicines in India and includes services by way of transportation of the patient to and from a clinical establishment, but does not include hair transplant or cosmetic or plastic surgery, except when undertaken to restore or to reconstruct anatomy or functions of body affected due to congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, injury or trauma;”
| A.6 |
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Based on the Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010, the definition of clinical establishment is as follows: |
2 (c) “clinical establishment” means-
(i) a hospital, maternity home, nursing home, dispensary, clinic, sanatorium or an institution by whatever name called that offers services, facilities requiring diagnosis, treatment or care for illness, injury, deformity, abnormality or pregnancy in any recognised system of medicine established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not; or
(ii) a place established as an independent entity or part of an establishment referred to in sub-clause (i), in connection with the diagnosis or treatment of diseases where pathological, bacteriological, genetic, radiological, chemical, biological investigations or other diagnostic or investigative services with the aid of laboratory or other medical equipment, are usually carried on, established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, and shall include a clinical establishment owned, controlled or managed by-
| a. |
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the Government or a department of the Government; |
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a trust, whether public or private; |
| c. |
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a corporation (including a society) registered under a Central, Provincial or State Act, whether or not owned by the Government; |
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a local authority; and |
but does not include the clinical establishments owned, controlled or managed by the Armed Forces.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this clause “Armed Forces” means the forces constituted, under the Army Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) and the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957);
| A.7 |
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That in the present case, the Appellant squarely satisfies the aforesaid statutory definition of “clinical establishment,” inasmuch as the Appellant is operating and managing fully functional healthcare facilities, namely UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, which provide diagnosis, treatment, care, preventive and promotive healthcare services through qualified medical professionals in recognised systems of medicine; further, such establishments are duly registered under the CE Act in the name of the Appellant, thereby conclusively establishing that the Appellant is administering and maintaining such clinical establishments within the meaning of the said Act; the Appellant had placed on record before the Learned Authority all relevant documentary evidences including registration certificates, agreements, scope of services, and operational records demonstrating provision of healthcare services; the same position was reiterated and explained during the course of personal hearing on 29.01.2026, however, despite such uncontroverted evidence and categorical satisfaction of the statutory definition, the Learned Authority has erroneously disregarded the same and denied the status of the Appellant as a “clinical establishment,” which is ex facie contrary to the facts on record and the express provisions of law. Copies of the Registration Certificates issued by the competent District Registration Authority/Office of the Chief Medical Officer, Haridwar, are annexed hereto and enclosed as Annexure-H. |
| A.8 |
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That in regard to the above, the ratio laid down Arden Health Care (P.) Ltd., In re (AAR – KERALA)/(Advance Ruling No. KER/131/2021 dated 18.02.2022) squarely applies to the facts of the present case, wherein the Hon’ble Authority categorically held that services involving care, diagnosis and treatment of patients, even when rendered outside a traditional hospital setting (i.e. at patients’ residences), would qualify as “healthcare services” provided by a “clinical establishment” and are accordingly exempt under Entry 74 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification; the Authority further held that any institution providing services by way of diagnosis or treatment or care for illness, through qualified medical or paramedical personnel, would fall within the definition of a clinical establishment and the exemption is to be determined based on the nature of services. The relevant para of the ruling is thus reproduced below: |
7.7 On a combined reading of the definitions of health care services and clinical establishment, it is evident that any institution providing services by way of diagnosis or treatment or care for illness etc. will qualify to be categorised under the definition of clinical establishment. From the details of the services provided, as described by the applicant, it is evident that the applicant is providing services of care for illness to patients at their residence and hence qualify to be classified as a clinical establishment under the category of any other institution providing services of care for illness as per the said definition.
7.8 Based on the discussion above, it is concluded that the applicant is a clinical establishment providing health care services that are exempted as per entry at Sl. No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017 Central Tax (Rate), dated 28-6-2017.
| A.9 |
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That also in Divyajivan Healthcare LLP, In re 90 GST 597 (AAR – GUJARAT) – 2021-VIL-435-AAR) is directly applicable to the present case, wherein the Hon’ble Authority categorically held that healthcare services provided by a clinical establishment remain exempt under Entry 74 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification, even where the consideration is received in a structured or bundled form such as a lump-sum “healthcare plan” covering multiple services over a period of time; the Authority specifically observed that the essential character of the supply must be determined based on the nature of services rendered, i.e., diagnosis, treatment, and care for illness, and that ancillary arrangements such as tic-ups with other hospitals or the manner of receipt of consideration do not alter the classification of the services as healthcare services. |
| A.10 |
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That the above position also finds judicial support in the ruling of AAR Karnataka in Matrix Imaging Solutions India (P.) Ltd., In re [2020] 77 GST 172/[2019] 30 GSTL 257 (AAR – KARNATAKA)/(Advance Ruling No. KAR ADRG 105/2019 dated 30 September, 2019) – 2019-VIL-385-AAR, wherein the Authority held that diagnostic services provided to hospitals or other establishments are still covered under Entry 74, and specifically observed that the exemption entry does not prescribe any condition regarding the identity of the recipient. Accordingly, once it is established that the supplier is a clinical establishment and the services rendered are diagnosis, treatment, or care, the exemption cannot be denied merely because the payment flows through an intermediary or institutional arrangement rather than directly from the patient. |
| A.11 |
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The CESTAT in Life Care Hospital Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise 2024 SCC ONLINE CESTAT 883 – 2024-VIL-1055-CESTAT-DEL-ST) held that a clinical establishment providing health care services falls within the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST, and that receipts connected with in-house treatment, including medicines supplied to patients and the processing of Mediclaim claims, are part of the composite health care service. The Tribunal expressly observed that the definitions of “clinical establishment” and “health care service” are broad enough to include services connected with treatment and that the provision of medicines to patients is “inbuilt in health care service and the treatment.” Accordingly, the Department cannot artificially split such receipts and tax them as Business Auxiliary Service or commission. |
“11 . The two definitions of “clinical establishment” and “healthcare service” clearly shows that they have been worded very broadly so as to include the various services, which are connected with the healthcare service and are inbuilt in it. The appellant who is running the hospital is squarely covered by the definition of “clinical establishment”, which at the outset says the clinical establishment means hospital and is rendering the healthcare services as defined therein. The definition of “healthcare service” when it uses the term diagnosis or treatment or care for illness, etc. by any recognised, system of medicines, denotes that the provision for medicines to the patients is directly connected to the health care services. In other words, the provision for medicines is inbuilt in health care service and the treatment”
| A.12 |
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That the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon’ble CESTAT in Sir Ganga Ram Hospital v. CCE 11 GSTL 427 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – 2017-VIL-1014-CESTAT-DEL-ST), wherein the Tribunal considered whether amounts retained by hospitals under revenue-sharing arrangements with doctors could be subjected to service tax under the category of “Business Support Services”. The Revenue had contended that the hospital was providing infrastructural support services to doctors and, therefore, the retained portion constituted taxable consideration. Rejecting the said contention, the Hon’ble Tribunal held that such arrangements are part of a mutually beneficial framework for the provision of healthcare services to patients, and cannot be artificially dissected to treat the hospital as providing services to doctors. It was further held that healthcare services are to be viewed holistically, and any attempt to segregate components of such services for taxation would defeat the very purpose of the exemption granted to healthcare services. |
| A.13 |
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That if the interpretation adopted in the Impugned Ruling is accepted, it would lead to manifest inequality and defeat the very object of the exemption granted under the GST framework. The legislative intent behind exempting healthcare services is to ensure that such essential services remain affordable and accessible to all sections of society. In the present case, the UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics have been established by the Government precisely with the objective of providing free-of-cost healthcare services to economically weaker and underserved sections of society under a public health mandate. However, under the erroneous interpretation of the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority, merely because the consideration is routed through M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, the executing agency, the services are sought to be subjected to GST. This would directly result in depletion of the limited Government healthcare budget, thereby reducing the extent and quality of services that can be provided to the ultimate beneficiaries. |
| A.14 |
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The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, in its official FAQ on GST, has categorically stated that the healthcare sector has been exempted from GST because the Government has accorded healthcare the importance and impetus needed to accelerate progress towards “health for all” under the National Health Policy 2017 and the Sustainable Development Goals. This explicit policy statement underlines that the legislative and executive intent is to keep access to healthcare affordable, especially for vulnerable populations who depend on public health systems. Levying GST on the very same healthcare services when delivered through Government-funded UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, while continuing to exempt substantially similar services in private hospitals, would run counter to this policy objective and create an irrational classification. |
| A.15 |
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The Government’s own position, as stated by the Health Ministry on 4 September 2025, is that the GST reforms complement Ayushman Bharat and PM-JAY, while healthcare services rendered by doctors, hospitals and diagnostic centres continue to remain exempt under the existing GST regime. The Ministry also recognised that lower GST on medicines and healthcare inputs advances the objective of affordable healthcare. This is significant because it confirms that hospital-based treatment and allied medical services are treated as part of the exempt health-care framework, and not as ordinary taxable commercial supplies. |
| A.16 |
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That connection matters because when an empanelled hospital treats a PM-JAY beneficiary, the amount it receives is ordinarily reimbursement for the exempt or non-taxable act of diagnosis and treatment, rather than consideration for an independent taxable service. In legal terms, the hospital is not merely “facilitating” a benefit; it is actually providing the health care service that the scheme funds, so the receipt is tied to the exempt healthcare function. |
| A.17 |
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In contrast, identical healthcare services provided by private hospitals to patients continue to remain exempt from GST, as no such distinction based on the routing of payment is applied. Consequently, the impugned interpretation creates an artificial and unreasonable classification, whereby Government-run welfare healthcare models are placed at a disadvantage vis-a-vis private healthcare providers. Such a position is clearly discriminatory, lacks any rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the exemption, and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Impugned Ruling, by introducing such inequality, defeats both the statutory intent and the larger public health objective underlying the exemption. |
B. ERRONEOUS MISCHARACTERIZATION OF HEALTHCARE SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE APPELLANT AS TAXABLE MANAGERIAL OR SUPPORT SERVICES
| B.1 |
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That the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has erred in law and on facts in holding that the operation and management of UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics do not constitute “healthcare services,” without appreciating the true nature and substance of the activities undertaken. |
| B.2 |
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The services rendered by the Appellant form an integral part of a comprehensive primary healthcare delivery system established under the 15th Finance Commission framework, encompassing outpatient consultations, maternal and child healthcare, screening of non-communicable diseases, and essential diagnostic services. |
| B.3 |
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That all activities performed at the said centers, from patient registration to clinical diagnosis and treatment, are intrinsically linked to the provision of medical care and are directly aimed at diagnosis, treatment, and care of illness, thereby falling squarely within the ambit of “healthcare services” as defined under the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| B.4 |
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The AAR has further failed to appreciate that the UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics qualify as “Clinical Establishments” within the meaning of the CE Act, being duly registered facilities providing medical services through authorized medical practitioners and paramedical staff. |
| B.5 |
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That the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Kerala v. Mother Superior Adoration Conven (SC)/(Civil Appeal No. 202 of 2012, decided on 01.03.2021) – 2021-VIL-43-SC has laid down the authoritative principle for interpreting exemption notifications. In Paragraph 24, the Court unequivocally held: |
“This being the case, it is obvious that the beneficial purpose of the exemption contained in Section 3(1)(b) must be given full effect to, the line of authority being applicable to the facts of these cases being the line of authority which deals with beneficial exemptions as opposed to exemptions generally in tax statutes. This being the case, a literal formalistic interpretation of the statute at hand is to be eschewed. We must first ask ourselves what is the object sought to be achieved by the provision, and construe the statute in accord with such object. And on the assumption that any ambiguity arises in such construction, such ambiguity must be in favour of that which is exempted. Consequently, for the reasons given by us, we agree with 31 the conclusions reached by the impugned judgments of the Division Bench and the Full Bench.”
