ORDER
1. This bunch comprises 39 appeals preferred by the assessee, State Bank of India, through its respective branches and Tax Deduction Account Numbers, against separate orders passed under section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as “the Act”] by the National Faceless Appeal Centre and the respective Additional/Joint Commissioners of Income-tax (Appeals)[hereinafter referred to as “the CIT(A)”]. The appeals relate to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18.
2. Since all these appeals arise from a common factual background concerning the taxability of reimbursement of Leave Fare Concession to the employees of the assessee, liability to deduct tax at source under section 192, the consequential demands raised under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), and penalties imposed under section 271C, the appeals were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. The issues common to the appeals are narrated collectively, while the assessment year-wise, TAN-wise and issue-wise particulars are set out in the relevant tables forming part of this order.
3. The appeals fall into two principal categories. The first category consists of 21 appeals arising from orders passed under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), whereby the respective TDS authorities treated the assessee as an assessee in default for failure to deduct tax at source under section 192 and also charged consequential interest. The second category consists of 18 appeals arising from orders imposing penalty under section 271C for the alleged failure to deduct such tax at source.
4. The appeal-wise particulars of the proceedings under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) are set out below:
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. as per ITA list / impugned order |
TAN |
Order under sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
First appellate authority and order date |
Demand |
| ITA 1387/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS40227F |
11.01.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 11.12.2025 |
Rs.1,21,173/- |
| ITA 1388/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS38670C |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-3, Hyderabad, 10.12.2025 |
Rs.4,45,833/- |
| ITA 1423/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS77235E |
20.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-3, Hyderabad, 11.12.2025 |
Rs.4,02,542/- |
| ITA 1424/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS77235E |
18.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 11.12.2025 |
Rs.1,13,266/- |
| ITA 1763/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS73688G |
30.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 29.12.2025 |
Rs.6,10,295/- |
| ITA 2486/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS70316B |
27.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 30.12.2025 |
Rs.4,23,169/- |
| ITA 5463/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS75707C |
18.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 09.03.2026 |
Rs.8,61,543/- |
| ITA 5546/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS80261G |
19.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 05.02.2026 |
Rs.1,53,609/- |
| ITA 6618/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS81940F |
29.02.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 29.12.2025 |
Rs.2,90,242/- |
| ITA 7200/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS38455E |
20.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 26.12.2023 |
Rs.3,76,293/- |
| ITA 7687/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
PNES36914D |
30.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 18.03.2026 |
Rs.1,10,483/- |
| ITA 7846/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
PNES27829E |
28.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 05.01.2024 |
Rs.2,22,623/- |
| ITA 7847/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
PNES27829E |
19.06.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 05.01.2024 |
Rs.1,95,659/- |
| ITA 7848/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS67200A |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 30.09.2024 |
Rs.3,81,888/- |
| ITA 7896/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS37750G |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 28.12.2023 |
Rs.1,44,952/- |
| ITA 7897/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS70707A |
17.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 27.12.2023 |
Rs.1,69,479/- |
| ITA 8196/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS36576B |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 05.01.2026 |
Rs.1,01,584/- |
| ITA 8373/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS56446F |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 29.12.2025 |
Rs.25,440/- |
| ITA 8473/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
PNES16880D |
20.06.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 30.09.2024 |
Rs.2,33,113/- |
| ITA 8474/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS37752B |
22.03.2023 |
Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, 22.12.2023 |
Rs.2,16,080/- |
| ITA 8496/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
PNES10365F |
26.03.2024 |
Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, 02.01.2026 |
Rs.1,12,946/- |
5. The appeal-wise particulars of the penalty proceedings under section 271C are separately set out below:
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. as per ITA list / impugned order |
TAN |
Penalty order under section 271C |
CIT(A)/NFAC order date |
Penalty |
| ITA 5768/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS67371D |
03.03.2025 |
20.03.2026 |
Rs.1,06,379/- |
| ITA 5903/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMC10673F |
03.03.2025 |
24.03.2026 |
Rs.82,164/- |
| ITA 5956/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS40227F |
03.03.2025 |
17.03.2026 |
Rs.62,461/- |
| ITA 5957/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS70563D |
03.03.2025 |
17.03.2026 |
Rs.2,93,511/- |
| ITA 6025/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS56446F |
28.11.2023 |
23.03.2026 |
Rs.13,181/- |
| ITA 6026/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS70563D |
24.01.2024 |
23.03.2026 |
Rs.1,15,138/- |
| ITA 6027/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS26785D |
28.11.2023 |
24.03.2026 |
Rs.86,528/- |
| ITA 6160/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS81370C |
03.03.2025 |
24.03.2026 |
Rs.1,40,009/- |
| ITA 6629/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS67371D |
24.01.2024 |
13.01.2025 |
Rs.2,41,520/- |
| ITA 7340/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS67623D |
28.11.2023 |
05.02.2025 |
Rs.92,516/- |
| ITA 7759/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS70656F |
22.03.2024 |
23.03.2026 |
Rs.77,302/- |
| ITA 7898/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS70707A |
24.01.2024 |
13.12.2024 |
Rs.89,688/- |
| ITA 8195/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS36576B |
28.11.2023 |
23.03.2026 |
Rs.52,363/- |
| ITA 8472/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS37163A |
28.11.2023 |
22.04.2025 |
Rs.1,04,864/- |
| ITA 8475/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
MUMS68676G |
29.03.2024 |
29.11.2024 |
Rs.1,34,249/- |
| ITA 8476/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
MUMS81940F |
03.03.2025 |
11.06.2026 |
Rs.1,57,740/- |
| ITA 8477/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
PNES10673F |
26.09.2024 |
08.11.2024 |
Rs.64,125/- |
| ITA 8495/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
PNES10365F |
27.09.2024 |
08.11.2024 |
Rs.57,921/- |
6. The common factual position emerging from the orders of the lower authorities is that the assessee provided Leave Fare Concession, hereinafter referred to as “LFC”, to its employees in accordance with the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992. In the cases presently under consideration, the employees had declared or designated a destination situated in India. The journeys undertaken by them, however, included travel through, or a visit to, one or more foreign destinations before reaching or returning from the designated destination in India.
7. The assessee treated the reimbursement of the eligible LFC expenditure as exempt under section 10(5) of the Act read with Rule 2B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Proceeding on that basis, the assessee did not include the corresponding reimbursement in the taxable salary of the concerned employees and did not deduct tax at source under section 192.
8. During TDS verification, the respective Assessing Officers examined the itineraries and reimbursement particulars of the employees. The Assessing Officers observed that, notwithstanding the designation of a place situated in India as the destination, the journeys undertaken by the employees included a foreign leg or a circuitous route through a foreign country. According to the Assessing Officers, a journey involving a foreign leg could not be regarded as travel within India for the purposes of section 10(5) read with Rule 2B.
9. On the aforesaid basis, the Assessing Officers treated the LFC reimbursements as taxable salary payments. It was consequently held that the assessee had failed to deduct the tax required under section 192. The assessee was, therefore, treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1), and interest was charged under section 201(1A).