| B.6 |
|
That it is a well-settled principle of law that if two views are possible in interpreting an exemption notification, the one favourable to the assessee in the matter of taxation has to be preferred. |
| B.7 |
|
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sun Export Corporation v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (SC)/(1997) 6 SCC 564 – 1997-VIL-15-SC-CU held that: |
“There cannot be any doubt that the ratio in Sun Export Case (supra) that, if two views are possible in interpreting the exemption notification, the one favourable to the assessee in the matter of taxation has to be preferred. This principle created confusion and resulted in unsatisfactory state of law. In spite of catena of judgments of this Court, which took the contra view, holding that an exemption notification must be strictly construed, and if a person claiming exemption does not fall strictly within the description of the notification otherwise then he cannot claim exemption”.
| B.8 |
|
The characterization of the Appellant’s services as mere “operation and management” or taxable managerial services is erroneous and unsustainable, as it disregards the essential clinical nature of the services and the Appellant’s responsibility towards medical outcomes and patient care. |
| B.9 |
|
In Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd. (SC)/(1990) 4 SCC 256 = 2002-TIOL-454-SC-CX – 1990-VIL-05-SC-CE), it was pointed out that an exemption notification should be construed strictly at the threshold. But once the exception/exemption is applicable, then a liberal construction must be adopted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that: |
“”4. Entitlement of exemption depends on construction of the expression “any factory commencing production” used in the Table extracted above. Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly cither because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principle requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction. Therefore, the first exercise that has to be undertaken is if the production of packing and wrapping material in the factory as it existed prior to 1964 is covered in the notification.”
| B.10 |
|
That, as per the terms of the Agreement governing the project, the Appellant is contractually obligated to deploy and maintain the entire medical and paramedical staff required for operation of the UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, including doctors, nurses, and other healthcare personnel, all of whom are appointed and retained on the payroll of the Appellant. These personnel are engaged exclusively for the purpose of rendering healthcare services to patients at such Government health facilities, thereby clearly establishing that the Appellant is itself operating as a clinical establishment providing healthcare services. By way of illustration, the Appellant has appointed Medical Officers and nursing staff under formal employment arrangements, wherein their duties expressly include diagnosis, treatment, nursing care, and other healthcare-related functions at UHWCs, now renamed UAAM. Further, the Appellant also bears the financial responsibility of disbursing salaries and wages to such personnel, as evidenced by bank payment records reflecting regular salary transfers to doctors, nurses, and supporting staff. Copy of Sample appointment letters and payroll/payment records of doctors and staff engaged for UHWCs, now renamed UAAM/polyclinics, are annexed hereto and enclosed as Annexure-I. |
These facts unequivocally demonstrate that the Appellant is not merely a contractor or intermediary, but is directly engaged in the provision of healthcare services through duly qualified medical professionals forming part of its organizational structure.
C. ERRONEOUS AND UNDULY RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM “RECIPIENT” LEADING TO MISAPPLICATION OF SECTION 2(31) OF THE CGST ACT, 2017
| C.1 |
|
The Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has fundamentally erred in holding that M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. is the “recipient” of services merely on the ground that it disburses payments to the Appellant. This conclusion is based on an incomplete and mechanical application of Section 2(93) of the CGST Act, without appreciating the broader statutory framework and the factual matrix of the transaction. The AAR has failed to consider that Braithwaite has been appointed as an operating agency by the State Government under the 15th Finance Commission framework and performs only an administrative and financial channelising function, operating strictly within the Government-approved grant structure. It neither consumes nor benefits from the healthcare services rendered by the Appellant and therefore cannot be treated as the true recipient in substance. |
| C.2 |
|
That the impugned ruling overlooks the express provision under Section 2(31) of the CGST Act, which defines consideration to include payments made “by any other person” in respect of a supply. |
| C.3 |
|
Section 2(31) & 2(93) of the CGST Act, which defines consideration & recipient respectively, is reproduced below as: |
(31) “consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes-
(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government;
(b) the monetary value of any act or forbearance, in respect of, in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government:
Provided that a deposit given in respect of the supply of goods or services or both shall not be considered as payment made for such supply unless the supplier applies such deposit as consideration for the said supply;
(93) “recipient” of supply of goods or services or both, means-
(a) where a consideration is payable for the supply of goods or services or both, the person who is liable to pay that consideration;
(b) where no consideration is payable for the supply of goods, the person to whom the goods are delivered or made available, or to whom possession or use of the goods is given or made available; and
(c) where no consideration is payable for the supply of a service, the person to whom the service is rendered, and any reference to a person to whom a supply is made shall be construed as a reference to the recipient of the supply and shall include an agent acting as such on behalf of the recipient in relation to the goods or services or both supplied;
| C.4 |
|
That a conjoint reading of Sections 2(31) and 2(93) of the CGST Act clearly establishes that the person making payment need not necessarily be the actual recipient of services, as consideration may flow from “any other person” while the recipient remains the person to whom the service is actually rendered; thus, in the present case, even if payments are disbursed by M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd., the real and substantive recipients of the healthcare services are the patients/beneficiaries availing diagnosis, treatment and care at the UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, and the Government which has entrusted the Appellant with the discharge of public health functions; therefore, the impugned ruling, which equates the payer with the recipient without examining the true nature of supply and the end-use of services, is legally untenable and contrary to the express statutory scheme. The AAR, by ignoring these provisions, has incorrectly equated the payer with the recipient and has thereby misapplied the statutory definition. |
| C.5 |
|
The factual matrix clearly demonstrates that the actual recipients/beneficiaries of healthcare services are the patients who visit the UHWCs, now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics for diagnosis, treatment, and preventive care. The Appellant provides comprehensive healthcare services directly to such patients through qualified medical professionals, and all services are rendered free of cost, with no charges levied at any stage. Braithwaite does not receive, consume, or utilize any healthcare service and does not exercise any control over clinical decisions or treatment. The AAR has thus ignored the real flow of services and has instead relied solely on the payment mechanism, leading to an incorrect determination of the recipient. |
| C.6 |
|
The documents on record clearly establish that Braithwaite’s role is limited to that of an executing/implementing agency responsible for tendering, contracting, monitoring, and disbursing funds under the Government scheme. The Memorandum of Understanding explicitly provides that the entire project is funded through the 15th Finance Commission health grants, and that Braithwaite must operate strictly within the sanctioned budget and guidelines, without deriving any independent commercial benefit. It does not render healthcare services, does not receive such services, and does not have any authority to charge patients. In substance, it acts as a fiduciary conduit for Government funds rather than as a commercial recipient of services. The AAR has failed to appreciate this critical distinction. |
| C.7 |
|
Healthcare services by a clinical establishment are exempt regardless of whether the consideration is paid by insurance companies, corporate employers, or government schemes, because the exemption depends on the nature of supply, not the payer identity. |
| C.8 |
|
That the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has gravely erred in adopting a contract-centric approach by placing undue reliance on the Operation & Management Agreement with M/s Braithwaite & Company Limited, instead of examining the true nature and substance of the activity. It is a settled principle of law that taxability must be determined based on the real nature of the transaction and not merely on contractual form or flow of consideration. In the present case, the substance of the activity is the provision of healthcare services through Government healthcare facilities, and the presence of an intermediary executing agency does not alter the essential character of the supply. |
| C.9 |
|
Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mc Dowell & Co. Ltd. v. Commercial tax Officer [1985] 22 154 ITR 148 (SC)/((1985) 3 SCC 230 – 1985-VIL-02-SC-CB), wherein it was held that taxability must be determined based on the real nature and substance of the transaction rather than its form or artificial structuring. |
| C.10 |
|
The arrangement in the present case is consistent with well-recognized healthcare delivery models where: Government agencies, insurers, or employers fund healthcare services, and patients receive services without direct payment. The MoU/Agreement clearly show that the Appellant operates within a grantbased funding model, with payments linked to public health objectives and subject to utilization certificates and audit requirements. Such structures inherently involve separation between payer and beneficiary. The AAR’s reasoning, if accepted, would render all such models taxable, which is contrary to both legislative intent and administrative practice. |
| C.11 |
|
Without prejudice to the submissions, reliance is placed on CBIC Circular No. 190/02/2023-GST dated 13.01.2023, wherein the Board has categorically clarified that incentives paid by the Government (MeitY) to acquiring banks under the RuPay/UPI scheme are not consideration for any supply made to the Government, but are “in the nature of subsidy directly linked to the price of the service”, and therefore do not form part of the taxable value in terms of Section 2(31) read with Section 15 of the CGST Act, 2017. |
| C.12 |
|
The relevant clarification expressly records that even where payment is made by the Government to a service provider, such payment would not ipso facto constitute consideration for a supply to the Government, if the underlying service is rendered to third-party beneficiaries and the Government merely facilitates or incentivizes such services. This position is fully supported by the statutory framework. Section 2(31) of the CGST Act defines “consideration” to include payments made by any person, but expressly excludes “any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government”. Further, Section 15 governing valuation of supply provides that only consideration forms part of the value, and subsidies provided by the Government are specifically excluded from the taxable value. |
| C.13 |
|
A conjoint reading of the above provisions makes it abundantly clear that where amounts are paid by the Government as financial support for implementation of public welfare schemes, without there being any quid pro quo supply to the Government itself, such payments cannot be treated as consideration for a taxable supply. |
| C.14 |
|
Applying the above legal position to the facts of the present case, it is submitted that the Appellant provides healthcare services directly to patients/beneficiaries under a government-mandated public health scheme, and such services are rendered entirely free of cost to the public without any commercial consideration flowing either from the patients or the Government. The payments received by the Appellant are strictly in the nature of budgeted grants routed through a government executing agency, solely for the purpose of operationalizing public healthcare infrastructure under the scheme. The Government (or the PSU) neither receives nor consumes any healthcare service; rather, it merely facilitates and enables the delivery of such services to the public at large. Accordingly, the payments received by the Appellant are squarely covered by the principle laid down in the aforesaid Circular, being in the nature of a subsidy directly linked to the cost of service delivery, and not consideration for any independent supply made to the Government or to M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. |
| C.15 |
|
The impugned ruling, however, proceeds on the erroneous assumption that any payment made by the Government or its agency necessarily constitutes consideration for a supply, without examining the true nature, purpose, and statutory treatment of such payments. This approach is contrary to both the express provisions of Sections 2(31) and 15 of the CGST Act as well as the binding clarification issued by the CBIC. |
| C.16 |
|
It is a settled position in law that Circulars issued by the CBIC are binding on the departmental authorities, and the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority could not have taken a view contrary to the clarification issued therein. The failure to apply the ratio of the said Circular vitiates the impugned ruling. |
| C.17 |
|
Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CCE, Patna v. Usha Martin Industries 505/[1997] 94 ELT 460 (SC) – 1997-VIL-29-SC-CE, wherein it has been categorically held that the Revenue cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the instructions issued by the Board, and while an assessee may challenge such instructions, the Department is bound by them. |
| C.18 |
|
That the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has erred in its interpretation and application of Circular No. 190/02/2023-GST and has proceeded on an incorrect factual and legal premise in holding that the payments received by the Appellant from M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited constitute consideration arising out of a contractual obligation. The Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has failed to appreciate the true nature and structure of the transaction, wherein M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited is not an independent commercial recipient, but merely an executing agency appointed by the UDD, Government of Uttarakhand, for implementation, operation and monitoring of 115 UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and 23 Polyclinics under a Government health programme with an approved project cost of approximately Rs. 81.57 crores. |
| C.19 |
|
As per Clause 11 of the MoU, it is explicitly provided that all activities under the project are to be carried out strictly within the grant amount recommended and approved by the Government of Uttarakhand under the 15th Finance Commission framework, thereby clearly establishing that the funds in question are in the nature of a government grant-in-aid earmarked for public healthcare delivery. The mere routing of such funds through an executing agency for administrative convenience and efficient implementation does not alter the intrinsic character of the payment. The Authority’s conclusion that the absence of direct payment from the State Government negates the nature of the grant is legally untenable, as the substance of the transaction must prevail over its form. |
| C.20 |
|
The Impugned ruling, by disregarding the underlying Government scheme and treating the executing agency as the recipient in a commercial sense, adopts a form-over-substance approach which is contrary to settled principles of taxation law, and consequently arrives at an erroneous conclusion that the amounts received are liable to GST. |
| C.21 |
|
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the amounts received by the Appellant under the Government healthcare scheme are in the nature of non-taxable subsidies, and therefore do not constitute consideration for any taxable supply. On this ground alone, the impugned ruling deserves to be set aside. |
D. GRANT RECEIVED BY THE APPELLANT IS IN THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY AND IS PER SE OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF SUPPLY, CONSIDERATION, AND TAXABILITY UNDER THE CGST ACT
| D.1 |
|
That the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has erred in law and on facts in treating the amounts received by the Appellant under the Government healthcare scheme as “consideration” liable to GST, without appreciating that the said amounts are in the nature of a Government grant-in-aid/subsidy and are per-se outside the scope of supply, valuation, and taxability under the CGST Act. The finding of the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority proceeds on a fundamental misunderstanding of the statutory provisions as well as the nature of the transaction. |
| D.2 |
|
That it is a settled position of law that GST is leviable only on “supply” in terms of Section 7 read with Section 9 of the CGST Act, and the value of such supply is to be determined in accordance with Section 15 of the CGST Act. Further, as per the definition of “consideration” under Section 2(31) of the CGST Act, any subsidy given by the Central Government or a State Government is expressly excluded from the ambit of consideration. Similarly, Section 15(2)(c) of the CGST Act also excludes subsidies provided by the Central or State Government from the value of supply. Thus, amounts in the nature of Government grants or subsidies are statutorily kept outside the scope of taxation under GST. |
| D.3 |
|
That the word “subsidy” is not defined under the CGST Act. Accordingly, reliance is placed on the dictionary meaning of the same and as defined under other acts, so as to understand the scope and nature of the said term. |
According to the Black Law Dictionary – A grant of money made by government in aid of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a proper subject for state aid, because likely to be of benefit to the public.
In ‘Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 40’ subsidy is described as follows:
“A subsidy is a grant of funds or property from a government as of the state or municipal corporation to a private person or company to assist to the establishment or support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public; a subvention”.
As per section 2(x) of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 the term ‘subsidy’ is defined as follows:
‘subsidy” means any form of aid, support, grant, subvention, or appropriation, in cash or kind, to an individual or a group of individuals and includes such other subsidies as may be notified by the Central Government’
| D.4 |
|
That the emphasis in each of the above definitions on ‘subsidy’ is on something given by the Government to assist in the establishment or support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public. Further, it is not the nomenclature of the amount but its underlying purpose and intent that shall determine whether the same is in the nature of a subsidy or not. |
| D.5 |
|
That even as per the definition provided under the Aadhar Act (supra), the grant provided by the government is clearly included in the definition of the term ‘subsidy’. Further, while interpreting the said definition, the five judge constitutional bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court inJustice K.S. Puttaswamy (RETD.) v. Union of India (SC)/((2019) 1 SCC (2019) 1 Supreme Court Cases 1) held in para 376 to 379 that all amounts which are charged on the consolidated fund are included in the definition of the term ‘subsidy’. |
| D.6 |
|
Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mepco Industries Ltd. v. CIT [2009] 1 319 ITR 208 (SC)/(2009 (248) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)) wherein it was held that the government grants different types and natures of subsidy depending upon the requirement of the underlying public purpose. The relevant text of the said para from the judgement is thus: |
“7. On the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the present case involves change of opinion. In this connection, it must be noted that Government grants different types of subsidies to the entrepreneurs. The subsidy in Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited (supra) was an incentive subsidy linked to production. In fact, in Sahney Steel and Press Works Limited (supra) [at page 257], this Court categorically stated that the Scheme in hand was an incentive Scheme and it was not a Scheme for setting up the industries. In the said case, the salient features of the Scheme were examined and it was noticed that the Scheme formulated by the Government of Andhra Pradesh was admissible only after the commencement of production. In Income Tax matters, one has to examine the nature of the item in question, which would depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, we are concerned with power subsidy whereas in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Limited, reported in [2008] 306 I.T.R. 392, the subsidy given by the Government was for re-paying loans. Therefore, in each case, one as to examine the nature of subsidy.”
| D.7 |
|
Similarly, in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (2018) 12 SCC 518, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the grant of subsidy is a matter of privilege; to be extended by the Government, it cannot be claimed as of right. |
| D.8 |
|
In Commissioner ofCCE, Bangalore v. Mazagon Dock Ltd. [2005] 187 ELT 3 (SC) – 2005-VIL-15-SC-CE), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that subsidy received from the government would not form part of the transaction value held: |
“7. Thus under Section 4 read with Rule 5 in cases like the present where price was not the sole consideration the amount in money value of any additional consideration is includable in the value. However, the additional consideration must be directly or indirectly from the buyer to the assessee. In this case it is to be seen that the subsidy was as per the policy of the Government. The subsidy of 20% was paid by the Government, 10% was paid by the buyer. In our view the subsidy of 20% from the Government cannot be said to be additional consideration as it is not received from the buyer either directly or indirectly. Therefore, that would not be includable in the price of the goods for the purposes of excise.”
| D.9 |
|
That the Appellate Authority for Advance Ruling Maharashtra in Jayshankar Gramin and Adivasi Vikas Sanstha, In re [2022] 143 2023] 69 GSTL 410 (AAAR-MAHARASHTRA) – 2022-VIL-75-AAAR observed as under- |
19. Now, we would like to refer to the definition or the term “consideration” as provided under section 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017, which reads as under:
“consideration” in relation to the supply of goods or services or both includes-
(a) any payment made or to be made, whether in money or otherwise, in respect of in response to, or for the inducement of, the supply of goods or services or both, whether by the recipient or by any other person but shall not include any subsidy given by the Central Government or State Government;
(b) xx xx xx
20. On perusal of the aforesaid definition of the term “consideration”, it is seen that the term “consideration” shall not include any “subsidy” given by the Central Government or State Government. Now, we would like to dissect as to whether the reimbursement amount received by the Appellant from the Women and Child Development Department of the Government of Maharashtra can be construed as subsidy or otherwise. In this regard, we would like to understand the meaning of the term “subsidy”. Here, it is seen that the term “subsidy” has not been defined under the CGST Act, 2017. In such case, we will have to resort to the dictionary meaning of the term “subsidy”.
Meaning of “Subsidy” as per the “Merriam-Webster” Dictionary:
a grant or gift of money : such as –
a :a sum of money formerly granted by the British Parliament to the crown and raised by special taxation;
b :money granted by one state to another;
c :a grant by a government to a private person or company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public.
Meaning of “Subsidy” as per “dictionary.com”:
a direct pecuniary aid furnished by a government to a private industrial undertaking, a charity organization, or the like;
a sum paid, often in accordance with a treaty, by one government to another to secure some service in return;
a grant or contribution of money;
money formerly granted by the English Parliament to the crown for special needs;
21. On perusal of the aforesaid dictionary meanings of the term “subsidy”, it is apparent that any money/amount granted by a government to any private person or company for undertaking any charitable activities, which are beneficial to the public, will be construed as subsidy. In the present case, the Appellant are being granted a fixed amount of money from the Government of Maharashtra under the “One Stop Crises Centre Scheme” for taking overall care of the destitute women who are litigating divorce, or homeless, or the victims of domestic violence. The said activities undertaken by the Appellant are clearly for the welfare of these destitute women, and thereby, serving the mankind in general. Hence, we are of the opinion that the said amount of money reimbursed by the government to the Appellant is nothing but subsidy as the entire money is being spent in the activities which are advantageous to the public.
22. Now, once it has been established that the subject amount reimbursed by the government to the Appellant is in the nature of subsidy, it is concluded that the said reimbursement amount cannot be construed as “consideration” in terms of its definition provided under Section 2(31) of the CGST Act, 2017, which has been reproduced hereinabove.
23. Further, in absence of any consideration, it is opined that the subject transactions/activities undertaken by the Appellant, wherein they are providing various assistances, such as food, shelter, legal assistances, medical assistances, etc., to the destitute women, would not be construed as supply in terms of Section 7(1)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017, which stipulates that for any transactions/activities to be considered as supply, there has to be an element of “consideration”. In absence of the same, such transactions/activities will not be considered as “supply”.
25. In view of the above discussions and findings, we pass the following order:
ORDER
26. We, hereby, set aside the Ruling passed by the MAAR vide Order No. GST-ARA-97/2019-20/B-91, dated 10-11-2021, Jayshankar Gramin v. Adivasi Vikas Sanstha, In re 2022] 89 GST 99/57 GSTL 148 (AAR – MAHARASHTRA) – 2021 -VIL-417-AAR by holding that since the impugned activities undertaken by the Appellant are not construed as “supply” in terms of Section 7(1)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017, the reimbursement amount paid by the Maharashtra Government to the Appellant for undertaking the activities specified under “One Stop Crises Centre Scheme” floated by the Central Government, will not be subject to the levy of GST.
| D.10 |
|
That applying the ratio of the above judgements to the present facts, the funds received by the Appellant originate from Government grants sanctioned under the 15th Finance Commission framework for the specific purpose of strengthening public healthcare infrastructure through UHWCs, now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics. The said amounts are not in the nature of commercial consideration for any independent supply, but are financial support extended by the Government to enable implementation of a public welfare scheme. The mere routing of such funds through an executing agency does not alter their essential character as a government subsidy. |
| D.11 |
|
That it is pertinent to note that the character of a subsidy is to be determined based on its purpose and intent, and not on the nomenclature or the mechanism of disbursement. In the present case, the entire funding is earmarked for providing free healthcare services to the public at large, which is a function intrinsically beneficial to society and squarely falls within the domain of Government welfare activities. Accordingly, such grants clearly qualify as “subsidy” in substance, being financial assistance extended by the Government for carrying out activities in the public interest. |
| D.12 |
|
In Circular No. 983/7/2014-CX., dated 10.07.2014 [2014 (305) E.L.T. T3], it was clarified by the Board under the excise regime that fertilizer subsidy paid by the Government to a manufacturer as a result of public policy is not includible in the assessable value. |
| D.13 |
|
It is submitted that Section 15(2)(c) of the CGST Act is nothing but a legislative recognition of the principles deducted by the Hon’ble Courts, as well as Board clarification issued under the erstwhile excise laws. The crux of the same being that the subsidy provided by the Central or State Governments is outside the ambit of transaction value. Thus, the said grant or subsidy, even though provided against taxable service, is not to be included in the transaction value. |
| D.14 |
|
That once it is established that the amounts received are in the nature of a government subsidy, the same cannot be treated as “consideration” in terms of Section 2(31) of the CGST Act, and in the absence of consideration, the essential ingredient of “supply” under Section 7 is not satisfied. Consequently, such transactions fall outside the ambit of GST perse and cannot be subjected to tax by adopting an artificial or extended interpretation. |
E. FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE TRUE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION AS A ‘COMPOSITE SUPPLY’ IN TERMS OF SECTION 2(30) READ WITH SECTION 8 OF THE CGST ACT, 2017
| E.1 |
|
At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has failed to appreciate that the services rendered by the Appellant constitute an integrated and indivisible bundle of activities, as clearly borne out from the contractual documents on record. The scope of work mandates the Appellant to undertake end-to-end operation of UHWCs, now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics, including the establishment of infrastructure, deployment of medical and paramedical personnel, provision of diagnostics, pharmacy services, treatment facilities, and community healthcare functions. These elements are not independent or optional services but are required to be performed in conjunction to ensure delivery of comprehensive healthcare. The Agreement further requires the Appellant to ensure fully functional centers with consultation rooms, diagnostic facilities, a pharmacy, and treatment spaces, thereby evidencing that all components are intrinsically linked and form a single supply. |
| E.2 |
|
It is submitted that the bundle of services provided by the Appellant is naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business of operating healthcare facilities. Healthcare delivery necessarily involves a combination of: Medical Consultation, Diagnostic Testing, Supply of Medicines, Nursing and Paramedical Support, Use of infrastructure and equipment. The documents demonstrate that the Appellant provides preventive, promotive, curative, rehabilitative, and palliative care, along with free drugs and diagnostics as part of a unified healthcare framework. These components cannot be separated without destroying the essential character of the service. The AAR has failed to recognise this inherent bundling and has incorrectly treated each component as an independent supply. |
| E.3 |
|
That under Section 2(30) of the CGST Act, “composite supply” means two or more naturally bundled supplies supplied in conjunction with each other in the ordinary course of business, one of which is a principal supply. Section 2(30) of the CGST Act, which defines composite supply, is reproduced below: |
(30) “composite supply” means a supply made by a taxable person to a recipient consisting of two or more taxable supplies of goods or services or both, or any combination thereof, which are naturally bundled and supplied in conjunction with each other in the ordinary course of business, one of which is a principal supply.