10. The assessee contended before the Assessing Officers that the designated destination of each employee was situated in India and that the mere inclusion of a foreign place in the itinerary did not, by itself, disentitle the employee from exemption under section 10(5). According to the assessee, the relevant consideration was the destination designated under the LFC scheme and the amount reimbursed in accordance with the governing service rules.
11. The assessee also relied upon the interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the proceedings concerning the restriction imposed upon foreign travel under the LFC scheme. It was submitted that, during the subsistence of the interim protection, the amount paid or reimbursed towards LFC was not to be treated as income for the purpose of deduction of tax at source. The assessee maintained that deduction of tax contrary to the subsisting judicial direction could have exposed it to proceedings for disobedience of the Court’s order.
12. Without prejudice to its principal contention, the assessee submitted that the liability under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), if otherwise found sustainable, was required to be determined by applying the actual rate of tax applicable to each concerned employee. It was contended that a uniform rate of 30 per cent could not be applied without examining the taxable income, applicable slab rate and tax already paid by the individual employee.
13. The Assessing Officers did not accept the explanation of the assessee. They held that the exemption under section 10(5) was confined to travel within India and that a journey involving a foreign leg fell outside the statutory exemption. The respective demands under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were accordingly raised.
14. Consequent to the orders passed under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), the respective authorities-initiated penalty proceedings under section 271C. The penalties were quantified with reference to the amount of tax which, according to the authorities, the assessee had failed to deduct under section 192.
15. In response to the penalty notices, the assessee reiterated that the non-deduction of tax was founded upon a bona fide interpretation of section 10(5) read with Rule 2B and the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court. It was contended that these circumstances constituted a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B. In certain cases, it was also pointed out that the appeals against the corresponding orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were pending when the penalties were imposed.
16. The penalty authorities did not accept the explanation. They held that the assessee had failed to establish a reasonable cause for not deducting tax at source and accordingly levied penalties under section 271C.
17. Aggrieved by the demands raised under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) and the penalties imposed under section 271C, the assessee preferred separate appeals before the respective first appellate authorities. The impugned orders disclose four distinct procedural positions regarding the filing and admission of those appeals. Certain appeals were expressly recorded as having been filed within the prescribed period. In certain appeals, the delay was condoned and the appeals were admitted. In another set of appeals, applications for condonation were rejected. In the remaining appeals, the impugned orders do not contain an express discussion or finding concerning limitation or condonation.
18. In the following appeals, the first appellate authorities expressly recorded that the appeals had been presented within the prescribed period and proceeded to adjudicate them on merits:
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. |
Nature of proceeding |
AO order |
First appeal filed |
| ITA 1388/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
21.04.2023 |
| ITA 1423/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
20.03.2023 |
18.04.2023 |
| ITA 5768/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
31.03.2025 |
| ITA 6160/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
29.03.2025 |
| ITA 8477/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
26.09.2024 |
07.10.2024 |
| ITA 8495/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
27.09.2024 |
07.10.2024 |
19. In the second category, the first appellate authorities accepted the explanation furnished by the assessee, condoned the delay and admitted the appeals for adjudication. In three penalty appeals, the delays were specifically quantified at 38 days, 7 days and 21 days. In the remaining appeals falling in this category, the impugned orders record that the delay was condoned but do not quantify the period of delay.
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. as per ITA list / impugned order |
Nature of proceeding |
AO order |
First appeal filed |
| ITA 1387/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
11.01.2024 |
13.11.2024 |
| ITA 1763/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
30.03.2024 |
19.11.2024 |
| ITA 2486/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
27.03.2024 |
03.10.2024 |
| ITA 5903/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
09.05.2025 |
| ITA 5956/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
08.04.2025 |
| ITA 5957/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
22.04.2025 |
| ITA 6618/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
29.02.2024 |
19.11.2024 |
| ITA 7687/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
30.03.2023 |
27.06.2024 |
| ITA 7897/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 /2015-16 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
17.03.2023 |
23.05.2023 |
| ITA 8196/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
04.12.2024 |
| ITA 8373/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
19.11.2024 |
| ITA 8474/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 /2015-16 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
25.05.2023 |
| ITA 8496/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
26.03.2024 |
01.10.2024 |
20. The third category consists of 11 appeals arising from penalties imposed under section 271C. In these cases, the CIT(A)/NFAC held that the assessee had failed to establish sufficient cause for the delay and rejected the applications for condonation. The delays recorded in these orders range from 99 days to 513 days. Notwithstanding the rejection of condonation, the impugned orders also proceeded, without prejudice to the finding on limitation, to examine the levy of penalty on merits and sustained the penalties.
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. as per ITA list / impugned order |
Nature of proceeding |
Penalty order |
First appeal filed |
Delay and finding |
| ITA 6025/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
28.11.2023 |
14.02.2025 |
Delay of 415 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 6026/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
24.01.2024 |
19.07.2025 |
Delay of 513 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 6027/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
28.11.2023 |
30.03.2025 |
Delay of 459 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 6629/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
24.01.2024 |
16.11.2024 |
Delay of 267 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 7340/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
28.11.2023 |
22.11.2024 |
Delay of 330 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 7759/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
22.03.2024 |
07.02.2025 |
Delay of 293 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
24.01.2024 |
04.12.2024 |
Delay of 285 days; |
| 7898/Mum/2026 |
|
|
|
|
condonation rejected |
| ITA 8195/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
28.11.2023 |
28.03.2025 |
Delay stated as 456/457 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 8472/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
28.11.2023 |
05.02.2025 |
Delay of 405 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 8475/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Section 271C |
29.03.2024 |
01.10.2024 |
Delay of 156 days; condonation rejected |
| ITA 8476/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Section 271C |
03.03.2025 |
10.07.2025 |
Delay of 99 days; condonation rejected |
21. In the fourth category, the first appellate authorities adjudicated the substantive grounds but did not expressly record either that the appeals were filed within limitation or that any delay was condoned. The absence of such a finding cannot, by itself, be treated as an affirmative determination that the appeals were filed within the prescribed period.
| File and ITA No. |
A.Y. as per ITA list / impugned order |
Nature of proceeding |
AO order |
First appeal filed |
| ITA 1424/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
18.03.2024 |
13.02.2025 |
| ITA 5463/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
18.03.2024 |
22.04.2024 |
| ITA 5546/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
19.03.2024 |
25.04.2024 |
| ITA 7200/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
20.03.2023 |
19.04.2023 |
| ITA 7846/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 /2015-16 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
28.03.2023 |
02.05.2023 |
| ITA 7847/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 /2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
19.06.2023 |
15.07.2023 |
| ITA 7848/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 /2015-16 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
21.04.2023 |
| ITA 7896/Mum/2026 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
22.03.2023 |
21.04.2023 |
| ITA 8473/Mum/2026 |
2017-18 /2016-17 |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
20.06.2023 |
14.07.2023 |
22. On the substantive issue, the first appellate authorities proceeded on the basis that the exemption under section 10(5) was confined to travel within India. They held that, once the itinerary included a foreign leg, the journey ceased to qualify as travel within India for the purpose of the exemption. The action of the Assessing Officers in treating the assessee as an assessee in default under section 201(1) and charging interest under section 201(1A) was accordingly sustained.