Illustration: Where goods are packed and transported with insurance, the supply of goods, packing materials, transport and insurance is a composite supply and supply of goods is a principal supply;
| E.4 |
|
It is respectfully submitted that on a proper application of Section 2(30) of the CGST Act, the principal supply in the present case is unequivocally a healthcare service. The dominant intention of the arrangement, as evident from the Agreement and Government scheme, is to provide medical care to the public. All other elements, including infrastructure, manpower deployment, diagnostics, and consumables, are merely ancillary and incidental to this principal objective. The Appellant does not provide any standalone operational or managerial service independent of healthcare delivery. The AAR has failed to identify the principal supply and has incorrectly elevated incidental elements to the status of the main supply. |
| E.5 |
|
The MoU/Agreement establishes that there is no separate or independent supply of individual components such as manpower, infrastructure, medicines, or diagnostics to M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited or the Government. The Agreement does not provide for separate pricing or delivery of such components as standalone supplies. Instead, the consideration is structured as recurring and non-recurring operational costs per center, which merely reflect cost elements of running healthcare facilities. Medicines and consumables are provided directly to patients as part of treatment, and there is no transfer of such goods to Braithwaite. This further reinforces that the supply is a single composite healthcare service and not multiple independent supplies. |
| E.6 |
|
The Appellant submits that the operation of these centers through nationally recognized health information systems such as e-Hospital, e-Sushrut, and the Integrated Health Information Platform (IHIP) clearly establishes that the services are not standalone or commercial in nature but are fully integrated into the public healthcare infrastructure of the country. The use of these platforms ensures standardized medical reporting, disease surveillance, and continuity of patient care, which are hallmarks of a structured healthcare delivery system. |
| E.7 |
|
Section 8 of the CGST Act clearly provides that the tax liability on a composite supply shall be determined in accordance with the principal supply. Once it is established that healthcare service is the principal supply, the entire composite supply must necessarily take on the tax treatment applicable to healthcare services, which are exempt under Entry 74 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. The AAR has disregarded this statutory mandate and has instead artificially segregated the components of the supply, which is impermissible in law. The AAR has erred in law by artificially dissecting the supply and misclassifying it as operational services. The impugned finding is thus unsustainable and liable to be set aside. |
| E.8 |
|
Without prejudice to the above, the reliance placed by the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority on rulings relating to manpower supply or hospital management services is wholly misplaced and distinguishable on facts, as in those cases, the supplier was not itself a clinical establishment providing diagnosis, treatment, or care to patients, but merely providing support or administrative services to another healthcare provider. In the present case, the Appellant itself operates the clinical establishments and directly provides healthcare services to patients, and therefore, such rulings have no application. |
| E.9 |
|
That the impugned ruling is vitiated on account of the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority placing reliance on certain case laws and judicial precedents which are neither properly cited nor verifiable, and appear to be based on uncorroborated or non-existent references, without providing any citation, source, or legal basis. Such an approach is contrary to settled principles governing quasi-judicial orders, which mandate that reliance must be placed only on authentic, traceable, and legally recognised precedents. |
| E.10 |
|
The case is uncited and non-existent on diligent research across all recognised databases. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in J M Jain v. Union of India [2026] 113 GST 529 (Delhi)/(MANU/DE/9166/2025) has cautioned against government departments citing AI-generated fake judgments, quashing SCNs for such lapses. |
| E.11 |
|
The Appellant respectfully submits that the “operation and monitoring” components of the contract cannot be artificially segregated and treated as independent or taxable administrative services. These elements are intrinsically linked to and form an essential part of a composite supply whose principal supply is the provision of healthcare services. The entire contractual arrangement is structured to ensure effective delivery of medical services, and therefore, the ancillary elements of operation and monitoring must take the tax character of the principal supply, which is exempt. |
F. IMPROPER AND ERRONEOUS DENIAL OF EXEMPTION UNDER ENTRY 3 OF THE CGST SERVICES EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION BY WRONGFULLY EXCLUDING SERVICES QUALIFYING AS ‘PURE SERVICES’ PROVIDED TO A STATE GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO FUNCTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 243W OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
| F.1 |
|
F.1 At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has erred in rejecting the applicability of Entry 3 by failing to correctly appreciate the legal status of M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited as a Government Entity. The MoU/Agreement clearly establish that M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited is a 100% Government of India PSU, wholly owned and controlled by the Government, and has been specifically designated as the operating agency for the implementation of UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics under the 15th Finance Commission framework. |
| F.2 |
|
The relevant entry is reproduced below for reference: |
| Sl. No. |
Chapter, Section, Heading, Group or Service Code (Tariff) |
Description of Services |
Rate (per cent.) |
Condition |
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
| 3 |
Chapter 99 |
Pure services (excluding works contract service or other composite supplies involving supply of any goods) provided to the Central Government, State Government or Union territory or local authority by way of any activity in relation to any function entrusted to a Panchayat under article 243G of the Constitution or in relation to any function entrusted to a Municipality under article 243W of the Constitution. |
Nil |
Nil |
The relevant extract of the Article is reproduced below for your perusal:
“243W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Municipalities, etc.
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow-
a. the Municipalities with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Municipalities, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to
i. the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;
ii. the performance of functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule;
b. the Committees with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule.”
The Twelfth Schedule to the Constitution of India is reproduced below: –
| 1. |
|
Urban planning including town planning. |
| 2. |
|
Regulation of land-use and construction of buildings. |
| 3. |
|
Planning for economic and social development. |
| 5. |
|
Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes. |
| 6. |
|
Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management. |
| 8. |
|
Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of ecological aspects. |
| 9. |
|
Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of society, including the handicapped and mentally retarded. |
| 10. |
|
Slum improvement and upgradation. |
| 11. |
|
Urban poverty alleviation. |
| 12. |
|
Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, playgrounds. |
| 13. |
|
Promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects. |
| 14. |
|
Burials and burial grounds; cremations, cremation grounds; and electric crematoriums. |
| 15. |
|
Cattle pounds; prevention of cruelty to animals. |
| 16. |
|
Vital statistics including registration of births and deaths. |
| 17. |
|
Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences. |
| 18. |
|
Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries.” |
| F.3 |
|
Further, any exemption notification has to be interpreted based on the language used therein. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hemraj Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Asst. CCE & Customs 1978 (2) ELT J 350 (SC) – 1964-VIL-14-SC-CE] laid down the principle as follows: |
“It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority”.
| F.4 |
|
The principle relating to the interpretation of notification was again considered and enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilisers Ltd. v. Deputy CCTes [1991] 55 ELT 437 (SC) – 1991-VIL-06-SC wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: – |
“It appears to us the true rule of construction of a provision as to exemption is the one sated by this Court in Union of India & OINR v. Wood Papers Ltd., & Ors (1991 JT (1) 151 at 155 – 1990-VIL-05-SC-CE)”….. Truly, speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in the nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction.”
| F.5 |
|
F.5 It is respectfully submitted that the findings of the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority in denying the benefit of exemption under Entry 3 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification are based on an erroneous and overly narrow interpretation of the contractual arrangement, and therefore deserve to be set aside. The Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has incorrectly concluded that the Appellant is acting as a sub-contractor to M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and not providing services to the State Government. This finding is factually and legally unsustainable. The project in question originates from the State Government, wherein the UDD, Government of Uttarakhand, entered into an MoU with M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited as an executing agency for the implementation of the Government healthcare scheme under the 15th Finance Commission framework. Thereafter, tenders were floated, and the Appellant was selected through a competitive bidding process to operate and manage the UHWCs, now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics. Thus, the Appellant is not a sub-contractor in a commercial sense, but an operating agency engaged in furtherance of a government function, with the executing agency merely acting as a supervisory and administrative conduit. |
| F.6 |
|
The Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has failed to appreciate that the mere routing of funds through an executing agency for administrative convenience and efficient implementation does not alter either the nature of the services or the identity of the ultimate recipient, which in the present case remains the State Government. The role of M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited is limited to monitoring, coordination and disbursement within the framework prescribed by the State Government, and it neither consumes the services nor alters their character. Therefore, the conclusion that services are not provided to the Government is based on a superficial reading of the contractual structure and ignores the substance of the arrangement. |
| F.7 |
|
Further, the services provided by the Appellant squarely qualify as “pure services” within the meaning of Entry 3 of the CGST services Exemption Notification, as they are in relation to functions entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution, namely public health, hospitals and dispensaries. The term “in relation to” is interpreted by the Courts in various judicial precedents. |
| F.8 |
|
Reliance is placed on the judgement given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Karnataka v. Azad Coach Builders (P.) Ltd. 2006] 196 ELT 135 (SC) – 2010-VIL-12-SC-CB) wherein it was held that the phrase “in relation to” is comprehensive and not restrictive. The relevant portion of the judgement is reproduced below: |
“The expression ‘in relation to’ are words of comprehensiveness, which might both have a direct significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the context in which it is used and they are not words of restrictive content and ought not be so construed.”
| F.9 |
|
Further reliance is also placed on the ruling given by AAR, Gujarat in the matter of in Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service, In re [ AAR – GUJARAT)/(Advance Ruling No. GUJ/GAAR/R/13/2021 dated January 27, 2021) – 2021-VIL-204-AAR, wherein it was held that the term ‘in relation to’ is very wide and the intention of the legislature is to encompass all those services which are provided so as to enable the organization to perform function entrusted in Article 243W of Constitution of India. |
“70. We find that the term ‘in relation to’ used in above exemption is very much wide enough to cover every kind of services that results in performance of the functions as mentioned in Article 243W of the Constitution Of India either directly or indirectly. Even the services provided for enabling the organization to perform defined functions would also be covered as a reason of usage of words ‘in relation to’. To substantiate this, we refer to the judgement of Doypack Systems (P.) Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that, the expression “in relation to” (so also “pertaining to”), is a very broad expression which presupposes another subject matter. These are words of comprehensiveness which might both have a direct significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the context. It also held that the expression “in relation to” has been interpreted to the words of wisest amplitude. The term “relating to” expands the scope of the entry. The terms have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (SC) – 1991-VIL-03-SC-CE-LB and Union of India v. Ahmedabad Electricity Co. Ltd. SC) – 2003-VIL-10-SC-CE, wherein it has been held that such words widen and expand the scope, meaning and content of expressions.
71. Thus, from above, it can be stated that the term ‘in relation to’ is very wide and the intention of the legislature is to encompass all those services which are provided so as to enable the organization to perform function entrusted in Article 243W of Constitution of India.”
| F.10 |
|
That applying the aforesaid statutory framework to the facts of the present case, it is respectfully submitted that the Appellant squarely satisfies all the essential conditions prescribed under Entry 3 of CGST Services Exemption Notification, in as much as: |
| (i) |
|
The services rendered by the Appellant are in the nature of “pure services”, being operation and management of Government healthcare facilities without any independent supply of goods in a commercial sense; |
| (ii) |
|
Such services are provided to a Government Entity, namely M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd., which is a 100% Government of India PSU duly designated as the executing/operating agency under the Government healthcare programme; and |
| (iii) |
|
The services are directly in relation to functions entrusted to a Municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution, specifically “public health” as enumerated under the Twelfth Schedule; |
thus, the Appellant’s activities form an integral part of the State’s public healthcare delivery mechanism, executed through a Governmental framework, and therefore clearly fall within the plain language and scope of Entry 3, entitling the Appellant to exemption, which has been erroneously denied in the impugned ruling.
| F.11 |
|
It is respectfully submitted that the impugned ruling is contrary to the clarification issued by the CBIC in Circular No. 51/25/2018-GST dated 31.07.2018, which directly covers and supports the case of the Appellant. The relevant extract of the circular is reproduced below for reference: |
| Service Tax |
GST |
Sl. No. 2:
(i) Health care services by a clinical establishment, an authorized medical practitioner or para-medics;
(ii) Services provided by way of transportation of a patient in an ambulance, other than those specified in (i) above. |
Sl. No. 74:
Services by way of-
(a) health care services by a clinical establishment, an authorized medical practitioner or para-medics;
(b) services provided by way of transportation of a patient in an ambulance, other than those specified in (a) above. |
| F.12 |
|
The aforesaid Circular categorically clarifies that services provided by private service providers to the Government under public health schemes, such as ambulance services under the National Health Mission, are exempt from GST, even where consideration is paid by the Government to such service providers. The Circular thus recognizes that the mere fact of payment by the Government does not alter the essential character of the service or render it taxable. |
| F.13 |
|
It is further clarified therein that such services are to be regarded as services “in relation to public health”, being functions entrusted to Panchayats and Municipalities under Articles 243G and 243W of the Constitution of India, and accordingly qualify for exemption under Entry 3 or Entry 3A of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| F.14 |
|
The Circular also explicitly draws a continuity between the service tax regime and GST, confirming that exemptions relating to healthcare and public health services have been carried forward under GST, thereby reinforcing the legislative intent to exempt such welfare-oriented services. |
| F.15 |
|
Applying the above clarification to the facts of the present case, it is submitted that the services provided by the Appellant, being operation and management of Government UHWCs now renamed UAAM, and Polyclinics under a Government healthcare scheme, are squarely in the nature of public health services rendered under a State-administered Programme. |
| F.16 |
|
The MoU and scheme documents demonstrate that M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited is functionally integrated with the State’s public health administration. It operates under: Supervision of the UDD, Compliance with 15th Finance Commission guidelines, Mandatory reporting, audit, and utilisation certification requirements. This level of control and integration establishes that Braithwaite is not an independent contracting entity but an extension of the Government’s implementation framework. The services provided by the Appellant to such an entity are therefore, in substance, services provided to the Government itself. |
| F.17 |
|
Reliance is placed on the Advance ruling of West Bengal in Mahendra Roy, In re 76 GST 365 (AAR – WEST BENGAL)/(Advance Ruling No. Z4MBAAR 12019-20 dated 23.09.2019) – 2019-VIL-288-AAR, wherein it was held that services relating to lifting, transportation, and disposal of municipal waste provided to a Municipal Corporation qualify as “pure services” and are exempt under Entry 3 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| F.18 |
|
Reliance is also placed on the Advance ruling in Ex Servicemen Resettlement Society, In re AAR – WEST BENGAL)/(WBAAR 22 of 2025-26 dated 10 December 2025) -2025-VIL-213-AAR, wherein it was held that security and scavenging services provided to Government medical colleges and hospitals qualify as “pure services” and are exempt under Entry 3 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. The Authority found that since the applicant supplied only manpower (wages, statutory dues, bonus), the first condition of “pure services” was satisfied. It further held that Government hospitals constitute the State, and that such services are intrinsically connected with public health, sanitation, and hospital functions under Articles 243G and 243W, emphasizing that the phrase “in relation to” has a wide ambit and covers even ancillary/support services essential for running hospitals. Accordingly, even though the services were not core medical treatment, they were treated as integral to public health functions and hence exempt. |
| F.19 |
|
The Government of India’s order dated 25.11.2023 expressly renames the AB-HWCs as “Ayushman Arogya Mandir” and records that these centres are established with infrastructure, human resources, drugs, diagnostics and IT framework for delivery of primary healthcare services to the public. The said order therefore clearly demonstrates that the Appellant’s activities are undertaken as part of the Government’s public health architecture, implementing functions entrusted to the State and local bodies in relation to public health, hospitals and dispensaries under Article 243W of the Constitution, and accordingly fall within Entry 3 of under the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| F.20 |
|
Further, reliance is also placed on the Advance ruling of Odisha in Odisha State Medical Corporation Ltd, In re [2025] 177 (AAR – ODISHA)/(Order No. 04/ ODI SHA-AAR/ 2025-26 dated 10.07.2025) – 2025-VIL-122-AAR wherein it was held that services relating to centralized procurement, warehousing, distribution, and monitoring of medicines and medical supplies for Government healthcare schemes does not constitute “pure services” rendered in relation to public health functions and are therefore not exempt under Entry 3 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. The Appellate Authority vide ruling dated 09.01.2026 set aside the AAR ruling and recognized that OSMCL, being a government-controlled entity implementing a free medical distribution scheme, was performing activities directly connected with public health infrastructure and delivery, and that such functions fall within the ambit of constitutional responsibilities under Articles 243G/243W of the Constitution of India. |
| F.21 |
|
The Appellant is engaged in the operation and management of Government healthcare facilities, which is intrinsically a public health function falling within the Twelfth Schedule. The observation of the Authority that the activities constitute a “composite supply” is also misplaced, as the dominant nature of the supply is provision of healthcare and allied operational services, and any incidental elements such as infrastructure support or manpower deployment do not alter the essential character of the supply as pure services rendered in furtherance of a government function. |
| F.22 |
|
In view of the foregoing facts, statutory provisions, and settled judicial principles, it is respectfully submitted that the impugned ruling suffers from a fundamental misappreciation of both law and facts. The Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has failed to appreciate the true nature of the transaction, the status of the recipient as a Government Entity, and the wide scope of the expression “in relation to” as consistently interpreted by the Hon’ble Courts. The Appellant’s activities are integrally connected with the discharge of public health functions entrusted under Article 243W and are executed within a government-controlled framework without any commercial character. Once the Appellant is found to fall squarely within the plain language of Entry 3, the benefit of exemption cannot be denied by adopting a narrow or artificial interpretation. Accordingly, it is most humbly prayed that the impugned ruling, to the extent it denies exemption under Entry 3, be set aside, and it be held that the services provided by the Appellant are exempt from GST under the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| F.23 |
|
That in view of the facts of the case, contractual framework, statutory provisions, and judicial principles discussed hereinabove, it is evident that the Appellant is engaged in providing healthcare services through Government-owned clinical establishments, which are squarely covered under Entry 74 of the CGST Services Exemption Notification. |
| F.24 |
|
That the Ld. Advance Ruling Authority has erred in law and on facts by incorrectly identifying the recipient of service and by adopting a narrow and erroneous interpretation of the exemption entry, ignoring that the exemption is based on the nature of service and status of supplier, and not on the person making payment. |
| F.25 |
|
That the Impugned Ruling is thus contrary to the statutory scheme, circulars issued by the CBIC, and settled principles of interpretation, and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside in toto. |
| F.26 |
|
That the present appeal is being filed within the prescribed time limit in terms of the applicable provisions of the CGST/SGST Act, and this Hon’ble Appellate Authority has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present appeal, as the Impugned Ruling has been passed by the Authority for Advance Ruling, Uttarakhand. |
| F.27 |
|
That the Appellant craves leave to add, amend, modify, or alter any of the grounds or submissions at the time of personal hearing. |
4. Details of Personal Hearing.
The appellant was granted the opportunity of personal hearing on 30.06.2026. Shri Ashwarya Sharma, Advocate on behalf of the Appellant through video conference attended the personal hearing before both the members (CGST and SGST) on the above scheduled date and reiterated the submissions already made in the Grounds of Appeal. Further during personal hearing, Shri Ashwarya Sharma, inter alia pleaded: –
| • |
|
That the findings of the AAR in the Para 8.3.8 that ‘Therefore, the Applicant has failed to establish that M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited was a patient and that they were supplying healthcare services directly to the recipient i.e. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited. Accordingly, we are of the view that exemption under Entry 74 of the Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 is not admissible to the applicant” is not proper and acceptable as under identical Operation & Management Agreements with the “Executing Agency” i.e. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU), the Appellant is engaged in the operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics as “Operating Agency” for supply the healthcare services to the patients. |
| • |
|
That the consideration is paid by M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU) and not by the patients. But as per definition of ‘consideration’ given under Section 2(31) of CGST Act, 2017 it does not affect to ascertain the nature of service that the consideration is paid by the patients or another person. |
| • |
|
That the Appellant is duly registered as a ‘clinical establishment’ as per Annexure-H attached to the Appeal. |
| • |
|
That the case laws including the case of Sir Ganga Ram Hospital v. CCE [ GSTL 427 (New Delhi – CESTAT) – 2017-VIL-1014-CESTAT-DEL-ST) are already referred to in the Grounds of Appeal in support of their case. |
| • |
|
That the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of Kerala v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent (SC)/(Civil Appeal No. 202 of 2012, decided on 01.03.2021) – 2021-VIL-43-SC has laid down the authoritative principle for interpreting exemption notifications. |
| • |
|
That the GST is not leviable on subsidy as any ‘subsidy’ given by the Central Government or a State Government does not amount to consideration as per Section 2(31) of CGST Act, 2017. The Appellant is received the payment from grant of Government of Uttarakhand through “Executing Agency” i.e. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU). |
| • |
|
That reliance is placed on CBIC Circular No. 190/02/2023-GST dated 13.01.2023, wherein the Board has categorically clarified that incentives paid by the Government (MeitY) to acquiring banks under the RuPay/UPI scheme are not consideration for any supply made to the Government, but are “in the nature of subsidy directly linked to the price of the service”, and therefore do not form part of the taxable value in terms of Section 2(31) read with Section 15 of the CGST Act, 2017. |
| • |
|
That the appellant is running the clinical establishment to provide healthcare services to the patients under identical Operation & Management Agreements with the “Executing Agency” i.e. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU). The interpretation of levy of GST in the instant case as per ruling of AAR is not in accordance with Government objective of affordable healthcare services to the public. |
| • |
|
On query made by a member during the personal hearing that as per the Letter of Intent dated 14.05.2025, total contract value is inclusive of all expenses and 18% of GST, Shri Sharma contended that the mention and non-mention of applicable GST in the agreement made between two persons does not affect the applicability and determination of levy of GST on the services rendered by the person. He also stated that he will prefer to submit an additional submission within one week. |
| • |
|
On another query made by member (SGST) during the personal hearing whether healthcare services are being rendered by the appellant itself or through any sub-agency/sub-letting arrangements, Shri Ashwarya Sharma, Advocate on behalf of the appellant stated that the appellant itself is the operating agency appointed for the operation, implementation and monitoring of the urban Health & wellness Centres and has not sub-let or outsourced the core healthcare services to any third -party agency. He further stated that he will submit an additional submission on this regard also within a week. |