23. In the orders passed by the Addl./JCIT(A)-2, Siliguri, and the Addl./JCIT(A)-3, Hyderabad, directions were also issued to the Assessing Officers to verify the rate of tax applicable to each concerned employee and to rectify or reduce any excess demand. The recovery was directed to remain subject to the interim protection operating in the connected judicial proceedings. In the orders passed by the Addl./JCIT(A), Prayagraj, the grounds concerning liability under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were dismissed without a separate employee-wise re-computation direction in the operative portion.
24. In the penalty appeals, the CIT(A)/NFAC did not accept the contention that the interim judicial directions or the interpretation adopted by the assessee constituted a reasonable cause under section 273B. The penalties imposed under section 271C were consequently sustained. In the appeals where condonation was refused, the penalties were sustained both on the preliminary ground of limitation and, without prejudice thereto, on merits.
25. Thus, the impugned orders before us comprise the following procedural and substantive categories:
| Category |
Nature of proceeding |
Number of appeals |
First appellate treatment |
Substantive outcome |
| Orders under sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
TDS default and interest |
21 |
Within time, delay condoned, or no express limitation finding |
Liability substantially sustained |
| Orders under section 271C |
Penalty |
18 |
Within time, delay condoned, or condonation rejected |
Penalty sustained |
| Appeals expressly within time |
Both categories |
6 |
Admitted |
Dismissed on merits |
| Delay condoned |
Both categories |
13 |
Admitted after condonation |
Dismissed on merits |
| Condonation rejected |
Section 271C |
11 |
Dismissed on limitation and also considered on merits |
Penalty sustained |
| No express limitation finding |
Sections 201(1)/201(1A) |
9 |
Substantive grounds adjudicated |
Liability sustained |
26. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal. The substantive grounds challenge the treatment of the assessee as an assessee in default under section 201(1), the levy of interest under section 201(1A), and the imposition of penalty under section 271C. In the appeals where condonation was refused, the assessee has also challenged the rejection of its applications for condonation of delay.
27. The assessee has raised substantially common grounds in the appeals arising from the orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A). For the sake of convenience, the representative grounds filed in the case of State Bank of India, Ambernath East Branch, TAN MUMS40227F, for assessment year 2017-18, corresponding to ITA No. 1387/Mum/2026, are reproduced as under:
| 1. |
|
The Learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) (“CIT(A)”) erred in confirming the order of the Assessing Officer (“AO”) holding the appellant to be an assessee in default for failing to deduct tax at source under section 192 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’). |
| 2. |
|
The CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that the Appellant had issued e-Circular no. CDO/p&HRD-PM/7/2014-15 dated 15th April 2014 stating that the employees shall not be entitled to visit overseas countries/ centers as part of leave travel concession (“LTC”) which Circular was challenged by the All India State Bank Officers Federation & Ors. before the Madras High Court by way of a writ petition (WP no. 11991 of 2014) and that the Madras High Court had vide its order dated 25th April 2014 granted interim stay of the Circular. |
| 3. |
|
The CIT(A) further erred in not appreciating that tax was not deducted at source by the Appellant on the LTC paid to its employees during the year under consideration in view of the specific interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in its order dated 16th February 2015 by which the Court held that the LTC paid or reimbursed would not amount to income and that no tax was to be deducted thereon. The CIT(A) ought to have appreciated that if the LTC was not to be treated as income of the employees as per the order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, the same even otherwise would not require withholding of tax under section 192 of the Act. |
| 4. |
|
The CIT(A) further erred in not appreciating that the Madras High Court vide its said order dated 16th February 2015 having directed the Appellant not to deduct at source on LTC had further stated that if the writ petition challenging the Circular was dismissed, the employees would be liable to pay tax on the LTC amount paid by the Appellant and, therefore, the CIT(A) ought to have quashed the order of the AO holding the Appellant to be an assessee in default. |
| 5. |
|
The CIT(A) erred in not quashing the order of the AO holding the Appellant to be an assessee in default for the reason that the Appellant, even if it wanted to, could not have deducted tax at source on LTC paid during the year under consideration in view of the orders of the Hon’ble Madras High Court till the time they were in force as acting contrary to the orders of the Hon’ble Court would have amounted to contempt of Court. |
| 6. |
|
The CIT(A) erred in not following the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in State Bank of India v. CIT (ITA no. 45 of 2025) where the Hon’ble Court after considering the above set of facts held that the Appellant was justified in not deducting tax at source in view of the interim directions issued by the Madras High Court asking the Appellant not to deduct tax at source. |
| 7. |
|
The CIT(A) erred in observing that the legal obligation to deduct tax was reinstated once the interim order passed by the Hon’ble Madras High Court was vacated without appreciating that the order of the Single Judge of the Hon’ble Madras High Court was challenged before the Division bench and later the Division bench’s order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) no. 16734 of 2023 has ordered the Appellant bank from not making any recoveries from its employees during the pendency of the petition. |
| 8. |
|
Without prejudice to above grounds, the CIT(A) erred in not holding that the Appellant could not have been deemed to be an assessee in default under section 201(1) of the Act if the employee had furnished the return of income, taken into account such sum for computing income and paid the tax due on income declared by the employee. |
The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter or delete and/or modify the above grounds of appeal before or during the course of hearing.
28. In the appeals arising from penalties imposed under section 271C, the representative grounds filed in the case of State Bank of India, TAN MUMS67371D, for assessment year 2017-18, corresponding to ITA No. 5768/Mum/2026, are reproduced as under:
| 1. |
|
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the penalty levied under section 271C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. |
| 2. |
|
The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the Appellant had acted under and in compliance with the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court dated 16 February 2015 directing that no tax be deducted at source on LTC paid / reimbursed to employees, and therefore the alleged failure, if any, was fully supported by reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B. |
| 3. |
|
The learned CIT(A) ought to have held that where the Appellant acted in obedience to a subsisting order of a Constitutional Court, no penalty under section 271C could be levied, since such conduct can never amount to wilful neglect, contumacious default, or deliberate defiance of law. |
| 4. |
|
The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that deduction of tax in breach of the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court would itself have amounted to disobedience of the Court’s order and could have exposed the Appellant to contempt proceedings; hence, the Appellant had more than sufficient and reasonable cause for not deducting tax. |
| 5. |
|
The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the Hon’ble Madras High Court had also clarified that, in the event the writ petition failed, the tax liability would fall upon the employees, thereby reinforcing that the Appellant’s conduct was under judicial sanction and devoid of any revenue-evasive intent. |
| 6. |
|
The learned CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that the issue was, in any event, debatable and legally contentious, and therefore penalty under section 271C, being penal in nature, was wholly unsustainable. |
| 7. |
|
The learned CIT(A) erred in not following / appreciating the ratio of the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in State Bank of India v. CIT (ITA No. 45 of2025), wherein, on similar facts, the Appellant’s action in not deducting tax at source pursuant to the Madras High Court’s interim directions was held to be justified. |
| 8. |
|
The learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that section 271C is subject to section 273B and that once reasonable cause is established, no penalty can survive. |
| 9. |
|
The Appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, delete or modify any of the above grounds at the time of hearing. |
29. During the course of hearing before us, the learned Authorised Representative (AR), submitted that the principal issue arising in the appeals under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) stood squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the following orders of the Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal:
| i. |
|
SBI Bullion Branch v. ACIT (TDS) [IT Appeal Nos.1565, 1566, 1569, 1570, 1572, 1802, 1803 and 1832 (Mum) of 2026, dated 30-6-2026]; and |
| ii. |
|
State Bank of India v. ITO, TDS [IT Appeal No. 2453 (Mum) of 2026, dated 28-7-2026]. |
30. The learned AR submitted (the assessee also placed on records the written submissions) that the aforesaid orders were rendered in the assessee’s own cases for assessment years 201617 and 2017-18 on materially identical facts. It was submitted that the Co-ordinate Benches had taken note of the substantive position that LFC reimbursement involving a foreign leg was not eligible for exemption under section 10(5). However, the issue arising in the proceedings under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) was distinct and confined to whether the assessee could be treated as an assessee in default for not deducting tax during the period when the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court dated 16.02.2015 were operative.