4.1 Additional Submission by the Appellant after Personal Hearing.
The appellant vide their e-mail dated 07.07.2026 submitted additional submission which is being reproduced below-
| A. |
|
MERE REFERENCE TO “APPLICABLE GST / TAXES” IN THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT DETERMINE TAXABILITY; AN AGREEMENT CANNOT OVERRIDE THE GST STATUTE OR EXEMPTION NOTIFICATION |
| A1. |
|
At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that the doubt raised during the course of personal hearing, namely that the contract/LOI refers to “applicable GST” or “taxes as applicable”, does not alter the legal position in the present case. The taxability or exemption of a supply under the GST regime has to be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the CGST Act, 2017, the Uttarakhand GST Act, 2017, and the exemption notification issued thereunder. A contractual clause cannot either create a tax liability where none exists under law, or take away a statutory exemption otherwise available to the Appellant. |
| A2. |
|
The expression “applicable GST” or “taxes as applicable” is, by its very nature, conditional and contingent upon the GST law. It only means that GST shall be charged if, and only if, GST is legally applicable on the supply in question. If the supply is exempt under Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, then the applicable rate of GST is nil, and no contractual reference to taxes can convert an exempt healthcare supply into a taxable supply. |
| A3. |
|
In the present case, the state-PSU MoU itself defines the contract price as inclusive of “applicable GST, and taxes payable”, and further records that the entire proceedings are to be carried out within the grant amount approved by the Government of Uttarakhand under the XV Finance commission framework. The MoU also records that no extra cost would be permissible towards supervision and taxes. These clauses do not establish taxability; rather, they show that the project operates within a fixed Government health-grant envelope and that no additional amount is separately contemplated merely on account of taxes. |
| A4. |
|
It is a settled principle that there can be no estoppel against statute. Parties to a contract cannot, by agreement, concession, quotation, invoice format, tender condition or commercial understanding, determine the classification or taxability of a supply contrary to the CGST Act and the exemption notification. Therefore, even assuming that the Letter of Intent or Agreement refers to GST at 18% or to “applicable GST”, such reference is at best a provisional commercial stipulation and cannot bind this Hon’ble Appellate Authority while deciding the true legal nature of the supply. |
| A5. |
|
The question before this Hon’ble Authority is not whether the contract contains a tax clause, but whether the services actually rendered by the Appellant are covered by the statutory exemption. The Appellant respectfully submits that the principal and dominant supply is the delivery of healthcare services through Government UHWCs/Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics. The Appellant is required to operate healthcare facilities, deploy doctors, specialists, nurses and paramedical staff, provide OPD consultation, diagnostics, medicines, referral services, preventive care, curative care, community outreach and public health functions. These are not independent commercial management services; they are the very content of healthcare delivery. |
| A6. |
|
The impugned ruling therefore errs in treating the contractual payment mechanism and cost heads as determinative of taxability. Under the GST regime, the nature of supply is to be determined from the substance of the activity performed and not merely from the manner in which consideration is routed or from the drafting of commercial clauses. The fact that payment is routed through M/s Braithwaite & co. Limited, a government-nominated executing agency, does not change the character of the services actually rendered by the Appellant to the public through clinical establishments. |
| A7. |
|
It is further respectfully submitted that the Government’s own public policy position is consistent with the exemption claimed by the Appellant. The Government has reiterated that healthcare services provided by doctors, hospitals and diagnostic centres continue to remain exempt under the existing GST regime, and that recent GST reforms are intended to promote affordable healthcare and reduce treatment costs. Levying GST merely because a public healthcare contract mentions “taxes as applicable” would defeat the very object of the exemption. It would create an anomalous and irrational result: substantially similar healthcare services supplied by private hospitals, clinics or diagnostic centres would remain exempt, whereas healthcare services supplied free of cost to poorer and underserved sections of the public through Government-funded UHWCs/Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics would be taxed merely because the Government has implemented the programme through an executing PSU. |
| A8. |
|
Without prejudice, even if the arrangement is viewed as a composite supply involving infrastructure, manpower, diagnostics, medicines and operational elements, the principal supply remains healthcare service. Section 2(30) of the CGST Act defines composite supply as a supply consisting of two or more naturally bundled supplies, one of which is the principal supply. Section 8 mandates that the tax liability on a composite supply shall be determined according to the principal supply. In the present case, all ancillary elements exist only to enable the provision of healthcare services. Therefore, once healthcare is identified as the principal supply, the entire supply must follow the exemption available to healthcare services under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). |
| A9. |
|
The mention of GST in the LOI or Agreement, therefore, cannot be read as an admission by the Appellant that its services are taxable. Taxability is not determined by admission, accounting treatment or contractual drafting. It is determined by statute. If the supply falls within Entry 74 as healthcare services by a clinical establishment, the exemption operates by force of law and cannot be overridden by any clause between M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and the Appellant. |
| A10. |
|
It is also relevant that the project is a Government public health programme funded through grants and implemented through the Urban Development Directorate, with Braithwaite acting only as the nominated executing/implementing agency. The Appellant has no right to charge patients, no independent tariff fixation power and no commercial revenue model from beneficiaries. The services are rendered free of cost to the public. In such circumstances, a generic tax clause in the contract cannot be elevated above the statutory exemption and the public-health character of the transaction. |
| A11. |
|
Accordingly, the reference to “applicable GST”, “taxes payable”, or GST at 18% in the contractual documents is legally neutral. It merely provides for a situation where tax is otherwise payable under law. It does not answer the prior and fundamental question whether GST is payable at all. Since the Appellant’s services qualify as exempt healthcare services, the only legally “applicable” GST in the present case is nil. |
| A12. |
|
In regard to the above, reliance is placed on the case of Devendra Kumar Singh Contractor v. Union of India [2025] 173 109 GST 755/98 GSTL 26 (Allahabad)/MANU/UP/ 1926/2025 , where it was held that the petitioner is liable to discharge the GST liability even if it is contrary to the mutual agreement arrived between the parties. The court reasoned that the petitioner has failed to indicate any notification issued under Section 9 of the Act, which imposes discharge of GST liability on the respondent under the Reverse charge Mechanism (RCM). In the absence of any statutory basis to impose GST liability on the recipient, the same cannot be imposed as per the private agreement between the parties. The above conclusion can be derived from the following paragraph of the judgment. |
“6. The petitioner has failed to indicate any notification issued under Section 9 of the Act having application to the contract in question and therefore, the plea sought to be 6 raised based on the agreement between the parties cannot be countenanced. The indication made in the agreement between the parties can be enforced by the petitioner against, respondent no.3, however, insofar as respondent-State is concerned, the liability to pay the GST is that on the supplier i.e. the petitioner and therefore, the plea raised in this regard has no substance.”
| A13. |
|
Reliance is also placed on the case of State of Karnataka Department of Finance v. Unique Constructions [ 739 (Karnataka)/2026 KHC:28028-DB – 2026-VIL-831-KAR, where the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court held that the contract between the parties cannot alter the statutory scheme for the levy of GST. Thus, the liability of the writ petitioners to pay Goods and Services Tax (whether under the CGST, SGST or the IGST Act) is required to be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the relevant statute. The question of the levy of GST, assessment, recovery, and enforcement is a matter of statutory prescription. The relevant part is reproduced below: |
“10. The dispute as to whether the writ petitioners would, be entitled to reimbursement of incremental tax paid or payable by them on account of the levy of GST is strictly a matter between the writ petitioners and the Employers with whom they had entered into a contract. The contract between the writ petitioners and the employer would not alter the statutory scheme for the levy of GST. Thus, the liability of the writ petitioners to pay Goods and Services Tax (whether under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 or the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017) is required, to be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the relevant statute. The question of the levy of GST, assessment, recovery, and enforcement is a matter of statutory prescription is required to be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the relevant statute. The question of the levy of GST, assessment, recovery, and enforcement is a matter of statutory prescription.”
| A14. |
|
The impugned ruling, to the extent it relies on contractual payment terms, cost heads or tax references to deny exemption, proceeds on an erroneous legal premise and deserves to be set aside. This Hon’ble Appellate Authority may kindly hold that contractual clauses cannot override the CGST Act, the exemption notification, or the true nature of the healthcare services rendered by the Appellant. |
B. HEALTHCARE SERVICES ARE RENDERED BY THE APPELLANT ITSELF AND NOT THROUGH ANY SUB-AGENCY / SUB-LETTING ARRANGEMENT
| B1. |
|
It is submitted that the second doubt raised by the Member (SGST) during the course of personal hearing, namely whether the healthcare services are being rendered by the Appellant itself or through any subagency/sub-letting arrangement, deserves to be answered in favour of the Appellant on the basis of the contractual documents, operational records and actual manner of performance of the project. |
| B2. |
|
At the outset, it is submitted that M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP itself is the operating agency appointed for the operation, implementation and monitoring of the urban Heath & wellness Centres, now renamed as Urban Ayushman Arogya Mandirs, and Polyclinics in the Garhwal region. The Appellant has not sub-let or outsourced the core healthcare services to any third-party agency. The responsibility to operate the healthcare facilities, deploy medical and paramedical personnel, ensure availability of functional clinical infrastructure and provide healthcare services to the public rests directly and exclusively upon the Appellant. |
| B3. |
|
It is further submitted that the UHWCs/UAAMs and polyclinics operated by the Appellant qualify as clinical establishments, being facilities where diagnosis, treatment, consultation, nursing care, medicine, diagnostics, referral services, preventative care, curative care, and allied healthcare services are provided through duly appointed medical practitioners and paramedical staff. The Appellant has also produced clinical establishment registration certificates issued by the competent District Registration Authority / Chief Medical officer, which record the centres as urban Health & Wellness Centre / General OPD and show Indovation Healthcare LLP as the owner/operator of the clinical establishment. |
| B4. |
|
The Appellant respectfully submits that as per the terms of the project, the Appellant is contractually obligated to deploy and maintain the entire medical, paramedical and supporting manpower required for running the UHWCs/UAAMs and Polyclinics. This includes Medical Officers, specialist doctors, nurses, multipurpose workers, counsellors, pharmacists/diagnostic support staff and other required personnel. Such deployment is not an optional or ancillary obligation; it is the very manner in which the Appellant discharges its obligation to provide healthcare services at the Government health facilities. |
| B5. |
|
The Appellant itself appoints and retains such personnel. The doctors, nurses and other healthcare staff are appointed by the Appellant under formal appointment / offer letters / engagement documents. Their duties expressly relate to medical examination, OPD consultation, diagnosis, treatment, nursing care, patient support, and other healthcare functions at the UHWCs/UAAMs and Polyclinics. Thus, the Appellant is not merely arranging a third-party agency to render services; the Appellant is directly operating the clinical establishments through its own appointed personnel. |
| B6. |
|
The financial and administrative control over such personnel also remains with the Appellant. The Appellant bears the responsibility of payment of salaries, wages, professional charges and other staff related expenses. The salary disbursement records, bank payment records and appointment documents demonstrate that the doctors, nurses and supporting staff are engaged by and paid by the Appellant. This clearly establishes that the Appellant is the actual healthcare service provider and not a mere facilitator broker or intermediary. |
| B7. |
|
By way of illustration, the Appellant has appointed Medical officers and nursing staff for the UHWCs/UAAMs under formal employment/engagement arrangements. The duties assigned to such Medical Officers include examination of patients, diagnosis, treatment, providing outpatient care, maintaining medical records, ensuring compliance with standard treatment protocols and rendering healthcare services under the applicable Government / UDD / NHM framework. |
Copy of the Offer letter for Appointment of a Medical Officer (MBBS) at UHWC, sent to one of the appointed candidates of the Appellant with Bank payment records, has been marked and annexed as Annexure A.