31. Referring to the ratio of the aforesaid orders, the learned AR submitted that the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court were binding upon the assessee during the relevant assessment years and restrained it from deducting tax at source from the LFC reimbursements. The Co-ordinate Benches had, therefore, held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1) for having complied with a subsisting judicial direction. Consequently, the interest charged under section 201(1A) was also held to be unsustainable.
32. The learned AR further submitted that the subsequent determination of the substantive taxability of the LFC reimbursement did not retrospectively convert the conduct of the assessee, undertaken in obedience to the then subsisting judicial directions, into a default under section 201(1). It was submitted that this distinction between the substantive taxability of the reimbursement in the hands of the employees and the liability of the assessee as a deductor had been expressly recognised in the aforesaid orders.
33. The learned AR submitted that the LFC reimbursements forming the subject matter of the present quantum appeals also pertained to the period during which the interim directions dated 16.02.2015 were operative. According to him, there was no material distinction between the facts of the present appeals and those considered in the aforesaid orders of the Co-ordinate Benches. He, therefore, prayed that the orders passed under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), as sustained by the respective first appellate authorities, be set aside and the corresponding demands be deleted.
34. As regards the appeals arising from penalties imposed under section 271C, the learned AR submitted that the penalties were founded upon the same alleged failure to deduct tax under section 192 which formed the subject matter of the corresponding proceedings under sections 201(1) and 201(1A).
35. The learned AR contended that the penalty proceedings were consequential to the underlying finding that the assessee had committed a default in deducting tax at source. If the corresponding quantum appeals were allowed by following the aforesaid orders of the Co-ordinate Benches and the assessee was held not to be an assessee in default, the very foundation of the penalties under section 271C would cease to exist. The penalties, being consequential, could not thereafter survive independently.
36. The learned AR, therefore, submitted that upon deletion of the demands raised under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), the corresponding penalties imposed under section 271C were also liable to be deleted.
37. Per contra, the learned Departmental Representative (DR)s relied upon the orders of the authorities below and the following decisions of the Co-ordinate Bench, Chennai:
| i. |
|
State Bank of India v. Asstt. CIT, TDS [IT Appeal No.1465 (Chny) of 2024, dated 27-6-2025]; and |
| ii. |
|
SBI LHO v. Dy. CIT, TDS [IT Appeal No. 734 (Chny) of 2026, dated 19-8-2026]. |
38. In the written submissions, the learned DR noted the contention of the assessee that, during the period when the interim order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court was operative, the assessee was restrained from deducting tax from the LFC reimbursements and, therefore, could not be treated as an assessee in default under section 201. The learned DR also noted the further contention that the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, though settling the substantive issue of taxability, could not retrospectively fasten liability under section 201 for a period during which the assessee acted in accordance with the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court.
39. The learned DR submitted that the aforesaid contentions conflated two distinct aspects, namely, first, the substantive taxability of the LFC reimbursement and the statutory obligation to deduct tax therefrom; and second, the effect of an interim judicial direction upon the conduct of the deductor during the pendency of the litigation. According to the learned DR, these two aspects required separate examination.
40. It was submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had authoritatively determined that LFC involving a foreign leg did not qualify for exemption under section 10(5) and that tax was, accordingly, deductible under section 192. According to the learned DR, the judgment was declaratory of the legal position and did not create a new charge or liability with effect from the date of its pronouncement. In the absence of any direction making the judgment prospective, the interpretation placed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon the statutory provisions governed the transactions and assessment years to which those provisions related.
41. The learned DR contended that the interim order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, being interlocutory in nature, could not be elevated into a substantive declaration that the LFC reimbursements were exempt under section 10(5). At the highest, the interim order regulated the immediate conduct of the assessee during the pendency of the proceedings. It neither amended section 10(5) nor created an exemption which the statute itself did not provide.
42. The learned DR clarified that the Revenue did not contend that the assessee was entitled to disregard the interim order while it remained operative. The Revenue accepted that the assessee was required to comply with a binding judicial direction. However, according to the learned DR, the fact that an interim order was binding upon the assessee as a judicial command did not mean that the legal proposition underlying the interim proceedings represented the final or correct interpretation of section 10(5).
43. It was submitted that compliance with the interim order could not retrospectively transform a taxable payment into an exempt payment or alter the substantive statutory liability subsequently declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The interim order might explain why the assessee did not deduct tax, but it could not change the substantive legal position regarding the taxability of the LFC reimbursements.
44. The learned DR further submitted that the liability contemplated under section 201 was fundamentally different from penal liability. Section 201 constituted a statutory mechanism dealing with the consequences of failure to deduct tax which was otherwise required to be deducted. The determination under section 201 did not depend upon proof of mens rea, deliberate default or contumacious conduct. The relevant question was whether tax was required to be deducted under the Act from the payment in question.
45. According to the learned DR, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had authoritatively determined that LFC involving a foreign leg was not entitled to exemption under section 10(5), the underlying statutory obligation to deduct tax under section 192 stood established. The subsequent declaration of law was, therefore, required to be considered while determining the statutory liability for the relevant assessment years.
46. The learned DR submitted that the circumstance that the assessee acted pursuant to an interim judicial order might be relevant while examining the consequences of its conduct, particularly in the context of penalty. Such circumstance, however, could not alter the substantive character of the payment or convert an otherwise taxable reimbursement into an exempt payment. The civil and statutory character of section 201 reinforced the distinction between the tax liability and the question whether the assessee had a bona fide or reasonable basis for its conduct.
47. The learned DR further contended that section 201 did not contain a general exception founded upon reasonable cause. In contrast, Parliament had expressly provided through section 273B that no penalty under section 271C would be imposable where the assessee proved that there was reasonable cause for the failure. According to the learned DR, the legislative scheme thus expressly made reasonable cause relevant to penalty under section 271C, but did not incorporate it as a general exception under section 201(1).
48. It was submitted that the assessee could not import the reasonable cause defence contained in section 273B into section 201(1), as doing so would amount to adding words to section 201 which Parliament had not enacted. The learned DR nevertheless submitted that this proposition did not render the interim order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court irrelevant. The precise inquiry was whether the interim order merely constituted a circumstance explaining the conduct of the assessee or, having regard to its exact terms and scope, operated as a judicial restraint upon the statutory obligation of the assessee during the relevant period.
49. The learned DR contended that even if the assessee established that the interim directions operated as a judicial restraint, such a finding had to be kept separate from the substantive taxability declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In particular, the assessee could not merely assert that the entire period from 2015 to 2022 stood protected. It was required to establish, with reference to the exact wording, operative period and scope of the relevant judicial order, that each particular payment giving rise to the alleged default was actually covered by the judicial restraint.
50. According to the learned DR, the liability under section 201 had to be examined with reference to the date of payment or credit, the nature of the particular LFC reimbursement and the operative terms of the judicial direction applicable on that date. The assessee was required to demonstrate that the payment fell within the operative period of the relevant order, that the payment was covered by the subject matter of that order, that the assessee was specifically bound by the order in respect of that payment and that there was no intervening order modifying, vacating or otherwise affecting the judicial protection.
51. The learned DR submitted that the interim protection could not be construed as creating a substantive exemption from section 10(5). The terms of the interim proceedings themselves contemplated that, if the writ proceedings ultimately failed, the concerned employees would be liable to pay tax. According to the learned DR, this indicated that the interim order governed the position pending adjudication and did not finally determine the availability of the substantive exemption.
52. It was further submitted that the TDS provisions constituted a machinery for timely collection of tax and that section 201 was intended to ensure that the person entrusted with the statutory obligation to deduct tax did not defeat or impair collection at the stage prescribed by the Act. The statutory right of the Revenue to collect tax could not be rendered inoperative merely because, during the pendency of the litigation, the assessee had acted upon an interim order.
53. The learned DR contended that accepting the case of the assessee in absolute terms would result in conferring upon it a substantive immunity which neither section 10(5) nor section 201 provided. Once the substantive legal position stood authoritatively declared, section 201 would ordinarily operate to secure the tax which was required to be deducted, unless the assessee demonstrated specific statutory or judicial protection against the operation of that provision. The existence of a judicial order might be relevant for such protection, but blanket immunity could not be presumed without examining its precise scope and duration.
54. The learned DR further submitted that the distinction between section 201 and section 271C was required to be maintained. The first question was whether tax was legally deductible from the LFC reimbursement. The second concerned the statutory consequence under section 201 arising from non deduction. The third, relating to penalty under section 271C, involved the additional consideration whether the assessee had established reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B.
55. According to the learned DR, even if the circumstances surrounding the proceedings before the Hon’ble Madras High Court were ultimately considered sufficient to constitute reasonable cause for the purpose of penalty, that conclusion could not automatically be imported into section 201. Conversely, if it were held that the precise terms of the interim order created a judicial restraint which prevented the assessee from deducting tax during a particular period, such finding had to be confined to the period and payments actually covered by that order. It could not be converted into a declaration that the underlying LFC reimbursements were exempt from tax.
56. The learned DR submitted that the binding nature of the interim order and the applicability of the subsequent declaration of law could coexist. While the assessee was required to obey the interim order during the period it remained operative, the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively determined the substantive law applicable to the LFC reimbursements. Therefore, the question before the Tribunal was the legal consequence under section 201 of the failure to deduct tax from payments subsequently declared to be subject to deduction under section 192.
57. In conclusion, the learned DR submitted that reliance upon the interim order of the Hon’ble Madras High Court could neither constitute a substantive defence to the taxability of the LFC reimbursements nor confer blanket immunity from section 201. The precise terms, duration and applicability of the interim order were required to be examined in relation to the particular payments. The learned DR accordingly prayed that the orders of the respective CIT(A) be upheld and the appeals filed by the assessee be dismissed.
58. In rebuttal, the learned AR submitted that the Revenue had relied upon decisions of the Chennai Benches which took a view adverse to the assessee, without taking note of another decision of a Co-ordinate Bench at Chennai rendered on the same controversy in favour of the assessee.
59. The learned AR placed on record the order in SBI Coimbatore Branch v. ACIT, TDS [IT Appeal No. 938 , 939, 940 and 942 (Chny) of 2026, dated 30-6-2026], relating to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18. It was submitted that the Co-ordinate Bench, on materially identical facts, held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default under section 201 in respect of the LFC reimbursements made during the period governed by the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court.
60. The learned AR submitted that the aforesaid order recognised that, although the Hon’ble Supreme Court had subsequently held that LFC involving a foreign leg was not exempt under section 10(5), the assessee was bound during the relevant period by the operative directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court not to deduct tax from such payments. The Coordinate Bench, therefore, allowed the appeals for assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18 and held that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default.
61. The learned AR accordingly submitted that there were contrary decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches at Chennai on the same issue. He contended that the Revenue could not selectively rely upon the decisions adverse to the assessee without considering the subsequent and other Co-ordinate Bench orders rendered in favour of the assessee on identical facts. He reiterated that the issue in the present quantum appeals stood covered in favour of the assessee by the Mumbai Bench orders already placed on record as well as the aforesaid Chennai Bench order dated 30.06.2026.
62. We have considered the rival submissions, the written submissions filed by the learned DR, the orders of the authorities below and the decisions placed on record by both sides. The substantive question whether LFC reimbursement involving a foreign leg qualifies for exemption under section 10(5) is no longer open for examination. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the assessee’s own case, has held that such reimbursement does not qualify for exemption and that tax is deductible under section 192.
63. The controversy before us is, however, narrower. It is whether the assessee can be treated as an assessee in default under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) for not deducting tax from LFC reimbursements during the period when the interim directions dated 16.02.2015 of the Hon’ble Madras High Court were operative.
64. The relevant portion of the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, as reproduced in the orders placed before us, reads as under:
“The interim order granted by this court is explained to the effect that any amount paid to the petitioner towards LTC or reimbursement of LTC pursuant to the impugned order would not amount to the income so as to enable the bank to deduct tax at source. It is made clear that if the writ petition is dismissed, the employees are liable to pay tax on the amount paid by the bank.”
65. The aforesaid direction did more than merely stay recovery of tax. It expressly regulated the manner in which the assessee was required to treat the LFC reimbursement for the purpose of deduction of tax at source. It directed that the payment would not be treated as income so as to enable the assessee-bank to deduct tax at source. It further provided that, if the writ petition ultimately failed, the liability to pay tax would rest upon the concerned employees.