Copy of the Offer letter for Appointment of a Staff Nurse (GNM) at UHWC, sent to one of the appointed candidates of the Appellant with Bank payment records, has been marked and annexed as Annexure B.
| B8. |
|
The appointment letters, salary records and bank-payment documents further establish that the medical and nursing personnel are directly engaged and remunerated by the Appellant. Therefore, the Appellant is not merely supplying manpower or coordinating healthcare activities; it is itself operating the clinical establishments and rendering healthcare services to the public. |
| Illustrative activity |
Manner in which it is performed |
Position of the Appellant |
| Operation of UHWCs/Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics |
The centres are operated and managed by the Appellant I accordance with Government guidelines |
Direct operator of the clinical establishments |
| Appointment of doctors and nurses |
Medical Officers, Staff Nurses and other personnel are appointed through offer/ appointment letters issued by the Appellant |
Employer and healthcare-service |
| Payment of personnel |
Salaries wages and professional charges are paid by the Appellant, as evidence by bank-payment records |
Bears financial responsibility for service delivery |
| Clinical services |
Patients are examined, diagnosed and treated by personnel appointed by the Appellant |
Services are rendered through the Appellant’s own establishment |
| Medicines diagnostics and referral services |
These facilities are arranged and administered as part of the Appellant’s operation of the centres |
Integral components of the healthcare service |
| Supervision and compliance |
The Appellant supervises personnel and ensures compliance with prescribed healthcare standards |
Exercises operational and administrative control |
| Relationship with patients |
Patients directly receive services at the centres operated by the Appellant; no third-party agency intervenes |
No outsourcing or sub-letting of core healthcare services |
| B9. |
|
It is respectfully submitted that there is no separate agency standing between the Appellant and the patients for rendering healthcare services. The public visits the UHWCs/UAAMs and Polyclinics operated by the Appellant; the patients are examined by doctors appointed by the Appellant; diagnostics, medicines, treatment, counselling, referral and allied healthcare functions are provided through the Appellant’s own operational setup. Therefore, the actual supply of healthcare services is by the Appellant itself. The actual operation of the centres and act actual delivery of healthcare services at the ground level is carried out by the Appellant through its own appointed staff. |
| B10. |
|
The impugned ruling has erred in not appreciating this distinction. The Appellant is not a manpower supplier and is not a contractor merely arranging staff for Braithwaite. The Appellant is responsible for running functional healthcare centres and ensuring healthcare delivery to the public. The deployment of doctors, nurses and staff is not the end-supply in itself; it is the means through which the Appellant provides healthcare services. |
| B11. |
|
Therefore, the doubt as to whether the healthcare services are rendered by any other agency is fully answered by the factual record. The Appellant directly appoints the personnel, pays them, supervises them, operates the centres, maintains the clinical establishment infrastructure and ensures delivery of healthcare services. Accordingly, the services must be regarded as healthcare, services rendered by the Appellant itself as a clinical establishment, eligible for exemption under Entry No 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). |
| B12. |
|
In view of the above, the Appellant is the actual provider of healthcare services, and the exemption cannot be denied on any assumption that the services are rendered by some third-party agency on behalf of the Appellant |
5. Discussion & Findings.
| 5.1. |
|
The Appellant has contended that the services provided by them may be considered either in terms of Entry No. 74 of the Exemption Notification No. 12/2017 CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as “Health care services by a clinical establishment”; OR in terms of Entry No. 03 of the said Notification as “Pure services” provided to the Government in relation to function under article 243W of the Constitution. |
| 5.2. |
|
In this present matter, in the impugned order dated 17.03.2026, the AAR found that the operation and management of Government Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs) / Ayushman Arogya Mandirs and Polyclinics) by the Applicant under identical Operation & Management Agreements with Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. (PSU- executing agency) does not constitute exempt “healthcare services by a clinical establishment” under Entry 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). The AAR also found that the said activities do not qualify as “pure services” provided to the State Government in relation to Article 243W functions (public health, hospitals, dispensaries – Twelfth Schedule Entries 6, 8, 23), and are therefore not exempt under Entry 3 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate). Accordingly, the services supplied by the Applicant were found liable to GST at the applicable rates under the CGST/SGST Act. |
| 5.3. |
|
We note that the Appellant i.e. M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP (GSTIN 05AAFFI9899G1ZS) operates and manages Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs), now known as Urban Ayushman Aarogya Mandirs (UAAMs) and Polyclinics in State of Uttarakhand under a public healthcare programme funded through grants/budget recommended by the 15th Finance Commission. The programme is implemented by the Urban Development Directorate (UDD), Government of Uttarakhand, through M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited, a Government of India PSU acting as the “Executing Agency”. Healthcare services are provided free of cost to the public and the Appellant being an ‘Operating Agency’ receives payments from Government grants/budget routed through the Executing Agency. |
| 5.4. |
|
As per Letter of Intent dated 14.05.2025, M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited awarded contract and placed an order to the appellant M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP as Operating Agency for ‘Operation & Monitoring of 49 Urban Health and Wellness Centres and 10 Polyclinic Services in the State of Uttarakhand (Garhwal Region UHWC-Part-1) at a total contract value of Rs. 31,28,17,422.60 inclusive of all expenses and 18% of GST for one year. Accordingly, an Agreement dated 27.09.2025, was made between M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP being ‘Operating Agency’ for the implementation, operation, and monitoring of 49 Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWC) and 10 Polyclinics in Garhwal Region UHWC-Part-1, State of Uttarakhand. We observe that in the Agreement dated 27.09.2025, there is no separate or independent supply of individual components such as manpower, infrastructure, medicines, or diagnostics to M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited or the Government. |
| 5.5. |
|
We also observe that ‘Services’ and ‘Scope of Work’ are mentioned in the Agreement dated 27.09.2025 made between M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP which is being reproduced as below: – |
“General Terms-Conditions and definitions
————————————————————
vi. ‘Services’ mean the deliverables that are set out on the scope of work defined in the order placed on Limited Tender and this agreement.
3. Scope of Work. The Operating Agency shall be responsible for ensuring that each Urban Health & Wellness Centre (UHWC) and Polyclinic is equipped with the necessary infrastructure, human resources, and functional capabilities to deliver quality healthcare services.
1. Infrastructure Development
(a) Urban Health & Wellness Centres (UHWCs)
The Operating Agency shall:
| • |
|
Establish designated spaces for registration and waiting areas, OPD and consultation rooms, pharmacies, treatment and injection areas, counselling and wellness spaces, and separate male and female toilets. |
| • |
|
Utilize existing infrastructure available under Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), Government Initiatives, Rented Commercial Spaces, Community Halls, and Government Housing, as new construction is not permitted under this scheme. |
| • |
|
Ensure geographic accessibility by identifying and mapping vulnerable areas and adhering to the 3.5 km service delivery rule for urban healthcare facilities |
(b) Polyclinics
The Operating Agency shall:
| • |
|
Upgrade selected UHWCs/Urban-CHCs to include specialist OPD services, advanced diagnostic facilities, and telemedicine hubs. |
| • |
|
Implement a Hub-and-Spoke Model, where UHWCs serve as referral centres for Urban HWCs to ensure streamlined specialist consultations and diagnostics. |
| • |
|
Provide separate earmarked spaces for Specialist OPD, Registration, Dental, Refraction, Physiotherapy, Laboratory, Treatment/Injection, Examination, Pharmacy, and Imaging Services to enhance service delivery. |
2. Functional Services
The Urban HWCs and Polyclinics shall perform the following functions and provide services strictly in accordance with the XV Finance Commission health grant implementation guidelines through local governments:
I. Facility-Based Services
| • |
|
Primary Care: Provide preventive, promotive, curative, rehabilitative, and palliative care, along with free essential drugs and diagnostics. |
| • |
|
Emergency & Referral Services: Ensure availability of basic life support, ambulance access, and structured referral pathways for critical cases. |
| • |
|
Mental Health Services: Offer counselling, tele-psychiatry consultations, and integration with national mental health programs. |
II. Community-Based Services
| • |
|
Surveys & Mapping: Conduct home visits to identify vulnerable groups and assess community health risks. |
| • |
|
Awareness Activities: Organize health education programs in collaboration with Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs), and Self-Help Groups (SHGs). |
| • |
|
Outreach Services: Conduct regular health camps and Urban Health and Nutrition Days (UHNDs) targeting high-risk populations. |
III. Public Health Functions
| • |
|
Community Engagement: Train and mobilize Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) and Mahila Arogya Samitis (MAS) to raise awareness and refer high-risk cases to the appropriate healthcare facilities |
| • |
|
Disease Surveillance & Early Warning: Implement real-time tracking of diseases and establish early warning systems for timely intervention. |
| • |
|
Wellness & Preventive Care: Promote lifestyle counselling, mental well-being programs, and addiction awareness initiatives to enhance public health outcomes. |
3. Human Resource Requirement: Each UHWC shall have a dedicated team responsible for service delivery, training and coordination.
I. Human Resource for One UHWC
| Type of Staff |
No. Required |
| Medical Officer (New Recruitment) |
1 |
| Staff Nurse (New Recruitment) |
1 |
| One MPW (male) (New Recruitment) |
1 |
| Guard (outsourced) |
1 |
| Cleaning Staff (Outsourced) |
1 |
| Total |
5 |
II. Human Resource for Polyclinics
| Type of Staff |
No. Required |
| Specialist each Medicine, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Paediatrics, Ophthalmology, Dermatology and Psychiatry |
6 |
| Dentist (May be one fixed days) |
1 |
| Staff Nurse (New Recruitment) |
2 |
| Optometrist |
1 |
| Physiotherapist |
1 |
| Integrated Counsellor |
1 |
| Multipurpose Worker/Guard (Outsourced) |
1 |
| Guard (outsourced) |
1 |
| Cleaning Staff (Outsourced) |
1 |
| Total |
14 |
4. Other important guidelines
| • |
|
Urban-HWC staff will be trained in primary healthcare, public health, digital tools, and community engagement, |
| • |
|
Medicines and diagnostics will adhere to CPHC and government guidelines via the e-Aushadhi System, following a hub and -spoke model for diagnostics. |
| • |
|
A Citizen Charter shall be prominently displayed, outlining available services, patient rights, responsibilities, and emergency contact details, |
| • |
|
In selected Urban-HWCs (Polyclinics catering to approx. 5 UHWC) based upon the context of the local area, state would make arrangements to provide selected specialist services on a periodic basis. Separate earmarked space to be made available for specialists OPD, registration, Dental, refraction, physiotherapy, laboratory, treatment/ Injection, examination, pharmacy, imaging services etc. |
| • |
|
Fixed day rotational specialist OPD services for Medicine, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Paediatrics, Ophthalmology, Dermatology and Psychiatry. Dental, physiotherapy and optometrist services etc. may be planned as per local needs and requirement, Laboratory tests for the specialties concerned along with point of care testing would be provided. The timings of U-HWCs with specialist services would be decided as per the need of the community. |
| • |
|
The select UHWCs providing specialist services shall provide assured referral linkages with higher centres like SDH, DH and Medical College Hospital in the City/ District. |
| • |
|
A Citizen Charter should be prominently displayed near the entrance of the facility. |
————————————————————“
| 5.6. |
|
On going through the ‘Scope of Work’ mentioned in the Agreement dated 27.09.2025 made between M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP, we observe that M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP being the Operating Agency is providing a composite healthcare facility management and operation services, including infrastructure, staffing, healthcare delivery, outreach activities, monitoring, and reporting obligations. Further, the agreement indicates that healthcare delivery is not limited to medical treatment. It is a bundled activity comprising; clinical services, diagnostics services, pharmaceutical services, public health and outreach activities, facility management, human resource deployment, monitoring and reporting. Thus, we observe that the contract is for comprehensive operation and management of healthcare facilities, rather than a mere supply of manpower or a standalone healthcare consultation service. |
| 5.7. |
|
Now the question under consideration is whether the services provided by M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP may be treated as exempt either in terms of Entry No. 74 of the Exemption Notification No. 12/2017 CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 as “health care services by a clinical establishment” or in terms of Entry No. 03 of the said Notification as “Pure services” provided to the Government in relation to function under article 243W of the Constitution. |
| 5.8. |
|
We observe that Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 exempts: |
(a) “health care services by a clinical establishment, an authorised medical practitioner or para-medics”. Further the Notification in its definition at clauses 2 (s) and 2(zg) defines ‘clinical establishment’ and ‘health care service’ which are reproduced below:
“2(s) “clinical establishment” means a hospital, nursing home, clinic, sanatorium or any other institution by, whatever name called, that offers services or facilities requiring diagnosis or treatment or care for illness, injury, deformity, abnormality or pregnancy in any recognised system of medicines in India, or a place established as an independent entity or a part of an establishment to carry out diagnostic or investigative services of diseases;”.