66. We agree with the learned DR that an interim judicial order does not amend section 10(5) or create a substantive statutory exemption. The LFC reimbursements involving a foreign leg continued to possess the substantive character subsequently declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, the substantive taxability of the reimbursement and the liability of the assessee as a deductor under section 201 are separate questions.
67. Section 201(1) operates where a person who is required to deduct tax fails to deduct it. During the period governed by the interim direction, the assessee was expressly restrained from treating the reimbursement as income for the purpose of deducting tax at source. The assessee could not simultaneously comply with the judicial direction and deduct tax under section 192. Compliance with one obligation would necessarily have resulted in breach of the other.
68. The present conclusion does not import a general defence of reasonable cause into section 201. We accept the Revenue’s submission that section 201 does not contain a general reasonable-cause exception comparable to section 273B. Our conclusion rests upon the anterior question whether the assessee could, during the subsistence of the judicial direction, be regarded as having failed to perform an enforceable obligation to deduct tax. A person judicially restrained from deducting tax cannot be said to have failed to deduct tax within the meaning contemplated under section 201(1).
69. We also accept that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court declaring the correct interpretation of section 10(5) was not prospective. Nevertheless, a subsequent declaration of the substantive legal position cannot retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial command into a statutory default. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court determined the taxability of the reimbursement. It did not decide the distinct consequence of a deductor having acted during a later assessment year under an operative judicial direction which expressly restrained deduction.
70. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court concerned assessment year 2013-14, when the interim direction dated 16.02.2015 was not in existence. The present appeals relate to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18. The material distinction is, therefore, not the date on which the Hon’ble Supreme Court pronounced its judgment, but the existence of the specific interim direction governing the conduct of the assessee during the relevant previous years.
71. The learned DR submitted that the assessee was required to establish, payment by payment, that each LFC reimbursement fell within the scope and operative period of the interim order. In principle, there can be no dispute with this proposition. Judicial protection can operate only to the extent of its terms, duration and subject matter.
72. In the present appeals, however, the Revenue has not identified any particular reimbursement pertaining to assessment years 2016-17 or 2017-18 which was paid outside the operative period of the interim direction dated 16.02.2015. Nor has any intervening order applicable during the relevant previous years been brought to our notice whereby the direction not to deduct tax had been modified or vacated.
73. The Revenue has referred to periods from 24.06.2022 to 08.08.2022 and from 08.06.2023 to 28.08.2023, when, according to it, no active stay operated. Those periods fall several years after the previous years relevant to the present appeals. A temporary cessation or modification of protection in 2022 or 2023 cannot retrospectively create a default in relation to payments made during previous years 2015-16 and 2016-17 when the interim direction dated 16.02.2015 governed the parties.
74. Thus, while we accept the necessity of correlating judicial protection with the relevant payments, the assessment years and chronology contained in the record establish that the impugned reimbursements were governed by the interim direction. No contrary payment-specific material has been brought on record by the Revenue.
75. The chronological position of the relevant judicial decisions is as follows:
| Date |
Authority and case |
A.Y. |
Outcome relevant to the present controversy |
| 04.11.2022 |
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Asstt. CIT [2022] 449 ITR 192 (SC)/Civil Appeal No. 8181 of 2022 |
2013-14 |
LFC involving a foreign leg held not exempt under section 10(5) |
| 27.06.2025 |
Chennai Bench in State Bank of India (Supra). |
2015-16 |
Assessee treated as an assessee in default |
| 18.11.2025 |
Hon’ble Kerala High Court in State Bank of India v. CIT [ (Ker)/ITA No. 45 of 2025 |
2016-17 |
Sections 201(1) and 201(1 A) held inapplicable during the period governed by the Madras High Court direction |
| 30.06.2026 |
Mumbai Bench in ITA No. 1832/Mum/2026 and connected appeals |
2016-17 and 2017-18 |
Appeals allowed and orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) quashed |
| 30.06.2026 |
Chennai Bench in ITA Nos. 938, 939, 940 and 942/Chny/2026 |
2016-17 and 2017-18 |
Appeals allowed by following the Kerala High Court |
| 28.07.2026 |
Mumbai Bench in ITA No. 2453/Mum/2026 and connected appeals |
2016-17 and 2017-18 |
Appeals allowed by following the earlier Mumbai Bench |
| 19.08.2026 |
Chennai Bench in ITA No. 734/Chny/2026 and connected appeals |
2016-17 and 2017-18 |
Substantive liability under section 201 sustained |
76. In ITA No. 1832/Mum/2026 and connected appeals, the Coordinate Bench, after considering the earlier decisions and the interim directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, recorded the following operative finding:
“7. The facts being identical in the present case, respectfully following the above decision of the Coordinate Bench, we hold that the assessee is not in default within the meaning of the provisions of section 201/201(1A), and accordingly, the order passed by the Assessing Officer u/s 201/201(1A) is hereby quashed.
8. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
77. Before reaching to such findings the Co-ordinate Bench considered various judicial precedents as –
5. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee further, referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court, which is placed at pages69 to 86 of the paper book, in ITA No.45 of 2025 dated 18.11.2025, submitted that recently the Hon’ble Kerala High Court held that the provisions of section 201/201(1A) are not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the assessee’s case. Ld. Counsel further stated that the appeal against the decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, which granted interim stay, is still pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court for adjudication.
6. Heard rival contentions and perused the orders of the authorities below. We observe that an identical issue came up for consideration before various Benches of the Tribunal, including the Coordinate Bench of Mumbai in the case of State Bank of India vs. ACIT in ITAs No.2886 and 2887/Mum/2024. The Tribunal, vide order dated 30.05.2025, held that the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee-in-default since the directions issued by the Hon’ble Madras High Court on 16.02.2015 were binding on the assessee during the period under consideration. While holding so, the Coordinate Bench observed as under:
“8. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material placed before us. We have also gone through various decisions of the coordinate benches cited by the assessee for the same assessment year, i.e. AY 2016-17. Specifically, in the case of State Bank of India v/s CIT(A) in ITA No.514/Agr/2024, it has been held by the coordinate bench at Agra as under:
4. At the same time, it could be seen that the impugned payments pertain to LTC granted by assessee bank for the period 15-02-2016to 24-02-2016 when the operation of interim order dated 16-02-2015of Hon’ble High Court of Madras was in operation, the relevant portion of which read as under: –
“6. The interim order granted by this court is explained to the effect that any amount paid to the petitioner towards LTC or reimbursement of LTC pursuant to the impugned order would not amount to the income so as to enable the bank to deduct tax at source. It is made clear that if the writ petition is dismissed, the employees are liable to pay tax on the amount paid by the bank.”