“2(zg) “health care services” means any service by way of diagnosis or treatment or care for illness, injury, deformity, abnormality or pregnancy in any recognised system of medicines in India and includes services by way of transportation of the patient to and from a clinical establishment, but does not include hair transplant or cosmetic or plastic surgery, except when undertaken to restore or to reconstruct anatomy or functions of body affected due to congenital defects, developmental abnormalities, injury or trauma;”.
On going through the above definitions, we observe that for the exemption benefit under Entry No. 74 of the Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017, the essential ingredients that need to be satisfied are that the supplier must be a clinical establishment; and that the services supplied must qualify as healthcare services.
| 5.9. |
|
Having considered the contractual documents, project guidelines, operational responsibilities, we find that as per Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 28.05.2025 made between Urban Development Directorate, Government of Uttarakhand and M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited, the Government of Uttarakhand has nominated M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited as an ‘executing agency’ for the implementation, operation, and monitoring of 115 Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs) and 23 Polyclinics in the State of Uttarakhand with a total estimated project cost of Rs 81.57 crores, which is a total budget allocation per year. Further, as per provisions made in the MOU, M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited through Tender selected and placed an order vide Letter of Intent dated 14.05.2025 to the appellant M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP as ‘Operating Agency’ for ‘Operation & Monitoring of 49 Urban Health and Wellness Centres and 10 Polyclinic Services in the State of Uttarakhand (Garhwal Region UHWC-Part-1). Accordingly, the Agreement dated 27.09.2025 has been made between M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited and M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP. Thus, the role of M/s Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. being ‘executing agency’ is limited to implementation and administration of the Government project and does not alter the nature of the services supplied by the appellant. The project documents placed on record clearly establish that the Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs) and Polyclinics are established for delivery of comprehensive primary healthcare services under the Ayushman Bharat Health and Wellness Centre (UHWC)/ ‘Ayushman Arogya Mandir’ project of Government of India. On going through the ‘Scope of Work’, we observe that it includes OPD consultations, maternal and child healthcare, management of communicable and noncommunicable diseases, referral services, diagnostics, dispensing of medicines, specialist consultations, telemedicine support and public health interventions. We also note that the appellant has submitted a “Provisional Certificate for registration of Clinical Establishment” [as Annexure-H to the Appeal] which has been issued by the Chief Medical Officer, Haridwar on 25.02.2026 for clinical establishment namely Urban Health and Wellness Centre, Shivalik Nagar, Ganga Nagai, Haridwar and wherein Indovation Healthcare LLP is mentioned as Owner of the said clinical establishment. Provisional/final certificates of registration of clinical establishment for other UHWCs (UAAMs) have not been placed by the Appellant on record. |
| 5.10. |
|
We find that in the instant case, the actual beneficiaries of the services are members of the public visiting such centres for diagnosis, treatment and healthcare. M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited neither receives medical treatment nor consumes healthcare services. It merely acts as a nodal implementing agency on behalf of the Government. However, the AAR proceeded on the premise that because consideration is paid by M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited, the appellant is supplying contractual operational, managerial and administrative services to M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited, not healthcare services by a clinical establishment. |
| 5.11. |
|
We observe that the AAR has not disputed that healthcare professionals are deployed by the appellant and also that healthcare services are rendered through these centres. The AAR appears to have focused primarily upon the contractual relationship and payment mechanism without adequately examining the actual activities undertaken at the Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs/UAAMs) and Polyclinics. We, therefore, find that the AAR erred in placing undue emphasis upon the contractual payment structure while overlooking the true substance and essential nature of the services supplied. |
| 5.12. |
|
We observe that the legislature has adopted the doctrine that a composite transaction derives its GST character from its predominant or principal clement. Therefore, the impugned supply must be determined by examining its essential nature, dominant intention and substantive character rather than its individual ancillary components. |
| 5.13. |
|
We note that the appellant is not undertaking consultancy, administration or facility management services independent of healthcare delivery. The appellant is itself operating healthcare institutions and delivering healthcare services through qualified medical personnel deployed/appointed by them as it is seen from the document/appointment letter of Medical Officer (MBBS) and for the post of Staff Nurse (GNM) at Urban Health and Wellness Centre, City-Haridwar (attached as specimen as Annexure-I to the Appeal). We further observe that in this case the dominant purpose of the agreement is therefore healthcare delivery. Administrative, managerial, reporting and operational obligations appearing in the agreement are incidental and ancillary to the principal objective of healthcare service delivery. The relevant sections of the CGST Act are reproduced below: – |
Section 2(30) – “Composite Supply”
“Composite supply” means a supply made by a taxable person to a recipient consisting of two or more taxable supplies of goods or services or both, or any combination, thereof which are naturally bundled and supplied in conjunction with each other in the ordinary course of business, one of which is a principal supply
Section 2(90) of the CGST Act – “Principal Supply”
Section 2(90) defines principal supply as:
“Principal supply” means the supply of goods or services which constitutes the predominant element of a composite supply and to which any other supply forming part of that composite supply is ancillary;
Section 8(a) – Tax Liability on Composite Supply
Section 8(a) provides that:
“a composite supply comprising two or more supplies, one of which is a principal supply, shall be treated as a supply of such principal supply;”.
In view of above we observe that the essential character of the activity remains healthcare service;
The term “essential character” was expressly used in the pre-GST regime.
“Section 66F(3)(a) of the Finance Act, 1994 stated that if various elements of such service are naturally bundled in the ordinary course of business, it shall be treated as provision of the single service which gives such bundle its essential character;”.
Thus, we find that the essential and dominant character of the activity remains diagnosis, treatment, preventive healthcare and patient care through clinical establishments. Therefore, the ancillary managerial elements cannot determine the classification of the supply.
| 5.14. |
|
We further note that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Union of India [2006] 2 STR 161/3 STT 245 (SC)/(W.P (Civil) 183/2003 Judgment Dated 02.03.2006) – 2006-VIL-07-SC-LB held that, a composite transaction cannot be artificially dissected into separate elements. The Court observed that the determining factor is the “substance of the contract” and the “dominant nature test”. Significantly, while explaining the principle, the Court specifically referred to hospital services and observed that components supplied during medical treatment cannot be viewed independently from the overall healthcare service rendered. Accordingly, where various activities are integrally connected with the delivery of healthcare services, the transaction must be examined in its entirety and characterised according to its essential and dominant nature rather than by isolating individual operational components. |
| 5.15. |
|
Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the various activities undertaken by the Appellant under the UHWCs/UAAMs/polyclinics project are not intended to exist as independent commercial supplies but are integrally connected with and subservient to the delivery of healthcare services to the beneficiaries. The agreement, when read as a whole, reveals a unified objective of facilitating and operationalising healthcare services through Urban Health and Wellness Centres/ Polyclinics to the public. Therefore, the impugned activities cannot be vivisected into individual elements for the purpose of determining their taxability; rather, they must be assessed in accordance with the essential and dominant nature of the arrangement, which is intrinsically linked to the provision of healthcare services. |
| 5.16. |
|
We observe that the AAR in its findings placed undue emphasis upon the contractual payment structure. For the limited purpose of Section 2(93)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017, the person liable to pay consideration, namely Braithwaite & Co. Limited, may be regarded as the recipient of the supply. Section 2(93) of the CGST Act defines the “recipient” primarily for identifying the person to whom a supply is made and for fixing statutory rights and obligations under the Act. However, determination of taxability and classification of the supply cannot rest solely upon the identity of the payer. The true nature, substance and objective of the contract, the activities actually performed, and the ultimate purpose for which such activities are undertaken are equally relevant considerations. |
| 5.17. |
|
We note that the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in Healthcare Global Enterprises Ltd. v. Asstt. CCTes (Enforcement) [WP Nos. 22236 and 23931 of 2023, CWP No.23928 of 2023, dated 30.04.2026] – 2026-VIL-541-KAR held that the exemption available under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT(Rate) cannot be denied merely because healthcare services are provided through another hospital or pursuant to a contractual arrangement with another entity. The Court emphasized that where doctors, specialists and para-medical personnel render healthcare services to patients, the essential character of the supply remains healthcare service notwithstanding the contractual mechanism through which consideration is received. The Court further relied upon CBIC’s Circular No. 32/06/2018-GST dated 12.02.2018 and held that healthcare services do not lose their exempt character merely because they are routed through another institution. Accordingly, the determination of exemption must depend upon the true nature of the activity undertaken and not merely upon the identity of the person making payment for such services. |
| 5.18. |
|
Thus, where services are performed as an integral part of the delivery of healthcare under a government health programme, the mere fact that consideration is paid by an implementing agency would not automatically transform the supply into a taxable management or support service. Conversely, where the substance of the contract reveals the provision of manpower, administrative support or operational management, the supply cannot acquire the character of healthcare services merely because the ultimate beneficiaries are patients. The classification must therefore follow the real nature and substance of the supply rather than the identity of the person making payment. |
| 5.19. |
|
We, therefore, find considerable force in the Appellant’s submission that healthcare services can be rendered under diverse commercial structures. In many government healthcare schemes, insurance arrangements, corporate medical arrangements and public-private partnership projects, payment is often made by Government, insurers, employers or nodal agencies instead of the patient. Such arrangements do not alter the character of the underlying healthcare service. |
| 5.20. |
|
Having considered the contractual documents, project guidelines, operational responsibilities, judicial precedents relied upon by the Appellant and the statutory provisions governing healthcare services, we conclude that the Appellant is engaged in providing healthcare services through clinical establishments i.e. Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs)/UAAMs and Polyclinics. The role of M/s Braithwaite & Co. Limited being ‘Executing Agency, is limited to implementation and administration of the Government project and does not alter the nature of the services supplied by the Appellant. |
| 5.21. |
|
Consequently, we are of the view that the services supplied by the appellant are correctly classifiable as exempt healthcare services under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 and corresponding State notification. |
| 5.22. |
|
Accordingly, the impugned ruling passed by the Authority for Advance Ruling deserves to be set aside. |
| 5.23. |
|
Since the services supplied by the appellant are held to be exempt healthcare services under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), the need to examine the alternative claim of exemption under Entry No. 3 of the said notification does not arise. |
RULING
| (i) |
|
The appeal filed by M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP is allowed. |
| (ii) |
|
The Advance Ruling Order No. 05/2025-26 dated 17.03.2026 – 2026-VIL-68-AAR passed by the Authority for Advance Ruling, Uttarakhand is set aside. |
| (iii) |
|
The services supplied by M/s Indovation Healthcare LLP in relation to operation and management of Urban Health and Wellness Centres (UHWCs)/ Urban Ayushman Aarogya Mandir (“UAAMs”) and Polyclinics under the Ayushman Bharat / Ayushman Arogya Mandir Scheme constitute healthcare services provided by a clinical establishment. Hence, the said services are held to be exempt from GST under Entry No. 74 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 and corresponding State Notification. |