The Hon’ble Court thus restrained the assessee bank not to deduct tax at source on such reimbursement. Finally, the decision has been rendered by Hon’ble High Court of Madras in case titled as All India State Bank Officers Association us. SBI ( ; dt. 14-06-2022) holding that withdrawal of additional facility would not infringe services rights or service conditions of officers of respondent bank and therefore, there was no perversity in respect of decision taken for withdrawal of additional concession granted to officers of respondent bank to travel abroad under LTC. It is thus clear that at the time of impugned payments, the interim order of Hon’ble High Court of Madras was in force which assessee bank was bound to follow. We concur that assessee bank had no option but not to deduct TDS on such reimbursements as per the interim order of Hon’ble Madras High Court. The directions given by the Hon’ble High Court were binding on the assessee and had the assessee deducted tax at source on impugned payment, it would have been contrary to the orders of Hon’ble High Court which could have amounted to contempt of court order. Finally, the decision in the aforesaid case has been rendered by Hon’ble High Court on 14-06-2022. Under these circumstances, we would hold that assessee bank, by interim order of Hon’ble High Court of Madras, was under an obligation not to deduct tax at source and therefore, the assessee could not be held to be assessee-in-default for non deduction of tax at source on impugned LFC payments. We order so. The impugned demand as raised against the assessee stand deleted.”
78. The subsequent Co-ordinate Bench in ITA No. 2453/Mum/2026 and connected appeals examined the distinction between the substantive taxability of the LFC reimbursement and the default of the assessee as a deductor. The relevant findings read as under:
“32. The fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently settled the substantive issue relating to exemption under section 10(5) against the assessee does not alter the position obtaining during the period when the binding interim order governed the parties. The issue of substantive taxability of the reimbursement and the issue whether the assessee could be declared an assessee in default for obeying a subsisting judicial order operate in distinct fields. The subsequent declaration of the correct legal position cannot retrospectively convert an act performed in obedience to a binding judicial direction into a default under section 201(1).”
“35. The facts of the present appeals are, therefore, materially identical to those considered by the Co-ordinate Bench in ITA No. 1832/Mum/2026 and connected appeals. No distinguishing feature has been brought to our notice. The learned Departmental Representative also agreed that the issue stood covered by the decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches.
36. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the Co-ordinate Bench, we hold that the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1) in respect of the impugned LFC reimbursements. Consequently, the interest charged under section 201(1A), being consequential to the default contemplated under section 201(1), cannot survive.
37. Accordingly, the orders passed by the Assessing Officers under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), as sustained by the learned CIT(A), are set aside and the demands raised in all the appeals are deleted.”
79. The Chennai Bench, in SBI Coimbatore Branch (Supra), also considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the intervening judicial directions. In paragraph 9, the Co-ordinate Bench noted that there was no dispute regarding the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that LFC reimbursement involving foreign travel was not exempt under section 10(5). It, however, found that during the previous years relevant to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18, the assessee was governed by the binding directions of the Hon’ble Madras High Court not to recover tax from the employees on such payments. The Bench further observed that, although the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently stayed the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, it specifically directed the assessee-bank not to make recoveries from its employees during the pendency of the proceedings. Considering that the obligation under section 192 was required to be determined at the time of payment on the basis of a bona fide estimate of the employee’s income, the Bench held that the subsisting judicial directions precluded the assessee from deducting tax during the relevant period. Following the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the assessee’s own case on identical facts, the Bench concluded as under:
“10. In view of the above legal position, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant bank cannot be treated as „assessee in default’.”
“13. To sum up, all the four appeals filed by the Assessee are allowed.”
80. More importantly, the aforesaid decision followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in State Bank of India (Supra), wherein the effect of the very same interim directions was examined. The relevant findings of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court, as reproduced in the order of Coordinate Bench, read as under:
“But in the case at hand, when so visualised, there cannot be any dispute that the appellant-assessee could not have made any deduction in view of the interim order issued as noticed earlier. It is only when the appellant-assessee, after having a liability to deduct tax, fails to do so, the question of invoking Section 201 of the Act and treating it as an ‘assessee in default’ arises. Here, the Madras High Court found, prima facie, that the amount paid would not be the income of a payee so as to deduct tax. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the provisions of Section 201(1) of the Act are not attracted to the case at hand. For the same reasons, the provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 201 of the Act providing for the levy of interest are also not attracted.”
81. The Hon’ble Kerala High Court expressly distinguished the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the basis of the assessment year and the operation of the interim directions:
“We also take note of the fact that the Apex Court, by judgment dated 04.11.2022 in State Bank of India v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (SC)/Civil Appeal No.8181 of 2022, has found that, as against payments made by the appellant bank to its employees towards LTC, it was bound to deduct tax at source. But this finding was with respect to the Assessment Year 2013-14 (financial year 2012-13). In the case at hand, during the financial year 2015-16 relevant to the assessment year 2016-17, the interim directions issued by the Madras High Court governed the field, and the appellant-assessee was justified in not having deducted the tax.”
82. The judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court, though not of the jurisdictional High Court, is a decision of a superior constitutional court directly on the same issue, involving the same assessee, the same interim direction and the same assessment year. No order staying or reversing the said judgment has been placed before us. Its ratio possesses greater persuasive authority than a contrary order of a Tribunal Bench.
83. The first decision relied upon by the learned DR is the order dated 27.06.2025 in ITA No. 1465/Chny/2024. The Chennai Bench sustained the order under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) and observed:
“We note the ld. CIT(A) observed that there was no stay from 24.06.2022 to 08.08.2022 and from 08.06.2023 to 28.08.2023 and that the assessee neither deducted tax on LTC nor made recovery, accordingly held the order of the Assessing Officer is correct in holding that the assessee is in default for non-deduction of TDS during 24.06.2022 to 08.08.2022 and from 08.06.2023 to 28.08.2023. We find no infirmity in the order of the ld. CIT(A) as we completely agree with the reasons recorded from paras 5.8 to 5.10 of the impugned order in confirming the order of the Assessing Officer. Thus, the grounds raised by the assessee are dismissed.”
84. This decision was pronounced on 27.06.2025. It preceded the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court dated 18.11.2025 and, therefore, did not have the benefit of the later judgment directly deciding the effect of the interim directions upon liability under sections 201(1) and 201(1A).
85. Further, the Chennai Bench relied upon periods in 2022 and 2023 during which the interim protection was considered not to be operative. The appeal before it pertained to assessment year 2015-16, while the present appeals, according to the Tribunal appeal particulars, relate to assessment years 2016-17 and 201718. The cessation of protection during specified periods in 2022 and 2023 does not answer whether the assessee committed a default in relation to payments made in the earlier previous years when the interim direction dated 16.02.2015 was operative.
86. The second decision relied upon by the learned DR is the order dated 19.08.2026 in ITA No. 734/Chny/2026 and connected appeals. The Chennai Bench held:
“5. The obligation of deducting tax is distinct from the payment or recovery of tax. Even if recovery proceedings were suspended or the bank was prevented from recovering amounts from employees, the duty to deduct TDS, based on the taxability of the income still exists.”
“7. In the result, the appeal of the appellants are dismissed on substantive issue and partly allowed for statistical purposes only on the issue of interest u/s. 201(1A) of the Act.”
87. The order dated 19.08.2026 is later in point of time. Mere chronology, however, does not resolve a conflict between Coordinate Bench decisions. The later Chennai order does not discuss or distinguish the earlier Chennai order dated 30.06.2026 in ITA Nos. 938, 939, 940 and 942/Chny/2026.. It also does not analyse the Mumbai Bench orders dated 30.06.2026 and 28.07.2026, although those orders had already been pronounced.
88. The order in ITA No. 734/Chny/2026 records the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in its chronology, but does not examine or distinguish its ratio that sections 201(1) and 201(1A) are not attracted where the assessee could not deduct tax because of the interim direction. The conclusion of the Coordinate Bench was also substantially founded upon periods in 2022 and 2023 when the stay was considered inoperative, without correlating those periods to the payments pertaining to assessment years 2016-17 and 2017-18.
89. We are, therefore, unable to apply the two adverse Chennai Bench orders to the present appeals. The decision in ITA No. 1465/Chny/2024 preceded the directly applicable judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court. The subsequent decision in ITA No. 734/Chny/2026 did not reconcile the contrary superior-court authority or the earlier Co-ordinate Bench decisions rendered on the same issue.
90. Our conclusion does not rest merely upon the numerical preponderance of decisions. It follows from the language of section 201, the precise terms of the interim direction and the chronology of the relevant payments.
91. The substantive taxability of LFC involving a foreign leg stands concluded against the assessee. However, section 201(1) requires a failure by a person who was required to deduct tax. During the relevant previous years, the assessee was expressly directed not to treat the reimbursement as income so as to deduct tax at source. The same order placed the eventual tax liability upon the employees if the writ petition failed.
92. The assessee could not have deducted tax without acting contrary to the judicial direction. The later declaration of substantive taxability did not retrospectively erase the judicial restraint or render the assessee’s compliance therewith a default. The statutory obligation to deduct tax had to operate subject to the binding order governing the parties at the time of payment.
93. The Revenue’s apprehension that this conclusion would create a substantive exemption is misplaced. We do not hold that the reimbursements were exempt under section 10(5). We hold only that the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1) for not deducting tax during the period when it was judicially restrained from doing so. The substantive tax liability of the concerned employees is not the subject matter of these appeals and remains unaffected.
94. Respectfully following the judgment of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court and the Co-ordinate Bench orders in ITA No. 1832/Mum/2026, ITA No. 2453/Mum/2026 and ITA Nos. 938, 939, 940 and 942/Chny/2026,, and for the independent reasons recorded above, we hold that the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee in default under section 201(1). Consequently, interest under section 201(1A), being founded upon the default contemplated under section 201(1), cannot survive.
95. The orders passed under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), as sustained by the respective first appellate authorities, are accordingly set aside and the demands raised in all 21 quantum appeals are deleted. The alternative ground concerning the first proviso to section 201(1) is rendered academic and is left open.
96. Out of the 18 penalty appeals, the CIT(A)/NFAC rejected condonation in 11 appeals. The explanation recorded in these orders is common. The assessee stated that the delay occurred in obtaining approval from the controlling authorities for filing the appeals. Further delay arose because the credentials used for the income-tax portal were unavailable following transfer or retirement of the concerned officials. The login details ultimately had to be reset through the e-filing web manager.
97. The CIT(A)/NFAC rejected the explanation principally on the ground that it disclosed lack of diligence and was not supported by sufficient evidence. The impugned orders nevertheless proceeded, without prejudice to the rejection of condonation, to examine the penalties on merits.
98. We have considered the explanation in the context of the common factual and procedural background of these appeals. The appeals were required to be filed by different branches and TAN holders of a large public sector bank, while the decision to litigate and access to the centralised portal depended upon approval and credentials controlled at different administrative levels. The explanation concerning transfer or retirement of officials, non-availability of credentials and resetting of portal access is consistent across the appeals.
99. There is no material on record indicating that the delay was deliberate, mala fide or calculated to secure any advantage. The assessee derived no benefit by delaying challenges to the penalties. Once the necessary approval and portal access were obtained, the appeals were filed. The Revenue has also not demonstrated any specific prejudice caused by the delay beyond the ordinary lapse of time.
100. The length of the delay is undoubtedly material, but it cannot be the sole consideration. The issue raised in the penalty appeals is identical to that arising in the quantum proceedings, and the penalties rest upon the very defaults which have now been set aside. Refusal to examine the appeals in these circumstances would perpetuate penalties founded upon demands which no longer survive.
101. Taking into consideration the institutional explanation, absence of mala fides, commonality of the proceedings and the requirements of substantial justice, we are satisfied that sufficient cause was shown under section 249(3). We accordingly set aside the orders of the CIT(A)/NFAC refusing condonation and condone the delay in the aforesaid 11 appeals.
102. Since the CIT(A)/NFAC has also recorded findings on merits and the issue is a pure legal issue common to all the penalty appeals, no useful purpose would be served by restoring the appeals merely for another adjudication by the first appellate authority. We, therefore, proceed to decide the penalties on merits.
103. Section 271C applies where a person fails to deduct the whole or any part of the tax required under Chapter XVII-B. The provision is expressly subject to section 273B, which provides that no penalty shall be imposable where the assessee proves that there was reasonable cause for the failure.
104. The learned AR submitted that the penalties were consequential and could not survive after the corresponding orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A) were set aside. The learned DR, on the other hand, correctly submitted that the civil consequence under section 201 and the penalty under section 271C operate in distinct fields and that reasonable cause has a specific statutory role in the penalty proceedings.
105. We agree that the penalty appeals require separate examination. Our deletion of the demands under section 201 does not dispense with the necessity of examining section 271C. However, the basis upon which the quantum demands have been deleted is directly relevant to both the existence of a failure contemplated under section 271C and the reasonable cause provided under section 273B.
106. The assessee did not refrain from deducting tax merely on account of an internal interpretation, administrative convenience or ignorance of law. It acted in accordance with an express and subsisting direction of the Hon’ble Madras High Court that the LFC reimbursement was not to be treated as income so as to enable deduction of tax at source. Deduction of tax contrary to that direction could have exposed the assessee to proceedings for disobedience of the judicial order.
107. In these circumstances, the conduct of the assessee was not only bona fide but compelled by a judicial direction. Such circumstances constitute reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B. The Revenue’s own written submissions recognise that the interim direction may be relevant while considering penalty and reasonable cause. On the facts before us, the reasonable cause stands affirmatively established.
108. Further, we have held in the quantum appeals that the assessee could not be treated as an assessee in default during the relevant period. The foundational allegation that the assessee failed to perform an enforceable obligation to deduct tax, therefore, does not survive. The penalties imposed solely by reference to that alleged failure cannot stand independently.
109. We accordingly set aside the orders sustaining the penalties under section 271C and direct deletion of the penalties in all 18 appeals. This conclusion applies equally to the seven appeals which were admitted and decided on merits by the CIT(A) and to the 11 appeals in which the delay has been condoned by us.
110. In the result, all 21 appeals arising from orders under sections 201(1) and 201(1A), and all 18 appeals arising from penalties under section 271C, are allowed.